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Studies on internal conflict focus on bringing a v io len t conflict to non-violent. 
Economic development and good governance are most attractive since essential 
services are provided to people, regardless o f ethnic affiliation. Autonomy for 
m inority  groups to maintain the in tegrity  o f a state is another option. Applied in 
Mindanao conflict, negotiated settlement, separation, and m ilita ry v ic to ry did not 
create a lasting peace. This study applies the levels o f analysis fram ework to 
investigate the conflict and considers the sub-state level as vital. It suggests the role 
of local actors as crucial in intrastate conflict. I t  examines the dynamics o f conflict at 
the local level and the interactions o f national and local leaders in the occurrence of 
war and peace in an armed conflict-stricken state.
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NOMENCLATURE
AFP Armed Forces o f the Philippines
ARMM Autonomous Region in  Muslim Mindanao
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
Bangsamoro Muslim nation in  Mindanao, southern Philippines (orig inally 
comprises the main Island o f Mindanao, Sulu archipelago, and 
Palawan or MINSUPALA).
BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
CAFGU Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit
CCP Communist Party o f the Philippines
CNI Commission on National Integration
CNN CPP/NDF/NPA
CVO Civilian Volunteers Organization
GRP Government of the Republic o f the Philippines
GPH Government o f the Philippines
MILF- Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD Memorandum o f agreement on Ancestral Domain
Moro W ord used by the Spaniards during colonial period in 16th century to
mean Muslims in the Philippines.
NDF National Democratic Front
NDF National Democratic Front
NPA New Peoples' Arm y
NPE New Political Entity
NSAG Nonstate Armed Group
OPAPP Office o f the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process
PNP Philippine National Police
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Internal conflicts un til recently are the main source o f instab ility  in - 
international affairs. No doubt the trends o f armed conflict in the 21st century have 
changed dramatically from interstate conflict to intrastate violence. Today, there are 
conflicts that are very elusive and seem very much resistant to settlement. Records 
show that civil wars, fo r instance, have increased considerably in  the past fifteen 
years or so, and are now considered the dominant form  of warfare.1 This is a 
concern o f leaders o f powerful states, policymakers, and scholars in the ir analyses 
not only due to the massive destruction o f lives and property w ith in  the state in 
conflict but also owing to the fear that i t  may spill over to neighboring countries. 
Scholars and students o f conflict commonly ask questions such as who fights in the 
conflict and why they do so. Indeed, why are internal conflicts, like secessionist 
movements and sim ilar other kinds o f armed struggle so cruel and seemingly 
victim ize civilians rather than those principally holding weapons? W hat make those 
supporters o f violence so aggressive that they tend to forget, or at least do not seem 
to mind, the consequential suffering brought about by violence? W hy are insurgency 
movements seemingly intractable that even the leaders o f governments, apparently 
reluctant, become tim id  in looking for resolution? W hy is i t  tha t international 
organizations and distant powerful countries are hesitant to intervene in  a very 
destructive w ar even before i t  reaches a po in t where civilians are killed  en masse?
1 Dennis Sandole, Capturing the complexity o f conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts o f the Post- 
Cold War Era (London: Printer, 1999),3.
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These are among the most puzzling concerns about the complexity o f internal 
conflict and war.
I f  i t  is true that conflicts confronted by states in terna lly are mostly 
categorized in the study of conflict and w ar as asymmetrical, then i t  is only proper, 
subject to international laws and laws o f the country in  conflict, fo r international 
organizations or powerful countries to intervene because when violence persists, 
the state in trouble is incapable o f resolving its internal security issues. Other than 
this, what else needs to be studied on the issue o f in ternal conflict? W hat about the 
role of individual actors, neighboring countries, and internal leaders both at the 
state level and the local level? This study is encouraged by the notion that conflict or 
war, in general, is not a natural phenomenon in w orld  affairs. Rather, i t  is a man- 
made disaster that only humans can resolve in the context o f atta in ing peace. 
Second, people -  even those who are deeply oppressed -  generally do not w ant 
conflict or war, i f  they can avoid it, for i t  can th row  them into a quagmire o f violence. 
In other words, violent conflict may only become part o f human society i f  man loses 
conscious reason and forgets or w rongfu lly calculates the bad consequences o f his 
behavior and action, or when he is pushed to the lim it and sees no other option but 
to take up arms. Individual behavior becomes worse when such a feeling o f 
uncertainty is transformed into collective grievances, especially i f  and when 
charismatic and responsible leaders emerge and take up the cudgels fo r the rights of 
many. This holds true particu larly in a situation where individuals or groups are in a 
state of uncertainty that the ir security is endangered.2
2 See Barry R. Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27-47.
Thus, this study supports and emphasizes the im portant role played by elites 
and leaders in  the eventual tu rn  o f a volatile situation into a v io len t confrontation 
between the stronger (usually government forces) and the weaker (rebel groups) 
w ith  incompatible goals. In short, bad leaders can be blamed fo r the occurrence of 
conflict and war, including its persistence, w hile good leaders, especially at the local 
level, can be praised and commended for the absence o f conflict and, i f  there is, the ir 
perseverance is the key to the resolution o f such conflict and the establishment o f a 
peaceful environment.3 This does not mean that the leaders in a state bombarded 
by several security problems are all irresponsible, bu t their mishandling in the 
channeling o f efforts, especially where monetary matters are involved, significantly 
influences the outcome o f any in itia tive  to end vio lent conflict. Of course, there have 
been many violent conflicts tha t have defied resolution and persist to this day, most 
o f these being driven by "ancient hatred.” The Philippine case falls in to  this category, 
having as it  does a s till very active secessionist movement in its southern island of 
Mindanao impeding development for more than fo rty  years now. The Mindanao 
conflict, the focus o f this study, has its roots in centuries-old historical and socio­
cultural debacles that have made the people o f that region accustomed to never- 
ending violence. However, such conflict has a solution and can therefore be resolved 
by finding the appropriate means o f ending conflict and wars.
Corollary to this, ancient hatred may be one o f the hardest issues to address 
in internal conflict. But as the saying goes, "time heals," that is, combatants and
3 See Michael E. Brown, "The Cause and Regional Dimensions of Internal conflict," in The 
International Dimensions o f Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University, 1996), 571-602.
unarmed people who may have made the w ar possible would reach a po in t where 
they are all weary o f war. The critical po in t is how  the means to ending conflict can 
be found and channeled to the beneficiaries o f peace, and how the eagerness of 
people fo r peace is translated into action. One must keep in m ind that a society 
experiencing conflict, by and large, has a structure w ith  appropriate leaders at each 
level. But these same leaders are weak in managing the conflict, and the ir incapacity 
prevents them from resolving the conflict. Thus, efforts o f any kind intended to ease 
the tension or perhaps end the conflict, i f  coursed through the same weak leaders, 
dim inish the likelihood o f success in the same manner tha t whatever is agreed at the 
"top level" of the government structure is not an assurance that i t  w il l be carried out 
at the local level. In fact, mere speculations on the possible reactions o f the local 
leaders may influence the policy o f state and strategic decision o f state leaders.4 This 
paper suggests that, more than anything else, the role o f local leaders vis-a-vis state 
policy is a more im portant variable in efforts to understand the persistence of 
internal vio lent conflict, including those deemed rooted in ancient hatred.
This inqu iry is structured in a manner that would satisfy the supposed 
outcome in the study o f internal conflict. Internal conflict, in the context of this 
study, refers to security instab ility  w ith in  a state caused by challenges from  non­
state actors regardless o f whether the intention is secession o r the capture of 
government. The focus o f the study is the internal armed conflict in Mindanao that 
has endured fo r more than four decades now. To this effect, the study attempts to 
provide explanations to the fo llow ing research questions: To w hat extent is the
4 See Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,"
International Organization, 42, no.3 (1998): 436.
in tractability  o f the armed conflict in Mindanao influenced by the role o f state-level 
actors and the local-level actors exploiting the dynamics o f the conflict? What 
explains the Muslims' continuous popular support for an exclusive organization that 
has resisted many attempts to settle the conflict in Mindanao? To w hat extent is the 
armed conflict in Mindanao compelled by economic deprivation, ethnic 
discrim ination, and inequality? And in what ways, i f  any, does the Mindanao conflict 
play a critical role in the stab ility  o f this part o f the w orld  against transnational 
security threats?
To address and provide analytical explanations and to align the research 
process to its overall goal, the study follows a sequence that would help attain, 
among others, the objective o f understanding the recurrence o f vio lent armed 
conflict in Mindanao. Chapter Two is the critical review o f the litera ture  on the study 
o f conflict and war. The w ork o f scholars, particularly, the theoretical fram ework 
they have developed about w ar and peace, is evaluated w ith  particu lar attention to 
the occurrence o f internal violence. An examination o f the causes o f w ar or conflict 
and peace, especially those that seem d ifficu lt to address, serve as the foundation o f 
the study. And then the last pa rt o f the literature review is a critical examination o f 
the approaches to internal conflict, which are contentious issues in the field. 
Nevertheless, three main tools fo r ending intrastate wars are examined, as follows: 
[1) negotiated settlement; (2) the partition  (de jure or de facto) or giving away o f a 
piece o f te rrito ry ; and m ilita ry  victory which basically means letting a wars come to 
its natural end.
Chapter Three is the historical account o f the Mindanao conflict. It is the
basis fo r the analysis in understanding the in tractab ility  o f this security problem  in 
this part o f Southeast Asia. It also elaborates on several responses o f both the 
Philippine government and the international organizations in the search fo r an end 
to this perennial conflict between the m ino rity  Muslims and the government-backed 
Christians. Most studies o f this conflict find that the problem is between the Muslims 
and the Christians both living on the same island, but the tru th  is i t  is a conflict 
between the secessionist Muslims and the government of the Philippines. The 
daunting part is that most scholarly w ork  about this conflict, especially those 
w ritten  by international scholars, claims that the internal v io lent conflict in 
Mindanao has been resolved, that is, basically because of the peace agreement 
signed by both parties in 1996. But the rea lity  on the ground shows the opposite. In 
fact, many analysts consider the recent surge o f violence in Mindanao’s conflict- 
affected areas to be even more cruel than any o f the previous clashes. This is one of 
the many reasons that studies o f the same interna l conflict are sometimes derailed 
due to a misreading o f the real issue and the main problem. Hence, undertaking this 
study became imperative.
Chapters Four and Five discuss the cases involving serious attempts to end 
the violent conflict in Mindanao. Chapter Four reviews the firs t peace agreement 
signed, under the auspices o f international organizations and distant powerful 
states, between the government o f the Republic o f the Philippines (GRP) and the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1976. The peace agreement sounded 
good but there was no resemblance at all o f peace on the ground even years after 
the agreement was implemented in  the southern Philippines. In short, only a few
leaders o f the rebel forces benefited from  the poorly conceived peace agreement 
Selected leaders of combatants were made to enjoy the benefits o f a luxurious life. 
They were brought to the national capital c ity  o f Manila and were given enough 
money and big houses. As a consequence, the real issue for the im plem entation of 
the agreement was neglected, creating massive confusion both on the part o f the 
Muslims and the government o f the Philippines. The misunderstanding on the 
interpretation o f provisions in the agreement led to continuing violence that has 
victim ized not only the Muslim m inority  but the Christians as w ell because armed 
confrontations were almost everywhere.
Chapter Five is a critical examination o f the second and supposedly final 
peace accord between the Moro secessionists and the government o f the Republic of 
the Philippines in 1996. Many analysts were convinced that it  was one o f the most 
successful ways o f conflict resolution in history. It  was peaceful and conducted in  an 
orderly manner, w ith  the MNLF members handing over their firearms and heavy 
weapons to the government in exchange fo r a brighter future. A key element o f the 
implementation of the agreement was the integration o f 7,500 combatants into the 
Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police. But apparently, the problem did 
not end there particularly on the part o f the Muslims in Mindanao.
Critics have argued that the peace agreement only tem porarily halted the 
violence, and provided enough space fo r the rebels, and even the armed forces, to 
replenish the ir losses, consolidate the ir forces, and reorganize the ir waning 
organization for armed hostilities in the future. This view  was proven righ t when a 
series o f actual armed confrontations broke out just a few years after the peace
agreement was signed. What went wrong? This is the prevalent question tha t needs 
further deep analysis. The details are found in the analysis portion  o f this study 
about the 1996 peace agreement. But it  would be w orth  mentioning at this po in t 
that this shows how d ifficu lt i t  is to deal w ith  internal conflicts, particu larly i f  there 
is a religious component involved. It is a fact that expectation is crucial in interstate 
relations, especially in the way cooperation prevails between and among states 
particularly on matters involving trade i f  they see a probability o f high trade in the 
future.5 This theory can also be applied to the volatile relations between parties in 
conflict. I f  people expect that an attempt to conflict resolution would give them an 
acceptable change in the ir future, then the likelihood o f cooperation is high. In 
contrast, i f  they see that the expected changes in the status quo would not amount to 
a better future fo r them, then Cooperation especially on the part o f the weaker is not 
likely. The relationship even worsens when commitments are not given fu lfillm ent 
and promises are broken. This situation is very dangerous because i t  affects 
relations and destroys trus t in one another.
The Filipino people, except the spoilers, fu lly  expected the 1996 peace 
agreement to create a more promising future that would bring about peace and 
stability, economic development, better liv ing standards for people in  the conflict- 
affected areas, and so on. But those expectations were generally thw arted by the fact 
that the changes did not solve the economic, educational, and social problems. No 
doubt, the surge of violence just a few years since the agreement was signed became 
endemic in the area, w ith  the magnitude o f destruction i t  brought upon lives and
5 See Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," 
International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 5-41.
property even greater than before.
Chapter Six offers a critical analysis o f the previous chapters. This study uses 
and is encouraged by the levels o f analysis fram ework which, though deemed an old 
method by some, remains a useful tool in analyzing the occurrence o f conflict and 
war. The three-levels-of-analysis, for example, has been used by several scholarly 
studies on understanding a certain phenomenon in w orld  affairs. Recently, w ith  
some modifications, i t  has been reevaluated and has subsequently included one 
level, the local level, to tu rn  i t  into four levels o f analysis in understanding internal 
conflicts and wars -  such as those categorized as ethnic conflicts.6 In this study, the 
"four levels o f analysis" is used to frame and increase the levels o f analysis on the 
question o f why conflicts such as the one in Mindanao, among others, persist.
The study argues that the role o f local leaders w ith in  the local setting is much 
more significant and influentia l when the future or outcome of an internal conflict is 
taken in to  account. It is a fact that in any conflict or war, there is always a set o f 
heads or leaders o f organizations who are credible enough to be followed by the ir 
followers. In the case o f internal conflict, whether the goal of a group is secession, 
control o f resources, or capture o f the state, local elites and leaders can play a more 
im portant role. In short, internal conflicts are basically the resu lt o f aggressive 
behavior o f leaders, both at the state and local levels. The extent to which the ir state 
o f leadership contributes to the dynamics o f the conflict varies from  one place to 
another. In contrast, the attainment o f a solid and more enduring peace is h ighly 
dependent on the benign intentions and kindness, or the intellectual capacity, o f
6 Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict ( Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 6-10.
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both leaderships at all levels. The degree as to how much impact the actions of 
leaders has in  each level varies from  one place to another. However, the study of 
internal conflict requires an understanding o f the concept of bargaining, and this 
research w ork  puts forward the idea that local leadership shares more in attaining 
mutual agreements7 in the same manner that national leadership exercises more 
patience along w ith  an aggressive pursuit o f benign and fa ir policies fo r the 
domestic constituents.
This study does not claim that every conflict can be ended by benign 
intentions o f dialogue. However, whatever the causes o f conflicts, be i t  driven by 
ancient hatred, economic instability, oppressive governments, or discrim ination 
against m inority  groups, this study suggests that one im portant reason about the 
protracted nature o f conflict is the fact that local actors are left out o f the equation 
and decisions are always made and manipulated at the top leadership w ithou t fu ll 
concession from local elites and leaders who are significant actors in the conflict. It 
may sound inconceivable to secure local leaders' consensus but that is the reality 
about the complexity o f internal conflict and war. The case o f the decades-long 
Mindanao conflict has thus laid the foundation for this proposition.
Finally, the last chapter summarizes the key points o f this study. In this 
chapter, the study lays out the result of its examination of the various aspects of 
internal conflict and war, particularly the one that has raged for over four decades in 
Mindanao. It  also shows a set o f analyses about the obstacles that lie in the path to 
ending the Mindanao conflict, and the circumstances w ith in  which efforts have been
7 See Robert Putnam, (1998).
made in an attempt to resolve the same. Among the expected outputs o f this study is 
that it  would uncover the circumstances that have impeded any attem pt at resolving 
the conflict, w ith  greater emphasis on the role o f actors at each level. The chapter 
also puts forward a set o f modest recommendations that w ould enhance our 
understanding o f the complexity o f this phenomenon, and the way in which 
attempts at a resolution o f the Mindanao conflict can be more effective in  terms of 
bringing about a lasting peace. Lasting peace in th is study means tha t other than the 
absence o f armed confrontation, or negative peace, there is a resemblance of 
stab ility in  the area because its inhabitants are finally integrated in to  mainstream 
society regardless of the ir economic and social status, ethnic and religious 




THE NATURE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT
Internal conflict is pervasive, complex, and almost everywhere tha t i t  
requires careful analysis in the context of understanding the causes and 
consequences, and possibly come up w ith  viable recommendations that may, in the 
course o f continuous studies, increase our knowledge o f determ ining solutions to 
this w orld  phenomenon. This problem, which basically occurs w ith in  a state, is not 
new and is getting much attention not only because o f its immense effects on the 
population but also due to its perceived cross- border effects on other countries. The 
recent chaos, in  fact ongoing in some states, in the Middle East had revived the 
attention o f policymakers, state leaders, scholars, and international communities to 
look back into the nature of problems that are occurring w ith in  states. The current 
internal problem in the Middle East has, indeed, created some skepticism in most 
students o f International Studies or International Relations on the mode o f resolving 
this type o f conflict. Usually, the rebels in conventional wisdom are always treated 
by any state as groups opposing the legitimate existence o f political power, and tha t 
the ir actions in the eyes o f the state as w ell as the international community, in most 
cases, are considered treasonous that in  no way must prevail.
In recent years, however, the internal security problems o f states have been 
getting much attention and gaining substantial support, especially i f  the population 
represented by armed groups is oppressed. In essence, there is skepticism on
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whether international actors or outside forces are contributing to the resolution of 
the conflict, whether favoring the legitimate state or the rebel groups. Other internal 
conflicts, whether the overall goal is control o f resources, change o f politica l system, 
or secession, are s till active in  some countries that i t  seems resolution is s till 
farfetched. So, w hy are some internal conflicts resolved and others are not? What 
accounts for the ir persistence? Who are the actors tha t may have been playing 
im portant roles in the conflict? These are some of the sources o f confusion in the 
study o f internal conflict that need careful analysis especially in the context of 
continuous study and the search for viable solutions appropriate in the current 
globalized world.
By definition, internal conflict o r intrastate w ar generally occurs between 
identity groups, as in ethnic conflict, or between certain groups and a legitimate 
government. Internal conflicts are usually violent, w ith  both parties in the conflict 
using force or arms in the attainment o f specific social o r political objectives. Other 
types of violence as spontaneous mob actions like riots and small-scale insurgencies 
are excluded in the category internal conflict in this study since they are tem porary 
in nature and do not require much of the resources o f states. Intrastate conflict is 
very d ifficu lt to resolve, and even i f  a ha lt is put on the ground through any means, 
the threat of a recurrence o f violence is always possible as observed in many 
internal conflicts in the past and those happening elsewhere.
Michael E. Brown [1996) gives us the specific forms of internal conflict which 
are basically originated from domestic rather than outside factors such as "v io lent 
power struggles involving m ilita ry  or civilian leaders; armed ethnic conflicts and
secessionist campaigns; challenge by crim inal organizations to state sovereignty; 
armed ideological struggles; and revolutions."1 Monica Toft s im ila rly  defines 
internal armed conflict between the state and domestic challengers, like civil wars, 
as one that leaves large numbers o f people killed in a m utually harmful and 
relatively continuous fighting.2 Most internal conflicts are driven by group identity, 
which is deemed to be very difficult, i f  not impossible, to change as i t  is often based 
on an individual's descent (e.g., language, religion, or race).3 In most cases, i t  is this 
component o f an identity, and the politicization o f tha t identity, that motivate 
groups to form m ilitan t organizations to identify the entire group as either loyal or 
disloyal to a country's population.4 In her data analysis of c ivil wars fought from 
1940 to 2007, Toft is able to identify the focus o f combatants as "sovereignty and 
governance," that is, who w ill control the political unit. In regard to this political 
objective, each side rejects the legitimacy o f the other to rule over part or all o f the 
te rrito ry  o f a state.5
In most cases, internal conflicts involve asymmetrical forces, tha t is, one side 
is stronger, usually the government, in terms o f forces, resources, and material 
support, while the other side usually referred to in the modern w orld  as insurgents 
is weaker in almost all aspects. Thus rebellion, fo r instance, is a k ind o f tw o-fo ld  
struggle between gaining much attention, support, o r even legitimacy fo r the
1 Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions o f Internal Con/7/ct(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT  
Press, 1996), 1.
2 Monica Duffy Toft, "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for rebel victory," International Security 34, no. 4 
(Spring 2010): 7-37.
3 See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (L.A., California: University of California Press, 1985), 41-45
4 Carter Johnson, "Partitioning to Peace Sovereignty, Demography, and ethnic Civil 
Wars,"International Security^!, no. 4 (Spring 2008):
5 Toft, 2010
struggle, on the one hand, and the struggle for sufficient power to attain the 
expected and perceived overall goals, on the other. In short, the struggle to achieve 
the "end" goal is directed against the government while the struggle fo r "means" is 
basically a struggle against nature, or one that is directed towards either the 
domestic or the international situation in  the places o f co n flic t6 In a broader sense, 
thus, internal conflicts may or may have no influence from  external factors. In the 
same way during the struggle to attain the "means," groups may e ither escalate the 
conflict to elevate it  to a higher level to attract more outside actors to the ir 
advantage, in a sense "socializing" the issue, or frame the direction o f the main issue 
so that media mileage works to the advantage o f the weaker group. Socialization of 
the supposed confined internal conflict is one o f the effective tools that weaker 
groups may use to elevate the ir position relative to the opposing force.7 In analyzing 
the current dynamics o f internal conflict, whether for social or po litica l reasons, the 
fram ing o f issues has effectively helped weaker groups (rebels) in  attracting and 
getting the international community and distant powers onboard in  addressing the 
internal problems o f a particular state.8 But other than th is common assumption in 
our pre lim inary investigation o f the nature o f internal conflicts, i t  is also w orth  
looking at theories and how scholars o f conflict and war, especially the pioneers of 
security studies, were able to contribute to the development of tools that have aided
6I. William Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, ed. (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1995), 7
7See E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi- Sovereign People: A realists View o f Democracy in America (New  
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).
8 Sidney G. Tarrow , Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 3d. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 142; also see David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master 
Frames and Cycles of Protests," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. A. Morris and C. McClurg 
Mueller (New Heaven CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 137.
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and enabled students o f international relations and security studies in  the analysis 
o f w ar and peace.
One o f the early studies on the occurrence of w ar has been the analysis of 
interstate war. Applicable theories on this m atter can be utilized to apply sim ilar 
findings of the early studies o f interstate conflict to the occurrence o f internal 
conflict. A fter all, among the most im portant factors to look into in the study of 
collective movements or conflict - whether interstate or intrastate - are the nature 
and behavior o f individual leaders that represent either the stronger (state) party or 
the weaker (the insurgents) party. Perhaps, the most common understanding on 
w hy w ar occurs is that society changes over time. Thus collective violence may be 
interpreted as a result o f "the process o f breakdown in a society." In this context, 
Charles T illy  et al. have observed that the effect o f change in the society, in  the form  
of "urbanization or industria lization" fo r instance, could dissolve the control over 
antisocial behavior as such rearrangement creates a potential fo r uncertainty and 
strain.9 In other words, even i f  the change in society is aimed at economic 
development, there is no assurance o f evenly distributed benefits to social and 
economic structures. In sum, the situation o f "unevenness" creates a potential fo r 
disharmony between the usual practices or experiences and the mechanism that is 
expected to regulate them. T illy  et.al. argue that responses to changes are crucial. 
These may be in the form  o f d ifferent collective social movements such as peaceful 
agitation, political violence, nationalism, or can be elevated to a form  o f revolution
9 Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly,The Rebellious Century 1830-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1975),4.
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and subversion.10In this case, we can expect that participants o f collective 
movements are those who are most adversely affected by societal change. There are 
also other sim ilar theoretical explanations and even empirical data suggest that 
collective actions or social movements are especially attracted to those who have 
been le ft out w ithou t being benefited by the old social ties and excluded in the new 
social order.n In the real world, this theory can be interpreted to mean that the 
existence o f political and social disorder in  any o f the states experiencing internal 
aggression by a group or groups is a result o f systematic marginalization brought 
about by societal change.
In the w orld  o f modernization, development is often seen as a kind o f change 
that is generally perceived to up lift the liv ing conditions o f a population. It  is 
sometimes expected to gratify and fu lfill the long aspirations o f society, but in 
reality social change may also result in social discontent. Ivo K. Feierabend, et al. 
argue that politica l turbulence is understood to be the result of social discontent- i t  
is a precondition for political instab ility  and violence.12 In other words, the 
instability  caused by collective movements that prom pt states to react according to 
what they deem necessary is basically understood to be something that originated 
from  the very exact reason o f dissatisfaction. The idea of satisfaction is often 
thought to be in regard to individual needs rather than social circumstances, but 
when collective discontent is attained at some point, then it  translates to a stage
10Ibid, 5.
11 Neil J. Smelser, “Mechanism of Change and adjustment to Change," in Industrialization and Society, 
eds. Bert F.Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (Paris: Mouton, 1966], 44.
12 Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political 
Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Anger, Violence, and politics: Theories and Research, eds. Ivo 
K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 
Inc, 1972], 108.
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where violence occurs w ith in  the society. The theory o f social change stands on the 
assumption tha t people are basically pushed to an environment they are not fam iliar 
w ith, and that they, in the context of change, are exposed to a new system w ith  new 
rules and procedures that eventually create anxiety and confusion which, in turn, 
transform individual or group behavior in to  an uncooperative mode.
Social changes, in  contrast, are expected to happen in every part o f the w orld  
as states expect a great deal in modernization- a kind o f social development that 
many believe could u p lift the economy of every state. Thus, in  the context o f the 
theoretical arguments about societal change that most scholars are pushing 
forward, continuous or at least occasional conflict among and between the people in 
a particular state amidst developmental change can be expected. Nevertheless, all of 
these theoretical assumptions can be summed up to one behavioral equation that 
explains the overall attitudes o f individual or group who, in one way or another, is in 
the chain o f violence. In simple terms, people tend to respond appropriately to 
things that surround them, especially i f  the ir expectations are d irectly  affected.
James C. Davies (1962), for instance, looks at the expectations and needs o f a 
society and draws a parallel ascending line of ‘expected need' and ‘actual need’, both 
o f which must be satisfied over time. He argues that "revolutions are most like ly to 
occur when a prolonged period o f economic and social development is followed by a 
short period o f reversal."13 In other words, as the expected need satisfaction 
ascends, the actual need satisfaction declines, and at that point the gap between 
them may be considered intolerable that it  pushes people to rise up. Similarly, Ted
13 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution,"American Sociological Review27,no.l (February 
1962): 5-19.
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Gurr (1970) in his classical w ork  asks w hy men rebel. His analysis is anchored on 
the physical and psychological needs o f humankind. His "frustration-aggression 
approach" to analyzing earlier social movements links the incidents o f political 
violence and rebellion d irectly to feelings o f deprivation arising from  unfulfilled 
expectations.14 In other words, this theory can be linked to questions o f internal 
conflict, as in secession, quest for autonomy or even fo r separation, that people are 
most like ly to resort to vio lent means i f  they see no chances o f success through 
peaceful ways. The daunting part in any o f these social collective movements is that 
when responses are not carefully studied in the context of resolution, then such 
people's actions may lead to war. In his famous 'Protracted Social Conflict Theory,’ 
Edward Azar (1980) argues that low -intensity warfare such as conflicts over 
religious, cultural o r ethnic identity are entire ly dependent upon the satisfaction of 
basic needs and, i f  not met, such conflicts in  the long term  cannot just be remedied 
by ordinary methods o f diplomacy or the use o f force.15
WHY WAR INSTEAD OF PEACE?
Few people, i f  any, like to live in conflict w ith  one another. Almost everyone 
in the world, even those who lived in the early centuries, would most like ly reject 
the idea that violence is acceptable in society. The same holds true in the present 
set-up o f the w orld  order. The reason, perhaps, is that everyone today is aware o f 
the very clear and substantial lessons o f previous wars. This notw ithstanding, 
however, the modern w orld  continues to be plagued w ith  vio lent conflicts that
14 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel? (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 46.
15 Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Coses (Hampshire: 
Dartmouth Publishing Co.Ltd., 1990), 2.
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seem never-ending despite numerous attempts to calm down violence so as to stop 
the killings not only fo r the sake o f the combatants o f both parties, bu t also to ease 
the more disastrous effects o f conflict on innocent civilians. This is the empirical 
puzzle that needs careful attention. To people in  some parts o f the world, internal 
conflicts continuously engender a disastrous environment. Why do we need to take 
up arms and go fight to k ill others? Why are there groups w illing  to die fo r the ir 
cause? What motivates people to engage in rebellion? Why do people jo in  mass 
revolts against legitimate governments? These continue to be among the basic 
questions that have been asked many years ago and are still being asked today that 
have yet to be answered.
Perhaps, one o f the extreme observations that have aided us in 
understanding the occurrence o f w ar or peace is the psychological explanation on 
why a supposed peaceful w orld  sometimes turns into a place o f misery. Kenneth 
Waltz (1959), in the firs t of his three images o f war, is convinced that in order fo r 
anyone to explain how peace can be achieved, one must have an understanding o f 
the causes o f war. For him, the miseries o f mankind are ineluctably the product o f 
man’s natures. His theory blames man as the prim ary cause o f w ar when Waltz 
explicitly states that, "the root o f all evil is man, and thus he himself is the roo t o f the 
specific evil, war."16 This theory is, w ithou t a doubt, a classical realist's perspective 
but i t  is a convincing claim. The only thing is that most often the behavior o f man 
toward certain things is also dependent on the outside forces that may influence 
one's attitude and behavior o r subsequent actions. Along this line, Waltz also
16 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959), 3.
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emphasizes that understanding the like ly consequences of any one cause may 
depend on understanding its relationship to the other causes; more often, the 
possible interrelationship o f causes makes the problem  even more d if f ic u lt17 In 
short, the firs t image, which is that o f International Relations, means that 
explanations about the im portant causes o f w ar are found in  the nature and 
behavior o f man. The theory is very candid in its analysis about the pernicious 
effects of human behavior that i f  the individual goodness of people can only be 
exhibited in every aspect o f the ir lives and universalized, then i t  would all simply 
translate into "world peace." In the context o f collective social movements, i t  may be 
assumed that the actions of every individual or significant leader could be crucial to 
the eventual occurrence o f conflict - be i t  in an interstate o r intrastate environment.
Human perception is also one of the significant factors tha t explains the 
occurrence o f conflict and war. It  is sometimes d ifficu lt to get a correct 
interpretation o f what people observe in the ir surroundings tha t may affect the ir 
routine endeavors and interests. When individual human behavior reaches a 
collective stage, then it  may tu rn  into violence that may sometimes be beyond the 
control o f individual leaders themselves or even states. I f  one party's perception o f 
others- connotes a threat to the former's existence and interests, even i f  i t  is 
incorrect, then that situation w ill lead to disaster. Barry Posen (1993) explores the 
applicability o f the "Neo-realist self-help concept” to the issue o f internal disputes or 
intrastate conflicts. In this context, states basically want to  remain autonomous and 
secure from any threats, either external o r internal, and w ill do so in try ing  to
17 Ibid., 14.
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strengthen the ir position.18In other words, states are always reactive to whatever 
forms or types o f threat they may perceive as causing a bigger problem fo r them in 
the future.
The critical po in t in this view  is that a state facing internal security problems 
would react, beforehand, to security threats posed by communal groups -- whether 
the overall goal is secession, control o f resources, o r capture o f government -  
according to what i t  deems appropriate. In this case, whatever actions the state may 
take, its leaders may not be aware that such actions are perceived by others as 
threatening. This perception, then, can trigger an arms race, and e ither party would 
view  as a "security dilemma” any potential crisis in which no one would come to 
the ir aid to defend the security o f the sta te .. The worse that may subsequently arise 
is that one party (preferably the stronger state) would initiate the firs t action by 
attacking a perceived threat to national security. Once a violent conflict starts, any 
move to stop i t  may be d ifficu lt as neither o f the parties in  the conflict would accept 
blame nor be w illing  to come to a settlement w ithou t having tested the ir fu ll 
potential for using force. In short, most o f the succeeding actions once a vio lent 
conflict has erupted could easily be justified by either group -  the state may be in a 
position to take pre-emptive action while the weaker could maximize the u tilization 
o f a "just w ar” concept or self-defense. Almost all histories of internal conflicts are 
characterized by a complex phenomenon in which whatever th e ir outcome -  
whether i t  be negotiated settlement, partition, or autonomy -  it  would always im ply 
change in the social or political structure o f states.
18 See Barry R. Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27-47.
Social and political changes in society have been perceived as critical in the 
transformation o f peace to violence. Structural changes can happen in the 
international system and the domestic politics. However, most often than not, 
changes in the system would always come from  the domestic politics o f certain 
states that eventually escalate i f  not addressed in the early eruption state o f the 
problem. Robert Gilpin (1981) argues that understanding w hy a state's policy 
changes, whether because o f external or internal factors, is related to the cost and 
benefit analysis o f the prevailing or impending situation. Governments change 
policies i f  the perception about the cost is much higher than maintaining the status 
quo.19In the same vein, changes in government politics that may have a great impact 
on the domestic structure o f society may be interpreted w ith in  the context o f how 
other scholars view an individual state or its leaders. In th is sense, it  is assumed that 
a state or its leaders are basically relative gain, not absolute gain, th inkers.20Most 
scholars favoring this argument are convinced that states (in  the case of 
international system) or parties or groups (in the case o f domestic politics) in this 
context can never have a cooperative relationship since they always th ink  o f the ir 
'gains relative to others' so that competition becomes inevitable in  the process. In 
short, this line o f argument holds that either w orld  politics or domestic politics are 
fu ll of, and being shaped by competition, fo r dominance or control o f politics, thus 
ensuring the predictability o f occasional conflict because in competition, a 
cooperative relationship always slides to animosity between competitors.
19 Robert Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
10 .
20See Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism," International Organizations 42, no.3 (1988): 499.
The individual behavior o f humans is a good predictor o f violence but it  is not 
capable o f generating the common notion that man, by nature, is innately 
aggressive. Still, what makes individual behavior changes -- whether cooperative or 
aggressive -- is what matters more through the influence o f outside 'situational 
forces' that drive individuals to change attitudes. Michael Howard (1983) is 
convinced that whatever may be attained in the calculation o f advantage and risk, 
whether careful sometimes or crude, tha t state leaders make before involving the ir 
government in conflict o r w ar is not related to the notion o f "machismo." In his 
study of war, what makes w ar inevitable is the fear of either side that the ir 
opponent is a rising power as in the Peloponnesian case wherein w ar was made 
inevitable by the growth o f Athenian power and the fear this may cause in Sparta.21 
This is consistent w ith  the earlier observation that 'perception' is a much more 
im portant predictor o f the occurrence o f violence whether interstate or those 
conflicts occurring w ith in  the boundaries o f states. W hile structural factors may be 
considered in the analysis o f w ar and peace, looking back at the very origin of 
certain conflicts may reveal that the individual behavior o f leaders is influenced by 
the ir common understanding or interpretation o f a phenomenon. So, in either case, 
the causes o f w ar can be determined by looking at actors' behavior and th inking 
w ith  conscious and reasoned decisions based on calculation, made by both parties, 
that there is more to be gained in going to w ar than just keeping a peaceful 
environment.22 A t this po in t o f the analysis, the occurrence o f vio lent conflict and its 
eventual protracted nature can be blamed on the s tup id ity  and self-interest o f 'elite
21 Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 10.
22 Ibid., 22.
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leaders’ both at the state level and the local level o f society.
Man's capacity fo r calculating the future may also cause problems that create 
more confusion in the long run. Most often than not, man’s ab ility  to foresee what 
the future is greatly dependent on historical lessons o f the past The worse that may 
come out is tha t when one's sources o f inform ation are raw, they can lead to even 
more confusion in man’s subsequent reactions. This is one o f the problems of 
Prospect Theory which states that due to the asymmetry between gains and 
perceived losses, which is central to prediction, groups (by extension through the ir 
leaders) who are w ith in  the domain o f losses accept the risks in  making a decision 
while those in the domain o f gains are risk averse. Similarly, in  terms o f the 
relationship o f parties, cooperation is expected to prevail i f  security is not an issue, 
but i f  security is involved, then cooperation is un like ly since iden tity  or ethnic 
groups begin to calculate the costs o f the benefits to th e ir security on the basis of 
relative gains.23 In short, the critical and more significant basis fo r analyzing conflict 
and peace is that incomplete information, mutual uncertainty, and most o f all 
erroneous expectations are significant and more im portant predictors o f civil w ar 
than what has been trad itiona lly  emphasized about the oppressive role of 
anarchy.24But in spite o f the individual role o f leaders, w hat is more puzzling in our 
analysis is the question o f solidarity tha t transforms single individual actions and 
perception into a collective movement.
It is w idely believed that violence grows out o f the struggle fo r dominance or
23David Carmentand Frank Harvey, Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence: An Evaluation o f Theory 
and Evidence (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 149.
24Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 24, 96.
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power among well-defined groups. But w hat brings them together fo r a common 
goal of contesting an established rule or policy is a question that has many possible 
explanations. Charles Tilly, et al. have explored and consider so lidarity  theory as an 
alternative understanding o f the theory breakdown.25 In other words, both these 
theories are concerned p rim arily  w ith  the potential fo r violent conflict o r even war 
that may stem from changes in the societal structure. Not all changes may be a 
potential source o f violence as there are times when people are bored o f the 
stagnant or slow rate o f development in society and embark on undertakings to 
u p lift the ir liv ing standards. Land disputes are one example, as they may be 
understood as a type of violence that may generate a protracted civil war.
In some studies o f te rrito ria l problems among groups, the possession o f a 
piece o f land is sometimes not the issue. Bruce M. Russett (1964), in  his study o f the 
relationship o f land ownership to violence, finds that there can be a wide range in 
the amount o f land owned by individuals w ithou t producing instability. Instead, 
Russett declares as critical to this a situation where "those who have the smallest 
amount of land are unable to make a steady and decent liv ing o f it," thus raising the 
degree o f instability.26 In short, the scarcity o f resources may create high levels of 
violence, on the one hand, and may also induce stability, on the other, depending on 
the impact o f those resources on the expectations o f society. Therefore, as long as 
the needs o f individuals or groups are relatively fu lfilled, then the likelihood of 
collective action is minimal. This explains how  political mass actions in urban areas
25 Charles Tilly, et al.,77ie Rebellious Century 1830-1930, 7.
26See Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relationship of Land Tenure to Politics,"
World Politicslb, no. 3 (April, 1964): 442-454.
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happen where possession or ownership o f material things is not related at all to  the 
formation of collective movements. It  can then be suggested tha t so lidarity can be 
related to needs and/or expectations. People w ill most like ly jo in  a mass movement 
i f  they have sim ilar goals, frustrations, and most o f all sim ilar and unfu lfilled  needs, 
even i f  they do not belong to the same cultural o r ethnical iden tity  and religious 
affiliation.
In religious violence, a d ifferent in terpretation may be required depending 
on how intense it  may be, this type o f violence being most often perceived as 
extreme due to the role that religion plays in mass action. Understanding violence 
brought about by collective action involving religious groups is even more d ifficu lt 
in the 21st century due to a fear o f religious fanaticism, as in the Islamic world, o r its 
more extreme version called terrorism . However, scholars are not slow in  the ir 
study o f this phenomenon. Mohammed Hafez (2003) looks through a d ifferent lens 
in explaining vio lent behavior in  some countries, especially in the Muslim world. He 
argues that violence, especially that which has spilled over to other parts o f the 
world, is a result of a political process that has deprived these groups o f access to 
political power.27 He identifies at least three resources that the Islam ist movement 
could command to effect social and political change: (1) Material and organizational 
resources commonly exercised by dedicated activists and experienced cadres; (2) 
Legitimacy and identity resources that serve as a moral authority to command 
sacrifices from activists and sympathizers; and (3) institutional resources where
27 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel?: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World ( 
ondon: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 22.
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groups have access to public office and state m inistries.28
A t any rate, humans by nature are found to be mostly fond o f anticipating 
w hat may affect the ir future aspirations. Man's ab ility  to calculate the consequences 
o f his actions is crucial to his future endeavor as i t  is this ability to see and predict 
the consequence of his deeds that would determine who he is in the future. I f  man's 
calculations o f future events do not seem exactly right, then actions related to these 
are more like ly to end disastrously. Michael Howard (2001) confidently explains 
that whatever may be the underlying causes o f interstate or intrastate conflict, 
"even i f  we accept the role o f atavistic m ilitarism  or o f m ilita ry-industria l complexes 
or o f socio-biological drives or o f domestic tensions in fueling it," the occurrence of 
w ar begins w ith  conscious and reasoned decisions based on a calculation, made by 
both parties, that they can achieve more gains by going to war than by jus t keeping 
the status quo or being in a state o f peace.29
In his response to the growing appreciation for global economic cooperation, 
Joseph Grieco argues that the observed high level o f mutual cooperation between 
states or, in domestic politics, ethnic or iden tity  groups, is not evidence that the 
oppressive effects o f anarchy are no longer an im portant determ inant o f the 
characteristics of interstate or intrastate politics. This is because a high level o f 
cooperation is expected when security is not the main issue, bu t when security is 
uncertain, cooperation is very d ifficu lt to achieve as states or groups would tend to
28Ibid., 19.
29 Michael Howard, "the causes of war”, in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International 
Conflict,eds. Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, D.C.: US1P, 2001), 37.
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begin calculating the ir relative gains over absolute gains.30 In other words, i t  is 
assumed here that interstate or intrastate wars do not just emerge from  our social 
system nor by erroneous calculation and understanding among men, bu t instead by 
a powerful force that is deeply ingrained in racial behavior.31 These are all, o r some, 
o f the major explanations that may guide students of security studies in the analysis 
o f war and peace occurring in interstate or intrastate politics. But other than these 
theoretical assumptions, it  is also w orth looking at the question o f how such actions 
o f groups are transformed into violence, or simply how a dispute turns in to  a vio lent 
conflict or war between contending parties.
FROM DISPUTE TO VIOLENT ARMED CONFLICT
In theory, there are many explanations guiding the analysis o f phenomena. In 
the study of violence, knowledge o f theories about the collective movement, as in  a 
revolution or mass protest, is imperative even as this is not enough to explain the 
question o f w hy people turn  violent to the extent o f being w illing  to k ill o r be killed 
for the welfare o f others. The conventional w isdom in th is regard is tha t the violence 
in  internal conflicts is directly caused by a deeply ingrained social fabric o f “ancient 
hatred" among and between groups tha t forces them to rise up in arms that 
consequently becomes a contagion spilling over to other areas even far beyond the 
borders o f states. Again, the behavior and attitudes of the leaders -w he the r they are 
bad or good -  are crucial to the future o f a fragile stability as the ir decisions and
30 See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation: A realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,“International Organization 42, no. 3(Summer 1988 ): 485-507; also Joseph M. 
Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990].
31 Keith L. Nelson and Spencer C. Olin Jr., Why War?: Ideology, Theory, and History (LA, California: 
University of California Press, 1979], 23.
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actions are potential sources of an unstable situation turn ing in to  an open vio lent 
confrontation or war.32
Bad leaders, both at state and local levels, are responsible fo r com m itting the 
members o f a group, where he is influential, to forget and abandon the tra n q u ility  of 
peace and resort to taking arms. I f  leaders w ould only see who that staying at peace 
is a better alternative to waging war, then states may be saved from  the miseries 
and pernicious effects o f internal conflict. The problem is that, even the ab ility  of 
good leaders to calculate the approximate cost o f committing the ir followers to war 
becomes erroneous, especially when a situation is reached that pushes them to the 
lim it. In other words, the ancient hatred theory of internal conflict may not be 
capable o f explaining the persistence o f violence because humans sometimes reach 
a point o f becoming war-weary, thus giving way to the emergence o f good leaders 
who seek to pacify bellicose ethos.
The occurrence o f internal conflicts and or its resolution is p rim arily  
dependent on domestic factors which are, most often, manipulated by elites or 
leaders both at the state and local levels. A t the state level, in a broader sense, 
leaders contribute much in times o f conflict at the local scene while, at the same 
time, the unscrupulous attitudes o f elites and leaders on the ground o f actual 
fighting fu rther exacerbate the confusion caused by decisions made at the state 
level.33In the simple process o f 'action-reaction' analogy, conflicts are simply the
32See Michael E. Brown," The Causes and Regional dimensions of Internal conflict," in The 
International Dimensions o f Internal conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown ( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), 571-602.
33See Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,"
International Organization 42, no.3 [Summer 1988): 427-460.
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conglomeration o f dynamics o f decisions made, on behalf o f the m ajority o f the 
population (state citizens), through the perception o f good leaders o f the common 
good, and the very actions o f local leaders in the ir response to policies made for 
them and on account o f ethnicity, culture, and religious affiliation. When the policies 
of state leaders are acceptable because these are deemed to serve the interests of 
identity groups and are perceived to be good by local leaders, then the likelihood of 
violent conflict is minimized. On the contrary, not all policies agreed and decided at 
the state level are implemented at the local level. Sometimes, the dynamics o f the 
domestic political situation generate conflict, such as ethnic conflict situations, 
provoked by elites and leaders in times o f political and economic crises in order to 
fend o ff domestic challengers.34 In other words, the role o f local leaders, in this view, 
plays an im portant part in whatever the state policy may impose on the provincial 
or regional level. In sum, whatever the factor tha t triggers armed confrontation in 
the internal conflict, whether i t  is economic, political, cultural, o r religious in nature, 
individual leaders' behavior and perception of gains and losses are the deciding 
factor in the occurrence of w ar and peace. That means that bad leaders bring the 
community into chaos while good leaders bring the society into peace.
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT MITIGATION
Internal conflict is not a new phenomenon. Its complexity brought about by 
many angles o f a conflict-ridden environment has attracted policymakers, state 
leaders, and scholars to seek a deeper understanding o f the flu id ity  o f intrastate 
conflict. Since the end o f the Cold War, students and scholars o f international
34 Michael E. Brown, International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, 17-18.
relations or international studies, particularly those specializing in security 
concerns, have been try ing  to investigate and study the surge o f internal violence, 
ranging from conflicts aimed at control o f resources to secessionist movements and 
political control to capture the state. The general idea, in looking fo r possible viable 
solutions to internal wars, is to come up w ith  a policy that both ind ividual states in 
conflict and international communities can adopt so as to m itigate the effects of 
actual fighting between the state and groups by saving properties and lives at the 
earliest possible time. In a sense, the consensus on the question o f how to prevent 
mass killings among parties to  the conflict is to have a serious and dedicated effort 
for negotiation.
Faced w ith  the proliferation o f intrastate conflicts that have caused many 
deaths brought about by ethnic c ivil wars in the mid-1990s, international 
policymakers and scholars have focused much attention on "partition" as a viable 
solution for preventing the recurrence o f ethnic civil wars.35 The debate 
surrounding partition has emerged in the fie ld o f conflict resolution at the end o f the 
Cold War, as this was the tim e ethnic conflicts came to the fo re fron t o f Western 
policymakers' attention. For this reason, international boundaries were t  redrawn 
so as to accommodate the political demands o f ethnic groups. However, in the 
process o f the continuing search for viable solutions to internal conflict, scholars in 
recent years have introduced a counterargument to negotiated settlements and 
partition. Proponents o f the "give w ar a chance" option argue tha t belligerents
35 See John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, eds., The Politics o f Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 1-40; and also Nicholas Mansergh, The Prelude to Partition: Concepts and Aims in 
Ireland and India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
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should be allowed to continue fighting un til one side achieves m ilita ry  v ictory.36
Once started, internal conflicts are very d ifficult, i f  not impossible, to resolve 
for many reasons. Scholars o f conflict have been try ing  to focus the ir attention 
finding possible solutions to ending violence particu larly happening in developing 
countries. Wars could be ended in many d ifferent ways, such as: [1 ] when one o f the 
conflicting parties achieves a m ilita ry  v ic to ry over the other; [2) when the w arring 
parties enter into a signed peace agreement as a result o f negotiations; or (3) when 
a truce/stalemate or ceasefire is established, thus term inating the actual fighting. 
Other than these, Roy Licklider (1995) has identified other factors that can influence 
the term ination o f intrastate conflict such as civil w ar and help prevent the ir 
recurrence, as follows: (1) the length and costs o f the war; (2) the ab ility  o f the 
central government to make commitments; (3) the presence o f mediators; (4) the 
strength o f the security forces;, and (5) the willingness to address grievances.37
In the study o f civil wars, scholars focus on the possibility o f find ing a definite 
solution to the conflict. In other words, studies seek to determine which types of 
ending internal conflicts -- like c iv il wars resulting from  secessionist movements, 
the collapse o f the state, the struggle for political control and resources, or the 
struggle for autonomy-- is more attractive because i t  is perceived as having the 
potential to produce an enduring peace. As observed in the h istory o f wars 
elsewhere, most internal conflicts, after they have been ended for quite some time, 
revert to the same intolerable violence w ith  even more devastating consequences.
36 See Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance,"Foreign Affairs78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 36-44.
37 Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil War, 1945-1993," The 
American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (Sept 1995): 681-690.
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This is the reason that international community and policymakers have emphasized 
the importance o f finding more viable means o f ending violence that could produce 
a lasting peace.
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
After the end o f W orld War II, scholars and policymakers shifted the ir 
attention to settling wars p rim arily  occurring w ith in  state boundaries. This was 
aimed at m itigating the tension between the two w arring parties through a 
negotiated settlement. The core recommendation o f this policy is to employ a th ird  
party which could facilitate and mediate in peace talks between the parties in 
conflict. This process involves offering resources prim arily  in the form  o f economic 
incentives and allocation of positions in the existing government in  order to halt the 
violence and preserve the lives o f combatants. Scholars o f civil wars, fo r the ir part, 
have devoted the bulk o f the ir research w ork on how best to achieve negotiated 
settlements. But what is negotiated settlement? Toft, in her most recent publication 
(2010), defines negotiated settlement as "an ideal type o f war term ination in which 
none o f the w arring parties admits defeat" and the combatants consequently agree 
to end the violence, especially the armed confrontation, and accept common terms 
on how to govern a post-war state. A survey of the literature on civil w ar 
term ination shows that negotiated settlement is a far more pervasive and influentia l 
option than any other type of w ar term ination.38 The basic assumption o f advocates 
for negotiated settlement is that the earlier the fighting is stopped, the more lives 
are saved.
38 Toft, Ending Civil Wars, 11.
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Since the end o f the cold war, negotiated settlements have been understood 
to emphasize the benefits o f cooperation while downplaying the threat of 
punishment should either or both parties fail to live up to their obligation under the 
agreement. Comparing options on ending internal conflict, advocates o f negotiated 
settlement contend that the combination o f the pro liferation o f weak states, 
refinement in insurgency strategy, and the w ide-d istribution o f small arms have 
made it  relatively more d ifficu lt fo r even well-supplied and well-led combatants to 
achieve victory. In short, what makes a settlement last long is the fact that 
combatants, including those who made the w ar possible, have grown too weary of 
w ar that going to another w ar is unlikely for both parties.
The durab ility  o f the peace attained after a settlement, to some scholars and 
practitioners, would probably depend on the international community to establish 
and implement the provisions o f the peace agreement, including tha t o f sustaining 
peace on the ground. In other words, i f  form er combatants who subscribed to the 
idea o f ending violence as a result o f a peace agreement are given a chance to have a 
voice in the ir political, economic and social destiny, then renewed violence can be 
averted. This factor alone may explain why scholars prefer negotiated settlement to 
all other types o f conflict resolution because allowing the combatants to have a say 
in the postwar configuration o f the government increases the likelihood that such a 
democratic process w ill lead to the creation and strengthening o f democratic 
institutions.39
In sum, the most powerful theoretical argument that supports the idea o f
39 See Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of 
Military Power-Sharing Arrangements,'"Journal o f Peace Research 40,no. 3 [May 2003): 303-320.
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ending intrastate conflict through a negotiated settlement is tha t it  reduces the 
number o f deaths and damage to properties at the soonest possible time. Assuming 
that the costs o f civil war, fo r instance, are measured narrow ly in  terms o f life, 
negotiations to halt violence would spare more lives than when fighting continues 
and, as a consequence, reduces the costs o f w ar for both parties.40 In other words, 
w ithou t a settlement the combatants would continue to go on k illing  each other, or 
even escalating the level o f violence.
The above arguments, however, have been criticized for many reasons. First 
and foremost, scholars and practitioners opposed to negotiated settlement argue 
that it  while may end the overt violence, it  does not provide a prom ising future for 
longer peace. A well-established truce, fo r example, can stop human suffering bu t at 
the same time i t  can be a good opportun ity  for either party  to the conflict to rearm, 
consolidate, and build up the ir forces for future battles. Thus, negotiated 
settlements may save lives but only for a short period. Moreover, even after a peace 
accord is signed and all is set to be implemented on the ground o f previous conflict, 
many see that the possibility o f attaining a more enduring peace would s till be hard, 
as parties, especially the combatants, always have strong incentives to reject the 
idea o f sharing power in a new government.41
In the study of Alexander B. Downes (2004) on intrastate conflict, he 
identifies many problems in regard to ending civil wars through th ird  party 
interventions fo r a negotiated solution. He observes that the conventional wisdom
40 See Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil War," American Political 
Science Review 89, no. 3 (Sept 1995]: 681-690.
41 See Toft (2010], Ending Civil Wars: A Rebel Victory?.
in both academic and policy circles on how best to end ethnic civil wars assumes 
that secessionist conflicts, fo r example, are best managed by granting regional 
autonomy in order to pacify ethnic groups, while contests for control o f the state 
could be addressed by power sharing.42 This idea has been adopted by scholars and 
promoted by the international community w ith  emphasis on the combination of 
autonomy and power sharing. Some o f the countries where this approach has been 
applied are Angola, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Macedonia and most recently 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but peace in these states remains elusive. Many other 
countries in  conflict have also undergone a negotiated settlement and either 
federalized the ir political system (Spain, Ethiopia), created new federal units i f  
already a federal system (India), granted regional autonomy (Sudan, Nicaragua, 
Moldova, The Philippines, Russia, Bangladesh), or institu ted power sharing 
(Lebanon in 1958 and 1976, Chad, Northern Ireland) in order to curb ethnic 
rebellions, bu t a lasting solution to these conflicts has not been found.
In fact, states that instituted power sharing after a civil w ar have collapsed 
into a renewed conflict w hile  others were abrogated before they could be 
implemented. Furthermore, agreements that have provided regional autonomy for 
rebels usually failed to end the conflict, as in the case o f Moros in the Philippines, 
Ethiopia's Afars, Somalis, and Oromo, Sri Lankan Tamils, and India’s Assamesse and 
Bodos.43 These are just a few o f the generally problematic cases involving 
negotiated settlements to internal conflicts.
42 See Alexander B. Downes, "The Problem with the Negotiated settlements to Ethnic Civil 
Wars,"Security Studies 13, no. 4 (Summer 2004]: 230-279.
43 Ibid
The opponent, especially the dominant power, appears w illing  to settle the 
conflict at any time i t  is prepared, bu t the w ar just fought gives each side little  
reason to be confident about the other's future intentions. On the other hand, 
negotiated settlements to internal conflicts require that groups, especially the 
weaker, abandon the ir armed struggle in  order to un ify the country. In some cases 
o f conflict resolution, arms are to be turned over to the government in exchange for 
monetary value in a process referred to as "buy back." The problem is there is no 
certainty that the ir form er adversary w ill not cheat on the deal, and that there is no 
guarantee they are safe from attacks when they are most vulnerable. In other words, 
groups always have the tendency to preserve the ir forces for th e ir own security, 
thus making form er combatants a potential threat fo r renewed violence. If  the 
groups are w illing  to settle, combatants are forced to surrender the ir arms and 
share the same state. This notw ithstanding, the same groups legitim ately fear to 
cooperate while others cheat, and skepticism prevails tha t could underm ine the duly 
signed peace agreements.
Furthermore, both the government and the rebel groups are uncertain o f 
political institutions they are sharing w ith  the ir form er enemy, and there is d istrust 
that the ir recent adversary w ill live up to the ir obligation in the agreement. Some 
scholars also argue that in power sharing arrangements (for instance, in regional 
autonomy), both the state and the rebel groups fear that the other side w ill attem pt 
to capture the state, exclude them from power and resources, and use government 
power to repress them in  the future. In the final analysis, scholars tend to believe 
that a misperception o f the intentions o f each side makes the parties more reluctant
39
to enter into a negotiated settlement; at the same time, parties to the conflict fear 
about the ir own security and are apprehensive about being attacked in the future.44 
W ith all these theoretical arguments that show little  confidence in  the ab ility  of 
negotiated settlements to produce a lasting peace then, scholars and practitioners of 
internal conflict have considered partition ing as a better solution to internal 
conflicts.
QUESTIONS OVER PARTITION
The debate over te rrito ria l partition ing as a solution to in terna l conflicts like 
c ivil wars is highly political in nature. . It involves not only revising the laws o f the 
existing state in order to accommodate the new political decisions, bu t also requires 
the consent, in most cases, o f the international community. But what is partitioning? 
Sambanis and Wohl (2009) broadly define pa rtition  as a civil outcome that leads to 
the te rrito ria l separation of a sovereign state.45In legal parlance, partition, mostly a 
result of negotiations, can be in the form o f ‘de jure partition,' in which a new 
internationally recognized state is created as a result of successful secession 
(scholars po in t to Bangladesh, Croatia, and Eritrea as examples); and 'de facto 
pa rtition / in which there is divided sovereignty over the te rr ito ry  o f a single 
internationally recognized state (e.g. Abkhasia and south Ossetia in  Georgia and the 
Turkish Republic o f Northern Cyprus in Cyprus).46
At the height o f the Iraqi c iv il w ar in 2006 to 2007, policymakers and
44 See Barry Posen, "Security Dilemma," Survival 35 no. 1 (1993)
45 Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer- Wohl, ''What's in Line? Is Partition a Solution to Civil 
Wars," International Security, 34, no. 2(Fall 2009): 82-118.
46 Ibid
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analysts turned to the concept o f partition ing the country in the face o f intensifying 
violence against civilians, m istrust among the main Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish 
groups, and the bleak prospects for state building.47In recent years, tw o examples 
come to mind: the de facto partition ing o f Kosovo from  Serbia in  1999 followed by 
the international recognition of Kosovo's independence in  2008, and the August war 
between Russia and Georgia fo llow ing the latter's invasion of the separatist region 
of South Ossetia.
Advocates o f the partition option assume that instability in  power sharing 
after a civil war makes i t  d ifficu lt not to separate w arring  parties w ith  or w ithou t 
formal recognition (de jure or de facto). This idea is perceived to be a stable solution 
to secessionist or ethnic civil wars and a clear-cut approach to creating a self- 
enforcing peace. Moreover, arguments fo r partition  claim that ethnic identities are 
hardened by war, making inter-ethnic cooperation d ifficu lt and increasing the risk 
that individuals are prone to being targeted by violence simply because o f the ir 
ethnic affiliation. Therefore, scholars and analysts advocating partition  suggest that 
i t  is better to physically separate w arring  ethnic groups in order to reduce the risk 
o f continued or escalating violence.48 In short, the partition theory explains w hy 
warring ethnic groups are having d ifficu lty  preventing themselves from de- 
escalating and demobilization. So, i t  is argued tha t in v iew  of the prevailing fear and 
m istrust between the w arring parties, ethnic groups m ust be separated and given 
sovereignty to produce long-term peace.
47 Ibid
48 See Carter Johnson, "Partitioning to Peace Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars,” 
InternationalSecurity32, no. 4 (Spring 2008):140-170.
Other scholars, policymakers, and state leaders even push fo r complete 
partition ing to  prevent the recurrence o f war, that is, by moving populations in 
order to have a homogeneous society. It means that since borders can rare ly be 
drawn to create an ethnically homogeneous society or state, fo r instance, advocates 
o f complete partition  recommend population transfers to accomplish w hat would 
otherwise be a worse situation for civilian populations. Moreover, i t  has been 
argued that a th ird -party  transfer would be better than forced transfers perpetrated 
by enemy m ilitias aiming fo r ethnic cleansing or worse.49 Advocates o f partition, 
however, do not claim that separating w arring ethnic groups w ill always prevent a 
return to w ar or low-level violence forever, bu t that i t  is often the best option to 
enable peace to take roo t and flourish. But this has been criticized by scholars who, 
while acknowledging that partition ing is conceivable, are convinced that i t  is 
d ifficu lt to implement. They raise a number o f arguments in this regard, namely: 
(1) that i t  w ould be hard for the international community to intervene by moving or 
relocating populations in the face o f intense violence; (2) that human suffering could 
be expected particularly for those who are to be relocated and, in  most cases, people 
strongly oppose being transferred because i t  may cause them not only economic 
and political instability  but also pose security problems fo r them.
Another argument for partition is elaborated by Chaim Kaufmann, who 
claims that "partition  is a good solution i f  i t  is impossible for groups to live together 
in an ethnically heterogeneous state.’’50 The argument is founded on the theoretical
« Ibid.
50 Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, 
20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 136-175.
assumption that ethnic power sharing, as suggested fo r negotiated settlements, is a 
particularly unstable solution because ethnic identities have been strengthened by 
the previous w ar and are thought to be more easily identifiable in  the long run than 
any other group identity. Consequently, members of certain ethnic groups become 
even more vulnerable and easily identified when the peace process fails. According 
to Kaufmann, "partition  can help mitigate, i f  not prevent, fu rthe r escalation of 
violence in c iv il wars because o f the idea tha t it  resolves the ethnic security 
d ilem m a"- that is, i t  reduces the threat that each ethnic group poses to the other by 
d ivid ing te rrito ry  and physically separating w arring groups.51 In this process, the 
tw o w arring parties are even encouraged to form  a homogeneous society even i f  it  
involves population transfer. It means that in terms o f armaments, the capacity of 
each group to secure the ir ethnic members remains, as they have no t given up the ir 
weapons to the central government. This argument turns to Barry Posen's ethnic 
security dilemma to explain w hy partition  would reduce violence during or after 
ethnic civil wars.52 Posen basically assumes that during the time when there is no 
im partia l state policing among the population, when the state is weak o r collapsing 
most like ly due to bad domestic politics, and when the tim e comes that there is an 
outbreak o f political violence in a m ulti-ethnic state, then anarchy prevails as ethnic 
groups become responsible for the ir own security. So, by separating them w hile 
maintaining the ir m ilita ry  forces, the aspect of being apprehensive about the ir own 
security is reduced. Don Doyle [2010] for his part, looks at iden tity  as a means o f 
giving incentives for a group to secede. He argues that "modern nations typ ica lly
51 Ibid.
52 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival3S, no. 1 (Spring 1993):27-47.
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identify the ir origin in a struggle to liberate the ir people from  unjust — often 
foreign-- rule and to unify the ir te rrito ry  and people under the banner o f a single 
national community."53 Therefore, whether the desire for secession is expressed 
through vio lent or peaceful means, secessionists can succeed only i f  there are means 
available to them especially when they see no other option.
Critics, however, question the logic o f Partition theory since the threat of 
renewed violence, even i f  w arring groups are separated, is always imminent. As 
Sambanis and Wohl pu t it, even i f  partition  solves a violent intrastate conflict by 
separating populations that do not trus t each other to cooperate in a postwar state, 
i t  can generate potential incentives fo r identity conflicts in both the form er (rump) 
and the secessionist state.54In other words, there is always a post-partition potential 
fo r conflict w ith in  the newly formed state over control o f government or 
competition fo r power because conflict can be created by a new group seeking to 
secede from the newly formed state either to rejoin the "rump state" or create a new 
entity. Second, there is a possible conflict between the newly formed state and the 
rump state (interstate conflict) when the new state has achieved legal sovereignty. 
Third, there can also be a conflict over control o f the rump state, as nationalist 
groups always challenge the government over the issue of te rr ito ry  lost to the 
secessionists. In the succeeding part, this paper w ill examine the other suggested 
solution to internal conflict, which is tha t o f m ilita ry  victory.
53 Don H Doyle, Secession as an International Phenomena: From America's Civil War to Contemporary 
Separatist Movement, ed. (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 4.
S4See Sambanis and Wohl, 2009.
LEGITIMACY OF A MILITARY VICTORY
Internal conflicts are so complex that even state leaders become irrational 
and could not th ink  o f acceptable options once armed confrontation begins. They 
tend to get outside actors to come on board in the belief tha t the la tte r could, in the ir 
capacity, bring some kind o f peaceful resolution to domestic issues. No doubt, in 
recent years o f studying civ il wars, scholars and analysts have shown a preference 
fo r either peace negotiations to possibly end the violence at the earliest possible 
time to prevent more loss o f lives, or separating the w arring parties so they could 
both have the authority to govern the ir regional area, o r new state, w hile fears for 
the ir own security are also reduced. These options, however, both have 
considerable advantages and disadvantages, depending on the nature and degree of 
violence and the characteristics o f the w arring groups. I f  the conflict is ethnic-based, 
then the conventional wisdom is to create an ethnically homogeneous society, o r if  
both parties are more like ly to adapt to a power-sharing system o f government, then 
regional autonomy or federalism may probably w o rk  to maintain a peaceful 
environment w ith in  a state.55 But, as to whether the peaceful environment on the 
ground can last after the violence is halted is another story altogether.
It  is clear, for instance, that intrastate conflicts are very d ifficu lt to manage as 
they usually require the intervention o f the international community because the 
state, through its government, lacks the capacity to resolve the conflict. In ligh t of 
these complexities o f internal conflict, some scholars in recent years have presented 
the ir counterargument by considering the seemingly perverse option o f promoting
55 See Chaim Kaufmann, (Spring 1996):136-175
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'v ictory' which, in the ir assumption, could offer a longer peace. One consideration is 
that in peace negotiations, the process does not move forward w ithou t any hitches; 
that is, every step forward is always followed by tw o steps backward. This may be 
the reason for some advocates of v ic tory to argue in favor o f allow ing the w arring 
parties to continue fighting un til they reach a po int where one of the parties 
achieves a m ilita ry  victory. Victory, as defined by Monica Toft (2010), is an "ideal 
type o f w ar term ination in which one side explicitly acknowledges defeat and 
surrenders.”56
The most prom inent argument in favor o f 'v ictory' is that o f Edward N. 
Luttwak (1999), where he argues that peace can happen when belligerents become 
exhausted or when one wins decisively.57 In other words, allow ing the w arring 
parties to continue fighting is seen as a better option fo r many reasons. Advocates 
of v ictory argue that, as far as the recurrence o f renewed violence is concerned, i t  is 
unlikely to happen because the loser has less capacity to wage war, coupled w ith  
the fact that he accepts the superiority o f the other. As Robert Wagner (1993) puts 
it, victories are more stable in  the long run than any other means because one side 
who surrenders has litt le  potential to reignite a new war.58
For outside actors' influences, Luttwak (1999) puts the fau lt and blame on 
the international community for the escalation o f conflict as he argues that "too 
many wars nowadays become endemic conflicts that never end because the
56 Toft, 2010.
57 Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," Foreign Affairs, (July/ Augustl999): 36-44.
58 Robert Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, ed. Roy Licklider 
(New York: NY University Press, 1993), 235-268.
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transformative effects of both decisive v ic tory and exhaustion are blocked by 
outside intervention."^S im ilarly, the view  that in ternal security problems o f states 
may have been caused in part by "Bad Neighbors” is w idely accepted.60 Moreover, 
in negotiated settlements such as a ceasefire o r armistice, combatants are more 
like ly to use the temporary ha lt of violence as an opportunity to reconstitute, 
reorganize, and consolidate or even beef up the ir forces in anticipation o f future 
war. Along this line, the possibility o f w ar recurrence is very high, and thus 
negotiated settlements may have an increased likelihood o f saving lives. But 
advocates of "Give W ar a Chance” argue that these options w ork  only in the short 
term and that once renewed violence occurs, i t  is hard to end again and can be 
costlier than the previous conflict.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have seen and analyzed key issues in understanding the 
complexity of internal armed conflict. It  shows tha t the prevention o f mass killings 
o f combatants and innocent civilians calls for a closer study of in ternal conflict, not 
because interstate conflict is waning in  the international system but because 
intrastate conflicts, in today’s world, are the prim ary source of instability. Theories 
o f war have been providing a guide to every scholarly analysis o f both interstate 
conflict and internal conflict. But there are times that these theories are insufficient 
in understanding w orld  phenomena, such as the persistence o f intrastate conflicts
59 Luttwak, 1999.
60 See Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict, in The 
International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1996), 579-580.
which impede and hold down countries from  moving towards developm ent There 
may be enough tools to aid analysts in understanding the causes and the 
consequences o f internal conflict, but the continuing quest fo r appropriate 
responses to this w orld  phenomenon requires more and more studies. U niform ity of 
approaches to internal conflict is not possible at all because conflicts driven by 
ethnic identity, religious belief, and political orientation do not fo llow  a linear 
pattern. The problem arises if, for instance, one approach is proven effective and 
promises a good outcome but is rudely applied elsewhere by leaders and policy 
makers.
Today, there is no doubt that the w orld  is equipped w ith  sufficient studies on 
determining the causes or "approximate causes" o f internal conflict, but because of 
its protracted nature, there arises a need to extend the analysis beyond the domestic 
affairs of states and ask questions such as to what extent the behavior o f outside 
actors could invite internal conflict and whether they contribute to more confusion 
in the internal affairs o f states. The intervention o f outside forces may exacerbate or 
ease tensions, but what is clear is that states are seldom capable o f resolving the ir 
own internal conflict. It  is suggested, in the context o f looking fo r avenues o f peace, 
that interventions are needed because government forces, more often than not, are 
involved in actual armed confrontation. Thus, i f  the state in conflict is le ft alone to 
resolve major issues, it  is unlikely that parties would reach a po in t o f consensus not 
only because the state itse lf is weak, bu t also because the state in  trouble usually 
makes biased strategic decisions that does not take into account the interests o f its 
opponent groups.
The focus o f internal conflict is often sovereignty and governance, and tha t is 
w hy states have d ifficu lty addressing conflict issues because governments could 
hardly give up a piece of te rrito ry  w ithou t having to use all available means to 
preserve the integrity o f the country. Similarly, internal conflicts are usually 
characterized as asymmetrical conflicts which involve a weaker side (usually the 
rebels) and the stronger side (usually the government forces). However, in today's 
globalized world, the stronger is not always the dominant side. In fact, the weaker 
side can use advanced communication and technologies to  influence m ajor strategic 
decisions, as exemplified by "the Arab Spring" phenomenon. More than anything 
else, it  is evident that the nature o f collective actions, in general, is often driven by 
feelings o f discontent -  which is w hy many studies focus their analysis on social 
needs, which are not easy to satisfy especially when i t  becomes a social demand. At 
any given time, when social dissatisfaction reaches the ‘po in t o f no re turn ,’ that is, a 
population is pushed to the lim it and must act, the groups o f people who feel 
oppressed and discriminated against are more like ly  to form  an exclusive 
organization that would challenge current policy, thus creating a very high potential 
fo r revolution or rebellion. But beyond this theoretical assumption, perception is a 
much more im portant variable to explain the triggering mechanism o f internal 
v io lent conflict. Both parties' view o f one another may or may not create a potential 
environment fo r attaining peace. There have been cases when groups would resort 
to taking up arms i f  the ir security is at risk, but such is dependent on how  one may 
logically in terpre t the actions of others. Even the benign intentions o f either party or 
by extension the international e ffort can be perceived as threatening, hence the
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probability  o f cooperation cannot be expected.
There are at least three major concepts that offer a solution to internal 
conflict by suggesting ways o f m itigating the pernicious effects of violence driven by 
differences in social, political, religious, and cultural beliefs. It  seems that 
negotiation is the prim ary option not only because i t  is the best solution but also 
because i t  is he option that is trad itiona lly  always available in order to stop the 
miseries o f conflict. However, everyone would agree tha t negotiations as a solution 
may resolve differences bu t it  usually takes longer to reach an agreement. 
Nevertheless, a negotiated settlement is preferred by state leaders, policymakers, 
and international organizations because o f the belie f tha t i t  is a democratic process 
o f settlement which is assumed to create a democratic system; would address the 
demands o f both parties; and above all, reduce the feeling o f insecurity and/o r 
uncertainty once a peace agreement is reached. The idea is to have a strong state 
under one central government composed o f diverse groups that abide by the rule of 
law.
If form ing a homogenous society is next to impossible, then studies o f 
internal conflict strongly suggest 'partition ' as a second option. The general 
assumption in this option is that i f  i t  is hard to integrate different groups w ith  
different beliefs, then it  is more advantageous to separate them so tha t armed 
confrontation is minimized, i f  not to ta lly  abolished. Some analysts even advocate a 
kind o f segregation that comes close to a complete partition. However, i t  is not an 
easy task to move from the ir place o f origin to places unknown to them fo r i t  is most 
like ly to transform the ir normal lives to one fu ll o f misery. Above all, even i f  a new
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state is created, there is no guarantee that a small group w ill not rise up to demand 
fo r separation from  the new state, or jo in  advocates for unification w ith  the rump 
state.
V ictory is deemed to be the last resort to end the violence brought about by 
internal conflicts. This option does not believe in the capacity o f humans to resolve 
the ir disputes by peaceful means. It sounds simple and easy and makes no claim that 
interventions are unnecessary, bu t i t  is simply an option that advocates no action to 
stop the surge violence. Therefore, i f  the goal of internal conflict studies is to 
m inim ize and/o r prevent a catastrophe in a conflict situation, then this idea serves 
nothing in our investigation. However, there are situations wherein using force is 
necessary i f  only to return control over domestic order. This is not to advocate 
armed confrontation or war, but that in  a situation where there is a potential armed 
threat posed by rebels, the state should, i f  necessary, use its m ight i f  only to assert 
its legitimate existence. Relatively strong armed groups are hard to convince 
diplomatically i f  they see nothing to obstruct them from threatening the 
government. In other words, using force by both the weaker and the stronger side in 
an internal conflict may be a last resort, but i t  is evident that parties are w illing  to 
cooperate i f  they see more disadvantages than gains by refusing to cooperate.
The concluding argument here is that, whatever the causes o f internal 
conflict, be it  state discrim ination and /o r oppressive government policies toward 
m inority  groups, the critical factor in  the persistence o f v io lent conflict or its 
peaceful ending is the attitude and behavior o f leaders o f both parties. Theories of 
conflict may serve as a guide in the quest fo r a lasting solution to internal wars, but
an investigation o f the "triggering mechanism" o f violence reveals tha t the behavior 
o f individual leaders, especially those belonging to the influential local elite and 
leaders in  local politics, is a very im portant variable in th is regard.. The occurrence 
and persistence o f vio lent conflicts can thus be blamed on bad leaders, but they can 




HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MUSLIM ARMED REBELLION IN THE
PHILIPPINES
INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the Mindanao problem, i t  is im portant to trace the
history o f the Muslims better known as 'Moros,' in  the southern Philippines. Failure
to know the historical background o f the Mindanao conflict may sometimes lead to
irrational th inking and misleading analysis, leading to the mistaken v iew  that the
Muslim combatants are mere bandits or terrorists. Mindanao is the second largest
island o f the Philippine archipelago which is the product o f a long historical
development influenced by many foreign rulers, each of whom have tried  to
recreate the native people in the ir own image. In the process, the native people and
communities became dislocated and were forced to adapt to social changes to ta lly
new to them. The culture itse lf became a heterogeneous gathering o f many strains
and influences from  many sources, and each source was represented by a set of
practices, values, and beliefs, but they co-existed rather than mixed or harmonized
in society.1 As a result, group identities w ith in  d ifferent communities came about
and each group alienated themselves from one another. This alienation was
manifested in Philippine history, among others, by the long years o f Muslim or
Bangsamoro struggle wherein the effects are considered a major problem of the
Philippine government until now. Notably, of all the conquerors, the Spaniards in
over 333 years o f colonization laid the foundations for the emergence o f a F ilip ino
1 R. Joel de los Santos, Jr., "Reflection on the Moro wars and the New Filipino," in Understanding Islam 
and Muslims in the Philippine, ed. Peter Gowing (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 92-102.
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nation that failed to create a homogeneous Filip ino society under one government. 
In the end, the disintegration of the native people created an environm ent favorable 
to the colonizers that no forces formidable enough came to oppose such foreign rule.
The Americans took over the adm inistration o f the country at the tu rn  o f the 
20th century and developed the islands into a state w ith  a political system sim ilar to 
that which had been prevailing in the ir home country, the United States o f America's 
liberal democracy. However, for so long the Americans were not to ta lly  successful in 
making the country a peaceful society through many attempts to integrate ethnic 
groups, particular the Muslims in the south, into the social and political mainstream. 
These attempts at Muslim integration under American or Filipino rule in Mindanao 
did not serve to create an avenue to pacify the 'on and o ff  conflict between 
government and the secessionist tendencies o f the Moros. The same trend was 
observed even after the Americans left at the end o f the Second W orld W ar and 
subsequently gave b irth  to an independent Republic o f the Philippines on July 4, 
1946. Today, the same "ancient hatred” is form ing the historic force that harks back 
to the events o f the past and is making it  d ifficu lt for the Philippine government to 
resolve the long-standing violent conflict in Mindanao. In fact, many among the 
Muslim population do not regard the Philippine government today as the ir 
government. More and more Muslims, especially in the conflicted areas, believe that 
the government development initiatives are only fo r the Christians in Mindanao. 
Some are o f the view  that economic aid is brought to the Christians while the m ortar 
shells are delivered to the Muslim communities. This is one o f the reasons that 
despite a number o f educated Muslims who are part o f the political system at the
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center o f government in Manila, a considerable portion  o f the Muslim  population in 
the south ignores attempts fo r integration because they are convinced that the 
government is only for the Christians who now comprise the m ajority  in Mindanao. 
Empirical evidence shows that many Muslims are covertly supporting the rebellion 
against the Republic o f the Philippines. For a clearer v iew  of the Mindanao conflict, 
thus, this chapter provides a b rie f historical background on the more than four 
decades o f almost continuous conflict in the southern pa rt of the Philippines which, 
fo r many, has 'ancient hatred’ roots that can be traced back to the colonial period.
THE MORO COMMUNITIES AND CHRISTIANITY
It is im portant to note that before the Spanish colonial rule began in 1521, 
Mindanao Muslims were already socially, politically, and economically organized in 
the two sultanates o f Maguindanao and Sulu. A t the end o f the 14th and the 
beginning of the 15th century, Islam as a relig ion was believed to be w ell- 
established on the island of Jolo and surrounding areas, now comprising the Sulu 
province, and later spread southward to the main island o f Mindanao and the island 
province of Palawan to the north. The arrival o f Islam in  this area was p rim a rily  a 
result o f natural commerce in which the traders from  neighboring areas as fa r as 
China, India, and Arab countries engaged w ith  the locals. Traders from  these 
countries, particularly the Muslims, had intermarriages w ith  the local elites and 
settled permanently, at first, in the c ity  o f Jolo and la te r in other adjacent areas. 
There were also bands o f Malay Muslim clerics from  Sumatra and other places in the 
Malay Archipelago who followed the Arab traders. Prominent foreigners like Raja 
Baguinda Ali, who came from Sumatra at the end o f the 14th century, achieved a key
position in the local Muslim community. Thereafter, the concept o f a Sultanate, 
where the Sultan is the supreme ru le r assisted by several bands o f Datus under him, 
was introduced. Sharif Abu Bakar, Raja Baguinda Ali's son-in-law, became the firs t 
sultan o f Jolo, which translated to the conversion o f its people to Islam. This process 
o f Islamization was accepted by the local communities, and later the concept o f a 
Sultanate spread and extended to other areas such as Basilan Island, now the 
province o f Basilan, northward to Palawan, eastward to Zamboanga, and westward 
to Borneo. This process was replicated in the main Island of Mindanao, particularly 
in the Cotabato and Lanao areas where Sharif Muhammed Kabunbuan, a trader from  
Malaysia who was the main actor in this movement, won the trust and confidence of 
the people of Maguindanao and eventually converted them into Islam. It is believed 
that by the firs t ha lf o f the 16th century, the process o f Islamization tha t orig inally 
started in Borneo and Sulu extended its influence to as far as M indoro and other 
areas in southern Luzon. In Manila, now the seat o f government, Raja Sulaiman was 
the firs t prom inent figure advocating the sultanate concept in the region.2
Islam as a religion was the common denominator, and the un iting  factor, 
among the communities in the entire archipelago. The population centers were 
im portant trading places run by organizations called the barangay, or a community 
made up o f a dozen to several hundreds o f families. The process o f Islamization then 
further accelerated the natural expansion o f this barangay-type society, which was 
usually headed by 'datus' (Muslim traditional leaders). The Datus were usually 
heads o f clans who served under the supervision o f the Sultan and were guided by
2 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of Southern Philippines, 
Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, MD.:Lexington Books, 2002), 185-193.
the functions o f the religious court, Agama, and the customs of the Adat, non-Islamic 
customs.3 In practice, the position o f Datu is hereditary. The Datu was a political 
leader, judge, oftentimes owner o f the larger portion o f the land, and made sure that 
religious obligations were fulfilled. Nowadays the Datu no longer owns a large 
portion o f the land bu t remains a respected and influential figure in the Muslim 
communities. In those social arrangements, the Muslims were basically organized 
into numerous small politica l units headed by Datus and then integrated to the 
sultanate of Sulu and Maguindanao. The set-up is s im ila r to India’s caste system, 
where the class below Datu was composed o f freemenT and below the freemen were 
the debt-bondsmen, and at the bottom  o f the social hierarchy were the slaves.4 This 
system has somewhat changed in today’s trad itional Muslim politica l system. 
Slavery is no longer practiced and the ownership of land is no longer a monopoly of 
the Datu. Still, the authority and influence o f the Datu in  the entire community of 
Muslims still prevails. In fact, even those who do not belong to the Datu's hereditary 
line are called Datu by v irtue  o f the political position they hold, which is a reflection 
o f the authority they w ie ld in the ir community.
Islam was the official religion adopted as result o f the then-flourishing trade 
w ith  merchants from China and Arabic countries in the Middle East including 
Yemen. In short, the international commerce brought in no t only traders bu t Islamic 
missionaries that paved the way for Islam to proliferate in most areas in the 
country. The introduction o f Islam gave the Muslims a separate distinction from  all
3 Peter G. Gowing, Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: Philippine 
Federation of Christian Churches,1964), 38-43.
4 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secesion, 192-193.
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other ethnic identities that were eventually Christianized in the archipelago. Islam 
as a religion gave the people o f Mindanao a sense o f community, which developed 
into a consciousness o f belonging to the international brotherhood that transcended 
tribal, linguistic, and even racial identity.5 Islamic activities were intensified to 
become the rallying po in t o f every Muslim when the spread of Christianity began to 
surge from  the north (Luzon) to the Visayas region and some parts o f Mindanao. By 
then, Islam had t  evolved in to  a powerful force against the spread Christianity, 
which the Spaniards were determined to propagate all over the archipelago.
The vast m ajority of Muslims consistently refused and strongly resisted the 
Spanish rule even after Raja Sulaiman was defeated in Manila, so that the Sultanates 
of Sulu and Maguindanao were never incorporated into the Spanish colony.6 Today, 
the same strong religious bond serves as the prim ary factor preventing the Muslim 
communities from  accepting and or adapting to a different way o f life. As a 
consequence, relations between the Muslim communities and the Spanish colony 
were characterized by hostilities known as the Moro wars, save fo r some instances 
o f in term ittent truces, over 333 years o f Spanish rule.
Today, the Muslims in the Philippines are generally found on the main island 
o f Mindanao, in the Sulu archipelago, in Palawan, and on different islands in  Luzon 
and the Visayan region by reason o f trade or migration. The greatest demographic 
concentration is in the Lanao, Cotabato, and Davao areas, the Sulu archipelago, the 
island o f Basilan, and Balabac in the southern part o f Palawan. There is no exact
5 R. Joel de los Santos, Jr., “Reflection on the Moro wars and the New Filipino,” in Understanding Islam 
and Muslims in the Philippine, ed. Peter Gowing (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988], 92-102.
6 Ibid.
number of Muslims in the Philippines, but they are estimated to account fo r about 6 
percent to 8 percent o f the current tota l national population. One other im portant 
characteristic o f Muslim communities in the country is that they do not share a 
single common language as they are composed o f d iffe rent ethnic groups that speak 
the ir own language and dialect. But beyond this diversity, they are united by Islam 
into one solid organization in the entire country, no matter where they are, fo r it 
gives them the distinctive identity. In fact, they always identify themselves as 
Muslims rather than Filipinos. These ethnic groups o f Muslims in the Philippines 
have, in the past, joined forces whenever one o f the ethnic groups was faced w ith  
the challenge o f having to defend itse lf against the national government’s armed 
forces. While these Muslim ethnic groups are a m inority  in terms o f the ir 
population, it  is not necessarily so in terms of the strength o f force they possess 
whenever they jo in  up to face the armed m ight o f the national government.
The four major Islamized ethnic communities are the Tausug and the Samal 
(or Sama) who are concentrated in the Sulu archipelago and the Zamboanga region, 
the Maguindanao who are concentrated in the Cotabato region and part of 
Zamboanga, and the Maranao o f the Lake Lanao region (to  many, the Iranon group 
belonged to the Maranao even as this group is situated between Lanao and 
Cotabato). Some Muslims from  any of these major ethic groups are dispersed in the 
Zamboanga region, Davao, and Bukidnon, and a growing number is based in Manila.7 
In situations where one or more o f these ethnic groups is facing problems, especially 
i f  i t  involves the ir relations w ith  the national government, then they automatically
7 Peter G. Gowing, Mosque and Moro, 1-6.
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earn the sympathy and support o f Muslims from ethnic groups that are not 
necessarily affected by the problem. This explains w hy the government, though it 
has the monopoly o f power, could hardly create a dent in the so lidarity and 
cohesiveness o f the Moros to adapt to policies o f the national government that are 
understandably new to them. The section that follows presents a review  o f the 
historical accounts of the Muslim resistance against the Spanish colonial rule.
THE MORO WARS AGAINST THE SPANIARDS
Spain became interested in its expansion to explore Southeast Asia from  the 
late 1500s to the decolonization period. The Philippines was one o f the ir prim ary 
targets for inclusion into the Spanish te rrito ry  while converting in to  Christianity the 
inhabitants in these areas who were undoubtedly already socially and po litica lly  
structured and organized according to the Islamic way o f life. The prom inent figure 
in Spain's expansionist process was Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, who arrived in the 
Philippines in 1565 and declared Spanish sovereignty over the islands. W hile Islam 
was in the process o f spreading from the south to the north, the Spaniards began 
converting the people to Christianity. There was opposition to Spanish rule and the 
conversion to Christianity, notably in the Sultanate o f Manila led by Raja Sulaiman, 
but his rule ended when he was defeated by the Spaniards in May o f 15 71.8 As a 
result, many were converted to Christianity especially on the islands o f Luzon and 
the Visayas while the whole archipelago was named the Philippines in honor o f King 
Philip III o f Spain. Consequently, the process o f conversion halted the spread o f 
Islam to the north and, instead, the Islamic way o f life was confined to the south o f
8 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 199.
the Philippines -- the Sulu archipelago and the Island o f Mindanao. In short, both 
religions, Islam and Christianity, played an im portant role in changing the landscape 
o f Philippine society, v irtua lly  d ivid ing the form erly unified groups o f people in the 
entire archipelago. This was the tim e when the cooperative relationship between 
Muslims and those eventually Christianized Filipinos was transformed, and overt 
vio lent conflicts became prevalent, especially when the colonizers influenced and 
used the people o f the north to fight those opposing conversion to Christianity 
[Muslims in Mindanao).9 In other words, Muslim anger against the colonizers was 
exacerbated by the fact that the supposed local allies — whom the Spaniards called 
Indios -  fought alongside the foreign invaders either vo luntarily  or by force. For 
more than 300 years the environment was characterized by hard fighting, in some 
instances interrupted only by short-term  ceasefires, and halted only m om entarily in 
1899 when the Americans came and successfully defeated the Spaniards.10
The 'Moro wars' were generally lumped together as a resu lt o f numerous 
Spanish expeditions to the Muslim lands in the Philippines, the frequent Muslim 
raids on territo ries already held by the Spaniards, and the naval battles that took 
place between the Muslims and the Spaniards from about the tim e o f Legazpi’s 
arrival in 1565 to the last days o f the Spanish rule in  the Philippines.11 Other 
Spanish scholars, notably Vicente Barrantes and Jose Montero y Vidal, have called 
these wars "guerras piraticas," on the premise that the Spaniards waged w ar on the
9Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao: Conflicting agendas. Stumbling Blocks, and Prospects Towards 
Sustainable Peace,” in Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific, eds. Annelies, Heijmans, et.al. (London: 
Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004), 483-485.
10 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 200-201.
11 Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines, 2nd ed. (Quezon City: UP Press, 1973), 107.
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Muslim te rrito ry  in the Philippines, including Brunei, to eliminate, or at least 
minimize, the piratical incursions o f the Muslims in to  the Spanish-held te rrito ry . 
This period o f Moro resistance against the Spaniards, as observed by Cesar A. Majul 
(1973), was the first o f six major stages that characterized the struggle between 
Spain and Brunei for political and commercial primacy in  the Philippine 
Archipelago. A t this stage, the Spaniards succeeded in destroying the Manila 
settlement and fo rt that were ruled by a Bornean aristocracy and elim inating 
Bornean traders from the Visayas and Northern Mindanao. This stage ended w ith  
the Spanish attack on Brunei in 1578. 12 The second stage, covering about two 
decades, is characterized by the attem pt o f the Spaniards to establish a colony in 
Mindanao, reduce the Muslim rulers into vassals, p roh ib it the rulers from  adm itting 
Muslim preachers, and persuade them to accept Christian missionaries. The third 
and fourth stages, covering a number o f years in the 17th century, witnessed the 
contest between the Spaniards and an alliance o f Muslims in Mindanao to control 
the Visayas. This contest was decided in Spain’s favor after her conquest o f the 
Moluccas in 1606. In this period, there was an acceleration of Spanish im peria listic 
expansion. The Spaniards decided to conquer the sultanates by compelling the Indio 
group (natives o f Luzon) to fight the Moros. The daunting part o f this stage was 
when the Spaniards adopted the policy o f depopulating the Muslim areas -  burning 
settlements, plantations, fields, and orchards, and enslaving the Muslims fo r the 
galleys. As a consequence, most o f the people retreated into the in te rio r areas to 
keep themselves relatively safe from Spanish attacks. Owing to Spanish
12 Ibid., ch. 3-8
62
provocations in Muslims territories, Sultan Kudarat in 1656 declared a jihad against 
the colonizer in the Cotabato region, and this was supported by all the other 
trad itional leaders. This period, according to Majul, demonstrated the fact that the 
Muslims were w illing  to keep the peace in Mindanao provided tha t the Spaniards 
would leave them and the ir te rrito ries alone. Although the Muslims never had a 
standing professional army of th e ir own, the ir coordinated efforts resulted in a large 
number o f casualties on the Spanish side. Every man was a citizen-soldier who was 
prepared to give his life in defense o f the community.
I t  was during the fifth stage, according to Majul, that the Moro wars began 
w ith  the re-fortification o f its garrisons notably in Zamboanga in  1718 but ended 
during the Spanish failure during that century to reduce the Muslims to vassalage. It 
was also in this period that the two d istinct Muslim groups, the Iranun and the 
Maranaos, began the ir devastating attacks on the other parts o f the archipelago, 
reducing the number o f tributes to Spain from  the Visayas and causing a v irtua l 
d isruption o f the economy of many islands under the Spanish colonial regime. 
Similarly, about ha lf of the century during which Spain was involved in  the Seven- 
Year War in Europe, the British invaded Manila and were able to put up a rule. 
Although the capture of Manila did not last long, the Muslims exploited the presence 
o f the British in carrying out attacks against the Spaniards. As a result, in  1763, the 
Sultan of Sulu ceded to the British some te rrito ries of the sultanate in  North Borneo 
as a way o f recognizing British help to the Muslims.13 The sixth stage o f the Moro
13 Cesar Adib Majul, "Role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People," Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (August 
1966): 312-313; Cesar Majul, Muslis in the Philippines (Quezon City: Philippines Press, 1973), 9; 
Nicholas Tarling, Sulu and Sabah: a study of British Policy Towards the Philippines and North Borneo
wars was believed to have started w ith  the 1851 Spanish campaign against Sulu 
(western part o f Mindanao) and only ended towards the culm ination o f Spanish rule 
in the Philippines in the late 19th century. In this period, there was a notable decline 
in the Sultanates o f Maguindanao and Sulu fo r various reasons. In February 1851, 
the Spaniards captured and burned down the entire c ity o f Jolo in  re ta lia tion fo r the 
pirate attacks led by some Datus. But after a short period, the Spaniards evacuated 
the city when they were able to forge an agreement on April 3 0 ,1 8 51 .14 Among the 
reasons contributing to the defeat o f the Sultan was the Spaniards' use o f improved 
war equipment. Institutional incapacity o f the Muslim societies to respond to 
increased Spanish m ilita ry  pressures was another factor that brought about the 
gradual decline in the Sultanates' influence over the entire Muslim region. From 
then on, the people o f the north (Christians) inherited the oppressive ways o f the 
colonial power, leading to a series o f major clashes between the Christians and the 
unorganized Muslim armed troops. Thus i t  has been argued that the centuries-long 
Muslim war against the Spaniards stemmed from  Spanish efforts to subdue and 
Christianize them, to which the Moro people in  general responded by developing the 
cult o f being a w arrio r.15
In 1899, the separate political existence o f the Moro people was recognized 
by then President of the firs t Philippine Republic, Emilio Aguinaldo, through a 
message to Congress. He proposed that his government be empowered to negotiate 
w ith  the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu fo r the purpose of establishing national
from the late Eighteenth Century (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), 10-12.
14 For the text of the agreement, see Teofisto Guingona, "Historical Survey of Policies,” 171-174.
15 Albert Ravenholt, The Philippines: A Young Republic on the Move (London: D.Van Nostrand
Company, 1962), 16.
solidarity upon the real basis o f a Federation w ith  absolute respect fo r beliefs, 
culture, and traditions. It  is im portant to note tha t the w ord Jihad, or ho ly war, was 
used by the Muslims to refer to the ir almost continuous conflict w ith  the Spanish 
colonial rulers in  the southern Philippines during this period. They also referred to 
the ir combatants as mujahideen. This Jihadist tendency in the Muslim w orld  even 
then shows that in a w ar against non-Muslims, the Jihadist movement reinforces 
the morale o f those who dare to combat the threat posed by the ir enemies. The 
thousands who were killed during the w ar w ith  the Spaniards are considered 
shahids, o r martyrs. Also, when the Sultans were unable to resist the m ight o f the 
Spaniards, the term  jihad was brought down to the level o f local communities, 
understandably led by the ir respective local leaders because they were obliged to 
defend Dar al-islam (the obligation to figh t for the maintenance o f the borders of 
Islam and the ir expansion) and shari'a law  unto death.16 To the extreme, Jihad fo r 
the Muslims in  the south was carried out in the form  of suicidal attacks, or 
juramentado in Spanish, meaning someone who has taken oath. This conduct of 
juramentado by the Moros, in the ir fight against infidels, was carried out in almost 
the entire duration of the Spanish era, and against the American soldiers who 
responded to Muslim resistance against foreign incursions by using the ir semi­
automatic caliber .45 hand gun and an automatic Crag-Jorgensen rifle .17
16 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 206.
17 Thomas M Kiefer, "The Parrang Sabbili Ritual Suicide among the Tausug of Jolo," in Understanding 
Islam and Muslims in the Philippines, ed. Peter Gowing (Quezon City: New Day Publisher, 1978), 53- 
57; Stephen Frederic Dale, "Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: Anticolonial Terrorism in India, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no.l (March 1988): 47-56; 
Sixto Y.Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago and its People (London: George H Harrap, 1923), 88-89; Peter G. 
Gowing, Muslim Filipinos-Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City: New Day Publisher, 1979), 100-102;
THE MOROS AND THE U.S. MILITARY OCCUPATION
The Americans arrived in the Philippines in 1898, the same year when the
Filipinos, through the leadership o f General Emilio Aguinaldo, declared Philippine
Independence on June 12, 1898 in the m idst o f the ir uprising against Spain. The
Americans eventually captured the capital Manila and the Spaniards in other places
surrendered as well. As a result, a treaty was concluded on December 10, 1898
between the United States and Spain in which sovereignty over the Philippine
archipelago, including Mindanao (although some Muslims in Mindanao claimed not
part of the treaty), was turned over to the Americans. General Aguinaldo was
frustrated by the Americans’ non-recognition o f the 1898 declaration of
independence, thus leading to a three-year w ar which ended after the surrender of
revolutionaries on April 16, 1902.18 W ith the Spanish departure from  the
Philippines, the Moros in the south which was then comprised by the Sultanates of
Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan and the various principalities o f the Lanao region,
continued to function as a d istinct and separate national entity, and was not a part
or under the effective control o f what is now the Philippines or any other broader
entity.19 In fact, upon the coming o f the Americans in  1898, they were not fu lly
aware o f the presence o f the Moro people in the south and when they learned about
it, they were very cautious not to engage the Muslims in a hostile manner.20
The Americans used "western education" instead of re lig ion as a tool for
Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1972 {Filipinas Foundation Inc, 1977), 8- 
9.
18 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 213.
19MacapadoAbaton Muslim, The Moro Armed struggle in the Philippines: The Non Violent Autonomy 
Alternative (Marawi City, Philippines: MSU Press &Information Office, 1994), 47.
20 See John P. Finley, "The Mohammedan Problem in the Philippines," The Journal o f Race 
Developments, no.4( April 1915): 353-363.
conquest. Just about a year after the Philippines was ceded by Spain to the United 
States of America under the Treaty o f Paris, the Americans on August 10, 1899 
arrived in  the c ity  of Jolo w ith  relatively no major armed resistance from  the Moros. 
This resulted in  the signing o f an agreement between the American m ilita ry- 
governor of Jolo, Brigadier General John C. Bates, and the Sultan o f Sulu, Muhammad 
Jamalul Kiram II. In the agreement, the Muslims recognized the sovereignty o f the 
United States, agreed to help suppress piracy, and tu rn  over to the Americans those 
accused o f crimes against non-Muslims. Moreover, Sulu would be allowed to run 
the ir internal affairs while the United States would maintain and recognize the 
dignity and authority o f the Sultan and other Datus. More im portantly, the 
Americans agreed not to interfere w ith  religious activities and respect the fu ll 
religious freedom o f the local people. Other than these, the Americans agreed to pay 
a monthly subsidy to the Sultan in the amount o f $250 and smaller sums to Datus, 
and the Muslims would also have the protection o f the United States against external 
threats.21 In international affairs, this period also marked the s ta rt o f a long 
relationship between the Philippines and the United States. Unlike the Spaniards, 
the Americans preferred to negotiate w ith  the Muslims rather than using force. This 
was manifested by the message o f U.S. President W illiam  McKinley to the U.S. 
Congress in 1899 in defining the policy o f the United States towards the Philippines:
21 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 213-214; Macapado Abaton Muslim, The Moro 
Armed struggle in the Philippines, 55.
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The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, 
to educate, to tra in  in the science o f self-government. This is the 
path we must fo llow  or not recreant to a m ighty trust committed 
to us.22
The policy was a self-assumed mandate and i t  came to occupy, fo r quite a different 
reason, an im portant place in  the th ink ing and rhetoric of both Americans and 
Filipinos. For the Muslims in the south, the agreement w ith  the Americans meant 
that they had neutralized the threat posed by the Americans and ensured the 
continuity o f the ir traditional way o f life as Muslims whose iden tity  was d istinct 
from that o f other Filipinos.23 Muslim leaders saw and seemed to believe that the ir 
diplomacy had kept the Americans out o f the ir internal affairs and guaranteed the ir 
way o f life on terms no worse than those imposed by the Spaniards. The Americans, 
on the other hand, believed they were gaining Muslim cooperation by the fact that 
they were keeping the latter peaceful and at the same tim e securing the ir 
acknowledgment of United States sovereignty over the islands. In reality, the U.S. 
Army’s main task was to maintain a peaceful relationship w ith  the Muslims, not to 
antagonize them, but at the same tim e suppressing piracy, curtailing the slave trade 
(though not abolishing slavery), and keeping Muslim inter-group conflicts w ith in  
bounds.
The U.S. m ilita ry  occupation o f Moro lands ensured Muslim acknowledgment 
o f the United States sovereignty in Mindanao and Sulu. During this period, the U.S. 
army could not spare many troops from operations in  the north  and depended
22 Peter C. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American government o f Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920) 
(Manila: Community Publishers, 1977), 15-16.
23 See the text of the Bates agreement, in Robert Bacon, "The Moro Problem in the Philippine Islands," 
Congressional Record (Washington, D.C., U.S. House of Representatives, May 6 ,1926 ), 8835; Peter 
G. Gowing, Mandate in Moro Land, 348-349 (appendix B); also Finley, Mohammedan Problem in the 
Philippines II, 28.
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mainly on garrisons at a few strategic points in Moro land. The 23rd U.S. A rm y w ith  
three officers and 185 enlisted men took over garrisons left by the Spaniards in  the 
city o f Jolo, then the ir seat o f government, w ith  a very specific mission to relieve the 
Spaniards and gradually extending American influence over Sulu and Mindanao. In 
dealing w ith  the Moro people, the Americans sought diplomacy instead o f using 
coercion to w in  Muslim friendship and neutra lity  not on ly to avoid serious trouble 
but because the U.S. troops could expect no circumstances in which reinforcement 
was possible.24
The firs t American who assumed the post o f m ilitary-governor o f the Muslim 
areas in Sulu and Mindanao, then called the Department o f Mindanao, was Brigadier 
General George W. Davis. He served from 1901 to 1902. In spite o f careful 
adm inistration by the United States government, the American mandate in  the 
Philippines -  particularly in the Muslim region — was m ild ly implemented during 
the m ilita ry  occupation. The policy o f non-interference, for example, in  the Moro 
internal affairs prevented any vigorous effort to develop, civilize, educate, and tra in  
Muslim Filipinos in the science o f democratic self-government. In this context, 
certain features o f Muslim Filipino society in judicial procedures, including slavery, 
generally made the Americans unhappy, as these were contrary to the ir sense o f 
social justice and order. Some officers o f the US army were eager to use a d irect 
hand in 'civilizing' the Muslims. Modern care was made available at any U.S. Arm y 
hospital and clinic. Public health and sanitation were introduced. Few schools were 
bu ilt and soldiers and civilians served as teachers p rim arily  intended fo r Muslims.
24 Macapado Abaton Muslim, op.cit, p. 55; Sydney A. Cloman, Myself and a Few Moros (New York: 
Double Day, Page & Co., 1923], 1-3.
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Moreover, bridges, roads, trails, and wharves were constructed which both d irectly 
and indirectly benefited the Muslims. But in spite of systematic efforts to educate 
the Muslims, Datus in d ifferent communities refused to  let the ir children go to 
school, fearing that this would mean a systematic move fo r conversion to 
Christianity. Instead, a Datu would just send a younger slave to study in  those 
schools.25 To fu rther push education, more US soldiers were sent to Mindanao. But 
this troop movement was easily misunderstood by the Muslims, as there had been 
ongoing speculations among the Muslims communities that American activ ity in 
the ir m idst m ight have already undermined the security o f their re lig ion and way of 
life.26
General Davis, during his term, attempted to change the trad itiona l practices 
o f the Moro to make them resemble the democratic beliefs and practices in the 
United States, such as ending slavery, polygamy, and piracy, and weakening the 
influence of the Datus over the ir constituents. It  may have been m otivated by noble 
intentions but the traditional Muslim leaders saw i t  as a systematic move that 
threatened the ir community and the traditional authority. The American decision to 
take a direct hand in controlling Moro affairs triggered a vigorous opposition from  
Muslim leaders that led to vio lent conflict between the American Arm y and the 
Moros. The firs t recorded incident occurred in Sulu in 1901 when Panglima Hassan, 
who believed resisting American or foreign rule was considered commandments of 
f l  sabil allah or fighting in the name o f Jihad, stood up against the Americans. This
25 Albert Ravenholt, op.cit.,58.
26 Peter Gowing, "Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines,” in The Muslim Filipinos, eds. Peter C.
Gowing, and Robert McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 35.
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action was replicated by other Muslim groups, including that o f the Maranaos who 
attacked American forces north o f Lake Lanao on the main island o f Mindanao.27 The 
incident was followed by several others that killed many Muslims as well as 
members o f the American army. The American m ilita ry  regime also attempted to 
change other systems in the area o f Sulu and Mindanao, such as the im position o f a 
tax system, customs duties, and a requirement fo r surveying lands, registry, and 
mapping which the Muslims became tru ly  w orried about. All these activities and 
sim ilar attempted changes the Americans wanted to implement in the Moro 
communities were regarded by the Muslims w ith  great suspicion about the 
Americans' real intentions.28
THE CREATION OF A MORO PROVINCE
Civil m ilita ry  authorities began to take a close look at the American policy on 
Moro land during the time when the United States was form ally committed to the 
fu ll independence o f the Philippines, as mandated in  the Philippine b ill o f 1902. The 
policy of non-interference was abandoned in order to exercise d irect rule over the 
Muslims w ith  the intention o f preparing them fo r eventual integration to the 
Philippine political system.29 By this time, Muslim areas in the south were called the 
‘Moro Province' which was fu rther subdivided into the five districts o f Zamboanga, 
Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, and Sulu. The Moro province was closely administered by 
the American Army which was entirely d ifferent from  other islands o f the
27 Moshe Yager, Between Integration and Secession, 215-215.
28 Pete G. Gowing, "Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920," Asian Studies 6, No.3 
(December 1968): 374-375; Peter G. Gowing, Mandate ofMoroland, 319-320; Federico Magdalena, 
"Moro-American Relations in the Philippines," Philippine Studies 44 (3rd Quarter 1996): 429-430.
29Peter G. Gowing, "Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 72-76.
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Philippines, which were transferred to civilian adm inistration when the uprising of 
the revolutionaries ended.30
Many factors were considered in the abrogation of the American policy of 
non-interference in Moro affairs. The influence o f F ilip ino Christians, particularly 
the nationalists, was powerful enough. They insisted that the Moro land was 
inseparable from  the Philippine archipelago. Moreover, both the Americans and the 
Filipinos in the North considered the vast natural resources of Mindanao and Sulu as 
v ita l to the national economy. In the process, the American policy on dealing w ith  
the Muslims developed into something very sim ilar to tha t of the Spanish policy in 
the same region, which devastated not only the Muslims' nationalism but also the ir 
relationship w ith  fe llow  Christian Filipinos. This resulted in severe shocks to the 
Muslim communities and the Muslim trad itional leaders (the Datus), the ir situation 
further exacerbated by the settlement o f Christians in Muslim areas.31
On the other hand, the Americans recognized tha t integration o f the Muslims 
into the modern Philippine state would take a long time, but they were determined 
to organize provinces that were dominated by the Christians. In the Moro lands, the 
Americans took the po litico -m ilita ry d is tric t system as a template fo r direct rule 
over the Moro people by making the Datus o f every d is tric t serve as the headmen, 
particularly in the remotest triba l areas. For the d ifferent government posts, officials 
were carefully selected. Those in the higher positions at first were mostly army 
officers, and few civilian Americans were appointed to posts as provincial attorney 
and superintendents o f schools. A ll provinces were still under the d irect supervision
30 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 215.
31 Ibid., 215
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o f the Governor General in Manila and the Philippine commission which was also 
dominated by the Americans.
The system set-up gave the Americans an opportunity to im plem ent what 
seemed righ t for the modern Philippine state. Slavery was made illegal and tyranny 
as practiced by the traditional leaders was reduced to some degree; these were the 
firs t rules forcefully imposed on the Moros. An attempt to  introduce the American 
concept o f the justice system was made through the triba l ward court system under 
the supervision o f American attorneys. This was also the start o f the demographic 
alteration o f the people o f Mindanao, as people from  the North started to migrate to 
Mindanao as part o f the program to civilize the Muslims and at the same time 
exploit the rich natural resources o f Moro land. In the process, Muslims became the 
m inority  in  the region while the U.S. political system also began to proliferate all 
over the country.
These developments, resulting from colonially imposed laws which basically 
did not recognize adat (Moro customary law), slowly stoked feelings o f resentment 
among the Muslims against the central government in Manila.32 The American policy 
o f direct rule and attempts to implement the mandate to use the democratic model 
o f governance struck the authority and prestige o f the Muslim chiefs, including the 
customs, traditions, and practices they had known fo r centuries. Laws against 
slavery threatened the politico-economic structure o f traditional society, and the 
establishment of provincial and d is tric t governments enforced basically by US army 
troops undermined the absolute power and status of traditional leaders in Muslim
32Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, op.cit., 483-488.
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society. Moreover, bypassing Muslim courts and refusing to recognize the existence 
o f customary laws increased the Moros' feelings o f i ll  w ill against the Americans. 
The Moros believed tha t the ir customs, traditions, and practices were consistent 
w ith  the teachings o f Islam, which is the ir way o f life guided by the Holy Qur'an. Any 
move to change or restructure the ir society by enforcing strict obedience to foreign 
laws was seen as a fundamental challenge to the ir re lig ion and the ir very existence 
as human beings.
Americans who became governors o f the Moro province never had friendly 
relations w ith  the Muslims. General Leonard Wood, the firs t governor o f the Moro 
province from 1903 to 1906 and was governor-general o f the Philippines from  1921 
to 1927, found nothing w orth  preserving in the Muslim customary laws o r Adat.33 
As a consequence, he fought Muslims who did not subscribe to American laws. It 
was at this tim e that Moro people who resisted American au thority  were called 
bandits or outlaws. The succeeding governors, such as Generals Bliss and Pershing, 
followed the same path o f forcible strategy instead of diplomacy in  dealing w ith  the 
Moro people un til 1914. Finally, w ith  the heavy losses the Muslims had incurred in 
fighting the Americans, the entire Muslim communities and the ir leaders realized 
that continued fighting w ith  the American army that was equipped w ith  modern 
weapons could mean the continuing loss o f lives among the Moro people in  Sulu and 
Mindanao.34 Consequently, when Brigadier General John Pershing took over and 
served from  1909 to 1913 as m ilita ry  governor o f the Moro province, and after a
33Peter C. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government o f Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920  
(Quezon City: UP System, 1977], op.cit, 107.
34 Peter G. Gowing, Muslim-American Relations, 372. 378-379; Peter G. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 
139-148; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 215-217.
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series o f bloody fighting between the opposing forces from June 11 to  16, 1913 in 
which the Muslims suffered heavy casualties, the Americans gradually gained the 
cooperation o f the Datus. by. In some instances, the Datus extended assistance in 
suppressing Muslim rebellion while the Americans also recruited Christian Filipinos 
in the ir M ilita ry  campaign. By 1901, the Philippine scouts and Philippine 
constabulary, composed entirely o f Indios o r F ilip ino Christians allied w ith  
foreigners, were organized under the leadership o f American officers.35
MORO RESISTANCE AS PART OF AN INDEPENDENT PHILIPPINES
The general situation in the Department o f Mindanao and Sulu, established 
on 15 December 1913, continued to be chaotic even when the firs t civilian governor, 
Frank W. Carpenter, was appointed head and adm in istra tor of the department in the 
same year. The Americans, all at command level starting at the top w ith  Secretary of 
War Elihu Root, were convinced tha t i t  w ould take a long tim e to  integrate the 
Muslims into the Philippine or American government, and were optim istic that 
turn ing over the control and management of Moro land would only be more 
problematic instead o f simply allow ing the Moro triba l structure and the ir way o f 
life to continue.36 The Zamboanga Chamber o f Commerce had a s im ila r v iew  and, in 
January 1910, made representations to  the President of the United States requesting 
that the southern Island o f the Philippines be separated po litica lly  from  the 
Philippine archipelago and be declared American te rrito ry  due to its potential
35 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 219; Sixto Y. Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago and Its 
People, 45-46; Peter G. Gowing, Muslim-American Relations, 379; Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino Muslim 
Armed Struggle, 19-27; Federico V. Magdalena, "Colonization and The Moro-Indio Conflict in 
Mindanao, Philippines," Studies in Third World Societies, no. 48 (June 1992): 63.
36 James R. Arnold, The Moro War: How America Battled A Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 
1902-1913 (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 20.
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economic benefits..37
This attem pt to separate Mindanao from the rest o f the country was repeated 
when the Muslim communities made a strong and concerted move in 1924 to allow 
the United States to annex Mindanao after independence was to be granted to the 
Philippines, and forcefully opposed inclusion in an independent Philippine 
Republic.38 But in spite of such a strong appeal, the Americans accelerated plans 
toward Philippine self-government and independence which exacerbated tensions 
as i t  was coupled w ith  a policy implementing a rapid campaign fo r 'F ilip in ization.' 
Consequently, Governor Carpenter transferred the supervision o f the Muslims in 
Sulu and Mindanao from  American adm inistrators in Zamboanga to the Filipinos' 
seat o f government -- where only a few Muslims were actively involved — in  Manila 
while continuing the Americans’ socio-political plans fo r the Moros w ith  the aim of 
speeding up the process o f the ir integration to the government o f the Republic.
This process consequently annoyed the Moros in general, even as there were 
a few Muslims who worked w ith  Christian Filipinos on the integration program. 
After six years o f the existence o f the Department o f Mindanao and Sulu (from  1914- 
1920), i t  turned out that a m ajority o f the people w orking there were Christians, a 
situation that convinced the Muslims that the Philippine government was only 
looking out fo r the Christians or what they termed as "Christian Philippin ization."39
37 See Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino Muslims, 168-169; Moshe Yegar, Between integration and Secession, 
223.
38 See appendix 3, Full text of the Declaration of Rights and Purposes by the group of Muslim 
Politician in February 1924 addressed to the US Congress.
39 Peter G. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, op.cit., 18, 242,251; Peter G. Gowing, Muslim American 
Relations, 373, 379; R.B. Thomas, Muslims but Filipino, 45-60; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 23-24; 
Ralston Hayden, "What Next for the Moro?" Foreign affairs 6, no. 4 (July 1928]: 639-640; Moshe 
Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 219-220.
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Of all the roles played by the Americans in Moro land, the one that really
transformed and undermined the traditional power o f the local Muslims elites was
the cancellation o f the Sultanate o f Sulu. It  was a result o f the nine-day negotiation
between the governor o f the Department o f Sulu and Mindanao, Frank Carpenter,
and the Sultan o f Sulu, Jamal Kiram II. The agreement says that
The Sultan o f Sulu is the titu la r spiritual head o f the Mohammedan 
Mosque in Sulu archipelago, w ith  all the rights and privileges which 
under the government o f the United States o f America may be 
exercised such an ecclesiastical authority, and subject to the same 
lim itations which apply to the supreme spiritual heads o f all other 
religions existing in American te rrito ry , including the rights to solic it 
and receive voluntary popular contributions fo r the support o f the 
clergy rites, and other necessary lawful expenses of an ecclesiastical 
character.40
The continued Moro resistance made the Philippine government realize the need for 
continued m ilita ry  support from  the US government. The U.S. army role in  aiding the 
cause o f advancing Philippine society by preserving peace and keeping order was 
assumed more and more by the Philippine Scouts and the Constabulary. From the 
standpoint o f the Moros, including the Sultan o f Sulu, they had acquired hereditary 
sovereignty over the land after a long history and the agreement w ith  Spain was 
merely about sovereignty over Moro land, and therefore, the Spaniards could not 
transfer the same to the United States, like the rest o f the Philippine Islands, since 
that sovereignty was never subject to the ir ownership. In spite o f the numerous 
developments put in place as part o f efforts to integrate the Moros into the national 
socio-political system, many among the Moros interpreted such a wave of
40 For the text of memorandum, see Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 352-353; Samuel K. Tan, The 
Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 176-179; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and secession, 220-
221.
development as a threat to the ir way o f life. Consequently, such developments were 
perceived as part of the continued m ilitarization o f the Moro land while the 
Philippines was under a commonwealth system.41 In fact, there were many Datus, 
particularly in  the Lanao region, who refused to send the ir children to public 
schools, surrender the ir weapons to the Americans, or allow the government to 
survey the lands. The same feeling o f opposition to changes in Moro society was fe lt 
in the Cotabato regions, where a call for simultaneous opposition to American 
infidels and Christian Filipinos was aired.42 Thus for several years, the Moros were 
v irtua lly  under m ilita ry  rule which exposed them to the v io len t side o f the 
government. This experience left indelible p rin ts in the consciousness not only of 
the Moros who had endured it  over a long period o f time, but also the more 
enthusiastic and vibrant young Moros who learned this im portant h istorical lesson 
o f the ir existence.
INTERNAL MIGRATION AND CONTINUING COLONIZATION
The proxim ity o f the Visayan Islands (especially Bohol, Cebu, Leyte, Siquijor, 
and Negros) to Mindanao has been a major factor in  the movement o f people 
between these two Islands. It  was believed, w ithou t substantial p roo f that Visayan 
settlers -- particularly those from  Bohol, who reportedly founded Dapitan in 
Western Mindanao -- had already settled along the northern coast o f Mindanao even
41MacapadoAbaton Muslim, op.cit., 59.
42 Sixt Y. Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago, 47-52; Joseph RalstonHayden, "What next for Moro?” Foreign 
Affairs 6, no. 4 (July 1928):, 638-639; W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f the Southern 
Philippines and the Malays o f Southern Thailand (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 
1990), 52; Carter G. Bentley, "Implicit Evangelism: American Education Among the Muslim 
Maranao," Pilipinas no. 12 (Spring 1989): 73-79; Moshe Yegar, Between Secession and Integration,
222.
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before the Spaniards came.43 The two provinces o f Mindanao, notably Agusan Del 
Norte and Surigao Del Norte, had been receiving m igrants from the islands o f Leyte 
and Bohol through the years.
This pattern of m igration from the Visayas to  Mindanao, as observed by 
Klaus Hausherr, continued and even accelerated during the American 
regimeespecially after the Moros were v irtua lly  contained by the U.S. army in 
1915.44 As the U.S-planned settlements in Mindanao were well underway, the 
government declared that those who would transfer from  the crowded north to 
Mindanao and Sulu would be given financial aid, housing, and sim ilar other benefits. 
The Cotabato area was the firs t target destination fo r the main bulk o f settlers, while 
sim ilar other smaller groups were scattered in some areas of Mindanao and Sulu. 
For example, one area for the settlement o f American soldiers who decided to stay 
in the Philippines was established in Momongan, now Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Years 
later, the peopling o f Mindanao by Visayan and Luzon farmers was also aided by the 
entry o f the logging industry, the extensive farm plantations, and the beginning of 
large scale m ining industries in  several areas o f M indanao45 W hile the political 
situation in Manila continued to develop in March 1934, the US Congress passed the 
Tydings-McDuffie Act providing fo r Philippine Independence after a ten-year
43Dela Costa, Horacio, S.J., The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1968 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1961), 310.
44 Klaus Hausherr, "Agricultural Colonization of Kapatagan Valley Basin, Lanao Del Norte, Mindanao, 
Philippines," in Problems of Land Use in Southeast Asia: Yearbook o f South Asia Institute, 1968-1969, 
ed. Schweinfurth(Heidelberg: University at Wiesbaden, 1969), 101.




W ith the continuation o f the settlement program, the Philippine 
commonwealth government established the National Settlement Adm inistration in 
1938 purposely to look at the systematic movement o f population to Moro land. 
This movement was tem porarily halted in late 1941 at the start o f the Pacific War, 
when the Philippines was preparing for inevitable invasion by the Japanese Imperial 
Army. But again, after the end o f the Second W orld  W ar in 1945, the m igration of 
people from all other parts o f the Visayas and Luzon rapid ly surged in most o f the 
fertile lands o f the Moros.47 A fter the 1950s, more Filipinos as w ell as American and 
Japanese business interests came fo r the purpose o f further exploiting Mindanao. 
This exploitation was made successful when the government approved perm its for 
investors to establish business, notably Del Monte, Stanfilco, and Dole which were 
especially engaged in growing bananas, pineapple, papaya, and tomatoes.48
Most of the workers were from  outside Moro land and, w ith  th e ir love of 
work, most o f them opted to stay permanently in the place where they were 
working together w ith  the ir families. The increasing population in  the area spelled 
trouble not only because o f the increasing needs of society but also because the 
Muslims realized that there was a systematic move to take the ir land away from  
them. The Moros believed they were the true owners of the land and not the 
Christians from Luzon and the Visayas who, by au thority  o f the government, rapid ly 
populated the lands. For the Muslims, the land was the ir heritage and was therefore





not to be owned nor sold to strangers fo r the ir own pro fit. Land fo r the Muslim has 
no owners; instead, only the righ t to use i t  is transferable and can be renewed. The 
Datu in each community, in this period, only assigned the right to use the land o r in 
some cases transfer that righ t to others w ith in  the ir area of influence.49The Moro 
system o f administering the land was entire ly the opposite o f American and 
Christian ways. This realization marked the start o f the Muslims’ overt resistance to 
the national government and led to the eventual rise o f the Moro organized armed 
struggle.
The Philippines got its independence from  American rule on July 4, 1946 
w ith  Manuel A. Roxas as the firs t president of the Republic. Certainly, the Muslims in 
the south were considered part o f the new liberal, democratic country. And w ith  the 
new independent state, the notion of Muslim secession would not be entertained. 
Instead, the leadership was quite convinced tha t Sulu and Mindanao should be 
developed because the area would be o f importance no t only fo r the economy but 
also the security of the region. Although m ajority  o f the Muslims did not share the 
notion o f nationalism, there were some especially the educated ones who 
cooperated and worked w ith  the government leadership as they supported and 
participated in the new political system o f the country. However, in the south, the 
Moros did not consider themselves citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, and 
were uneasy that the lands were gradually taken over by people they considered 
foreigners.50
49 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secssion, 225.
50 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 241.
Their sense o f a separate iden tity  was exacerbated by the role o f religion. 
Muslim Philippines became acquainted w ith  the spread o f pan-Arabism throughout 
the w orld  in the 1950s and w ell into the 1960s. W hile the Moros belonged to 
different ethnic groupings, they were united by Islam in opposing the Christian 
Filipinos from the North. Starting in the early 1950s, many Muslim  religious 
preachers came to the Philippines from  Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Qatar, Pakistan, 
and the neighboring Islamic countries o f Indonesia and Malaysia.51 An im portant 
development in this period was the eventual awareness o f Islamic education among 
the Moros, who were encouraged in this regard by many countries in the Middle 
East. Consequently, many young Muslims o f the south availed o f the scholarships 
made available to them and pursued studies in d iffe rent Islamic schools, particu larly 
at the Islamic University o f Madina in Saudi Arabia and in al-Azhar, Cairo. 
Simultaneous to this development was the massive build-up of Madrassas or Islamic 
schools in Muslim Mindanao, especially after scholars returned home and served as 
Ustadz or teachers.
Another im portant development in this period was when some o f the local 
Muslim leaders were invited to participate in various conferences and seminars in 
the Muslim w orld  and in the annual haj or pilgrimage to Mecca. These are among 
the various factors that brought the Muslims in  the Philippines closer to the Islamic 
world. In fact, one o f the most significant events in  the local history o f Islam was the 
conduct o f the firs t Filipino Muslim Conference in  1955 in Cotabato City which was 
participated in by more than 5,000 delegates from  Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia,
51 W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 56-57; Peter G. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 187.
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and Singapore.52
In the meantime, the Moros’ sense o f alienation from the rest o f Philippine 
society grew and became a staging po in t for inevitable collective action. In 1951, 
the revolt against the government began in Sulu under the leadership o f Hadji 
Kamlun supported by some 100 men . The prim ary reason for th e ir revo lt was not 
very clear, but one th ing there is no doubt that the Moros d id no t like the 
government’s settlement program, including the systematic subdivisions o f the ir 
lands. A fter the end o f WWII, the im m igration policy was renewed ostensibly to 
decongest the populated North and at the same tim e explore the economic 
potentials o f Sulu and Mindanao. Again, this was one o f the most serious reasons for 
instab ility  that ruined the relations and continues to create major barriers between 
Muslim and Christian Filipinos rather than bring progress to the economy of 
Mindanao and the entire country. Today, the then-small population o f Muslims has 
grown considerably but they remain a m inority  not on ly in the context o f the tota l 
national population but also vis-a-vis the smaller total population o f Mindanao. The 
daunting part o f the Moros' long h istory o f alienation and eventual repression has 
served as the basis fo r the Moro people's struggle for the ir righ t to self- 
determination. It  is also the reason that the cooperation o f the Muslims has been 
m inimal whenever an attem pt is made to integrate them into the mainstream of the 
Philippine socio-political system.
52 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 243.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have seen the centuries-Iong history o f anim osity between 
and among identity groups w ith  d ifferent social orientations. This was evident in  the 
long series o f never-ending violence between Muslim and Christian Filipinos since 
the Spanish colonial period up to current times. There was never a situation where 
both parties’ cooperation prevailed in  a way tha t they would have an environment 
in which they could have a harmonious co-existence under one progressive, strong, 
and democratic government o f Filipinos. The firs t major factor that greatly 
contributed to the complexity o f the conflict situation in Mindanao and in the entire 
country was the coming o f the colonial powers. They failed to produce one 
homogeneous society under one umbrella o f government. Those who subscribed to 
Christianity, either vo luntarily  or by force, were highly influenced by or adapted to 
Spanish rule, while those did not -  particu larly the Muslims in the south -  remained 
loyal to the ir traditional way of life based on the teachings o f Islam.
These accounts show how d ifficu lt i t  is to change the habitual social, political, 
cultural, and religious beliefs and orientation o f individual identity o r ethnic groups. 
It can be argued that changing the structure o f society in to  something that is new to 
the population is very difficult, i f  not impossible, particularly where religious beliefs 
are involved. In the case of the Moros o f the Philippines, i t  is true tha t they belonged 
to different ethnic groups tha t were never united under one ru ler, bu t they were 
unified under Islam in the face o f great uncertainty and insecurity.53 Filipinos on the 
islands of Luzon and the Visayas adopted the religion that had been introduced to
53 Edward M. Kuder," The Moros of the Philippines," The Far Eastern Quarterly 4, no.2 (Feb. 1945):
119-126.
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them, arguably by force, because o f the massive power of the colonizers that they 
could not beat back in the ir years o f opposition to foreign rule. A t this point, Dr. 
Regina Karp's views on the importance o f re lig ion to people is most apt when she 
states, in an academic essay, tha t "Recent conflicts and post-conflict stabilization 
efforts (w ar on terro r) have driven home the message that questions o f faith are a 
vita l part o f people's vision o f how they w ant to live."54 I t  only shows that, even in 
the 21st century, security and cooperation in w orld  affairs is h ighly affected by how 
people are influenced by the ir religious beliefs.
The Americans succeeded in taking over the administration o f the Philippine 
archipelago, conscious and aware o f the lessons o f the preceding Spanish rule. They 
obeyed and took seriously the notion o f non-interference in the religious aspect, 
that is, fu ll respect for religious freedom, especially for the Muslims in  the south. The 
environment was relatively calm fo r a while because the Moros fe lt tha t they could 
continue to practice the ir trad itional way o f life, but when the Americans began 
attempts to impose the ir own view  o f what is right, consequently try ing  to alter 
certain aspects o f the Islamic way o f life, they were faced w ith  serious opposition 
that eventually resulted in fierce armed confrontations tha t led to casualties on both 
sides.
The foreign rulers' failure to establish a homogeneous Filipino society by way 
o f integrating different ethnic groups was exacerbated by the process o f isolation 
and discrimination. The situation worsened when the isolationist tendency o f the 
Moros was countered systematically by the ir forced integration using Christianized
S4 Prof. Regina W. Karp is the director of Graduate Program in International Studies at Old Dominion
University.
Filipinos from  Luzon and the Visayas to convince the Moros to agree to integration, 
even to the extent o f using these Christians to figh t the Muslims in  the south. These 
attempts to integrate the Muslims continued up to the 1970s. Indeed, the h isto ry of 
the Mindanao conflict has seen the d ifferent ways, either diplomatic or coercive, of 
try ing to gain the fu ll support o f the Moros fo r the ir possible integration into 
mainstream Philippine society, and the outcomes o f such attempts tha t should serve 
as lessons fo r future activities in this region. A careful reading o f th e ir h istory shows 
that the Moros would cooperate w ith  any e ffort to pacify or integrate them i f  and 
when the ir social, political, cultural, and religious orientations are respected. Lastly, 
i t  was evident in this chapter that Moros have a high regard fo r the trad itiona l 
hierarchical structure o f the ir community and a high respect fo r trad itiona l 
leadership. In the next chapter, this paper critica lly  examines the major attempts at 
conflict resolution in the southern Philippines.
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CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL INTEGRATION PROBLEMS AND THE 1976 PEACE AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
The integration process for Muslims or the "Moros” in the southern 
Philippines was a long and tedious task which the government had been facing for 
several years w ith  difficulties. In spite o f such difficulties, however, the government 
continued to execute the policy believing that through the economic and educational 
programs for Mindanao, the Muslims would eventually appreciate the government 
effort fo r them. The im m igration policy was designed p rim a rily  to develop 
Mindanao, and was expected to address the economic problem not only for the 
benefit o f the Muslims in  the south but fo r the entire country as well. Other than the 
government-assisted im m igrant Filipinos from Luzon and the Visayas, the in flux of 
business industries to Mindanao came next as the government approved many 
applications fo r establishing plantations and logging concessions in that region. To 
ensure fu ll implementation of the development program, the government put up an 
agency, renamed in later years, which would ensure tha t the benign intentions for 
the Muslims and the whole population o f Mindanao would be fulfilled. On the other 
hand, the program for the education o f the Moros was also undertaken in  the belief 
that once the Moros got a good western education, they would become part o f the 
overall society o f educated people who would run the Philippine government. 
These were the two main government programs fo r the Muslims w hich was at the 
time vigorously pursued in the context o f attaining un ity  between the Muslims and
the Christians. But i t  seems that such approaches did no t provide an avenue fo r the 
resolution o f the conflict. Instead, i t  gave an opportun ity  for the intensification of 
violence between the native Muslims and the Christianized Filipino settlers in Moro 
land. When the deteriorating security situation coupled w ith  the draining of 
resources and pressure from international community were felt, the Philippine 
government had no other recourse but to negotiate and find a peaceful resolution to 
the Mindanao conflict. In this chapter, the effects o f these government internal 
policies toward the Muslims, especially in Mindanao, w ill be examined. The last part 
of this chapter undertakes a critical examination o f the firs t major attem pt at 
conflict resolution in 1976 (the T ripo li Agreement) under the auspices o f the 
Organization o f the Islamic Conference, now renamed the Organization o f Islamic 
countries (OIC).
ECONOMIC PROGRAMS FOR MINDANAO
The plan to develop Mindanao after independence from the United States of 
America, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, was one o f the priorities o f the new ly 
formed democratic government o f the Philippines. The program fo r the exploration 
o f both Mindanao fertile lands and its natural resources coincided w ith  the 
pacification campaign o f the rebellion in the north by the Huks (HUKBALAHAP). The 
Huks had been organized on March 29,1942 during the Japanese occupation o f the 
Philippine archipelago. By the time Manuel Roxas, the firs t president o f the 
independent republic, assumed office, the Huk movement was the only group posing 
an internal threat in the north. This group was inspired by the communist ideology 
that had attempted to influence the government system. It was the righ t tim e for
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the government to use the vast fertile  lands o f Mindanao to a ttract the rebels to 
return to the mainstream o f society.
When Ramon Magsaysay became Philippine president in 1953, the 
settlement efforts o f the government continued vigorously because the 
administration had promised and ensured that sizeable lands in Mindanao would be 
given to the Huk rebel returnees. This was one o f the major factors that paved the 
way fo r the cessation o f hostilities as many o f the Huk members agreed and 
accepted the offer o f the government.1 The Economic Development Corps (EDCOR] 
was organized purposely to decongest Luzon and ensure the economic benefits for 
the form er combatants while exploring the economic potential o f Mindanao. In 
short, the resettlement to Mindanao was properly institutionalized particu larly for 
the people not from  Mindanao but those Filipinos who, for the Muslims, were 
considered foreigners in  Mindanao. For sure, the government m otivation fo r this 
program was no t directed against the Muslims; rather, i t  was based on the idea that 
the entire Philippine archipelago must be dealt w ith  as a whole, and the isolationist 
tendency o f any ethnic group had to be addressed in the context o f coexistence.
The government's systematic policy o f settlement resulted in  the massive 
movement of population from the North to Mindanao, not only o f fo rm er rebels bu t 
also the landless, released prisoners, army veterans, those who had come sim ply to 
explore the areas, and everyone who wanted to resettle in  Mindanao. For those who 
had enough capital, they put up plantations and cattle ranches; others w ent into 
logging in the almost untouched forests, exploring mines, and other s im ila r activities
1 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 247-248.
tha t signified permanent settlement in the area. In the business sector, the Chinese 
came to the area and took care o f the business industry  while some o f them also 
exploited the natural resources o f Mindanao. This systemic economic process 
undertaken in Mindanao may have contributed to expanding the national economy, 
generally raised the people’s liv ing standards, relieved the country o f the problem of 
congestion in Luzon, eased tensions over a growing communist insurgency in Luzon, 
and most of all provided an opportunity for the government to develop Muslim 
areas fo r the ir integration into the national socio-political mainstream. However, 
only a few Muslims benefited from this process because most o f the development 
companies such as mining, logging, and other industries were all taken over by the 
Christians. Owing to the ir lack o f educational qualifications and the ir tendency to 
isolationism, the Moros were left out o f the government's development effort.2
In 1954, the agency called the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
Adm inistration (NARRA) was formed to facilitate the im m igration o f Christians to 
Mindanao and administer the targeted areas fo r settlement on the island. The 
agency was able to attract more and more settlers to the resettlement program not 
only because of the proposal to d istribute land (considered public lands) to them 
but also because the government was determined to provide them w ith  financial 
and logistical support. By the end of 1958 or some four years since NARRA's 
creation, about 23,400 Christian families had already settled in the Cotabato region 
alone. This process of moving populations continued systematically, and in fact 
some of the settlers who were not part or did not avail o f the settlement program
2 T.J.S. Revolt in Mindanao, 104-105; Cesar Majul, The Moro Struggle, 900; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos,
189.
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simply moved to Mindanao on the ir own. In ten years, between 1960 and 1970, the 
Christian population in Cotabato alone was more than doubled. By the end o f 1976, 
some analysts estimated the number o f Christian settlers in Cotabato to have h it a 
m illion. The NARRA was deactivated in 1964 and was replaced by the Land 
Authority  whose function was basically to  adm inister the d istribution o f lands to 
settlers.
Under the administration o f President Ferdinand Marcos, who was elected to 
office in  1965, reelected in  1969, and prolonged his stay in power u n til 1986 by 
declaring Martial Law in 1972, the government continued the programs for 
Mindanao w ith  some slight modifications especially in terms o f the functions of 
offices. In 1971, Marcos deactivated the Land Authority  and established a new 
agency, the Department o f Agrarian Reform (DAR), which served as the mother 
agency tha t supervises the Bureau o f Settlements to administer land d istribution. In 
furthering the development effort o f Mindanao areas, Marcos put up a coordinating 
agency called the Reconstruction and Development Program fo r Mindanao (RAD), 
whose function was to ensure the administration and rehabilitation programs 
already in place was taken care o f and functioning according to the overall aims for 
Mindanao. It is good to note that o f all the government development programs for 
Mindanao, RAD was tasked to look into Islamic Education.
The responsibilities o f RAD, among others, were to administer the education 
o f Muslim pupils and increase the number of scholarships to Muslim  students. By 
this time, there was an attempt fo r educated young Muslims to occupy positions in  
the government service. Some of those who availed of the government educational
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programs were rebel returnees. The daunting part was that, fo r little -know n 
reasons, some of them returned anew to  the underground movement after 
completing th e ir educational courses.3 Perhaps, it  was the government im m igration 
policy which they perceived as a threat to th e ir parents' continued righ t to t i l l  the ir 
lands that drove young Muslim professionals to rebel against the national 
government instead o f rendering the ir services to the government in exchange for 
the ir education.
Mindanao island is w ide enough to cater to the economic needs o f the 
country. For those running the government, there is no reason fo r the state not to 
develop the area, more so since it  is not owned by the Muslims. There was no 
question, perhaps, on the development o f the vast land as i t  had addressed the 
problem o f landlessness and had relieved the overcrowded North, bu t the 
increasing number o f settlers became a source o f alarm for Muslim communities 
over ownership and control o f the land which had effectively raised tensions 
between the Christians and the Muslims. The Moros' feelings o f resentment against 
the Christian m ajority had increased not only because o f the land issue, but also 
because the Christians earned government support in almost all the ir dealings w ith  
the Muslims. As a result, the government was seen as the main factor pushing for 
discrim ination against the Muslims and supporting the systematic landgrabbing in 
Mindanao. Of course, the Army, the police, and local authorities were all under 
government and mostly Christian control which gave the Moros a reason to claim
3 Michael Mastura, Development Program fo r Mindanao and Sulu, 144; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 
264-266; Silva, Two Hills o f the Same Land, 44-46; Rodil, The Lumad and Moro, 12; Man Mohini Kaul, 
"The Marcos Regime in the Philippines," India Quarterly 34, no. 3 (July-September 1978):320;
Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 248.
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they were discrim inated against and being eased ou t of Moro land. W ith the 
combination o f the settlement process and tensions, the Moros were forced to 
retreat to the mountains, w ith  some preferring to  move to the swampy areas where 
the source o f livelihood was solely fishing. This explains why many Moros would 
rather rebel than coexist w ith  the settlers u n til today. Since then, the conflict 
between the Moros and the government-backed Christian settlers, especially in 
1967 and 1968, became more intense in almost a ll areas in  Mindanao.4 Instab ility  in 
Mindanao was always expected because the conflict was not only about concern 
w ith  the social system bu t also involved legal matters.
Moro society in general is essentially based on trad ition  w hile the Christians 
relied too much on what was legal according to w ritten  documents. This was a 
major cause o f conflict o f interest between the Muslims and the Christian settlers 
that made it  almost impossible to resolve in terms o f creating a homogeneous 
society. Although there were some Muslims educated during that time, bu t s till they 
were only a mere handful that the ir influence on the whole community was minimal. 
The worse that sometimes happened, especially during a crisis, was that the 
Christians were even seen by many as collaborators of the aggressive and 
discrim inatory government o f the Philippines against the Muslims. In short, the 
economic approach conceived by the government since its inception in 1953, when 
President Magsaysay assumed office, to pacify the secessionist tendency of the 
Moros o f the south improved the lives o f the Christian settlers bu t the alienated
4 Majul, The Moros o f the Philippines, 172; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 105; Lela Garner Noble, "The
Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," Pacific Affairs 49, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 406;
McKenna, Sources o f Muslim Separatism, 13-18.
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Muslims continued to occupy the other side o f the development program, as 
aggressors, owing to w hat they perceived as a discrim inatory policy against them. In 
effect, violence occurred in  almost every major center o f Mindanao w ith  a 
considerable number o f casualties on both the Moro and Christian sides. In sum, 
government economic programs substantially enhanced the liv ing  conditions of 
some people, especially the Christians, in Mindanao but its impact on the resolution 
of the violent conflict was minimal.
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR THE MUSLIMS
Perhaps, o f all the programs intended for the Muslims in the south, education 
was the most effective tool fo r integration and undoubtedly benefited and improved 
the living conditions o f the next generation o f Moros after independence. Some of 
them joined government service as lawyers and engineers, among others, tha t to 
some extent helped the process o f integration o f Moros into Philippine society. In 
fact, w ith  the deteriorating security situation in the south, the Philippine Congress 
appointed three o f its members led by Congressman Domocao Alonto, who later 
became senator, to investigate and possibly come up w ith  a recommendation about 
the situation o f the Moros in the south.
The product o f this study led the Philippine Congress to pass a law creating 
the Commission on National Integration (CN1) in 1957. Under this law, the 
government was to ensure that education, among other things, was one o f the 
priorities o f the government fo r Muslims in the south sim ilar or o f equal standard to 
that o f the Christians. Muslim education, then, was supported by the government 
through scholarships fo r young students in order for them to fin ish the ir respective
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courses. According to some studies, this educational support fo r young Muslim 
students peaked in the 1960s and enabled them to go to  a university o f the ir choice. 
A total o f 1,210 recipients were recorded as o f 1967, m ost of them coming from  the 
families o f Datus while some were children o f poor families.5
This program served not only as an avenue for socialization between 
Christian and Muslim students but also became an opportun ity fo r Muslim students 
to meet other ethnic groups and share the ir experiences w ith  one another. The 
school campus became a meeting place to discuss things related to the ir situation in 
schools as well as the instab ility  in Moro land. In essence, the so lidarity between and 
among the Muslim ethnic groups was strengthened by  the bonds the students 
formed in school. It was expected that this generation o f Muslims would be much 
more different than those who stayed behind in the ir homeland where connections 
and knowledge about the outside w orld  were lim ited.
Educated individuals, in theory, are always expected to be well-inform ed. In 
the event the situation is reversed, they are expected to  air the ir grievances in a 
more sophisticated manner that would enable them to gain the attention o f the 
outside world. A t the national capital o f Manila where almost all the scholars were 
studying, the mosque became another im portant place for Muslim  students to 
gather particularly after the ir Friday weekly prayers. This isolationist tendency 
should not be a surprise as even before the CNI was created by the Philippine 
Congress, the three Muslim congressmen who were appointed members o f the 
study group in 1954 found out that Muslims in the south neither identified
5 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 244-245.
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themselves as Filipino citizens nor as part o f Philippine society; rather, Islam was 
central to th e ir identity.6
In general, the Moros were happy to be called Muslims ra ther than Filipinos 
and the ir loyalty was to the ir respective ethnic groups -- Maguindanao, Maranao, 
Tausug, and others. This observation held true not only fo r those in  urban areas but 
also those in rural areas. This was the reason the study group recommended that 
the government embark on "education and economic programs" fo r Muslims, 
believing that such tools would pacify the Muslims and ease tensions in  the south. 
Apart from several other educational programs for Muslims, thus, the Mindanao 
State University (MSU) was established in Marawi City to cater to the educational 
needs o f the Moros in rural areas o f Mindanao.7 In later years, other MSU branches 
and public schools were established fo r both Muslims and Christians in  Moro land.
In 1963, the Senate reviewed the results of the education and economic 
programs o f the government and found that the objective o f Muslim integration into 
the national mainstream had not been met, that is, the social, economic and 
educational gap between the Muslims and the Christians and other groups remained 
at a high level. In other words, the Moros had rejected the government’s policy of 
assimilation both in terms o f educational and economic programs as only meant for 
the Christian majority. In short, the benign intention behind the creation o f the 
Commission o f National Integration fo r the Muslims was never realized up to its
6 ibid...
7 McAmis, Muslim Filipinos, 43; Majul, The Moros of the Philippines, 169; Moshe Yegar, Between 
Integration and Secession, 244-245.
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abrogation in  1975.8 Not surprisingly by mid-1960s, a more inform ed set o f young 
Muslim leaders had emerged. Most o f them were lawyers who gradually opposed 
the government’s d iscrim inatory policies in areas such as d ip lom atic and issues 
concerning the Philippine economy and politics. This new band o f leaders included 
Muslim students and clerics who had studied abroad and were openly critic iz ing the 
government's d iscrim inatory policies against the Muslims.
It may have been part o f the assimilation strategy for the government to 
assume that the Muslims had fina lly  realized that they were part o f Philippine 
society. Simultaneous in this process was the country's impending te rrito ria l claim 
to  Sabah in North Borneo. The Muslims, particularly the Tausug, were aware that 
Sabah was once a part o f the Sultanate o f Sulu. This was a great opportun ity  fo r the 
country to use the Tausug in asserting its claim to Sabah. Notably, in this period, 
both Christians and Muslims were interested in security matters and, through local 
politicians, they gradually formed m ilitias p rim arily  for the ir security.
President Diosdado Macapagal was the firs t to raise the Philippine claim to 
Sabah before the government o f England in 1962, re iterating that Sabah belonged to 
the Sultanate o f Sulu even before the Spaniards came to Philippine shores, and that 
i t  was never sold nor given to any nation in the region. I t  was true that sometime in 
1878, the te rrito ry  had been leased to a British company but sovereignty over the 
te rrito ry  was never given to any nation or d istant power. In spite o f the Philippine 
claim, however, the British turned over the te rr ito ry  to Malaysia on September 16,
8 Peter G. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 184-185; Cesar Majul, The Moro Struggle, 900; Moshe Yegar, 
Between Integration and Secession, 245;Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 59-60.
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1963.9
In 1967, the Philippine Arm y recruited a number o f Muslims, m ostly young 
Tausug, for a secret m ilita ry  training. The Moro recruits were brought to the 
isolated island o f Corregidor, form erly a well- fo rtified  American base south of 
Manila, fo r m ilita ry  tra in ing in order to prepare them fo r an eventual in filtra tio n  of 
Sabah. However, for reasons that were unclear, the trainees numbering about 28 to 
60 were massacred by the ir trainers on March 18,1968. One o f the Muslim trainees 
named Jibin Arula managed to escape from  the mass killings that eventually became 
known as the Jabidah massacre. In one o f the testimonies o f Arula before the Senate, 
the trainees were brought to an a irstrip  on Corregidor Island in batches of 12 and 
were then killed by the ir trainers by firing  squad.
The process of integration o f the Muslims to Philippine society was gearing 
towards gradual success, manifested by the willingness o f the educated Moros to 
jo in government service at that time, even jo in ing the Army as in the case o f the 
Moro trainees who were unfortunately massacred. This horrib le incident, more than 
any other, may have completely discredited the integration process fo r Muslims, 
serving as a stark reminder to the entire Muslim community in the country o f the 
discrim ination, distrust, and other acts in im ical to the ir interests that had been 
perpetrated by the foreign colonizers and continued by the national government 
ruled by Christian Filipinos. It  was easy fo r the Moros to conclude that the massacre 
was p roof that the administration, then under Ferdinand Marcos, had no regard fo r 
the life o f Muslims in the South. The incident had many significant implications for
9 McKenna, Sources of Muslim Separatism, 9; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 251.
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the Moros, especially in terms o f what they fe lt as the government's u tte r disregard 
for them as citizens o f the Philippines, and consequently led them to realize the 
importance o f intensifying the Moro struggle fo r separation. In fact, the declared 
attempt for secession through the Mindanao Independence Movement (M IM ] was 
understood to be a d irect consequence o f the Jabidah massacre.10
The Jabidah massacre should have been kept internally by the Philippine 
government, bu t because some senators and lawmakers were Muslims reinforced 
by the opposition party, the killings became known to the public and eventually 
affected the Philippines's international relations w ith  some other countries, most 
notably the severing o f its diplomatic ties w ith  Malaysia. According to analysts, it 
was at this tim e that the Malaysian government, increasingly concerned over the 
conflict in Mindanao, began to support the Muslims in the south to the extent of 
providing them w ith  tra in ing assistance and armaments.11 In the local scene, Datu 
Udtog Matalam and several other Moro leaders openly established the Muslim 
Independence Movement in May 1968 and later renamed i t  the Mindanao 
Independence Movement. The emergence o f the MIM was an apparent response to 
the Jabidah massacre, indicating the Moros’ loss o f trust in  the Philippine 
government. Furthermore, the overall goal o f the organization, contained in a 
manifesto, was that the Muslims in the south, comprising the area o f Mindanao, Sulu 
and Palawan (MINSUPALA), were seceding from  the Republic o f the Philippines in
10 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and secession, 251-252; Cesar Majul, The Moros of the 
Philippines, 173; Peter Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 191-192; Gomez, Muslim-Christian Relations, 
160-163; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 107-128.
11 Noble, The Moro National Liberation Front, 409; Che Man, Problems of Minority Populations, 62; 
Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 252.
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order to establish an Islamic State wherein the Muslims could preserve the ir 
ancestral te rrito ry  and be governed by the ir own system according to Islamic rules 
and the Adat o f the Moros.
The MIM manifesto’s fundamental elements are found in  its Declaration of 
Principles, namely: (1) the Muslim righ t to self-determination (2) Islam as the 
religion o f the community which requires a defined te rrito ry  since that re lig ion is 
not just an ideology but also a way o f life fo r the Moros; (3] the economic 
advancement, cultural development, and politica l independence o f the Moros that 
can only be realized i f  they have sovereignty over the ir te rrito ry ; and (4) the 
Muslims' capability for o f self-rule or political independence because o f the fact tha t 
the Muslim community has a considerable number o f educated men who can 
govern.12 This declaration reached the attention of the international community 
through a copy sent to the United Nations and heads o f different Islamic states. The 
im portant role o f local leaders in the Muslim com m unity must be emphasized, at 
this point, and in those years, there was no recorded incident o f strong opposition to 
the MIM’s declaration o f secession from any group o f Moros in  Mindanao, Sulu, or 
Palawan. Unity among the Islamized ethnic groups in the south on the m atter of 
opposing the government may have already been deeply embedded in the ir culture, 
but it  was intensified by the Jabidah massacre coupled w ith  new set o f articulate 
leaders who had acquired education from  universities in Manila and elsewhere, 
including those educated in the Middle East.
Many claim that the MIM was never a successful or popular movement. The
12 For the full text of the manifesto, see Glang, Muslim secession or Integration? 103-105; and in Che 
Man, Muslim Separatism, 187-188.
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movement as observed by many historians was confined only to the documents 
published in media outlets. More so, the movement's leader, Datu Udtog Matalam, 
had publicly w ithdraw n his position for reasons that are unclear. Naturally, that 
development dampened Christian worries about Muslim secession while the 
Muslims may have simply lost confidence in  Matalam’s leadership and were 
convinced that the MIM was only a course o f action taken by Matalam due to his 
frustration w ith  his political career in Cotabato. Whatever Matalam's motivations 
were, one th ing is clear: the MIM opened the minds o f the new generation of Moro 
leaders. Again, it  may have been one im portant outcome of the education of 
Muslims that they, through the abrogation o f MIM, were able to reconcile 
themselves w ith  the rea lity that sometimes you may not succeed in your quest for 
change especially i f  you do not have the support o f the majority. Taking advantage 
of the favorable situation, the government applied the pacification strategy to 
contain and prevent the escalation o f secessionist movement.
In October 1968, President Marcos met w ith  Matalam, resulting in a better 
future for Matalam's political career. He was offered a position in the government as 
presidential adviser for Muslim affairs. This development neutralized the MIM and 
marked the end of Matalam’s leadership o f the movement, bu t i t  did not ease 
tensions and the escalation of violence in the south.1̂  In fact, after a while, Sultan 
Rashid Lucman established another radical Muslim organization, the Union o f 
Islamic Forces and Organizations (UIFO). In the same year, another Muslim 
organization, the more conservative Ansar al-Islam, was founded by Senator
13 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 253; Cesar Majul, Moros of the Philippines, 174;
George, Revolt in Mindanao, 129-142; Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 120.
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Domocao Alonto that brought Islam into the scene. Senator Alonto sought not only 
the support o f the local population in the south but also established linkages to 
Muslim networks abroad. Hence, the situation in the south became regionalized as 
neighboring states covertly intervened in  the internal affairs o f the Philippines. By 
the end o f 1969, about 90 young Muslims from  Mindanao were recruited fo r guerilla 
warfare tra in ing in a Malaysian army tra in ing camp on the Island o f Pangkor.
The group o f trainees was organized both by the MIM and the UIFO. Among 
the members of this group were Nur Misuari, who later headed the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), Abul Khayr Alonto, Jimi Lucman (son o f Rashid Lucman], 
and several other young Moros who were aware o f the situation o f the Muslims in 
the ir homeland. When this group returned home, they were the ones who organized 
the secessionist MNLF and the Bangsa Moro Arm y (BMA]. Most o f them became 
leaders o f the Moro struggle for independence in succeeding years. According to 
some accounts, there were a number o f British nationals and Palestinians who 
served as instructors and trainers during the group's tra in ing in Pangkor. The 
tra in ing o f the Moros was made possible upon the recommendation o f then-Chief 
M inister o f Sabah Tun Mustafa, who had Tausug blood, which was approved by 
then-Malaysian Prime M inister Tunku Abdul Rahman who promised the Moro 
leaders that he would support the tra in ing and the ir eventual struggle fo r 
independence from the republic o f the Philippines, although Tunku denied any such 
involvement o f the Malaysian government in the Moro struggle fo r secession from  
the Philippines. Subsequently, the local Muslims leaders, upon the suggestion o f the 
Malaysian government, established the so-called Islamic Directorate o f the
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Philippines (IDP) whose aim was to coordinate outside assistance fo r Muslims in  the 
Philippines. The IDP organizers were from  the conservative and trad itiona l leaders 
as well as m ilitants such as Nur Misuari, Rashid Lucman, and Macapanton Abbas. In 
a declaration signed by all leaders, the IDP called for un ity  among the Muslims and 
the ir readiness to defend Islam and the homeland against any form  o f aggression.14
By 1970, there was increased tension coupled w ith some deadly armed 
confrontations not only in the Cotabato areas, where the most populous Christians 
formed m ilitias, but also in North Cotabato. In la ter months of that year, the violence 
spread in the areas o f South Cotabato where most of the settlers from  the Visayas 
had also organized the ir armed militias. S im ilar forms o f armed confrontation also 
intensified in the Lanao areas, w ith  considerable damage to properties and lives, 
between the "Black Shirts" or Muslim guerillas and the "Ilagas" (rats) or the m ilitias 
formed by the Christians against the threat posed by Moros. The Ilagas were mostly 
Christians supported by the constabulary w hile the Black Shirts depended on the 
local community aided by support from Muslim countries. These armed 
confrontations were devastating for both the Muslim  and the Christian communities 
in the affected areas, even as the Moros were worse off.
Their failure to suppress the massive attacks o f the Ilagas, who burned and 
destroyed Muslim communities, forced the Moro people to flee the ir communities 
for safer places. These armed attacks by the Ilagas were perpetrated in  various 
Muslim communities in the provinces o f Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, and North 
Cotabato and in some areas where Muslims had originally established th e ir
14 Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 75; Mercado, Culture, Economics, and Revolt, 157; Moshe Yegar,
Between Integration and Secession, 253-254.
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communities. In Lanao del Norte, the Ilagas, who coordinated the ir operations w ith  
the Constabulary, were reportedly supported by a band o f local politicians such as 
the Christian governors and financed by business companies who were allowed by 
the government to operate random ly in some areas o f Mindanao. On the Muslim 
side, some of the prom inent leaders identified to have been providing support to the 
Moro fighters were also politicians and trad itional leaders such as Congressman Ali 
Dimaporo and Matalam, bu t they eventually became President Marcos's close 
political ally and adviser on Muslim affairs, respectively.
The conflict in some communities escalated fu rther until the deteriorating 
situation was understood as a w ar between the Muslims and the Christians. Owing 
to this, the Muslims considered all Christians to be the ir enemies no matter where 
they were in Mindanao. On the part o f the Christians, the ir most damaging 
perception of the Moros that has been perpetuated to this day, though not openly 
articulated, is that the only Muslim Filipinos they can tru s t are "no one but the dead 
Moros.” Muslims had suspected as much, because the Arm y and the police fought 
against the Muslims in many places in Mindanao, and the Ilagas fought the Muslims 
in the region's rura l areas; hence, the entire Moro population in the south was 
committed to defending themselves while attacking Christian communities.15
The heightened vio lent conflict in Mindanao invited many outside actors and 
the international community. The Moros were quite assured o f support from  the 
Muslim w orld  as some pledged aid to the Muslim armed struggle. Others remained
15 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 254; Cesar Majul, The Moro Struggle, 903-905; 
Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 188,192-194; George, revolt in Mindanao, 143-161; Noble, The Moro 
National Liberation Front, 410.
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moderate and looked for possible collaboration w ith  the government o f the 
Philippines for the peaceful resolution o f the conflict. The Government o f Libya was 
the firs t to react, bringing the issues concerning the Moros in Mindanao before the 
UN Subcommittee fo r Human Rights in  August 1971. This action was supported by 
several other Muslim states, which accused the government o f the Philippines of 
genocide and persecution o f religious m inorities. In reaction to such allegations, the 
Libyan President Muammar Qadhafi gave assurance tha t he would extend material 
aid to the Muslims in  the Philippines. During the outbreak of hostilities in  Mindanao, 
there were reports that Arab countries were supporting the Moro struggle, thus 
equipping the Muslim rebels in terms o f logistics and finance. It  was also reported 
that Pakistan and Libya collaborated in efforts to provide arms to the Moros. This 
development came to the attention o f then-Philippine President Marcos, setting o ff a 
serious debate on whether to cut o ff Philippine diplomatic relations w ith  Pakistan 
that did not, however, materialize.16
The endemic violence in  Mindanao had terrified  the entire population. But in 
spite o f the chaos that gripped almost all o f Mindanao, leaders o f both Muslim and 
Christian communities attempted to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
Despite such efforts, the same leaders became indecisive and were unable to find 
and pursue a peaceful resolution to the problem. The educated Muslims in 
government, like Senator Mamintal Tamano, could do nothing but blame the 
government fo r its flawed policy on the Mindanao conflict. Tamano claimed that if  
the bloodbath in Mindanao was not given adequate attention, i t  would bring about
16 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 255-256.
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serious economic and security problems not only in Mindanao alone but that it  may 
further escalate to engulf the entire country and involve international actors.17
Unable to do more to control the violence especially between the Ilagas and 
the Moro rebels, the government declared a truce. On 26 February 1971, President 
Marcos declared a ceasefire in order to be able to give way to negotiations fo r the 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. Marcos offered financial aid to the leaders of 
Moro rebels in Cotabato in order to pacify them and perhaps improve the economic 
condition o f the Muslim communities. Other than that, he also tried  to look at the 
problem of land disputes by prom ising the Muslims that the government would find 
ways to resolve the land issues. This was the usual reaction o f state leaders 
whenever they came to realize that violence could not be ended by "m ilita ry  v ictory 
or by doing nothing" to stop the surge of violence resulting from adamant behavior. 
In other words, the government policy on the Mindanao conflict was merely one of 
"containment" since it  is very d ifficu lt to end an internal conflict once i t  has started, 
and more so i f  the government itse lf has been an accessory to the conflict. 
Unfortunately, the containment policy is prone to reversal when leaders do not see 
any progress or when such a policy does not provide a too l for effectively halting the 
surge o f violence. On March 30, 1971, President Marcos ordered the Armed Forces 
to undertake a renewed m ilita ry  option in Mindanao, which meant that the 
government would increase its m ilita ry  presence in the south. Unfortunately, i t  did 
not ease tensions in the region.
The fighting in the Cotabato areas had escalated anew, particu larly in
17 Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration? 70-71; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 
256.
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Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Del Norte, and Lanao Del Sur. A t th is time, some 
Muslim leaders began calling fo r Jihad against the Ilagas (Christian M ilitias) who 
were perceived as a grave threat to the existence o f the Moro community. It  so 
happened, likewise, that an increasing number o f Christian politicians now held 
local government positions as mayors and governors in  Muslim-held te rrito ry , a 
political development that confirmed the idea that the resettlement program o f the 
government had tru ly  succeeded. This seemed so because o f the fact that the 
m ajority o f the resettlement areas were already dominated by Christian settlers, 
easing out the Moros who retreated to the mountains and marsh lands. Estimates 
show that by the end o f 1971, about 1,566 had been killed  -  more than ha lf o f them 
Muslims — and about 100,000 displaced from  both Muslim and Christian 
communities. By this time, the Muslims feared fo r the ir security, as they considered 
both the army and the civilian armed groups the ir enemies.18
No doubt, the deteriorating security situation in the southern Philippines 
attracted the attention o f the Muslim world. Again, the firs t to react was Libya, when 
Muammar Qadhafi sent a le tte r addressed to then-Philippine President Marcos on 
July 1971, expressing concern over the situation of the Muslims in Mindanao. The 
Philippine government realized i t  had to respond accordingly no t only because of 
the internationalization of the Mindanao issue bu t out o f fear tha t the Muslim w orld  
m ight cut o ff the ir o il supply to the Philippines. The Government o f the Philippines, 
through acting Foreign M inister Jose Ingles, thus, denied all allegations o f abuse and 
religious repression o f the Muslims. Ingles, who spoke on behalf o f the Philippine
18 Cesar Majul, The Moro Struggle, 905; Peter G. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 194-195; Noble, Moro 
National Liberation Front, 407,410. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 75.
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government, claimed that the v io lent conflict in the south was rooted in land 
disputes and political tensions and that the government w ould welcome any 
investigation.
By October 1971, the escalated violence in Mindanao prompted Libya, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, and the Islamic secretariat o f the Organization o f Islamic 
Conference (OIC) to condemn the Philippine government for allegedly com m itting 
genocide and slaughter o f Muslims. These states demanded that the United Nations 
intervene. In response to the accusation, President Marcos in January 1972 invited 
the ambassadors of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and Egypt to v is it the Mindanao areas so tha t the issue, especially on 
religious involvement, would be clarified. The v is it was apparently showed that 
there was no anti-Muslim genocide in  the Philippines. In March 1972, the 
government of Libya offered financial aid to the Philippines in exchange fo r ending 
the war against the Muslims in the south. Also, there was a report that the vis iting 
Libyan delegation distributed 35,000 B ritish pounds to the Muslims intended fo r the 
purchase o f land to build mosques, as w ell as fo r food, medicines and clothing.
The Libyan representative visited Indonesia and Malaysia and encouraged 
the leadership to join in Libya’s e ffo rt to assist the Muslims. However, the Libyan 
representative denied the veracity o f these reports, saying that i f  ever assistance 
was extended to the Muslims in  the south, i t  was all intended fo r strengthening 
religious faith by increasing the number o f mosques, for the rehabilita tion of 
destroyed communities, the construction o f cultural centers, and purchase o f food 
fo r refugees in the region. In short, Libya strongly denied aiding the Muslim
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rebellion w hile other Islamic countries insisted that they extended aid to the Moros 
solely for humanitarian purposes. But it  was clear tha t through the government of 
Libya, the Islamic w orld  was pressuring the Philippine government to take care of 
the Muslims, and not subject them to abuse and genocide. In spite o f the Philippine 
government’s e ffort to contain the issue so i t  would not be interpreted as a war 
between Christians and Muslims, vis iting delegations from Egypt and Libya 
concluded, after a four-day v is it in July o f 1972, that the conflict in the southern 
Philippines had become a "religious war" and that local authorities were the ones 
supporting the armed militias. In July o f the same year, Salipada Pendatun, an 
educated Muslim leader who was the Speaker Pro Tempore of the Philippine House 
o f Representatives, reported having received promises o f support in  terms o f aid to 
the Moros in the south from the leaders o f Algeria, Morocco, and L ibya .19
In 1972, the tension became intense as armed hostilities occurred in almost 
all areas in Moro land which agitated the Muslims to press for secession toward the 
establishment o f an independent Muslim state. Most o f the Muslim students in the 
national capital of Manila returned home to Mindanao, leaving the ir studies and 
join ing the underground movement to oppose the perceived oppressive government 
and eventually establish an independent Islamic state in  the south. Another reason 
these students went home was the rum or that the President would declare m artial 
rule in  the Muslim areas of Mindanao. The speculation came true on September 21, 
1972, when President Marcos placed the entire country under m artia l law in order
19 The Manila Chronicle (March 27,1972); Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and rebellion, 257-258;
Cesar Majul, The Moro Struggle, 905-906; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 195-196; George, Revolt in
Mindanao, 244-246;McAmis, Muslim Filipinos, 50-52.
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to, according to the declaration, address the rampant violence in Mindanao and stop 
the organization of the Muslim secessionist movement in the south. However, the 
government intention to disarm the Muslim population earned d iffe rent reactions 
particularly from  the Muslims. They regarded such a government plan as a threat to 
the ir security and an insult to the ir sense of pride. In other words, they deemed 
pride and security much more im portant than the government's in tention to restore 
stability in the areas o f conflict. In the end, the declaration of m artia l only led to the 
escalation of violence and strengthened the quest for secession. Furthermore, the 
declaration o f martial law  and its subsequent impact helped to g lo rify  the existence 
of the Moro resistance, particularly the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that 
served to represent the Muslims.20
In spite o f numerous attempts to pacify the Moros, the violence even 
escalated that i t  seemed the government forces were unable to contro l the growing 
popular support o f the Muslim communities to the rebels. By the end o f 1972, the 
conflict was apparently no longer a case of sporadic fighting bu t an organized 
rebellion that was causing many deaths. A t this time, several reports confirmed a 
massive arms shipment in Mindanao from  abroad purposely to aid the Moro 
combatants in fighting government forces. Usually, when the m ilita ry  option was 
unable to lessen the violence, the government would resort to getting the attention 
of outside actors or to declare a ceasefire. Indeed, President Marcos un ila tera lly 
declared a ceasefire and ordered government troops to  tem porarily ha lt m ilita ry  
operations against the Muslims — from December 20,1972 to January 15,1973 — to
20 George, Revolt in Mindanao, 183-185; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 258-259.;
Peter G. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 196; Rodil, The Lumad and Moro, 17.
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give way to negotiations. He promised once again that the government would grant 
amnesty to the rebels who choose to re turn to the fold o f the law. But i t  seemed that 
Marcos was not sincere in this because even as he made the announcement, there 
was an increased deployment o f troops in the south. The increased m ilita ry  
presence in Mindanao may have been meant to reinforce the capability o f the 
Philippine Army to maintain peace and order in the region, bu t the move was 
naturally interpreted by the Muslims as a threat. Consequently, even the President 
decided to extend the deadline fo r the grant o f amnesty to A p ril 1973, but the 
Muslim rebels did not avail o f the amnesty program.21 Instead, the Moro rebel 
organization was fu rther strengthened and foreign aid poured in to  the Muslim 
communities, thus allow ing them to acquire more weapons.
There are, indeed, lessons to be learned from  the policy o f containment in the 
southern Philippines. First, educational programs alleviated the harsh liv ing 
conditions o f the Muslims, and some of the educated Muslims were able to occupy 
political positions and participate in other sectors o f governance such as in medical 
and health, engineering and construction, and social development. But on the other 
hand, the education of the Muslims also presented them w ith a clear avenue for 
openly bringing the issues o f Mindanao to international attention, thereby enabling 
the international community to intervene in  the internal affairs o f the Philippines. 
Through the CNI, the economic development program fo r Mindanao also helped 
alleviate the liv ing conditions o f populations, particu larly the Christians from  the 
north who were systematically aided by the government resettlement program.
21 Philippines: Restoring Order, FEER, vol. 78, no. 48 (November 25,1972): 13; Judy Stowe, the 
Philippines: Three Dimensional Muslims, FEER, vol. 80, no. 24 (June 1 8 ,1973):5
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Mindanao's idle lands turned into vast plantations became a m ajor source of 
agricultural products tha t had contributed much to the national economy. But on 
the other hand, the government’s resettlement program was a leading cause o f the 
Mindanao conflict that even the government has been unable to resolve i t  un til now. 
Perhaps, i f  those economic development programs were implemented equitably to 
benefit both the native Muslims and the Christian settlers, then the land disputes 
would not have been as intense as they turned out to be. The issue o f land 
ownership may not be a big problem at all bu t when the benefits from  the land are 
insufficient or not distributed evenly, then rebellion is always expected because i t  is 
a matter of survival fo r the affected communities. The next section w ill show how 
succeeding developments in Mindanao impacted on the domestic and foreign policy 
o f the Philippine government vis-a-vis interventions from  other countries.
THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT
Before the peace agreement better known as the "Tripoli Agreement" was 
signed between the government of the Philippines and the leadership o f the MNLF, 
there was a series o f developments both in  Philippine politics and at the 
Organization o f the Islamic Conference (OIC). In 1972, the Moro National liberation 
Front (MNLF) had grown into a formidable armed group representing the Muslim 
communities. This movement had begun as early as 1969 when a group o f 90 
Muslim volunteers from  Mindanao underwent m ilita ry  tra in ing on the island o f 
Pangkor, Malaysia. When they returned home, they became the core leaders o f the 
Moro underground movement against the government whose purpose was to 
establish an independent Muslim state in the south. N ur Misuari, a Tausug and
former professor at the University of the Philippines where he had also gotten his 
te rtia ry education, became the Chairman o f the MNLF. Abdul Khayr Alonto, a 
Maranao from  Lanao and a son of form er governor o f Lanao Del Sur, was the deputy 
o f Misuari, but later for unclear reasons was replaced by Hashim Salamat who was a 
Maguindanaon from  Cotabato. Misuari became a known young leader as early as his 
University days because o f his idealism and his conviction that change is possible 
only through an armed uprising. His p rim ary concern was the situation o f the 
Muslims in the south even as he was also connected fo r a w hile w ith  the le ftis t 
Marxist organization Kabataang Makabayan [Patrio tic Youth). The MNLF had 
earned substantial support both from  the local Muslim populace and foreign Islamic 
nations. By 1969, Misuari met local leaders Datu Udtog Matalam, founder o f the 
Muslim Independence Movement [MIM), Salipada Pendatun from  Cotabato who 
later became senator, and Rashid Lucman o f the Lanao District. These three 
prom inent Moro leaders helped conceptualize the tra in ing o f local Muslims in 
Pangkor where Misuari had been one such trainee. Supporters o f the MNLF 
provided not only logistical and financial assistance but also the conduct of 
trainings, the provision o f political asylum, and weapons, along w ith  politica l 
pressure on the Philippine government. The politica l problem in Mindanao and the 
subsequent declaration o f M artial Law strengthened the MNLF, which became the 
vehicle fo r coordinated Moro resistance as i t  did did not welcome any form  of 
intervention not aligned w ith  its goal.22
The developing situation in the south had to be addressed not only due to the
22 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 267-268; Noble, The Moro National Liberation 
Front, 409; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 197-200.Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 77-78.
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escalating violence that had killed many but also because the government o f the 
Philippines was under foreign pressure, specifically from  the government o f Libya 
and the Malaysian government which was providing tra in ing venues fo r the Moro 
rebels, along w ith  several other Muslim countries which were extending financial 
aid to the Muslim rebellion. Undoubtedly, the Libyan support fo r the separatist 
movement in Mindanao had been noted when Colonel Muamar Qadhafi contacted 
local Muslim leaders, especially Rashid Lucman. The Libyan government through its 
spokesman had announced that since 1971, Libya had assisted the MNLF in terms of 
providing arms, financial aid, asylum, and exerting efforts to organize economic 
sanctions by Muslim countries on the Marcos regime. According to reports, the 
MNLF did obtain much of its support in the early stages of the revo lt from  the 
government o f Libya, which gave Nur Misuari $3.5 m illion, although additional 
financial assistance came from the "Solidarity Fund of the 01C." In the later part of 
the rebellion, the MNLF through its fie ld commanders got additional support from 
the local Muslim populations through Zakat.23
The Philippine government was aware that the foremost demand of the 
MNLF was independence for the Muslim areas in  Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan 
(more popularly known in the Moro communities as MINSUPALA). However, i t  was 
not clear whether the MNLF was tru ly  aim ing for complete independence (or 
secession from the Republic o f the Philippines] or jus t autonomy. In any armed 
uprising, the goal has to be properly defined; otherwise, i t  can become aggravated as 
leadership changes or the passing o f tim e could mean a different situation fo r both
23 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 272-273; Noble, The Philippines, 13; May, The 
Moro Movement, 54-55.
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parties. By April 1973, the MNLF leadership demanded that the Philippine Arm y in 
Mindanao be pulled out, that those lands form erly owned by the Moros be returned 
to them unconditionally, that the Islamic laws and the traditional customs, adat, be 
imposed in the Muslim te rrito ry , and that the MINSUPALA region be granted 
autonomy. Included in these demands were complaints about the burning of 
Muslim houses, robbery, and sim ilar other related complaints concerning respect 
for Moro women and the ir religion, Islam.24
In July o f the same year, a Muslim W orld League delegation came to the 
Philippines to conduct an investigation in the conflict-affected areas in  Mindanao. 
Interestingly, the delegation expressed satisfaction w ith  the outcome o f the ir 
investigation and reported that, after meeting w ith  Moro leaders, they had found 
that the Muslims in Mindanao had pu t aside the issue o f secession and that therefore 
i t  was best to resolve the problem through negotiations, as suggested by President 
Suharto o f Indonesia, and not by the use o f force. In August 1973, however, another 
delegation o f four Muslim Foreign Ministers o f the Islamic Conference o f Foreign 
Ministers (ICFM) came to the Philippines to conduct the same investigation. This 
time the team stayed fo r tw o days in Mindanao and found out that the Philippine 
Army had specifically used its m ight to attack the Muslims in the south. In the ir 
press conference in Manila, the team openly stated that the "politica l solution" 
rather than socioeconomic o r m ilita ry  approaches was the key to bringing to an 
end the violent conflict in Mindanao. This led to the team to conclude and suggest to 
President Marcos to negotiate w ith  the MNLF rather than use the m ilitary, noting
24 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 277; May, The Religious Factor, 309;
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that the MNLF had adequate means to continue the rebellion against the 
government. In turn, the government was disappointed not only because o f the 
result o f the investigation bu t also because o f the Libyan assertion that the Moro 
issue in the southern Philippines would remain in  the agenda o f the Muslim w orld .25
Indeed, despite the move o f Indonesia and Malaysia not to include the 
Mindanao situation in the agenda o f the fifth  Conference o f Muslim Foreign 
Ministers held in Kuala Lumpur on June 19-26, 1974, a number o f Arab 
representatives clearly stated that one of the ir prim ary concerns was the problem of 
Muslim m inorities in the world, particularly the M inority  Muslims o f the Philippines. 
Consequently, a resolution prepared by Muslim dignitaries during a conference held 
at the Mindanao State University in Marawi city became part o f the report o f the 
Committee o f Four Foreign Ministers. The recommendation was to grant autonomy 
to the Muslim m inority  in the southern Philippines. In the same conference, the 
Libyan foreign m inister raised the problem o f Muslims in Mindanao, and openly 
admitted that, indeed, Libya had provided financial, arms, and ammunition to the 
rebellion in Mindanao, and promised to continue helping and using every means 
available, including oil embargo, to bring about a politica l solution to the Mindanao 
problem. On June 25, a resolution was passed in  which the Conference seriously 
expressed its deep and ongoing concern about the situation o f the Moros in 
Mindanao, and called on the Philippine government to stop the m ilita ry  operations 
and avoid further actions that would k ill the Muslims and destroy the ir properties 
and places o f worship. In short, the Conference called on the government o f the
25 Noble, Chronology, 3; Nobel, Ethnicity and Philippine Malaysian relations, 463; George, Revolt in 
Mindanao, 246-248; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 282-283.
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Philippines to stop the m ilita ry  campaigns against the Muslims and negotiate 
instead w ith  the Muslim leaders, particularly w ith  the MNLF who at that time was 
the sole armed group representing the plight o f the Moros. The Conference also 
demanded that the Philippine government provide protection and security to the 
Muslims, re turn the evacuees to the ir homes, and most specifically to halt the 
systematic and government-supported Christian m igration from  Luzon and the 
Visayas to Mindanao. These resolutions undoubtedly increased the level o f pressure 
from  Islamic countries and certainly raised the prestige o f the MNLF, and provided a 
starting po in t for Arab countries to take the issue seriously in the succeeding 
conferences.26 In fact, follow ing the resolution was the constant visits o f foreign 
dignitaries to the Philippines in a b id to ensure tha t the government o f the 
Philippines was moving toward negotiations.
By early 1975, Hassan Al-Touhami, secretary-general o f the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC), visited Manila in  order to encourage the Marcos 
regime to negotiate w ith  the Muslims in the south. Perhaps owing to the pressure 
from Islamic countries particu larly the perceived threat o f an oil embargo, President 
Marcos responded favorably by sending a delegation to Jeddah, headed by Alejandro 
Melchor, for exploratory talks w ith  Nur Misuari and other Moro leaders. However, 
the meeting had a result unfavorable to both parties as the Muslim delegation 
insisted on the establishment o f autonomy for the areas covering Mindanao, Sulu,
26 Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 213-214; Peter Gowing, Religion and Regional Cooperation: The 
Mindanao Problem and ASEAN, Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1-2 
(1982^: 15-20; Noble, The Moro National Liberation Front, 414,416; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 
247-248; Santos, Towards a Solution, 226; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 286- 
287.
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and Palawan while simultaneously demanding the recall o f the m ilita ry  troops from 
these areas. The Melchor-led delegation was firm  on its position that the 
government would not accept the condition as i t  would compromise the country's 
te rrito ria l integrity. It was the conclusion o f the Melchor delegation that external 
actors were just using the MNLF demands to fu rther the ir own interests.27
In spite o f the announcement made by Marcos tha t he would not agree to the 
demands o f the MNLF fo r autonomy and the establishment o f an army un it 
independent from that o f the Philippine army, Misuari on his pa rt continued calling 
on the government to recognize the Bangsamoro homeland, its sovereignty, and its 
political autonomy. Misuari said that by granting local autonomy to the Moros, it 
would mean that the central government o f the Philippines would just be 
concentrating on external security while Mindanao would be responsible fo r its own 
internal security. The government, through Melchor, refused to acknowledge these 
demands because it  considered them a threat or even an attack on the sovereignty 
and in tegrity  o f the country. This led once again to an impasse. Nevertheless, while 
another round o f talks was set for April o f the same year, the m ilita ry  forces from  
both parties escalated the violence in Mindanao. On 15 January 1975, the day the 
Jeddah negotiations started, a group o f about 400 rebels attacked an army camp in 
Jolo, k illing  41 people and destroying a radio station in Marawi city, followed by 
several other attacks on a number o f towns in Mindanao on the same day.28 Perhaps, 
this was a strategy to get more international attention. This is a natural tendency in
27 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 295.
28 Noble, Ethnicity and Philippine- Malaysian Relations, 468; Santos, Towards a Solution, 226;
George, Revolt in Mindanao, 249; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 295-296.
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a rebellion, especially on the aspect o f asymmetry, because i t  is the only way the 
weaker side in a conflict can elevate its strength relative to the dominant 
government forces. Secondly, i t  was suspected that such escalation o f violence was 
designed, especially on the side o f the stronger, to control the violence and 
neutralize the challenger -- otherwise it  may lose the cred ib ility  tha t is v ita l to 
gaining domestic support.
The process of negotiation was not only a business between the MNLF and 
the government. In fact, whatever the outcome o f the process o f try ing  to arrive at a 
consensus favoring a resolution, the most im portant factor was s till the local 
audience or civilian population. As the peace negotiations w ith  the MNLF began to 
gain ground, the Christians were suspicious that Mindanao w ould eventually be 
under the control o f the MNLF and were skeptical about how the Moros would 
govern the population o f Mindanao. Consequently, some o f the Christian residents of 
Mindanao rushed to sell the ir properties, w hile those on the side o f the Muslims 
expressed disagreement w ith  the government intention to recognize the MNLF as 
the sole organization representing the Moro people in  the south. Also, there were 
Muslims who never joined the MNLF because o f the belief that the MNLF was an 
organization fo r the Tausug and Samal, o r because they were no t convinced by the 
way the MNLF was pushing forward the struggle using violence. Naturally, the 
government took advantage o f this v irtua l division among the Muslims to announce 
that it  would not confirm that the MNLF was the sole representative o f the Moro 
people, and that other identity groups should be included in the talks.29 I f  the
29 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 296-297; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 251-251.
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intention o f the government was to weaken the MNLF demands, then i t  made some 
progress because the local support for the MNLF had certainly declined to a certain 
level, but this development in the negotiations had also increased the complexity of 
the problem because the government w ould now  have to deal w ith  many groups 
w ith  different goals and demands from  the central government.
In response to a le tte r from  OIC secretary General Al-Touhami, who stressed 
the renewal o f the negotiations on the condition that autonomy was granted to the 
Bangsamoro in Mindanao, President Marcos announced in March 1975 tha t the 
negotiations would resume the fo llow ing month. He then took another action 
purposely to weaken the MNLF stand on the negotiations particularly on the la tte r’s 
claim o f being the sole representative o f the Muslims in  the south. In A p ril o f that 
year, he called fo r a four-day local peace conference in Zamboanga City in the 
southern Philippines that was attended by the Philippine ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia and hundreds o f leaders from  d ifferent Muslim armed groups, mostly not 
from  the MNLF ranks. The conference resulted in a rejection o f the supposed 
establishment o f an Islamic separatist state. Consequently, President Marcos 
announced that he would appoint Muslims to some ranking positions while 
accepting rebel surrenderees into Philippine Arm y units, establish an agency called 
the Southern Philippines Development Authority  (SPDA), and allocate enough funds 
fo r development projects such as roads and bridges. Other than these initiatives, 
President Marcos sent his w ife Imelda on a series o f foreign mission to seek the help 
o f other countries. Imelda visited several heads o f state for the purpose o f getting 
them on board fo r the resolution o f the Mindanao issues. Among the leaders she
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visited were Anwar Sadat o f Egypt and King Khaled o f Saudi Arabia, both o f whom 
promised to support the peace process between the government o f the Philippines 
and the Muslim m inority  in the south. Some Philippine leaders also met w ith  the ir 
counterparts in other Islamic countries like Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, and the United 
Arab Emirates, all o f whom confirmed the ir support fo r the peaceful resolution of 
Muslim issues in Mindanao. W hile there were continued intensified MNLF 
operations and government forces beefed up the ir m ilita ry  offensives, the 
government announced that about 17,600 men had surrendered to government 
authorities.30
The government policy o f attraction coupled w ith  the strategy o f build ing up 
the state's m ilita ry  superiority enabled the Marcos regime to gradually deescalate 
MNLF attacks in different areas o f Mindanao. However, the increased number o f the 
Armed forces and Police also adversely affected efforts to resolve the security 
issues. The officers o f the Army particu larly those deployed in the Muslim areas 
were highly trained and capable o f leading the ir units, but the attitudes and 
behavior o f lower ranked soldiers were not tha t admirable. Those who came from  
the north were poorly trained in combat and the ir standard of discipline was poor. 
They did not speak the language o f the locals, which made it  even more d ifficu lt to 
communicate and coordinate the ir efforts in Mindanao. In any m ilita ry  campaign, 
mastery o f the local language is a must, otherwise stabilization operations w ould be 
a disaster. In 1976, the ground troop situation had improved especially on the 
aspect of tra in ing and logistics, which has a great impact on the effectiveness of
30 Noble, Chronology, 4;
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m ilita ry  operations against the rebels. In the government’s assessment, the number 
o f rebels had decreased dramatically as a result o f the ir losses and defections. These 
losses on the side o f the Muslims were a ttribu ted to the political defeat of Tun 
Mustafa, the chief of Sabah, who was replaced by Tun Fuad Stephens. Stephens was 
known not to use Sabah in furthering secessionist movements or anti-government 
movements nor as a place for refugees.31 But w ith  a considerable number o f Muslim 
immigrants from Mindanao in Sabah who had been liv ing there even before the tim e 
of Stephens, such plans faced serious problems not only because o f fam ily ties 
among the Muslims in Sabah and Mindanao, bu t also because Sabah was so close 
geographically to the Sulu archipelago.
During the seventh conference o f Muslim  Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul 
on May 12-15, 1976, the leadership o f the MNLF asked the participants to put 
pressure on the government o f the Philippines to accept what was decided by the 
conference during the 1974 and 1975 meetings. A t the end of the conference on May 
16, the foreign ministers reaffirmed the decisions made in  the previous conferences 
and called for the cooperation o f both sides to renew negotiations that could lead to 
a possible peaceful solution to the Mindanao conflict. I t  was also agreed that the 
negotiations should be based on the Quadripartite M inisterial Commission (Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Senegal] recommendation for the term ination o f the 
m ilita ry  offensives against the Muslims, the w ithdraw al o f the same forces from  the 
area o f conflict, and the implementation o f autonomy w ith in  the state o f the
31 Noble, Moro National Liberation Front4,18-420; Carl A. Trocki, Islam: Threat to ASEAN Regional 
Unity? Current History 78, no. 456 (April 1980]: 181; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and 
Secession, 300.
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Philippines. While intense violence was ongoing in Jolo and Zamboanga, thus, the 
government o f the Philippines announced its new plan fo r autonomy in  Mindanao. 
The proposal was for the creation o f two autonomous commissions that would 
facilitate Muslim participation in government affairs as well as set the p rio rities  for 
economic, political, and social development in  the Muslim  areas.32
President Marcos was convinced tha t i t  was Libyan President Muammar 
Qadhafi who had pressured the OIC to support the MNLF, had given asylum to MNLF 
fighters, and had provided the rebels w ith  financial and m ilita ry  assistance. W ith 
this conviction, Marcos was strongly convinced that Qadhafi would be the key to the 
resolution o f the Philippine internal security problem in  the south. Marcos believed 
that even i f  the government forces defeated the Moro rebellion, the more serious 
threat to his government would be an oil embargo. Therefore, negotiations fo r a 
peaceful resolution to the Mindanao conflict was the best option provided that the 
integrity of the country was protected. Thus, Marcos sent his w ife Imelda to T ripo li 
in November 1976 to ta lk  w ith  Qadhafi about renewed negotiations w ith  Misuari, 
who was then living in Tripoli. The result o f Imelda's tw o  meetings w ith  Qadhafi was 
the signing o f what became known as the "T ripo li Agreement," a significant 
document in the history o f the Philippines, signed on December 23, 1976. 
Subsequently, a ceasefire was declared, followed by a series o f talks between 
government representatives and the MNLF, w ith  representatives o f the OIC in
32 Moshe, Yegar, Between Integration and secession, 303-304; Noble, The Moro National Liberation 
Front, 423-424; Suhrke and Noble, Muslims in the Philippines, 187; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 
144-145; see OIC Resolution 12/7-P, The Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 
Meeting in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, (12-15 May, 1976) http://w w w .oic-' 
oci.org/page detail.asp?p id =68 .
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attendance.33
Present at the talks from December 15-23 tha t year were government 
representatives and a delegation from  the MNLF headed by Nur M isuari; Libyan 
foreign m inister Ali Abdussalam Treki, who served as the chairman o f the meeting; 
and the Quadripartite M inisterial Commission (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and 
Somalia) including the Secretary General o f OIC Dr. Ahmad Karim Gaye. The 
document became a starting point fo r the supposed peaceful resolution o f the 
Mindanao conflict. The main contents o f the T ripo li Agreement are as fo llows:34
1. The establishment o f Autonomy in the Southern Philippines w ith in  the realm 
of the sovereignty and te rrito ria l in tegrity  o f the Republic o f the Philippines;
2. The areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines shall 
comprise the following: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, 
Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao 
del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan;
3. Foreign Policy shall be o f the competence o f the Central Government o f the 
Philippines;
4. The National Defense Affairs shall be the concern of the Central A u thority  
provided that the arrangements for the join ing o f the forces o f the Moro 
National Liberation Front w ith  the Philippine Armed Forces w ill be discussed 
later;
5. The Muslims shall have the righ t to set up the ir own Courts which im plem ent
33 Noble, Chronology, 6; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 253; Gunn, Radical, Islam, 47; McKenna, Source 
of Muslim Separatism, 23; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 304.
34 For the Full text of the Tripoli agreement, see appendix "E".
the Islamic Shari'ah laws. The Muslims shall be represented in all Courts 
including the Supreme Court. The representation of the Muslims in  the 
Supreme Court shall be upon the recommendation from the authorities o f the 
Autonomy and the Supreme Court. Decrees w ill be issued by the President of 
the Republic of the ir appointments taking into consideration all necessary 
qualifications o f the candidates;
Authorities o f the autonomy in the South o f the Philippines shall have the 
righ t to set up schools, colleges and universities, provided that matters 
pertaining to the relationship between these educational and scientific 
organs and the general education system in  the state shall be subject o f 
discussion later on;
The Muslims shall have the ir own administrative system in compliance w ith  
the objectives of the autonomy and its institutions. The relationship between 
such administrative system and the Central adm inistrative system w ill be 
discussed later;
The authorities o f the autonomy in the South o f the Philippines shall have 
the ir own economic and financial system. The relationship between this 
system and the Central economic and financial system o f the State shall be 
discussed later;
The authorities o f the autonomy in the South o f the Philippines shall enjoy 
the righ t o f representation and participation in the Central Government and 
in all other organs o f the State. The number of representatives and ways o f 
participation shall be fixed later;
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10. Special Regional Security Forces are to be set up in  the area o f the Autonomy 
for the Muslims in the South o f the Philippines. The relationship between 
these forces and the Central security forces shall be fixed later;
11. A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council shall be formed in the areas 
o f the Autonomy for the Muslims. The setting up o f the Legislative Assembly 
shall be constituted through a direct election, and the form ation o f the 
Executive Council shall take place through appointments by the Legislative 
Assembly. A decree for the ir formation shall be enacted by the President o f 
the Republic, respectively. The number o f members of each assembly shall be 
determined later on;
12. Mines and m ineral resources fall w ith in  the competence o f the Central 
Government, and a reasonable percentage deriving from the revenues o f the 
mines and minerals shall be fixed for the benefit o f the areas o f the 
autonomy;
13. A Mixed Committee shall be composed of representatives o f the Central 
Government of the Republic o f the Philippines and the representatives o f the 
Moro National Liberation Front. The Mixed Committee shall meet in  T ripo li 
during the period from the Fifth o f February to a date not la ter than the Third 
of March 1977. The task o f said Committee shall be to study in detail the 
points le ft for discussion in order to reach a solution thereof in conform ity 
w ith  the provisions o f this agreement;
14. A ceasefire shall be declared immediately after the signature o f this 
agreement, provided tha t its coming into effect should not exceed the 20th
January 1977. A Joint Committee shall be composed of the tw o parties w ith  
the help o f the Organization o f the Islamic Conference represented by the 
Quadripartite M inisterial Commission to supervise the implementation o f the 
ceasefire;
The said Joint Committee shall also be charged w ith  supervising the 
following:
a. A complete amnesty in  the areas o f the autonomy and the 
renunciation o f all legal claims and codes resulting from  events which 
took place in  the South o f the Philippines;
b. The release o f all the political prisoners who had relations w ith  the 
events in the South o f the Philippines;
c. The return o f all refugees who have abandoned the ir areas in the 
South of the Philippines;
d. To guarantee the freedom of movements and meetings;
A jo in t meeting shall be held in Jeddah during the firs t week o f the month of 
March 1977 to in itia l what has been concluded by the Committee referred to 
in Para. 11;
The final agreement concerning the setting up o f the autonomy referred to in 
the firs t and second paragraphs shall be signed in  the City o f Manila, Republic 
o f the Philippines, between the Government o f the Philippines and Moro 
National Liberation Front, and the Islamic Conference represented by the 
Quadripartite M inisterial Commission and the Secretary General o f the 
Organization of Islamic Conference;
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18. Immediately after the signing o f the Agreement in Manila, a Provisional
Government shall be established in the areas of the autonomy to be 
appointed by the President o f the Philippines; and be charged w ith  the task 
o f preparing for the elections o f the Legislative Assembly in  the te rrito ries of 
the Autonomy; and adm inister the areas in  accordance w ith  the provisions of 
this agreement until a Government is formed by the elected Legislative 
Assembly. The Government o f the Philippines shall take all necessary 
constitutional processes for the implementation o f the entire Agreement.
The T ripo li Agreement raised hopes and the opportunity for a final end to the long 
conflict in the southern Philippines. The Marcos regime was praised by many 
countries particularly the members o f the Association o f Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). However, in the capital Manila, there were mixed interpretations about 
the agreement. Some viewed the government's decision to sign the agreement as a 
clear indication of the MNLF's v ic tory because the terms in the agreement were, 
indeed, very close to what the MNLF had been demanding from  the government, 
which meant that the MNLF organization had successfully taken steps toward fu ll 
autonomy. But in contrast, Marcos strongly stressed that further moves to jo in  the 
Muslim districts into one administrative region would require a process o f 
determining through referendum w hat the people in the affected areas tru ly  
wanted. Naturally, the MNLF was no t happy w ith  this development and stressed 
that i t  would oppose the holding o f a referendum as i t  was not stipulated in the 
Tripoli agreement. Consequently, the agreement faced a serious problem because o f 
the differences in interpretations and understanding o f the terms of
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implementation.35
The government o f the Philippines wanted to ensure that the people liv ing  in 
areas to be covered by autonomy were consulted instead of s im ply imposing the 
agreement on them according to the terms o f implementation. In other words, this 
situation confirms that even w ith  a signed agreement between the government and 
the rebel movement, there is no assurance it  could be implemented in the conflict- 
affected areas. What is agreed at the national level is not necessarily followed at the 
provincial level, especially i f  such a policy w ould lead to sudden changes in the 
traditional system of authority in the affected communities.
In the beginning o f 1977, an agreement on the cessation o f hostilities was 
signed between the government and the MNLF under the supervision o f the ICFM, 
followed by a government declaration the amnesty for rebel returnees was already 
in effect. On January 11, the government announced that i t  would conduct a 
referendum in the 13 districts stipulated in the T ripo li Agreement to determine 
whether the populations in those districts were w illing  to live in  an autonomous 
region and also determine the extent o f the areas to be covered by the autonomous 
government. This development created a confusion that required a renegotiation on 
the implementation o f the T ripo li agreement. On the side o f the Philippine 
government, Imelda Marcos visited T ripo li once again in a bid to break the impasse 
on the impending referendum. Qadhafi, through a le tte r to Marcos, urged the 
Philippine government to issue a decree that would enable the creation o f autonomy 
fo r the 13 districts; set up a provisional government in  which the MNLF would
35 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 306; Peter G. Gowing, Religion and Regional 
Cooperation, 17; Mercado, Culture, Economics, and revolt, 163-164.
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participate; and allow the provisional government to organize a referendum to 
determine the form of adm inistration w ith in  the area o f the autonomy.36
Consequently, President Marcos declared the establishment o f autonomy in 
the 13 districts in the south on March 26, 1977. Among his firs t acts was the 
appointment o f six Muslims as d is tric t governors and seven Christian governors to 
compose and run the provisional government. Marcos offered the chairmanship of 
the provisional government to Nur Misuari; but convinced that such autonomy was 
lim ited, Misuari rejected the offer. W hat followed in  the process was the declaration 
fo r the establishment of two autonomous regions, regions 9 and 12. The 
autonomous government covered by region 9, to be based in Zamboanga city, was 
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, and Lanao del Norte. The autonomous 
government in region 12 covered Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato (now 
Cotabato Province), and Sultan Kudarat in which Cotabato city was the selected 
base. The two autonomous regions were not allowed to act independently on 
matters that fall under the jurisd iction of the central government. Furthermore, the 
two regions, 9 and 12, were to d irectly report to the President o f the Philippines.37 
The MNLF was not happy w ith  the creation o f the two autonomous regions as they 
excluded other districts mentioned in the T ripo li Agreement. It  considered such a 
move as an effort to mislead the Muslims on the true meaning o f the terms and 
conditions o f the Tripo li Agreement. The MNLF turned fo r help to outside actors as 
i t  called on Muslim countries to pressure the Philippine government to act in
36 For text of the Qadhafi's letter, see selected Documents-part I (ISIP), 6-14 and Aid Memoire, 34-37, 
for the position of the MNLF, see selected Documents-Part 3 (ISIP), 169-173.
37 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 307.
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accordance w ith  the mandate o f the Agreement signed in  1976.38
In spite o f the strong opposition o f the MNLF and its counter-proposal to 
establish an autonomous region placing Zamboanga City as its capital c ity where it 
would have security forces o f its own, the Marcos regime was determined to hold a 
referendum as planned to determine the extent o f the autonomy w hile  asking the 
people whether or not they would w ant to live under MNLF administration. The 
MNLF declared that they would not participate in  the referendum and w ould move 
to undermine the smooth conduct of such government activity. The MNLF suspected 
that the conduct o f the referendum placed i t  at a disadvantage since only five o f the 
13 districts had a Muslim majority, the rest being populated by a Christian majority. 
Despite the MNLF protest and the disagreement o f Libyan Leader Qadhafi, the 
referendum was held in  the 13 provinces on A p ril 17, 1977 and the fina l result was 
announced on A pril 23.39 M ajority o f the respondents in  the referendum opposed 
the inclusion o f the 13 districts into one region under MNLF adm inistration while 
Marcos's plan to grant autonomy to the two regions was ratified even though a 
m ajority o f the Muslims boycotted the referendum. The foreign m inister, Carlos 
Romulo, visited many Muslim countries in an effort to explain the outcome o f the 
plebiscite and the stand of the government o f the Philippines on the Muslim 
autonomy issue. But on May 16-22, 1977 at the Eighth Conference o f Muslim 
Foreign Ministers convened in Tripoli, the foreign m inisters called on Muslim  states
38 Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 147; Rodil, the Lumad and Moro, 17; Mercado, Culture, Economics, 
and Revolt, 164; Peter Gowing, "Contrasting Agendas for Peace in the Muslim South,” Philippine 
Quarterly of Culture and Society 8, no.4 ( Decemberl980): 298-299.
39 For official result of the referendum, see selected documents-part-1 International Studies Institute 
of the Philippines (ISIP), 15-19.
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to support the MNLF and criticize the Marcos regime fo r not complying w ith  its 
international obligations under the T ripo li Agreement. The conference further 
instructed the Committee o f Four to continue finding ways towards the resolution of 
the conflict between the government o f the Philippines and the Muslims 
represented by the MNLF. A t this time, the OIC granted the MNLF observer status at 
the Conference.40
In the local scene, the fighting continued in  different areas o f Mindanao in 
which both parties to the conflict accused each other o f breaking the ceasefire 
agreement. A t the upper level o f command in the Armed Forces, senior m ilita ry  
leaders suggested to the President tougher m ilita ry  campaigns as a possible solution 
to the Mindanao conflict. On the other hand, the MNLF was unable to generate 
formidable forces like those from 1970 to 1973 due to exhaustion on the part o f the 
combatants, the surrender o f some MNLF fighters to the government, and the 
emerging corruption w ith in  the ranks and file o f the MNLF. These difficulties faced 
by the MNLF organization were exacerbated by the fact that its leaders were no t in 
the area o f battle but were based abroad. Consequently, the fighting elements o f the 
MNLF coalesced w ith  local leaders o f the Muslim communities. Despite the 
perceived decline o f the combat effectiveness o f the MNLF forces, the government 
authorities -especially the Army -  had not been capable of maintaining peace and 
security in  the south because o f the threat posed by another rebel group: the
40 For text of the resolution of the 1CFM eight conference in May 16-22,1977, see Selected 
Documents-part 1 (ISIP), 31-32; also see Misuari's address to the conference, in Selected 
Documents (ISIP), Part 3, 71-84; Noble, The Philippines; Muslims Fight for an Independence State, 
14; May, Moro Movement, 57; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 308-309.
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communist New People's Army (NPA).41
The deteriorating situation o f the MNLF particu larly  among the combatants 
served to create a situation that divided the Muslim rebel movement in Mindanao. 
The firs t to break away from  the organization in 1978 was Hashim Salamat, who has 
then Misuari's deputy and second in command. Salamat and his followers 
established another organization called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 
The MILF was more inclined to the religious way o f struggle and, because his newly 
formed MILF was not recognized by the OIC, Salamat opted to move the center of 
the organization to Pakistan. According to reports, some 500 MILF fighters were 
trained in  Afghanistan. Salamat earned the support o f religious leaders not only 
abroad but also in local Muslim communities. Rashid Lucman and Salipada 
Pendatun o f Lanao and Cotabato respectively, though both in exile in Jeddah that 
time, supported Salamat in his new struggle. The MILF began to organize a local 
support system among the Muslims in Mindanao while emphasizing the teachings of 
Islam and creating an organization fo r women, youth, and the Ulama. This process of 
organization was followed by the creation o f the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces 
(BIAF), which served as the MILF’s fighting arm. The MILF was supported by then- 
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, even as Salamat was later abandoned by Lucman 
and Pendatun who formed another group named the Bangsamoro Liberation 
Organization (BMLO).
By 1982, another sim ilar group called the MNLF-Reformist Group (MNLF-
41 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 310; Cesar Majul, The Moro Struggle, 912; Peter 
G. Gowing, Religion and Regional Cooperation, 17; Ivan, Molloy, The Decline of the Moro National 
Front in the Southern Philippines, Journal of Contemporary Asia 18, no. 1 (1988): 62-72.
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RG), composed mostly o f the Maranao o f Lanao, was founded by Dimas Pondatu.42 
But in spite of the numerous Muslim rebel groups that emerged during those years, 
the OIC maintained that the MNLF was the main organization representing Muslims 
in the southern Philippines -  w ith  Nur Misuari as the standing leader.43 The reason 
fo r the emergence o f many groups may have been understood as a competition for 
leadership, or as a result o f the attraction policy o f the Philippine government to 
encourage rebels to abandon the revolt. But one may conclude that i t  was a product 
o f perseverance on the part o f the movement itself. I t  shows the flu id ity  o f the 
situation in the internal conflict that even though one organization's capacity to 
pursue combat activities is in decline, a new one would emerge e ither to continue 
the struggle or push fo r another ideology, but the overall goal o f these groups to 
fight for the rights o f the ir identity  group.
Another development in the underground movement was the surrender of 
some of the combatants. On June 7, 1978, Abul Khayr Alonto, who had been MNLF 
vice-chairman, surrendered to the government along w ith  500 combatants who laid 
down the ir arms. Alonto was encouraged by the prospect of becoming a prom inent 
leader who would eventually jo in the government and enjoy the benefits o f the 
created autonomy. A1 Kaluang, also one o f the hardcore leaders o f the rebellion 
based in the Sulu area, also surrendered to the government. Both A lonto and Aluang 
had surrendered in the past but returned after a while to the underground 
movement. Alonto was appointed by President Marcos Speaker o f the legislative
42 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 311.
43 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 312; Cesar Majul, The Moros of the Philippines, 
176; Noble, The Philippines: Muslims fight for an Independence State, 16.
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assembly o f region 12.
In line w ith  the policy o f attraction by the Marcos regime, high salaries for 
high positions were offered to those who would abandon the rebellion and join 
government service w ith in  the autonomous governments of regions 9 and 12. By 
1982, thus, about 37,000 (as claimed by the government) Muslim rebels had 
surrendered to the government. However, there were reported anomalies in the 
alleged surrender o f rebels. Some reports noted that no t all who surrendered were 
real MNLF fighters but only pretended as such to avail o f the benefits offered. Some 
would surrender for a while and then later on go back to the underground 
movement claiming they were s till part and parcel o f the Moro struggle.44
During the opening o f the Eleventh Islamic Conference o f Foreign Ministers 
on May 17-21, 1980 in Islamabad, Nur Misuari when given a chance to address the 
conference announced that the MNLF, under his leadership, had reverted to its 
original demand for self-determination and independence to solve the Moro p light 
in the southern Philippines. The conference once again blamed the Philippine 
government fo r not addressing the issue of the Muslims and fu rthe r preventing 
negotiations toward achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The conference 
remained supportive o f the MNLF position and was s till prepared to pursue peace 
negotiations in accordance w ith  the terms and conditions stipulated in the 1976 
T ripoli Agreement.45 In other words, no consensus was easy to attain between the
44 Noble, The Philippines: Muslims Fight for an Independence, 17; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration 
and Secession, 312-313; May, Situations of Philippine Muslims, 435; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 
263.
45 Resolution no. 21/11-P, 11th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, "The Question of the 
Muslims in the Philippines", www.oic-oci.ora/paae detail.asp?p id=68: Noble, The Philippines: 
Muslims fight for an Independence, 12,17.
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parties in  the negotiations. The MNLF through its leader Nur M isuari would just 
seek the help o f the OIC in situations where the Philippine government was deemed 
to be merely try ing  to contain the Muslim struggle rather than pursuing the 
mandate o f the 1976 T ripo li Agreement.
On the other hand, the Philippine government, in a b id to prevent the 
escalation o f Muslim rebellion, was frequently using the "policy o f a ttraction" to 
undermine the Muslims’ sympathy fo r the MNLF in  the belief tha t i t  would weaken 
the Moro rebellion. On the part o f the OIC, they could do nothing except to protest 
against the government of the Philippines fo r not pursuing peace in the southern 
Philippines, and to the extreme, provide financial and logistical support to the 
Muslim rebels in Mindanao. Support o f any k ind  from  abroad may have been 
intended fo r economic and social development o f Muslim communities bu t there 
was no assurance that such aid would be solely used fo r the intended purposes and 
not for advancing the Muslim rebellion against the Philippine government.
CONCLUSION
This chapter showed how the Philippine government had struggled so long 
to pacify the Muslim rebellion in the south. The process of pacification was so 
complex that even the attempted peace agreements d id  not create a cooperative 
environment between the parties to the conflict. The government had been faced 
w ith  a dilemma in the course o f looking fo r options, preferably peaceful, tha t its 
strategic decisions only led to more confusion among government leaders and those 
that represented the Muslim communities. The national leadership has had to 
balance its policy w ith  the national interest and tha t o f the people o f Mindanao
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while taking steps to  ensure that diplomatic relations w ith  other countries, 
particularly the oil producing countries in the Middle East, would not be jeopardized 
by the way i t  handled the problem o f secessionism in Mindanao.
While the Philippine government under Marcos and before him  was busy 
formulating its economic policy, the Huks emerged in the north which became the 
major security threat fo r the newly created democratic country in  the Southeast 
Asia region. The plan fo r Mindanao development was a p rio rity  in the economic 
policy o f the central government in Manila not only fo r economic but also for 
security reasons. This policy allowed the government to use the fertile  lands in 
Mindanao in its policy o f attraction for the rebellion in the north. There was also a 
strong conviction that developing Mindanao would pacify Muslim isolationist 
tendencies. I t  must be remembered that during those years, the Philippines was 
second only to Japan in terms o f economic performance. Nevertheless, the 
development plan through the exploration o f vast lands in  Mindanao benefited the 
rebels, or Huks, from the north.
The government was able to effectively end the Huk rebellion in Luzon but 
the same program created tensions between the government and the Moros in 
Mindanao. In short, such an ambitious plan fo r Mindanao had been one o f the most 
effective options in terms o f attracting combatants to end their rebellion. The Huk 
movement was successfully ended by offering its leaders and fighters po litica l 
positions w ith  a promise of land in Mindanao when they surrender. Consequently, 
as illustrated above, the policy o f the government became one-sided, leaving behind 
the interests o f the Muslim communities while giving more p rio r ity  to supporting
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the Christian settlers. In other words, the government program fo r development 
coupled w ith  the resettlement o f people from the north to the south may have been 
an effective tool to end both the rebellions in the north by the Huks and the Muslim 
rebels in  the south i f  i t  was managed in  accordance w ith  the interests o f both 
Muslims and Christians. As a result, these government programs only increased the 
level o f insecurity among the Muslim communities, thus giving them greater 
incentives to rebel.
The educational program as a government policy for the integration o f the 
Muslims into the mainstream o f Philippine society was perceived to be the long­
term  solution to the Moro rebellion. Muslim youths, through various scholarships, 
were able to go to school mostly in the universities in Manila through which they 
landed the kind o f jobs and professions they wanted. Consequently, there were 
many Muslims in  the succeeding generations who become lawyers, engineers, 
doctors, nurses, and the like which enabled the Muslim community to elevate the ir 
literacy. In fact, some of these young Muslims even pursued advance studies in the 
developed countries, including the United States. Most o f the educated Muslims, 
indeed, became part o f the government service not only in the place where they 
came from, but even in  the central government wherein Muslims were given a 
chance to be a member o f the House o f Representatives or the Senate. In short, 
education for Muslims was proven an effective tool fo r their integration into the 
national mainstream. Perhaps, the educational program fo r Muslims in  the south is 
one of the prim ary reasons for the continued existence o f "moderate groups” among 
the Muslims o f Mindanao.
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Contrary to the good outcome of the educational program fo r Muslims, the 
same also presented some disadvantages , particularly in  terms o f its impact on the 
resolution o f the Muslim secessionist tendency. The process of educating the young 
Moros had provided a common venue for congregation and unified all the linguistic 
groups into one strong and cohesive organization. To the extreme, the knowledge 
and skills they earned from universities apparently became a tool to widen the ir 
netw ork that enabled the same generation to bring the international Islamic 
community to the ir side. The education o f Muslims w ould have been an effective 
tool for integration had the government taken advantage of the leadership skills of 
these educated young Muslims in furthering the goal o f uniting Filipinos.
What happened, instead, was that the government efforts to develop 
Mindanao were perceived as a systematic way o f discrim inating against the 
Muslims. As a result, the educated leaders' connection to the outside w orld  made it  
possible to internationalize the Mindanao conflict and facilitate foreign intervention 
in the country’s internal conflict. In the end, d ip lom atic pressure from  outside 
compelled the Philippine government to enter in to  an agreement tha t was to have a 
tremendous impact on its domestic and foreign policies. But even though the 
government was struggling to resolve its security problem in the south exacerbated 
by external factors, i t  could have made a prom ising sta rt fo r the peaceful resolution 
o f the Muslim rebellion i f  only the government was sincere in its commitment. 
Ultimately, the conflict became an interaction between the state leaders and the 
international community led by the OIC. Lastly, the process o f w ider interaction 
provided a greater incentive for the Moro people in  the south to continue the
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rebellion against the government. Thus, the decades-long effort to integrate the 
Muslims in the southern Philippines into the national socio-political mainstream 
became a problematic process.46
In the next chapter, the study examines the second m ajor attem pt at 
resolving the Mindanao conflict.
46 Jeffrey A. Milligan, "Religious Identity, Political Autonomy and National Integrity: Implications for 
Educational Policy from Muslim-Christian Conflict in Southern Philippines.” Islam and Christian 
Relations 12, no. 4 (2001), 435.
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CHAPTER 5
REMEDIAL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE 1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Internal conflict always conies w ith  political instability in  a country. Change 
in political leadership is a potential source o f social disorder because o f expected 
enormous changes in government policies. This instability  and discontinuity o f 
policies, particularly in the developing world, happens because a set o f leaders in  a 
new regime resists follow ing the path o f established political policy o f previous 
regimes. The causes o f change in the system can be attributed to the behavior and 
personality o f leaders. In matters o f addressing internal security issues, there is no 
assurance that what was v irtua lly  agreed during the previous regime between 
challengers and the government is carried on in the new regime. Peace negotiations 
have always been a victim  o f this adversarial behavior of leaders who always 
consider the government's superiority over groups which undermine the legitimacy 
of the state. To the extreme, the same conflict and the negotiation w ith  rebels are 
commonly used for advancement o f political interests that do not contribute to the 
overall aim o f bringing peace. Some politicians use security issues to elevate the ir 
political status relative to others by making promises, commitment, and contracts in 
which not everything has to be true and could be implemented when they occupy 
influential positions in government.
In the Philippines, the fragile situation in the south has been a pasture for 
those leaders who, by virtue o f the ir political position, just play around the pressing 
security problems. The instability  o f the situation in Mindanao is a product o f the
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inab ility  o f both the government and the rebel leaders to fu lfill the ir commitments. 
Oftentimes, leaders in  political authority  are simply making sure tha t the escalation 
o f violent conflict is contained and would not invite outside actors, although most of 
the time i t  does get the attention o f other states. National leaders try  to avoid 
intervention in order to prevent conflicts from  spilling over to the regional or 
international level, believing i t  would complicate the matter. But i t  is un like ly tha t a 
vio lent internal conflict can remain an internal matter until i t  is resolved. When 
external forces become part o f the actors in security issues, the complexity of 
interactions is heightened that the likelihood o f easy resolution becomes almost 
impossible. Thus, the government itse lf has to address the concerns o f the domestic 
audience w hile balancing the demands o f external actors.
The 1976 Peace Agreement between the Government o f the Republic o f the 
Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which represents 
the Muslims in the southern Philippines was a covenant. I t  was an agreement fu ll of 
promises fo r lasting peace, prosperity, and equality tha t would m itigate the effects 
o f perceived discrimination. But promises almost always remain unfu lfilled as 
leaders become forgetful. Leaders, after they are elected to key politica l positions, 
would only realize the "big mistake" o f making undoable promises during the 
political campaign period once the people begin to hold them to such promises.
The 1976 peace agreement must have been several steps ahead towards 
attainable peace because both parties in the conflict had agreed to  sta rt build ing 
confidence in the context o f ending the decades-old hostilities between the Muslims 
and government-backed Christians in Mindanao. Because of the s tup id ity  o f the
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leaders, the clear horizon for peace over Mindanao turned out to be futile  that even 
interventions [diplomatic) o f international communities and distant powers have 
not worked. In this chapter, the study examines the remedial negotiations which 
attempted to rectify the faulty approaches to conflict resolution between the GRP 
and the alleged secessionist Muslims in the southern Philippines.
It  was an "alleged secessionism" because the h istory of the Mindanao conflict 
shows that the Muslim rebels would only tu rn  to making extreme demands for 
"independence or separation” when they saw no hope o f achieving autonomy. The 
firs t section o f this chapter examines significant events concerning the series of 
negotiations after the 1976 agreement to prevent fu rther escalation o f the violent 
conflict, which had evolved into a conflict between the government-backed 
Christians and the m inority  Muslims. The second section is a critical examination of 
the process o f implementation o f the 1996 Final Peace agreement between the 
government and the MNLF, and undertakes an assessment of the overall impact of 
that agreement in the context o f ending the Muslim rebellion in the southern 
Philippines.
EFFORTS PRIOR TO PEACE AGREEMENT
The political leadership o f the Philippine government at the height of 
tensions in the 1980s, when the dictatorship was being contested, and the political 
opposition brought the Mindanao conflict to the center of political propaganda . 
While the incumbent dictatorial rule was losing domestic support, the leadership of 
the opposition took advantage o f attracting the rebel forces, particu larly the MNLF, 
in order to get the people under the ir influence to support the candidates o f the
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opposition party. The MNLF, thus, expressed sympathy fo r the anti-Marcos 
movement and support for any action to oust President Marcos to be replaced by 
someone who would look into the p light o f the Muslims. During the election 
campaign period in 1985, Corazon Aquino, the w idow  o f Senator Aquino who was 
murdered at the Manila International A irpo rt when he returned home from  exile in 
the United States, promised to look at the establishment of local autonomy fo r the 
Muslims in  Mindanao and Sulu in accordance w ith  the guidelines stipulated in the 
Tripo li Agreement. Following this line of political propaganda, President Marcos 
accused the opposition party o f endangering the integrity o f the country by 
supporting the establishment o f a Muslim state in Mindanao. However, the political 
opposition denied this and claimed that should Mrs. Aquino win, she would support 
fu ll autonomy for Muslims in the south fo llow ing the mandate o f the T ripo li 
agreement, and that under no circumstances would secession be entertained.1
When Corazon Aquino became president after a bloodless popular uprising 
in Manila in what is now known as the People Power Revolution o f February 1986, 
one o f the priorities o f her regime was to restore peace and order in the entire 
country through reconciliation. Some o f the jailed leaders o f the New People’s Arm y 
(NPA) were pardoned and released from prison. To address the Muslim rebellion in 
the south, a ceasefire was declared and a call was made on all armed groups to come 
to the negotiating table. To start the peace negotiations, a meeting was held in 
Malaysia but despite the ceasefire unilaterally declared by the Armed Forces, only 
the MNLF-RG/BMLO showed up to meet w ith  the m in ister of defense. Technically,
1 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 331; May, Philippines under Aquino, 348; May, 
the Moro Movement, 58-59; Majul, The Moro Struggle, 915.
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the government was reluctant to ta lk to this group because it  was the MNLF that had 
been pushing fo r autonomy fo r Muslims in Mindanao. Other groups may have been 
causing security problems but they were not recognized as the representative o f the 
Moro people. Consequently, the Aquino adm inistration decided to negotiate w ith  
MNLF chairman Nur Misuari. But no significant development took place on this 
front fo r months and the rebels in  Mindanao, particu larly  in Sulu, continued fighting 
w ith  the Army. I t  was assessed that the intention of the Muslim rebels m ight have 
been to intensify their attacks to pressure the government to possibly agree to the 
demands of the MNLF. These clashes prompted the government to respond quickly. 
By June o f 1986, the firs t government response was to send the undersecretary for 
foreign affairs, Mamintal Tamano, a Muslim, to several Arab countries to request the 
OIC and the W orld Muslim League to orchestrate talks, through the ir leaders, 
between the government of the Philippines and Muslims in  the south.2
The Philippine government had to do a dual task o f convincing the leadership 
of the MNLF to negotiate and, at the same time, amending Philippine Laws had to 
accommodate the MNLF autonomy. The prom inent figure that had been try ing  to 
persuade Misuari, who was based in Jeddah, to return to  the Philippines to restart 
peace talks w ith  the new adm inistration was Butz Aquino, a brother-in-law  o f 
President Aquino. Misuari agreed to return to the Philippines for peace negotiations 
w ith  the government. On the other hand, the government was making sure that in 
the newly drafted constitution, local autonomy for Muslims in the south was 
included. Indeed on October 15, 1986, the Constitutional Committee included a
2 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 331-332.
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section of the constitution granting autonomy to Muslims in Mindanao, later called 
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or ARMM. But i t  was specifically 
mentioned that such autonomy would be created w ith in  the context o f national 
sovereignty and the te rrito ria l in tegrity  o f the Republic o f the Philippines. 
Consequently, the Aquino adm inistration agreed to grant autonomy to the four 
d istricts where the Muslims were a majority. A t that time, Misuari agreed w ith  the 
government plan and returned to the Philippines to ta lk personally to the President. 
In a development like this, outside actors are quick to respond owing to the very 
like ly possib ility that a "peace agreement" w ill be reached between the parties in the 
conflict. Neighboring countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the OIC were 
very quick to arrange subsequent meetings w hile  preventing Misuari from  pursuing 
his demand fo r secession from  the republic. In the end, Misuari was compelled to 
accept, for the meantime, the offer o f autonomy to fou r districts which was far 
better than the two districts previously created by Marcos.3 But i t  must be 
remembered that in this period, several other Muslim armed groups had emerged, 
and definite ly such groups were not part o f the government negotiations w ith  the 
MNLF.
M isuari’s return to the Philippines raised hopes fo r a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict in Mindanao. He was highly regarded for defending the rights o f the 
Moros, and so, for the Muslims especially in  Sulu, he was considered a hero. 
Following his arriva l was a four-day general assembly which started on September
3 May, The Philippines under Aquino, 349-351; idem. The Moro Movement, 59; Che Man, Muslim
Separatism, 89-90; James Clad, The Misuari Gamble, FEER 133, no. 37 (September 11,1986): 18-19;
Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 332.
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3,1986 in Jolo and was participated in by at least 2,000 armed men, civilians, and an 
official from  the Libyan embassy in Manila. Another most significant development 
on the ground was the meeting o f President Aquino w ith  Misuari on September 5 in 
Jolo in which they agreed that the government and the MNLF would resume talks 
and that a ceasefire would be declared to give way to the negotiations. There was an 
assurance that the "peace talks" would resume in the context of atta in ing stab ility  in 
Mindanao. Mrs. Aquino appointed Major General Jose Magno, the Commanding 
General o f Southern Command whose jurisd iction  covers the entire Mindanao area, 
and Agapito ‘Butz’ Aquino, her brother-in-law , who had been her emissary to 
Misuari in  the months before the February 1986 presidential snap elections, as 
government negotiators.
But it  seemed that peace was so elusive in  this pa rt of the Philippines. W hile 
the MNLF forces, by virtue o f the ceasefire, more or less abided by the cessation of 
hostilities, other armed groups also claim ing to represent the Moros continued to 
fight w ith  government forces. In addition, the NPA threat was im m inent tha t i t  could 
sabotage the ongoing peace talks. On the part o f the MILF, which broke away from  
the MNLF in the late 1970s, its chairman Hashim Salamat announced that his 
organization would not take part in whatever the GRP and MNLF agreed upon. The 
MNLF-RG also announced that i t  was not obliged to comply w ith  such an agreement 
unless the ir group was included in the talks. In spite of opposition from  other 
groups, thus, Misuari traveled to several Muslim areas in  order to gain the support 
o f the local people for the peace process. But the Christians and religious sectors 
were skeptical about the peace talks as they suspected that secessionism for
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Muslims in the south had been encouraged by the government. Consequently, 
Christian armed groups emerged to oppose the feared takeover o f the MNLF over 
Mindanao.4
The firs t meeting attended by representatives o f the Aquino adm inistration 
and the MNLF was held in Jeddah on January 3, 1987, in  which the OIC Secretary 
General was present. Both parties agreed that succeeding meetings w ould  be held in 
Zamboanga fo r a thorough discussion o f the issue o f autonomy fo r Mindanao, Sulu, 
Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan through the constitutional process, which meant 
that the people in these areas must be consulted on whether they would accept 
being part of the Muslim autonomous region. However, the MNLF opposed the 
proposed conduct o f a referendum believing i t  was disadvantageous to the cause of 
Muslim autonomy in areas where Christians were a majority. In spite o f the warning 
from the MNLF that this constitutional process would jeopardize the negotiations, 
the constitution was ra tified on February 2, 1987 mandating the creation of 
autonomy fo r Muslims in the south and the Cordillera on the north  through a 
democratic process, that is, the people must be asked i f  they would like to be part of 
the autonomy.
While the ratification o f the 1987 Constitution meant the establishment of 
autonomy in the south, thus, i t  also meant tha t people liv ing  in these areas must firs t 
be consulted through a referendum. W ith the historical events that had transpired 
between the Christians and the Muslims firm ly  implanted in the ir minds, both sides 
were suspicious that the side that wins in the referendum would dominate and
4 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 332-333; Majul, The Moro Struggle, 915-916;
May, The Philippines under Aquino, 351.
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exercise fu ll authority over the other. In other words, w ha t prevailed in the minds of 
the people was the fear for the ir security tha t even the government could not 
guarantee once an attack from either side started. No m atter how good the im pact of 
the peace effort would be in terms o f economic development as w ell as social and 
political stability, skepticism always prevails among the contenders to negotiations 
when security becomes a concern, as in  the case o f the Mindanao conflict. Moreover, 
the conduct o f a referendum meant that autonomy would be lim ited  to areas where 
the Muslims were a m ajority instead o f the original demand o f the MNLF fo r 13 
provinces.5
In the subsequent meetings o f both parties, the government panel insisted on 
negotiation in accordance w ith  the 1987 Constitution which was ratified by the 
m ajority in a referendum. In short, as far as the creation o f an autonomous area was 
concerned, it  should go through a constitutional process that requires the consent of 
the people in each d istric t targeted fo r inclusion in the autonomy. Technically, this 
was a very simple process but i t  was a major stumbling block to the negotiation. The 
constitutional process, through a referendum in which the m ajority o f the residents 
o f the affected areas would ra tify  the creation o f an autonomous region in each 
district, became the basis for the peace process in Mindanao. In contrast, the MNLF 
combatants as well as the MILF forces that were inclined to a religious way of 
struggle, did not participate in such a political exercise. Aside from disagreements of 
both parties on the interpretation o f the provisions o f the peace accord, the 
government insistence on setting up a Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) to
5 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 333-334; Majul, The Moro Struggle, 917; Majul, 
The Moros of the Philippines, 177; May, the Philippines under Aquino, 351-354.
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be composed o f many sectors o f society fu rthe r compounded the situation. In 
essence, this option involving many actors would fu rthe r complicate the negotiation 
process because each actor’s demand has to be satisfied; otherwise, i t  would trigger 
strong opposition to an agreement.
U ntil May 1987, the talks never had a fru itfu l outcome; instead, the MNLF 
leadership warned that hostilities in Mindanao were im m inent because o f the 
disagreement on the terms and conditions fo r establishing autonomy. The 
government accused the MNLF o f looking fo r an excuse to  pursue its overall goal of 
seceding from the Republic o f the Philippines. Naturally, the Christian m ajority  
frowned on the idea o f secession, and the extreme reaction as a response to this 
would be the reversal o f peace efforts and a re turn to armed hostilities between the 
Muslims and the Christians- not between the MNLF and the Government forces. 
Misuari, on his part, condemned the Aquino regime and as usual turned to the OIC 
fo r help to pressure the Philippine government. While Misuari was insisting on 
having the talks under the OIC's auspices, the government was re luctant to involve 
outside actors because i t  was d ifficu lt for the Aquino adm inistration to deal w ith  
tw o camps at the same time.6 The regime may have been right in  its move to avoid 
external intervention in the negotiation process, but i t  must be remembered that 
OIC member states had been significant actors in the effort at conflict resolution that 
the MNLF could turn  to. More so, i f  the government alone was made to decide on the 
future o f the peace process, the chances o f success were m inimal because the state 
would not decide on matters w ith  strategic implications fo r its future interests.
6 Moshe Yegar, op. cit, 334-335; see also Majul, The Moro Struggle, 917-920; Majul, The Moros of the 
Philippines, 177-178.
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After neglecting consultations w ith  the MNLF, the Aquino administration 
created a Regional Consultative Commission to formulate a law  fo r the 
establishment o f a regional autonomy for Muslims in Mindanao. In making the law, 
the government tried to encourage both parties to  participate bu t the MNLF and the 
MILF showed no interest. A fter several months o f crafting the law, the b ill creating 
an autonomous area fo r Muslims was signed by President Aquino. The law  stated 
that the autonomy would be established in the context o f the T ripo li Agreement for 
the 13 provinces and nine cities, but contingent upon ratification o f the population 
liv ing in those areas mentioned. The regional autonomy would be sovereign over its 
local economy, especially on matters relating to the exploration o f natural resources. 
Said law also mandated the establishment of local courts, the Shari'a and tribal 
courts, which can litigate on matters pertaining to personal issues, family, and 
property. Im portant in the law  was the mandate on the Philippine government to 
undertake measures to allocate funds for the autonomous region.7 It  seemed that 
the law’s provisions were almost carefully studied to cater to the demands o f the 
Moro people, but as noted earlier, the conduct o f a referendum made it  impossible 
to ensure the inclusion o f all the 13 provinces in  the proposed regional autonomy. 
In other words, that law  was sim ilar to Marcos's attempts to pacify the Muslim 
rebellion. Nevertheless, the government initiatives were seen to exert a m itigating 
effect on the situation in the south but would not resolve the Muslim rebellion there. 
The MNLF organization may have been satisfied w ith  whatever government could 
give, but the emergence of several other armed groups tha t were not involved in  the
7 Moshe Yegar, op.cit, 335.
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peace process and were capable o f creating security disturbances in the area 
complicated the situation in the south.
In spite o f w hat had been taking place, a referendum on Muslim autonomy 
was conducted in the 13 provinces on November 19, 1989. Again, this referendum 
was strongly opposed by the MNLF. But w hile  the MNLF called to boycott the 
referendum, the political exercise was a success on the part o f the Christian 
population and a failure on the part o f the Muslims. Most o f the 13 provinces, 
particularly those w ith  a m ajority  Christian population, opposed inclusion in  the 
autonomous region. Only four o f the 13 provinces voted for autonomy, these being 
the Muslim m ajority provinces o f Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi 
which would now belong to the Autonomous Region in  Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 
Cotabato City was chosen as the seat o f governance. This was a kind o f forced 
attempt at conflict resolution, fo r even in the face o f open refusal o f the Muslim 
m inority  to take part in the talks, the dominant Christians tried to come up w ith  a 
remedial agreement in the hope o f bringing about stab ility  in the region.
The MNLF leadership called fo r Muslim unity fo r an armed struggle against 
the government of the Philippines. Several attacks on government troops and 
facilities were launched by the rebels that derailed the benign intention of 
government to create a mutual agreement that would pacify the Muslim rebels and 
communities. There were reports about an increased number o f MNLF forces 
tra in ing m ilitias, but more than that, i t  was believed that the OIC continued to 
support the MNLF aspiration. The support o f the OIC to the MNLF was clearly 
stipulated during the 17th Annual Conference o f Muslim Foreign Ministers held in
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Amman, Jordan in March 1988, and also during the 18th Conference held in Riyadh 
in  March 1989. The OIC had declared the failure of the Philippine government to 
fu lfill its commitment to resolve the Mindanao conflict in  the context of 
implementing the T ripo li Agreement.8 The fu lfillm ent o f commitments was deemed 
so im portant that when it  was not implemented according to the agreement, it 
invited renewed conflict, sometimes w ith  even more intensity than the previous 
one.
A fter the elections for governor and vice-governor o f the autonomous region 
in October 1990, President Aquino signed into law the transfer o f powers to the 
ARMM. In spite of the OIC's claim that the government had failed to fu lfill the 
mandates of the Tripo li Agreement, the Aquino regime was confident and believed 
that autonomy follow ing the terms o f the T ripo li was now  being implemented w ith  
the transfer o f power to  the autonomy by v irtue of the ARMM organic law. The 
MNLF, which was batting for genuine autonomy based on the agreed creation of 
regional autonomy for 13 provinces, rejected the government move. Consequently, 
violence escalated anew as the Arm y intensified its combat operations against Moro 
rebels. Reports stated that all civilian villages suspected of supporting the MNLF 
were bombed, resulting in many deaths, damage to property, and the displacement 
o f thousands o f residents from the ir homes.9
This was expected in a failed negotiation because part o f the mandate o f the 
Armed Forces was to prepare fo r the w orst should the peace talks fail. The
8 Majul, The Moros of the Philippines, 179-180; Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 
335-336; May, The Religious Factor, 311; Madale, The Organic Law, 170-183.
9 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 336.
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government had no other option bu t to adapt to a changing environment and using 
its m ilita ry  m ight to neutralize combatants was always seen as the best option in 
order to restore stability in the communities. In the end, negotiations like this w ind 
up in a deadlock because m ilita ry  action becomes more attractive to both parties, 
especially i f  such armed confrontation has already started and has inflicted 
casualties on either side. But most often, the overall situation on the ground and the 
future o f negotiations usually change when changes in the political leadership take 
place.
TOWARDS CONFLICT SETTLEMENT
When Fidel Ramos became Philippine president on June 30, 1992, hopes 
were buoyed that the impasse would be broken because government 
representatives met w ith  Nur M isuari in T ripo li in October 1992. Misuari, on his 
part, was ready to re turn to the Philippines to resume talks i f  these w ould be based 
on the Tripo li agreement this time around. President Ramos was determined to 
resume the talks and, in fact, allowed the OIC to act as an observer in the 
negotiations. Being a form er m ilita ry  general, Ramos had a d ifferent approach to 
security issues. He ordered intensified operations against combatants who had 
separated from the MNLF. But the rebels responded in a different manner. There 
were several incidents o f kidnappings for ransom, which was another development 
that added to the complexity o f the Mindanao conflict. There was no clear evidence 
on who were responsible fo r the acts o f kidnapping, bu t it  was increasingly clear 
that a new and more radical threat, the Abu Sayyaf, had emerged in Basilan province 
and Sulu. M ilita ry reports said the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) emerged in 1989,
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acquired tra in ing in some Arab countries, and had links to the international te rro ris t 
network Jama'a Islamia 01). In spite o f the atrocities perpetrated by the rebels, both 
the government and the MNLF agreed to hold a round o f talks, which lasted four 
three days in Jakarta, in 1992. Furthermore, there was hope, th is tim e that an 
agreement would be reached because the MNLF had dropped its demand for 
complete secession from the Philippines. Consequently, the government decided to 
start official negotiations w ith  the MNLF and possibly w ith  the MILF as w ell.10
The resumption o f negotiations was made possible because the demand for 
an Autonomous Islamic State in Mindanao was dropped by the MNLF. A ceasefire 
was agreed upon after a meeting in Jakarta in October o f 1993. However, as the 
negotiations progressed, the MILF forces and the Abu Sayyaf intensified m ilita ry  
actions against government troops and vita l installations. The Abu Sayyaf moved on 
to its notorious role o f carrying out kidnappings fo r ransom, particu larly of 
foreigners. But in spite o f the deteriorating conditions on the ground, the 
negotiation process continued. This time, Misuari agreed on terms that the 
transitional government in ARMM would not automatically lim it the term  o f office of 
incumbent officials in the autonomous region. Concerns about education, economic, 
and judicial matters were in itia lly  discussed while other issues were taken up in 
succeeding rounds of talks. In addition to this development, the Ramos 
administration also looked at the situation o f Muslim refugees and immigrants in 
Sabah.
President Ramos him self visited Malaysia and neighboring countries to
10 Amnesty International 1993, 240; Sales, W ar and Peace, 52; Moshe Yegar, op.cit, 337.
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explain, among others, the side o f the Philippine government on the peace 
negotiations w ith  the Muslims in the southern Philippines. Ramos also opened a 
diplomatic extension office in  Sabah to increase Philippine diplom atic cooperation 
w ith  the Malaysian government.11 Perhaps, this was one o f the best strategies o f the 
Ramos administration in resolving the Mindanao issue in  view  o f the fact tha t the 
Malaysian leadership was once helping the Moro rebellion by provid ing tra in ing for 
the firs t batch o f MNLF cadres who became the leaders o f the Muslim rebellion in 
Mindanao.
After series of talks, the stalemate was broken in  June 1995 when the two 
parties agreed on the understanding that the agreement would be composed o f two 
parts. The firs t part was that Misuari would be the Governor o f the ARMM in the 
scheduled autonomy election on 9 September. The second part was the 
consequential renaming of the 13 provinces orig inally mentioned in the Tripo li 
agreement as the Special Zone for Peace and Development, for which the Southern 
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) would be established and 
o f which Nur Misuari would be named caretaker for the term o f three years. This 
three-year period was supposed to give Nur Misuari enough tim e to attract and 
convince the Christians to jo in  the autonomous region. I t  was also the intention in 
this period that resources fo r development channeled into the ARMM would be 
gradually poured into the rest o f Mindanao.
The Consultative Assembly w ith  81 members and the Darul Ifta, a religious 
consultative assembly, were set up to help Nur Misuari in the adm inistration o f the
11 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 337;
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ARMM. However, a referendum would be held after three years to determine the 
extent of the te rrito ry  to be covered by the autonomy, while at the same time 
keeping the four provinces in the ARMM as ratified in a 1989 referendum. A 
significant part o f the agreement, likewise, was the integration o f 7,500 MNLF 
combatants into the Armed Forces o f the Philippines and the National Police. The 
rest of the MNLF forces would just lay down th e ir arms and end the ir rebellion.12 
This time, i t  seemed-the agreement resembled the T ripo li Agreement o f 1976, but 
the problem was in the treatment o f the combatants. I t  was a partia l integration 
since, according to some estimates, the number to  be integrated was not even ha lf of 
the total armed men of the MNLF. As seen later in the Muslim struggle, those left 
behind by the integration process eventually formed the ir own group, and the worse 
scenario was that the same group would continue to rebel against the government.
Misuari visited several communities claim ing that the SPCPD, which he 
chaired, was the only solution to the impasse in the talks between the government 
and the MNLF, which means that th is was just a transitional step towards the 
establishment o f a permanent autonomy in the 13 provinces and ten cities in the 
southern Philippines. Misuari also hoped to get adequate funding so he would be 
able to oversee and improve the economy in Mindanao by upgrading v ita l facilities. 
However, President Ramos explained clearly to the people that SPCPD was not a 
regional government and had no authority or jurisd iction over the m ilita ry  and the 
police. In other words, the President’s pronouncement indicated that the ARMM was 
not an autonomous region and that the authority  and powers vested in the SPCPD
12 Moshe Yegar, op. cit., 339-340; also see annex " " for the full text of the agreement between the 
government of the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF.
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were merely an extension o f the President's power. But in spite of all o f these 
developments, the government saw the strategy as the best tool to dampen the 
Muslims' secessionist tendency.13 In short, the two parties to the peace talks had 
contradictory interpretations about the impending establishment o f autonomy for 
the Muslims. The government explanation eased the Christians' insecurity about the 
future implications for them of the ARMM because the president w ould s till control 
the supposedly autonomous areas. On the MNLF side, however, M isuari had to 
explain his opposition to the agreement to maintain his prestige. He claimed that 
agreeing to the government offer, for a while, was just the firs t step toward 
complete autonomy.
Finally, the government announced in August 1996 that the signing o f the 
peace agreement between the government o f the Philippines and the MNLF was 
scheduled on September 2 that year. The signing o f the agreement, in theory, would 
mean the end o f the Muslim rebellion in the southern Philippines because the rebel 
group had finally agreed to end the violence. For more than 30 years o f the Moro 
struggle, an estimate o f more than 100,000 lives were lost -ha lf o f them combatants, 
about 30 percent government soldiers, and the rest innocent civilians. According to 
some estimates, the government had spent no less than $3 b illion fo r the w ar alone, 
not to mention the costs of repairing and rehabilitating damaged v ita l installations 
and properties o f both the government and private entities. Nevertheless, Misuari 
officia lly assumed the post o f ARMM governor on September 13. The government
13 Rigoberto Tiglao, The Philippines: The Fire Next Time, FEER, vol 159, no.13 [March 28,1996): 24; 
Peter M. Sales, War and Peace in the Southern Philippines: An analysis of Negotiations Between the 
Ramos Administration and the Moro National Liberation Front, Pilipinas, no. 27 (fall 1996): 61, 63; 
Davis, Islamic Guerillas Threaten the Fragile Peace, 30; Moshe Yegar, op. cit., 340-341.
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had promised a yearly budget o f $380 m illion  for the region. Observers in  the 
conflict claimed that the tw o major reasons fo r the MNLF's decision to end the 
rebellion were that the rebels had grown tired  o f waging war and popular support 
for the ir cause had declined. Similarly, the m ilita ry  and other government forces had 
also become war-weary, and the public’s support for the war was waning. Another 
factor that also convinced Misuari to forge an agreement was pressure from  the OIC, 
even though i t  extended support to Misuari up to the very end o f the talks.14
In theory, a rebellion is ended by "negotiated settlement” the moment an 
agreement is signed by both parties in conflict fo r the cessation o f hostilities. But in 
the case o f the Mindanao conflict, the situation was different from  other internal 
conflicts happening elsewhere. For while the MNLF had entered in to  a peace 
agreement w ith  the government o f the Philippines, other armed groups claim ing to 
represent the p light of the Muslims had emerged in the conflict-affected region. The 
MILF had been posing a serious threat to government authority in the same area of 
autonomy while the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu and Basilan provinces including its sub-units 
in Central Mindanao continued to ins till fear among the communities by kidnapping 
members o f prom inent families.
As armed confrontations between the Arm y and the ASG occurred, the MILF 
was often dragged into the fray as the Army's offensives against the ASG usually 
took place in the MILF’s area o f operations. Consequently, whenever the Arm y gave 
chase to the ASG, the MILF would be dragged into the armed confrontation because 
the ir camps, according to them, were being attacked by the Army. In the end,
14 Tiglao, op. cit., 24; Sales, op. cit., 61,63; Moshe Yegar, op.cit., 341.
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frequent armed clashes took place in  the autonomous areas . There were reports as 
w ell that some members o f the ASG came from the MNLF, or those who were left 
behind in  the integration program.
THREATS TO PEACE
The conventional wisdom about peace negotiations is that vio lent conflict 
ends when two parties enter into a peace accord. This is supported by the fact that 
rebels “lay down” the ir weapons and agree to the terms and conditions o f the peace 
pact in the hope for a brighter future. This was exactly what happened in the 
Philippines. When the rebels were integrated into the Armed Forces and the Police, 
violence was halted, although not long enough. Understandably, the rebels were 
assured o f economic development for the ir areas, while rebel leaders were offered 
political positions in the government to. But the Peace Accord had obvious major 
loopholes. At least three armed groups were deemed threats to the peace 
agreement: MNLF members who were le ft behind, the MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG).
A fte r a series o f talks, the government and the MNLF agreed to end the 
rebellion, bu t i t  must be remembered tha t a number o f MNLF members were not 
included in  the integration program of the government. The integration process had 
accommodated only 7,500 MNLF combatants, w hile  it  was simply assumed that the 
rest of the rebels would lay down the ir arms and support the ir new-found 
autonomy. In some estimates, the MNLF had some 20,000 armed members, which 
means that not even ha lf o f the rebels could avail of the benefits o f the integration 
program and be part of the national mainstream.
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According to the plan, the MNLF forces who would surrender to the 
government must bring along w ith  them, as a prim ary requirement, one firearm 
when they signified the ir in tention to be part o f the integration program. By strict 
mathematical computation, only 7,500 firearms were turned over to the 
government, but reports showed that most rebels owned more guns in the ir homes. 
Consequently, there was no proper accounting o f loose firearms circulating in the 
region. In addition to this, most o f those who signified the ir intention fo r inclusion in 
the integration program were not the original MNLF combatants. For reasons o f age 
and the lim ited quota, these older fighters chose no t to be integrated into the 
government's armed services; instead they sent the ir sons as the ir representatives.
The neutralization o f the armed men, in  theory, was a success but MNLF 
fighters who were excluded from  the integration program and had kept the ir 
firearms continued to pose a threat to security. Those who were not given a chance 
to jo in the M ilita ry  or the Police fe lt even more discrim inated against. Some o f them 
formed the ir own group; some preferred to jo in  the MILF, believing i t  was the true 
organization that would really fight fo r the liberation o f all Muslims in the southern 
Philippines. Those MNLF members who were selected by the leadership to be part 
o f the integration were happy enough, but the "threat to peace" were those who 
were not included in the integration program. Some o f the "left behind" MNLF forces 
joined the notorious Abu Sayyaf w hile  others were welcomed by the more Islamic- 
inclined organization, the MILF. Just a few months after the signing o f the peace 
agreement, there were incidents o f armed confrontation between the Arm y and the 
jo in t forces o f the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf.
The MILF refused to jo in  the MNLF in  the peace negotiations w ith  the 
government because it  did not recognize the peace agreement as a solution to the 
Muslim struggle. The MILF forces consistently grew stronger not only because of 
MNLF members who joined the organization, but the fact that i t  was the sole 
organization le ft that had the support o f Muslim communities, especially those who 
did not support Misuari's adm inistration. Allegations about Muslim support for the 
Abu Sayyaf kidnappings remained unconfirmed because Islamic law does not 
support kidnapping for ransom activities, including indiscrim inate bombings of 
public places, although the ASG claimed that the ir actions were geared towards 
protecting Islam from attacks by non-Muslims. Thus, for the same reason, the 
religious component of the MILF struggle had marred its denial o f being linked to 
the notorious ASG. As a consequence, there were speculations, especially among the 
m ilitary, that both the MILF and the ASG had the same overall goal o f establishing an 
independent Islamic State in the south.15 This complication was exacerbated by the 
fact that the ASG had been operating w ith in  the same areas as the MILF. Whenever 
the m ilita ry pursued the ASG for kidnapping, the ASG usually ran towards MILF-held 
areas. In the process o f resolving the ASG threat, thus, the government was always 
trapped in a quagmire o f fighting the combined forces o f the MILF and the ASG.
Some o f the MILF cadres had acquired m ilita ry  tra in ing abroad. Today, the 
organization has more than 25,000 combatants. The MILF also earned enormous 
support from the local Muslims because o f its religious inclination. W hile the MNLF 
became known fo r its strong demand for te rrito ria l expansion o f autonomy for the
15 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 337, 341-342; Tiglao, op.cit., 24, 27-28
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Muslims, the MILF fights for complete Islamic independence o f areas w ith  a Muslim 
majority. I t  must be remembered that the MNLF usually tried  to escalate the 
violence to gain attention from outside actors, preferably the OIC member countries. 
For the MILF, it  always claimed that fighting against government was not only for 
the liberation o f the Muslims bu t a Jihad or holy war. In some studies, it  was 
assessed that the latter part o f the Marcos regime and the entire Aquino 
adm inistration (1978-1986 fo r Marcos, 1986-1992 for Aquino) unw itting ly  gave the 
MILF ample time to build up its forces. There were only m inor clashes between the 
MILF and the government forces during those years because both regimes were 
focused on negotiating w ith  the MNLF. When the MILF sp lit from  the MNLF 
organization in the late 1970s, Hashim Salamat was able to organize a group of 
young men who were trained in foreign countries, and then sent to Afghanistan to 
fight alongside the Arab mujahideen against the Russians.16
During those years, MILF strongholds were not confined to  the provinces o f 
Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, in North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and South Cotabato. 
Support was also coming from the Muslims in Davao del Sur and Davao del Norte, 
Basilan, Sulu, and Zamboanga. The center o f the MILF movement was in 
Maguindanao where a camp called Abubakar was located. M ilita ry  tra in ing and 
religious enhancement activities were conducted in that area. Before its destruction 
during a m ilita ry  offensive in 2000, there were foreigners who served as tra iners in 
Camp Abubakar, and the MILF graduated more than 200 young trainees who 
became commanders in the organization. The tra in ing  also included making
16 Moshe Yegar, op.cit., 342.
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homemade bombs and manufacturing arms like the "Rocket-Propelled Grenade 
launcher” (RPG), and ammunition. Again, the leadership of the MILF did not agree 
to jo in the MNLF in the negotiations because they believed that the creation o f the 
ARMM would not solve the Muslim struggle. For them, the ARMM was not genuine 
autonomy that would give religious freedom fo r Muslims in the south. The MILF 
envisioned a federal structure in the Philippine government in which one o f the 
states would be called Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation) fo r the Muslims. I t  must be 
remembered that in the history o f the Mindanao conflict, there is no single event in 
which the government o f the Philippines ever considered demands fo r a separate 
state and was thus expectedly not prepared to grant it  to the MILF.17
While the government was busy negotiating w ith  the MNLF in  1996, the 
MILF took advantage o f the time to build up its m ilita ry  strength. On the same year, 
the MILF escalated its m ilita ry  campaigns against government forces which resulted 
in  many clashes in different areas, particularly in Central Mindanao. The MILF rebels 
were observed to be more particular in attacking vita l installations such as electric 
power plants, irrigation facilities, and Christian communities. Selected incidents of 
kidnappings were also blamed on the MILF lost command group (the Pentagon) that 
operates mostly in central Mindanao which include the provinces o f Maguindanao, 
Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, Lanao del Sur, and South Cotabato. Victims of 
kidnapping were mostly wealthy businessmen, foreign contractors, and prom inent 
Christian families. I t  was believed, particularly by the M ilitary, tha t the ransom 
money paid by victims in exchange for the ir freedom was used to finance the
17 Moshe Yegar, op. cit., 343; Tiglao, Philippines: The Fire Next Time, 26-30; Tiglao, Return to Arms, 
FEER, vol 160, no. 30 (July 24,1997): 32
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logistical needs o f the MILF such as the purchase o f arms and ammunition. The MILF 
claimed they were buying arms from  m ilita ry  personnel. Also, the MILF claimed that 
MNLF forces, preferably those who disagreed w ith  the Misuari-Ramos agreement, 
were join ing the MILF to continue the struggle for self-determ ination.18 Clashes 
between the MILF forces and the m ilita ry  continued un til a b ila tera l ceasefire was 
called on January 27,1997.
Oftentimes, the occasional declaration o f truces did not work. Ceasefire 
declarations were usually shattered by incidents o f kidnapping. The M ilita ry  often 
accused the MILF of being responsible fo r such crimes as kidnappings, bombings, 
and extortion activities. It was believed that the money generated from  these illegal 
activities was used to support the growing number o f MILF fighters. Kidnapping 
activities were a serious concern o f the government because such acts derailed the 
process o f peace-building in the south. Whenever there was a kidnap incident, the 
m ilita ry  was forced to pursue the kidnappers and most often ended up fighting w ith  
the bigger MILF forces. This was the reason that the m ilita ry  consistently claimed 
that MILF forces were involved in the kidnap for ransom activities, w hile  the MILF 
denied such allegation. On June 26, 1997, the m ilita ry  launched an attack and 
captured the second largest MILF camp, Rajamuda, located in the marsh land 
between North Cotabato and Maguindanao provinces. The fo llow ing month, after a 
bloody clash in Camp Rajamuda, President Ramos ordered the m ilita ry  to stop 
operations against the MILF that led to the signing o f another ceasefire agreement in 
July o f the same year. In spite o f Ramos's promise to reopen talks w ith  the MILF,
18 Tiglao, The Hard Corps, 28; Tiglao, Moro Action Call, FEER, vol 159, no. 15 (April 11,1996): 12
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clashes continued and even worsened when it  was discovered that tw o o f the rebels 
killed in an encounter in October were Pakistani and Egyptian nationals.19
As mentioned earlier, the Abu Sayyaf (ASG] along w ith  its small sub-units in 
other areas operating under a kidnap-for-ransom strategy were another threat to 
peace in the southern Philippines. Compared w ith  the MNLF and the MILF, the ASG 
was much smaller in number but more extremist, and was a major source of 
provocation fo r the government. The ASG emerged in 1989 on the islands o f Basilan, 
Zamboanga, and Jolo. Apart from  its strategy o f kidnapping fo r ransom, it  also 
carried out bombings o f public places and attacked government forces p rim arily  to 
instill fear among the population. In return, the local people in the area where the 
ASG operated were forced to support them for fear of being killed. The identified 
firs t leader o f the ASG was Abubakar Abdurazak Janjalani. He was born in  Basilan in 
1963 from a poor fam ily but acquired education from  Libya, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. 
He was also trained in a m ilita ry  camp in Libya, and fought in Afghanistan in  the 
1980s alongside the Afghan Mujahedeen against the Russian Army. When he 
returned to Mindanao, he became Uztadz or Islamic teacher in some Madrasas or 
Islamic schools owing to his Islamic education. He also became a preacher o f Islam, 
in which most o f his sermons during Friday prayers in the Mosque included the 
waging o f a revolution against the government and the Christians. According to 
m ilita ry  estimates, the total number o f ASG was from  300 to 500 men w ith  complete 
armament, including anti-tank weapons believed to have been shipped from  foreign 
countries. In most o f the ASG raids, members o f the MNLF lost command and MILF
19 Moshe Yegar, op.cit, 344.
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aided the ASG, and then returned to the ir orig inal organization once the operation 
was over. W ith these tactics, the m ilita ry  on several occasions concluded that the 
MILF and the ASG belonged to the same organization whose prim ary strategy was to 
conduct te rro r activities. Furthermore, the m ilita ry  believed tha t the religious 
affiliation o f Muslims in  Mindanao and Islamic institutions provided the ASG 
linkages w ith  international radical Islamic organizations.20
In the early 1990s, the ASG became a major concern o f the Philippine 
government and the international community because o f its kidnapping activities 
targeting foreigners. Several explosions, abductions, and murders especially in 
Western Mindanao were believed to be part o f the ASG's notorious activities to sow 
te rro r in the south. There were also explosions in  Manila that k illed  many innocent 
civilians in which the ASG was the prime suspect. In August 1991, tw o Christian 
missionaries from  New Zealand and Sweden were assassinated in Zamboanga City. 
A year after, the ASG continued to abduct several others, mostly Christian priests or 
pastors. In November 1992, a doctor and his w ife  including the ir children were 
abducted in Basilan. In January 1993, two nuns were also abducted in Sulu, and in 
February o f the same year two priests, one American and the other Spanish, were 
abducted.
These are some o f the ASG's notorious activities in  the south that un til today 
the Philippine armed forces aided by the United States army has been combating 
w ith  extreme difficulty. In some instances, negotiations for the safe release of 
hostages succeeded because the ransom money demanded by the ASG was paid, but
20 Moshe Yegar, op.cit., 344-345;
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other victims were sim ply killed. In most negotiations, the participation of 
representatives o f foreign embassies in  Manila was demanded by the ASG in order 
to make sure that the ransom money would be released to them. On June 3,1994, 
the Philippine army began a massive attack on ASG in Sulu. But the ASG responded 
by intensifying the ir usual te rro ris t attacks on m ilita ry  and civilian installations. The 
Abu Sayyaf abducted 74 Christians in Basilan o f whom 15 were k illed  w hile the rest 
were later released unharmed. From 1991 to 1995 alone, the ASG carried out a total 
of 74 abductions, 75 explosions, 58 robberies, and 50 cases of m urder.21
While the government had been suspecting linkages between the ASG and 
other major rebel groups, the MNLF denied any connections w ith  the ASG. On the 
other hand, the MILF strongly denied any involvement in abduction activities, saying 
such form  of warfare was not allowed by the MILF rules o f engagement. However, 
the m ilita ry  organization confirmed reports that MILF rebels were providing 
sanctuary to the ASG especially when they were on the run  and evading 
confrontation w ith  the Army. The Army, in most o f the ir operations, was restrained 
from pursuing the ASG whenever the latte r ran to MILF-controlled areas, as the 
government did not want to escalate conflict w ith  the MILF. Ceasefires between the 
GRP and the MILF had been providing ample tim e and safe grounds fo r the ASG to 
regroup because the MILF usually disallowed the Philippine army from  operating in 
the ir complex. This is why the m ilita ry  confirmed the allegation tha t the MILF was 
providing safe haven to the ASG. The extent o f MILF support for the Abu Sayyaf was 
not clear, but i t  was evident tha t the ASG could move freely w ith in  MILF te rrito ry .
21 Moshe Yegar, op. cit., 345-346
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In recent years, the ASG's te rro ris t activities created stum bling blocks to 
peace talks between the GRP and the MILF. Abductions o f innocent civilians forced 
the m ilita ry  to pursue the kidnappers and, in  the course o f the operation, the 
m ilita ry  would end up clashing w ith  the MILF. The ASG ran towards the MILF 
complex so that the succeeding encounters o f the Army were consequently not w ith  
the ASG but w ith  the MILF forces. In this light, the ceasefires failed. Another complex 
situation was the unavoidable participation o f civilians in  the course o f negotiations 
w ith  the terrorists. Negotiations were usually carried out by civilians on behalf of 
the terrorists. In most cases, the local politicians became spokespersons o f the Abu 
Sayyaf in negotiating the release o f hostages. According to unconfirmed reports, 
local politicians involved in the negotiation process fo r the release o f the hostages 
were given a share in the ransom money. In short, kidnappings became a source of 
income fo r those involved.
There was also another small group operating in the most southern part of 
Mindanao, the Abu Sofia group. This group had about 30 to 40 members that were 
ill-equipped compared w ith  the ASG, and was responsible for the abduction o f a 
Korean engineer in 2002 in Sarangani province. The army launched several 
offensives against the Abu Sofia but in most operations, the rebels managed to 
escape and avoid confrontation w ith  the army. Perhaps, this group was not out to 
in flic t casualties, as the ASG used to doubt, bu t only to get the ransom money they 
demanded. A small piece o f document captured by the Philippine Arm y Special 
Forces during an attack launched against the Abu Sofia group in Sarangani province- 
-where this author was part o f the operation-revealed at least three main
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components o f the kidnapping syndicate.
The outermost layer was a group o f people who comprised the group’s 
negotiating team. They were responsible fo r making contacts w ith  authorities, 
negotiating fo r ransom money for the release o f the hostages. The second inner layer 
was the security team composed o f both civilians and armed men. The civilians 
served as look outs or messengers, and gave information on the movement of 
government security forces. The armed group, on the other hand, was responsible 
for the propaganda system and fighting government troops when i t  was 
unavoidable. The innermost layer in the system was the hard core team. The team 
was composed o f a small group responsible fo r keeping the hostages in a secret 
location. A ll these three layers o f the kidnapping syndicate had proportional shares 
in the ransom money. This was one o f the reasons the m ilita ry considered the ASG 
one o f its most d ifficu lt adversaries in more than a decade. The increased ASG 
atrocities invited foreign intervention. The United States government, especially 
after the 9 /11  incident, has been very active in supporting the Philippine Armed 
Forces in combating the te rro ris t organizations in the country. But in spite o f the 
many developments on the ground that threatened the peace process, the 
government was determined to continue the integration o f MNLF combatants into 
the Armed Forces and the Police.
INTEGRATION OF MNLF COMBATANTS
The Final Peace agreement signed in September 1996 provided for, among 
others, the integration of the 7,500 MNLF forces. Those fortunate combatants 
included in the program were selected based on the recommendations o f d ifferent
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field commanders. However, not all o f them were original MNLF combatants. Some 
were sons o f old members; some were younger relatives who could afford the 
m ilita ry  tra in ing  conducted by the Philippine Army and the National Police. As of 
today, the government has made substantial progress its treatm ent o f the MNLF 
combatants. Some of those who belonged to the firs t batch o f integrees are now 
ranked major and in a few years, they w ill be promoted to the next higher grade.
But despite the success in bringing a considerable number o f MNLF into 
government service, the integration program has its share of shortcomings. In the 
course of the integration program's implementation, problems cropped up tha t led 
to failures in the process. I t  must be remembered tha t there were many MNLF 
fighters le ft behind in the integration process whose disposition was not clear. 
Since the integration began, incidents o f renewed armed hostilities between the 
government forces and the disgruntled MNLF members had increased. Similarly, the 
ASG and the MILF intensified attacks on government installations to signify the ir 
opposition to the agreement, while the NPA also escalated atrocities in some other 
areas outside the autonomous region.
The Final Peace Agreement was carefully planned in the context o f attaining, 
more or less, the needs of the Muslims. It provided implementing structures and 
mechanisms consisting of tw o phases o f implementation. Phase 1, a three-year 
transitory period, started immediately after the signing o f the agreement. Under the 
transitory phase, the Special Zone o f Peace and Development (SZOPAD) was created. 
The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), chaired by 
the MNLF chairman, was established to oversee the development efforts in the
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Zones o f Peace. Moreover, a consultative Assembly (CA) was established to ensure 
close coordination between concerned agencies. The integration o f the MNLF 
combatants into the Philippine Armed Forces and the Police was included in Phase I 
o f the implementation. The three-year transitory period culminated w ith  the 
holding o f a plebiscite in the SZOPAD areas fo r purposes of getting the peoples’ 
approval on the amendments to the Organic Law and determ ining which provinces 
and cities would agree to be part of the ARMM. A fter the plebiscite, the conduct of 
Phase II was started. MNLF chairman Nur M isuari took office as governor o f the 
ARMM and concurrent Chairman o f the SPCPD on September 13, 1996. The surge of 
international aid to Mindanao in support o f the peace agreement and the integration 
of MNLF forces into the m ilita ry  and the police raised optim ism that the long- 
awaited peace and development was fina lly  w ith in  reach in the southern 
Philippines. But beyond skepticism on how form er foes could be joined together in 
one organization, the government was determined to continue and implement the 
provisions o f the peace accord.
Paragraph 20 o f the Peace Accord provided fo r the integration o f the 5,750 
members o f the MNLF in to  the Armed Forces o f the Philippines [AFP], and 250 o f 
them into the auxiliary services. Paragraph 19, on the other hand, provided for the 
integration of 1,500 MNLF members into the Philippine National Police (PNP), and 
another 250 members in  the auxiliary services. These were the numbers agreed 
upon by both parties, although the government was aware that the tota l number o f 
MNLF integrees was not even one-third o f the tota l number of MNLF combatants.22
22 OPAPP, Report on the Implementation of the 1996 Final Peace agreement between the Government o f
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In short, this process o f neutralization o f armed groups is unstable because, in  the 
case o f the MNLF fighters, there was no clear disposition o f members who were 
excluded from  the integration process.
The 'partia l integration' o f the combatants reduced, to some extent, the 
number o f loose firearms in the areas o f conflict but, by and large, i t  has had little  
impact on the p rim ary objective of ending the vio lent conflict in Mindanao. The 
number o f MNLF integrees represents only about 30 percent o f the to ta l strength of 
MNLF forces. On the other hand, the agreement provides for a mechanism designed 
to mitigate the discrepancies by putting the burden on the government. In other 
words, i t  holds the government responsible fo r exerting "utmost e ffort" to establish 
the necessary conditions that would ensure the eventual integration of a maximum 
number o f MNLF combatants into the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) -  to be 
created later — and other agencies and instrum entalities of Government. This was 
done, albeit not fu lly  implemented. Moreover, a special socio-economic, cultural and 
educational program to cater to the needs o f MNLF forces not absorbed into the 
AFP, PNP, and the SRSF was to be established. Such program was meant to prepare 
the MNLF forces and the ir families fo r productive endeavors; provide them w ith  
educational opportunities, technical skills and livelihood trainings, and above all, 
give them top p rio rity  for h iring  in development projects. But, for reasons of 
educational attainment, most members landed jobs related to manual labor in 
construction companies. Others served as bodyguards o f local politicians.
On the matter o f integration, the agreement waived all requirements and
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation front, (Pasig City: March, 
2004), p.52
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qualifications fo r MNLF members to pave the way for the ir integration into the AFP 
and PNP, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations.23 Those who were to be 
integrated to the Philippine army, most o f whom had low  educational qualifications, 
were to be organized in itia lly  into separate units w ith in  the transition period of 
three years. Until such tim e that mutual confidence was developed among form er 
MNLF members and the ir Arm y colleagues, they were to  be gradually integrated 
into different regular units o f the Armed Forces o f the Philippines. Most o f them 
were to be deployed in the areas o f autonomy.
Under the integration program, every aspect o f disarmament, 
demobilization, and integration was to be addressed in accordance w ith  the existing 
policies o f the AFP and the PNP. The Joint Integration Board (JIB) composed o f AFP 
and MNLF representatives was organized to ensure the smooth conduct o f the 
integration process, which include among others, the recruitm ent o f qualified MNLF 
combatants, the ir tra in ing and deployment, and employment o f MNLF integrees. To 
ensure strong control and effective command, an MNLF representative, in 
coordination w ith  the AFP, was appointed and assumed the duties, functions, and 
responsibilities o f Deputy Commander o f the Southern Command fo r separate units 
o f the MNLF members jo in ing the AFP.
PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION
In October 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos signed Administrative Order (AO) 
No. 295. The AO provided guidance on the integration o f the MNLF members into 
the AFP. As mandated, 5,750 MNLF combatants were to  join the AFP and 1,750
23 See appendix "F", 1996 Final Peace Agreement paragraph 20b.
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were to be integrated into the Police. A ll other matters regarding the integration 
program which were not covered by this order were to be prescribed by the 
President as Commander-in-Chief o f the Armed Forces o f the Philippines.
AO No. 295 mandated the Department of National Defense, through the 
Armed Forces o f the Philippines, to  take charge o f implementing the MNLF 
integration program. The implementation o f said program consisted o f three phases, 
as prescribed by the Armed Forces o f the Philippines, namely: (1) the processing 
phase; [2) individual tra in ing phase; and (3) the on-the-job tra in ing  (OJT) phase. 
The entire integration program was to  be completed w ith in  the prescribed three- 
year transitory period starting in  November 1996 until September 1999.24
a. Processing Phase
Even as i t  has been criticized fo r allegedly favoring those who have strong 
connections to influential persons in the MNLF leadership, the processing phase, has 
the prim ary objective o f determ ining from the lis t o f MNLF combatants qualified 
individuals fo r tra in ing as candidate soldiers or officer candidates o f the AFP. In this 
phase alone, the im p lic it selection process created fu rther problems, as the MNLF 
combatants who were disqualified from  undergoing m ilita ry  tra in ing  as w ell as 
those "le ft behind" fo r screening fe lt rejected and were thus angered by the 
mechanics o f the recruitm ent process. Some MNLF members protested and insisted 
that they did not have to go through a process o f m ilita ry  tra in ing because they were 
already trained beforehand in  the organization. However, the AFP has its own 
requirements and tra in ing the MNLF integrees was apparently designed to ensure
24 Philippine Department of National Defense Guideline no. 139: Guidelines on the Integration of the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), (Quezon City: November 21,1996).
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they had the skills needed o f a member o f the Philippine m ilitary.
In order to comply w ith  the mandate to tra in  a to ta l of 5,500 MNLF cadres, an 
additional 2,500 MNLF combatants were made ready to serve as alternates in case 
some principal candidates were disqualified based on the standard guidelines set by 
the AFP. From there on, the Philippine Arm y was tasked to organize a team to 
undertake Personal and Equipment Survey of the MNLF candidates in coordination 
w ith  the MNLF leadership. Under the guidelines, all candidates w hether officer 
candidates or soldiers were required to bring the ir individual firearm  surrender this 
to the authorities. In the policy guidelines, anyone who failed to tu rn  over a firearm 
(preferably a long firearm) would be disqualified and denied entry into the m ilita ry  
services.
The policy o f turn ing in individual high-caliber firearms contributed to the 
goals of disarmament, but i t  has contributed to the deterioration o f the overall 
process o f ending violence in the south. In the campaign to  reduce the pro life ra tion 
o f illegal firearms, the policy succeeded. Numerous firearms, more or less equal to 
the number o f MNLF candidates for integration into the AFP and PNP, were 
recovered from the organization. But everyone knew tha t most candidates owned 
more than one firearm, and because he was only obliged to turn over one firearm, 
others were kept at home. Thus, the disposition o f uncollected loose firearms 
remained unresolved. Moreover, some o f these firearms that were handed over to 
the authorities were not the real firearms o f MNLF combatants, but rather bought in 
order to qualify fo r the integration process. And not all who came fo r processing, 
including officers, were real MNLF combatants as a good number o f them had only
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substituted fo r the real combatants after paying some amounts o f money.25
b. Individual Training Phase
MNLF combatants selected fo r integration underwent an orientation and 
internalization period designed to develop mutual trus t and understanding between 
and among the trainees and the AFP members. This period marked the start o f the 
tactical tra in ing and other skills for m ilita ry  service. Apparently, there was not much 
difference in the manner of tra in ing the MNLF trainees in  the rebel movement from 
the standard tra in ing for regular recruits entering the m ilita ry  services, except that 
the MNLF trainees were allowed to use some of the tra in ing tim e fo r religious 
activities. There were a total o f 5,340 candidate soldiers (CS) who underwent a six- 
month Basic M ilita ry Training (BMT) conducted in three batches in  d ifferent 
tra in ing centers of the Philippine Army. But the bulk o f the MNLF trainees were 
later trained in  Central Luzon, about a thousand kilometers away from  the ir homes 
in Mindanao.
Similarly, the 160 MNLF officer candidates took a 48-week "Officer Candidate 
Course” which started in January 1997 at the Officer Candidate School (OCS) in 
Tanay, Rizal— some 50 kilometers southeast o f Manila. OCS was one o f the prem ier 
tra in ing schools established by the AFP to tra in  candidates to be incorporated into 
the officer corps. Upon completion o f the coursework, another 24 weeks was 
prescribed for "on-the-job tra in ing" for smooth transition from being form er rebels 
to being members of the Philippine Army. A t this time, the MNLF officer candidates
25 The author was privileged to have genuine knowledge on the personality of few integrated MNLF 
combatants, when he served as instructors of MNLF during their military schooling at 4 th Army 
Training Group in mid- 2007.
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saw the real environment in the field, which was where they were to be eventually 
deployed. Fortunately during this period, the firs t batch o f MNLF trainees (ordinary 
soldiers) had completed the training. When the 160 MNLF officers were deployed in 
different units o f the Philippine Army, these form er MNLF fighters-turned-soldiers 
were already serving as members o f the regular army. In the end, i t  created a chance 
fo r the MNLF officers to  handle and lead form er comrades w ith  whom they used to 
fight side-by-side against government forces. In July 2006, the orig inal number of 
160 officers had increased to 220 because the second batch of officer candidates had 
also completed the ir OCS tra in ing.26
c. On-the-job Training (OJT) Phase
The OJT phase provided an opportunity fo r the MNLF officer candidates to 
experience the actual environment in the field before being deployed to the ir actual 
assignments. The officers were also tasked to command and lead the newly enlisted 
personnel belonging to the firs t batch o f integrees. They in itia lly  composed the 
organized 47 separate rifle  companies and ten (10) engineer companies. The 24- 
week OJT program offic ia lly ended in January 1998 and, subsequently, officer 
candidates were commissioned and called to m ilita ry  duty in the same period. Some 
officers continued the ir OJT un til the completion o f the 2nd and 3rd batch o f 
integrees, while others were deployed in d ifferent units o f the A rm y both in the 
infantry and engineer battalions.
Many commanders of Arm y battalions in  the field during the OJT were very 
much impressed by the performance o f the candidates. In fact, one battalion
26 Based on the updated reports of the Philippine Army as of 10 July 2006.
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commander explicitly explained that some o f the tem porarily assigned candidates in 
his un it were even better than those who were already perform ing as officers in  the 
Philippine Army.27 Perhaps, the experiences o f the MNLF members in the field 
made them excel especially in matters related to combat tactics. However, many of 
the ex-MNLF candidates did not have adequate educational qualifications compared 
to those who have undergone the regular process o f jo in ing the AFP.
During the OJT period, AFP guidelines emphasized the inculcation in the 
minds o f the MNLF of love o f country, nationalism, m ilita ry  discipline, respect for 
law and order, observance o f the chain o f command, and understanding the ir duties 
and responsibilities in the Arm y as government servants. These were practically 
changing the minds of the MNLF members from  being w arriors and insurgents to 
being law-abiding citizens o f the Republic. The transform ation process was 
impressive but did not include trainings that would transform the MNLF combatants 
into productive individuals o f society. It must be remembered that after 
surrendering to authorities, the form er combatants v irtua lly  declined to engage in 
violence. The real motivation o f the MNLF in ending rebellion and jo in ing  the AFP 
was that they had grown war-weary. A t the time they abandoned armed struggle, 
they expressed preference fo r liv ing in peace w ith  the ir families than going to w ar 
again.
Many MNLF members preferred to be assigned to the engineering battalions 
because it  presented very little  chance fo r them to fight again. In the engineering 
battalions, they may be best utilized fo r the government's socio-economic
27 Interview conducted at headquarters of the Philippine Army on 12 July, 2012.
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development programs. They can also help enhance government efforts for 
reconciliation, w ith  those integrated into the Arm y tapped to help negotiate w ith  
and convince other armed groups to do w hat they did. In fact, one o f the officers 
claimed that the government or the AFP in particular is not thinking wisely for 
utilizing the MNLF in combat, noting that the success may be limited to win in battle, 
but it would be best i f  the AFP or the government is aiming strategically for the 
gradual resolution o f the violent conflicts in the Philippines.28
The integration program as prescribed in Letter o f Instruction (LOI) number 
41/96 PAGSASANIB (integration) mandates that all integrated MNLF combatants, 
both officers and enlisted personnel, shall be provided equal opportunities as other 
regular AFP members for fu rther professional tra in ing and m ilita ry  schooling, 
including foreign schooling, in  accordance w ith  the AFP tra in ing and education 
programs and policies.29 This policy is most impressive and may raise everyone's 
expectations, bu t the chances o f the MNLF integrees going on foreign schooling were 
minimal, i f  not impossible. Only a few MNLF officers had the required educational 
attainment to qualify them for inclusion in the highly competitive foreign schooling 
for AFP officers. To date, no MNLF officer has been sent fo r schooling abroad,
d. Deployment and Employment of MNLF Returnees 
The final stage o f the integration program was when the trainees, both officer 
candidates and enlisted personnel, completed the OJT period, which marked the 
beginning of the ir services to the Armed Forces. The integrated MNLF members, just
28 MNLF officers, interview by the author, Cotabato city, July 19,2012.
29 Letter of Instruction 41/96, issued by the chief of staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, (Quezon
City, October 1996)
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like any other AFP regular members, may be assigned to other units o f the AFP. In 
the course o f assignment, the AFP encountered problems w ith some members o f the 
MNLF integrees who, for personal and individual reasons, failed to adapt to the 
m ilita ry  culture and refused to report to the ir new un it assignments. In short, they 
did not want to perform jobs that required them to be away from the ir families.
In July 2006, the Philippine Arm y reported tha t 189 MNLF officers were 
serving the Army faithfully, while 31 others were facing charges fo r com m itting 
various offenses including deficiency in m ilita ry  schooling, absence w ithou t official 
leave [AWOL], and other adm inistrative misdemeanors. For MNLF enlisted 
personnel, only 3,989 were actively serving the Arm y and a to ta l o f 1,541 were 
dismissed for various offenses.30 Similarly, o f the 1,500 former MNLF combatants 
fu lly  integrated into the PNP, only 1,449 integrees were s till on duty status w hile 51 
were on inactive status. Of those deemed inactive, 15 were deceased, 21 dismissed 
fo r various offenses, 13 dropped from  rolls o f the PNP, and two suspended. Most of 
the MNLF integrees on active status were deployed in the ARMM area.31
The statistics show that authorities needed fu rther study on the integration 
program as one o f the major components o f the Peace Agreement. The in ten t to 
neutralize the MNLF combatants by integration to the AFP and the PNP was 
carefully planned and proven an effective way o f violence reduction, but the process 
and the implementation need further comprehensive studies. Deployment and 
employment o f former combatants should not only be focused on combat duties.
30 Documents taken from 0G3, Force Integration Branch: Updated Philippine Army Records on MNLF
integrees.
31 OPAPP, op.cit., p.19-20
181
Employing them for community development and other socio-economic activities 
could be more productive, not only in the conflict-affected areas bu t also in the rest 
o f the country.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO PROBLEMS
The 1996 Final Peace Agreement mandated the government o f the Philippines 
to exert utmost efforts to establish favorable conditions that would ensure the 
eventual integration o f the remaining MNLF forces in to  the AFP, the Police, and 
other line agencies o f the government. 32 This policy ensured tha t the MNLF 
combatants not integrated into the AFP, and the ir families, would have access to 
better livelihood opportunities and eventually u p lift the ir socio-economic status.
On February 14, 2002, the PNP approved the request o f the MNLF executive 
council for the conversion o f the 250 quota intended fo r auxiliary services (a civilian 
position) to Police Officer-1 in the Philippine National Police. But due to budgetary 
constraints, the Department o f Budget and Management (DBM) approved a funding 
only for 150, an amount earmarked fo r auxiliary services and not fo r regular PNP 
members. In March 2004, only 62 o f the 144 recommended fo r absorption to the 
auxiliary services possessed the required e lig ib ility  to qualify fo r integration. 
Nevertheless, in an expression o f commitment to fu lly  comply w ith  the terms and 
conditions o f the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, the PNP requested the higher 
authority to issue temporary appointments for MNLF members who lacked the 
required e lig ibility. In June 2005, a total o f 5,750 MNLF combatants had been
32 See appendix "F", 1996 Final Peace Agreement, paragraph 20a
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integrated into the AFP, and 1,500 MNLF combatants into the PNP.33 Moreover, the 
a ttrition  case o f the 474 MNLF members had been reviewed by the Joint AFP-MNLF 
Integration Board, and declared vacant fo r replacement by new MNLF candidates. In 
July 2006, no new batches o f ex-MNLF combatants were trained to f il l the vacancy, 
but the Philippine Arm y was prepared fo r the recruitm ent process in the event a 
directive was released fo r this purpose.
The decreased number o f form er MNLF combatants in the m ilita ry  service 
can be attributed to a number o f factors. Notably, the dismissal o f members from  the 
service was a result of deficiencies in m ilita ry  schooling and absence w ithou t official 
leave (AWOL). Also, some MNLF were killed  along w ith  arm y troops during 
encounters w ith  the remaining rebels fighting the government. Apparently, being 
deficient in  academic modules during schooling can be attributed to the fact that 
most o f the MNLF members' academic backgrounds were either low-level, which 
does not satisfy the required academic qualification, or the ir education was aligned 
to the Arabic educational system. M ilita ry  institutions did not create a favorable 
situation to accommodate the former MNLF combatants’ educational background; 
instead, tra in ing centers continued to impose the same academic standard as those 
required o f regular members o f the AFP taking m ilita ry  courses.34
On the other hand, most of the AWOL cases among MNLF enlisted personnel 
can also be attributed to many factors. According to one of the officers o f the 
Philippine Army directly in charge o f the adm inistration o f MNLF integrees, some
33 OPAPP, op.cit., p . l l
34 Program of instruction (POI) prepared by the Training and Doctrines Command, Philippine Army 
for Officers taking Infantry Officer Advanced Course (10AC) for calendar year 2006.
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MNLF members did not report back because o f the ir failure to adapt to the m ilita ry  
profession, which required duties in places away from the ir families. Some 
preferred not to continue the ir service to the AFP fo r financial reasons. Being a 
member o f the AFP, form er MNLF can avail o f financial loans from  loan institutions, 
provided that payment fo r such loans was automatically deducted from  the ir 
monthly pay and allowances. It turned out tha t those who availed o f too many loans 
eventually had only a little  amount le ft from  the ir m onthly pay and allowances.35 
Consequently, they preferred to return to the countryside, hide and evade 
responsibility for the ir debts. Such a decision to leave was due to the fact tha t even if  
they continued to serve the AFP to the best o f the ir ability, i t  seemed pointless to 
them as they had nothing to send to the ir families. Apparently, MNLF integrees were 
not oriented on financial benefits and the consequences o f mismanaging the same.
The m ilita ry  career and educational enhancement are both im portant in the 
m ilita ry  profession, but the experience o f the MNLF was different. For instance, 
MNLF officers assigned to the Corps o f Engineers were sent fo r schooling in a 
different m ilita ry  specialization which made i t  more d ifficu lt for them to cope w ith  
courses not fam iliar to them. In the Philippine National Police, MNLF members who 
did not meet the prescribed 72 credit units earned in  college underwent an 
educational program formulated by the PNP and the Commission on Higher 
Education (CHED). Those high school graduates that lacked units in college were 
given crim inology classes fo r a maximum 1,200 tra in ing hours to satisfy the
35 Interview with the Officer at headquarters of the Philippine Army, Makati City on July 10, 2009; 
Major Radam Sansawi, former MNLF combatants now in the Army since 1996 after the signing of 
the Peace Agreement, interview by the author, headquarters Philippine Army, Makati City, 
September 4, 2012.
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requirement fo r enlistment in the regular police. Those who did not finish 
secondary education were given a crash education program in the form  of seminars 
and trainings. These crash courses were credited by the Commission on Higher 
Education as equivalent to 72 units in criminology. In short, the situation o f the 
MNLF combatants both in the academic and adm inistrative aspects needed 
continuing attention from the government w hile acknowledging the ir 
distinctiveness from others who have undergone regular academic schooling.
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR FORMER COMBATANTS
The existing laws, policies, rules and regulations that govern the m ilita ry  
institutions did not apply to the MNLF integrees. In the Peace Agreement, the 
necessary requirements and qualifications for the entry of MNLF combatants into 
the PNP and the AFP were waived. But such policy apparently only applied to entry 
requirements. Once they had become fu ll-tim e members o f the m ilita ry  
organization, they were covered by the rules and regulations o f the m ilitary. 
Consequently, as they continued to serve in the m ilitary, the MNLF integrees needed 
higher educational qualifications to cope w ith  the prescribed standard policy set in 
the M ilita ry and Police institutions. The government was quick in dealing w ith  this 
problem, issuing a Joint Memorandum Circular signed by the Commission on Higher 
Education (CHED) and the Office o f the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process 
(OPAPP) on January 24, 2002.
The jo in t memorandum provided the implementing guidelines fo r the 
OPAPP-CHED Study Grant Program for rebel returnees. The aim of the grant was to 
expand MNLF access to college education. The Study Grant was open not only to
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MNLF members bu t also to qualified rebel returnees from the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) and the New People's Arm y (NPA), including the ir next of 
k in  who cannot afford to study in college due to financial constraints. It is apparent 
at this po in t that states in conflict, like the Philippines, are compelled to exert 
utmost efforts for the education o f its citizens since education is the best long-term 
solution to poverty and rebellion. Education is time-demanding and very expensive, 
but sustaining forces to counter rebellion is more expensive and certainly deadly.
In May 1999, at the level o f the Philippine Army, a set o f implementing 
guidelines on the educational program fo r MNLF integrees was formulated. The 
program sought, among others, to upgrade the education, skills, ethical values, and 
professional m ilita ry  career o f the MNLF integrees. This policy was also in support 
o f the government's peace in itia tive  to attract other threat groups to jo in  the 
mainstream o f society through the forging o f s im ilar agreements w ith  the 
government. In the report o f the Philippine Arm y on July 2006, 86 MNLF officers 
availed o f the program and completed the ir college education, while 37 were s till on 
schooling status at d ifferent institutions, and later graduated w ith  baccalaureate 
degrees.
Despite the efforts made to upgrade the MNLF’s educational deficiencies, 
many still failed to pass the necessary requirements in  their succeeding m ilita ry  
schooling. To address this problem, the Philippine Arm y issued a directive on July 6, 
2006 implementing the enhanced or modified approach to tra in ing o f the MNLF 
integrees.36 The system was sim ply adopting the "buddy system" in any tra in ing and
36 Philippine Army directive on Modified Approach to Training of MNLF Integrees, (Makati City, HPA)
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m ilita ry  schooling fo r the MNLF members. Students who needed assistance were 
provided w ith  a 'buddy' to help them meet academic needs through tu to ria l 
assistance. Buddies were also enrolled in  a tra in ing or course, and either competent 
members o f the MNLF integrees or Muslim officers or enlisted personnel underwent 
the procedures for regular entry to the AFP. These efforts were appreciated. But for 
the sake o f peace and development, critics noted that institu tions should exercise 
leniency and accommodate m inor discrepancies rather than enforce a s tric t 
im position o f standard norms.
In early 2000s, a group o f officer-integrees requested fo r the deferment of 
the ir schooling and demanded fo r a 'separate special class’ for them because they 
could not compete w ith  others who had good educational backgrounds. But a 
separate class fo r MNLF integrees, according to the trainers, could jeopardize the 
original in tent o f integration. Ultimately, many failed to finish the ir course work, 
thus hindering the ir promotion to the next higher rank. It is evident from the 
foregoing that the strict imposition o f a new system fo r rebels, such as the MNLF 
integrees, tends to create and increase incentives for renewed misunderstanding. In 
the end, failure to acknowledge these weaknesses means derailing the orig inal 
in tent o f a peace agreement.
CONCLUSION
Peace in Mindanao has been elusive. The 1976 T ripoli agreement should 
have been a good starting point fo r peace, but it  never had a chance to be 
implemented. Instead, i t  became a center o f political disputes between the 
incumbent regime and the opposition party. Marcos, for the sake o f pleasing the OIC,
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played around w ith  politica l and legal issues concerning the im plementation o f the 
autonomy. The opposition party, then led by Corazon Aquino, entered into an 
unpublished promised o f cooperation w ith  the MNLF. When she became President, 
owing to the same vague interpretation o f the terms and conditions stipulated in  the 
agreement, she was not able to forge a final peace accord w ith  the MNLF. Instead, 
her administration became busy addressing other security issues such as the series 
o f coups perpetrated by m ilita ry  rebels who were her former allies in toppling 
Marcos in February 1986. Issues about the security situation in the south were left 
behind, and violence continued in almost every part o f Mindanao. A t this time, the 
MNLF concluded that the Aquino adm inistration was not interested on fu lfilling  her 
promise o f a peace deal, made during her campaign for the presidency fo r the 1986 
snap presidential elections, w ith  the Muslims in the south.
It seemed that the 1976 peace agreement was easy to understand and its 
contents easy to in terpre t in  the context o f attaining peace in  Mindanao. On the 
other hand, the same piece o f document was not easy to understand when the 
attainment o f a solid peace became a second prio rity . This complex situation was 
exacerbated by the fact tha t other groups had emerged and were relentlessly 
creating chaos in order to sabotage the negotiations. In short, politica l leaders were 
just going around critical issues, and pushing away obstacles to a peace agreement 
was not in the ir priorities. As a consequence, the MNLF leadership tried  to seek the 
help of outside actors, such as the OIC, to pressure the government o f the 
Philippines to implement the Tripo li agreement, while the MILF and ASG continued 
to escalate the violence. In the end, the government became overstretched for
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having to address many concerns from  different actors. Nevertheless, during the 
administration of Aquino, she could do nothing more than negotiate fo r the 
declaration o f a truce as a remedial solution to the Muslim rebellion, which did not 
work.
When Ramos became president in June 1992, he inherited the problem in 
Mindanao. However, in spite o f numerous stumbling blocks to the peace talks, he 
managed to forge a fina l peace agreement w ith  the MNLF in September 1996. He 
was able to bring relative peace in Mindanao when his adm inistration agreed to 
integrate the 7,500 MNLF members in to  the Armed Forces and the Police. He was 
able to formulate policies for the development o f the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao. However, for lack o f supervision from  the central government, 
development initiatives had m inimal impact on the region.
The usual problem of corruption prevailed among the leaders o f the ARMM. 
Similarly, while the integration process was going smoothly, the enormous tasks of 
rebuilding the war-torn areas and coordinating development efforts in the SZOPAD 
areas were too d ifficu lt for the MNLF, who found themselves in a to ta lly  d ifferent 
and unfam iliar environment in governance, public service, and adm inistration.37 
Nur Misuari was blamed by the central government for fa iling to efficiently 
administer the region. Succeeding leaders o f the ARMM followed the same pattern 
of adm inistration in which those who held positions were benefited by the financial 
aid that poured into the region.
Another factor that exacerbated the political situation in the ARMM was the
37 Benedicto R. Bacani, op.cit., p.16
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presence of many armed groups. While the MNLF lay low  and was cooperating w ith  
the government, the MILF and the ASG continued the ir struggle fo r fu ll autonomy, 
not the goal agreed upon between the GRP and the MNLF. It can be learned from  the 
Ramos administration that peace attained through "negotiated settlement” could 
reduce the number o f losses on both parties, but remained fragile when a 
considerable number o f rebels was left behind on the ground. In addition, even if  
there was an agreement forged, i t  did not give assurance o f s tab ility  i f  leaders were 
not sincere about it.
The perceived failure in ARMM governance became a "focal po in t" where 
both sides blamed one another as p rim arily  responsible fo r the deteriorating peace 
agreement. The MNLF organization blamed the national government fo r fa iling to 
enact a new organic law w ith in  the three-year transition period and neglecting its 
responsibility to provide material resources fo r the development projects in the 
SZOPAD areas. The SPCPD which was intended to coordinate development in  the 
SZOPAD areas turned out to be good only on paper and did no t have powers to 
manage the resources. The Consultative Assembly consisting o f the local 
government officials and representatives of ARMM provinces and cities was 
supposed to provide a roadmap fo r development, but i t  d id  not function as expected 
because o f lack o f support from the national government. The absence o f clear-cut 
working relations between the national and the local governments in the SZOPAD 
areas was a problem too.
Perhaps, the integration o f the MNLF members into the m ilita ry  and the 
police was the most commendable accomplishment o f the Ramos adm inistration.
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Although there were apprehensions about the loyalty of the MNLF, at least the 
m ilita ry  was able to decrease the number o f loose firearms in  the Muslim 
communities. W ith the economic development initia tives and the incorporation of 
the MNLF, violence was tem porarily  minimized. The Muslims, particu larly  those 
benefited by the government program, were able to compare w hat i t  was like to live 
in peace than w ith  violence. The impact o f such a comparison among the Muslim 
communities was that those in the government service, especially the MNLF 
members who adopted and embraced the m ilita ry  culture, lost the ir interest in 
rebellion. There were few MNLF members who did not continue the ir service to the 
m ilita ry  fo r certain reasons, bu t these were considered minor.
The process o f integration was carefully done as foreseen obstacles were 
addressed beforehand. To ensure smooth transition to soldiery, a separate 
command, although not known to many, created by a jo in t committee became a 
useful lin k  between the higher command o f the m ilita ry  and the MNLF members. 
Among those taken care of by the unit, in coordination w ith  the m ilita ry , were the 
educational programs for the MNLF members who needed to go fo r civilian 
schooling. In the end, aside from  gaining a college degree, the intellectual knowledge 
they gained from  school made them competitive w ith  the ir contemporaries in the 
m ilitary. Technically, the rebellious attitude was eventually ejected from  the minds 
of the form er rebels. But the problem did not end w ith  getting a college degree. The 
environment in the m ilita ry institu tions was not the same as tha t in schools and 
universities. Even those who finished the ir degree faced d ifficu lty  in  adapting to the 
rigid tra in ing and strict compliance to standard rules. In the end, not all MNLF
191
members, especially those in the officer corps, stayed long in the service.
Recently, the government o f the Philippines has been negotiating w ith  the 
MILF. W hile the outcome of the peace negotiations is s till unclear because i t  does 
not include several significant actors on the ground such as other rebel armed 
groups, local influentia l leaders, and so on, i t  is clear tha t MILF forces would s till be 
integrated into the m ilitary. Prospective management o f MILF combatants, should 
they be accommodated like the MNLF, could be critical in  the context o f ending the 
rebellion in Mindanao. The same consequences can be expected i f  government 
institutions refuse to bend the established standard policies and norms a lit t le  bit. 
Also, a sim ilar economic development approach is seen as attractive, bu t w ithou t 
proper supervision in the implementation process, particularly how  the funds are to 
be channeled, the likelihood o f repeating the same problem is very high.
It must be remembered that incumbent leaders o f the ARMM are no longer 
form er MNLF members, as orig inally intended. Also, even i f  these trad itiona l 
political leaders have been in position for so long, they have been struggling to bring 
peace and development in the region. In short, the ir proven incapacity to lead the 
Muslims and establish peace and development in the area o f conflict necessitate 
further analysis. Moreover, the intent o f national leaders fo r a peaceful resolution o f 
the decades-old armed conflict in Mindanao needs to be reevaluated. In the next 
chapter, the strength o f these significant variables in looking for a viable solution to 
the Moro rebellion is discussed.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONSEQUENTIAL EVIDENCES AND ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The preceding two chapters have shown how complicated and d ifficu lt i t  is to 
end a vio lent internal conflict like the one in Mindanao. Attempts to pacify the 
combatants in the armed conflict have been very d ifficu lt because o f challenges that 
impede initiatives for conflict settlement. States facing a sim ilar internal security 
problem cannot do more than establish truces w ith  groups that try  to undermine 
and question the legitimacy o f a government.
Establishing a "ceasefire" is understood to be an immediate course o f action 
because i t  is the best option for lim iting  the escalation o f violence and presumably 
provides an opportunity for a return to normalcy. It is also a way to provide an 
opportunity to establish safe grounds where parties to the conflict could start talks 
for a negotiated settlement. Contrary to the general notion that truces create a 
favorable environment towards negotiations fo r conflict settlement, however, the 
same temporary halt o f confrontation is also understood in  the Philippines as giving 
"safe tim e” for both parties to rebuild, consolidate, and reorganize th e ir forces in 
preparation fo r any eventuality, that is, in the event o f a breakdown o f the peace 
talks or the resumption o f war.
The Mindanao armed conflict showcases the vicious cycle o f violence. Today, 
the same conflict between government forces and the Muslim rebels has created a 
puzzle among analysts and observers about its persistence, one that has almost
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evaded resolution despite years o f negotiations coupled w ith  several actions to 
mitigate the disastrous effects o f violence on the people. Why is i t  that, fo r so long, 
this problem could not be remedied or ended? In spite of numerous studies on 
internal conflict, what is it  about the Mindanao conflict that renders i t  elusive to 
settlement? W hat are those aspects o f conflict resolution that need fu rther study in 
the context o f the Mindanao armed conflict which analysts may have failed to 
consider? Or w hat lies beyond the trad itiona l ways of ending violence as far as the 
Muslim rebellion in Mindanao is concerned?
It  is commonly accepted that there is no universal set of approaches fo r many 
conflicts around the world. However, in the context o f attaining a longer peace in 
intrastate conflict-stricken states, there are fundamental sim ilarities o f conflict 
dynamics among countries. In essence, the approaches o f countries may d iffe r to 
some extent, bu t the critical underlying circumstances beyond the obvious reasons 
for armed conflict seem identical in all countries w ith  internal problems involving 
non-state armed groups (NSAG). This chapter attempts to present a holistic picture 
o f the nature o f conflict between the Moro people and the government o f the 
Republic o f the Philippines. I t  provides a detailed analysis o f the conflict which 
considers im portant aspects, beyond obvious reasons, tha t have a potential fo r the 
recurrence of violence.
The firs t part, among others, is a b rie f discussion of how analysis fits to 
explain the complexity of the Mindanao armed conflict, followed by a general 
analysis o f two significant occasions tha t offered an opportunity fo r conflict 
resolution -- the 1976 and the 1996 peace agreements. The final section analyzes
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the implications o f a "peace deal" that seemingly does not address the rightfu l 
audience. It is im portant for any attempt to investigate an internal conflict, like the 
Muslim rebellion in  the southern Philippines, to address the righ t audience o r at 
least consider other crucial factors in dealing w ith  rebel combatants and the people 
supporting the underground movement tha t are ligh tly  considered, i f  at all, in  the 
process o f conflict settlement. Conflict resolution is a long and tedious process that 
requires an analysis o f the history and the current complex environment attendant 
to the conflict. W ithout understanding the dynamics o f the process that would 
reveal the entanglements o f a highly complicated situation, analysis may only be 
lim ited to what are openly seen, thus restraining the research from  uncovering 
im portant determinants w ith  potentials for the recurrence of violence.
COMPLEXITIES IN THE MINDAO ARMED CONFLICT
To some analysts, it  is a common understanding that conflict and w ar are 
part o f the history o f human existence. But in  the context of resolving differences, 
however, human beings have learned a lo t from  the ir experiences in conflict or w ar 
w ith  one another. The Mindanao armed conflict is one o f several cases o f internal 
conflicts that have puzzled analysts. There have been many studies seeking to 
understand the nature o f conflict and identify  possible solutions to the more than 
four decades o f armed hostilities between the government o f the Philippines and the 
Muslims in the south o f the country. Most studies on the Mindanao armed conflict 
have pushed fo r more traditional ways o f ending violence based on its identified 
root causes as economic deprivation, discrim ination o f m inority  groups, and 
unfavorable treatment o f disadvantaged groups in Philippine society. However, i t  is
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this study’s position tha t analysis must not only be lim ited to understanding the 
causes, also known as "proximate causes," o f conflict because even the 
recommended approach to the same armed conflict may pose a threat o f reversal, 
especially when the question o f implementation is involved. The roo t causes o f the 
Mindanao armed conflict may have been identified bu t the ways on how i t  may 
recur, after i t  is ended, have yet to be determined.
In the survey o f literature, i t  is common among analysts to consider 
"historical hatred” as the prim ary cause o f a prolonged conflict tha t makes conflict 
resolution almost unattainable. This "hatred” is ingrained in the people o f every 
generation, making it  very d ifficu lt to remove from  peoples’ minds. Ancient hatred, 
as others call it, has many reasons to prevail. In the case of the Mindanao armed 
conflict, the Muslims and Christians can coexist in peace and development because 
everyone is aware of the benefits of liv ing  in a healthy and peaceful environment 
even as ancient hatred has prevailed between them over a period o f time.
There is no doubt that "ancient hatred" has exacerbated the complex 
situation in Mindanao that even the leaders themselves have become tim id  and 
uninterested in resolving the armed conflict. To some extent, the anim osity between 
the Muslims and Christian settlers is a product o f a misconception that has caused 
both parties to suspect one another o f being a threat instead o f an ally. 
Consequently, the result o f such "hatred” has been a fragile peace and security tha t 
every armed confrontation pushed further toward a more serious and complex 
situation. Surely, every armed confrontation has displaced innocent civilians who 
were forced to leave the ir livelihood behind, which generally meant a downturn in
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the economy and the liv ing conditions o f affected communities. To this effect, every 
concern in the armed confrontation is sometimes superseded by a more pressing 
situation that demands a clear government economic policy, leaving behind the 
issue o f peace settlement. The sheer complexity o f the Mindanao situation has thus 
given rise to numerous calls fo r an end to the violence and a clear remedy to address 
the physical needs o f the people. Indeed, the armed conflict has grown more 
complicated as to be better understood as a social problem that can be linked to the 
theory o f social disorder. Analysts argue that groups, ethnic or religious, would rise 
up and clash once dissatisfactions occur w ith in  society.1 In this light, the question of 
economic deprivation has been the fundamental basis fo r studies on the Mindanao 
debacle.
Dissatisfactions among the general public are shaped by many factors. But 
whatever they are, public discontent would only lead to a social movement such as 
rebellion against a government when it  is shared by all other groups and thus 
solidifies into a common grievance.2 As long as grievances remain confined to a 
certain group against another group, bigger armed conflict is un like ly because the 
grievances are directed only against a group and not towards the government. An 
intergroup conflict is sometimes even more d ifficu lt to understand because o f its 
potential to escalate. In the southern Philippines, the rido or conflict between 
families or clans is almost as oppressive as "vertical conflict” or conflict between the
1 James C. Davies,"Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Rev. 27,no.l (Feb. 1962), 6; 
Ted R. Gurr Why Men Rebel? (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 46; Edward E Azar, 
The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases ( Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990), 2.
2 Ivo K. Feierabend, et al., "Social Change and Political Violence,” in Anger.Violence, and Politics, eds. 
Ted Robert Gurr, et al.(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, inc, 1972), 108.
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government and non-state armed groups (NSAG].
The rido in Mindanao, un til today, is considered a serious problem.3 It is very 
d ifficu lt to address because it  is being used by interest groups to  serve the ir vested 
interests. A supposed interaction between two groups becomes complicated by the 
participation o f many actors w ith  diverse interests. Actors’ partic ipation in a rido 
may be triggered by many factors. There are those who may be involved due to 
internal linkages that cannot be avoided, such as fam ily ties, friendship, and other 
personal connections that bind one group to another. Others may have been 
intentionally forced to participate and become accessories to the conflict owing to 
personal interest. But w ith  all these actors’ involvement, the w orst scenario that can 
become a potential stumbling block to finding a solution to rido is the participation, 
either by intention or by force, o f groups that fall under the category o f "spoilers of 
peace."
Indeed, rido or clan conflict in Mindanao may be d ifficu lt to  understand, bu t 
the more critical scenario is the collaborative partic ipation of government security 
forces in intergroup conflict tha t can either inh ib it the escalation o f violence or 
promote a more complex situation. For example, m ilita ry  units where a rido occurs 
can prevent the escalation o f violence by just not allow ing the hostilities between 
groups to escalate. The bad side, on the other hand, is when government security 
forces through the ir "bad leaders" are perceived to be favoring either one o f the 
groups. On the contrary, when a clan conflict is confined w ith in  the interaction of 
disputing families, studies show that i t  could be resolved interna lly through the
3Astrid A Tuminez," The Land is Ours: Moro Ancestral Domain and its Implications for Peace and 
development in the Southern Philippines,” SAIS Review 27, no.2 (Summer -Fall 2007): 87.
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customary laws o f Moros. Even the role o f women in dealing w ith  rido can be a key 
to resolving the conflict.4
On several occasions until recently, rido in Mindanao has been used as an 
excuse fo r authorities to either intervene or not intervene in the conflict. 
Intervention o f security forces on the ground, where rido is occurring, is one critical 
factor influencing the future o f clan conflicts. Based on h istorical evidence, 
whenever a dispute is between or among Muslim clans or families, the tendency of 
government security forces is to neither intervene nor mediate in the conflict 
because, in the ir view, i t  is pointless to mediate in rido since i t  is a w ar involving 
Muslims against Muslims. On the other hand, i f  a dispute over land, fo r instance, 
arises between Christians and Muslims, the tendency o f the security forces is to side 
w ith  the Christian communities.5 Therefore, a single incidence o f rido can generate a 
vertical conflict between Muslims and the security forces because the Muslims’ 
feeling o f alienation and resentment is magnified. To the extreme, Muslims would 
rather look fo r groups they can rely on for the ir own security because they see no 
hope o f ever getting any protection from  government security forces.
Engaging many actors w ith  d ifferent agenda makes any effort to bring lasting 
peace on the ground difficult. However, as discussed earlier, the capacity to identify 
and understand the behavior o f the leaders is critical to understanding the dynamics 
o f these groups. Even the spoilers o f peace have the ir own leader who uses his
4 Anne-Marie Hildson, "Invisible Bodies: Gender, Conflict and Peace in Mindanao," Asian Studies 
Review 33 (September 2009): 349-365.
5 The Author is privileged to grow up in the areas of armed conflict, and serving the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines since 1991 to date; Colonel Amenkadra Undog, a Regiment Commander of the 
Philippine Army Special Forces in 2011, interview by the author, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City,
August 29, 2012.
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followers to pursue the goal o f derailing efforts to bring  peace through peaceful 
means -  usually by the use o f the m ilita ry  option -  to a conflict-affected area. But 
whatever the reasons a group is try ing  to push forward, a leader is influential 
enough to generate considerable local support because he knows tha t inadequate 
back-ups from  the community would potentially derail any action.
In a rebellion, leaders could be from  w ith in  its armed component or are 
purely civilian members of the organization who could influence the m ajority o f the 
followers. In the case o f the Muslim rebellion in Mindanao, traditional leaders from  
communities, religious leaders, or incumbent political leaders play a critical role, 
apart from the armed groups, in the fight for self-determination. On the other hand, 
a legitimate group like the m ilita ry  which is mandated to fight fo r and defend the 
rights o f many is forceful enough because its leader is acting on the basis o f the 
constitutional mandate to protect the people and the country.
A government facing internal security problems must understand the 
dynamics and complexity o f conflict, particu larly appropriate ways o f dealing w ith  
groups that try  to undermine the legitimacy o f the state. This study argues that 
state-level leaders who fail to consider the capacity o f "group leaders" or "local 
leaders" o f an organization to lead the ir followers would, in the long run, fa il to 
resolve the long-standing internal conflict. In the same manner, governments whose 
leaders are not interested in dealing w ith  the problem caused by internal threats are 
prone to instab ility  because the government system itse lf comes into question. On 
the contrary, when state-level leaders are determined to deal w ith  and look for 
means to find solutions to internal armed conflict, such as rebellion or secession, the
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chances o f success in ending the problem are highly probable because state leaders' 
influence, after all, is more powerful than that o f a sub-state government. On several 
occasions, this complicated but traceable linkage o f processes has been observed in 
the long h istory o f the Mindanao armed con flic t
During the presidency o f Fidel V. Ramos from 1992 to 1998, the strength of 
his leadership was tested when he engaged the MNLF rebels through diplomacy. 
According to Ruben Torres, a form er cabinet member who was Ramos's chief 
negotiator w ith  the MNLF, his firs t challenge in  the adm inistration o f Ramos was 
when he was tasked to engage the MNLF through peaceful negotiations. Torres was 
very confident to ta lk to the rebels because he knew tha t the President was sincere 
in  making peace and allowing development to take root in  Mindanao by bringing the 
MNLF combatants to the socio-political mainstream. Similarly, the MNLF 
combatants and the local people supporting them were determined to engage in and 
support the negotiations because they knew that Torres had a direct line of 
communication to the President.6
The result o f the national leadership's determ ination was seen when the 
government was able to forge a peace agreement w ith  the MNLF in 1996. The peace 
agreement was made possible because "the government exerted more efforts to 
realize a peace settlement of the armed conflict in Mindanao."7 In contrast, when a 
state leader decides to end a rebellion by the use o f force (m ilita ry  victory), then his 
followers, particularly the state's m ilita ry  and police organizations, w ould support
6 Ruben Torres, "Warriors Crave for Peace,” RPDEVSGVFoundation: Caring, Sharing, Daring [2009].
7 Fidel V. Ramos, former Philippine President, interview by the author, Makati City, September 4,
2012 .
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him  in  ligh t o f his constitutional mandate as commander-in-chief o f the entire 
Armed Forces. This scenario was seen in 2000 when then-President Joseph Estrada 
employed m ilita ry  power against the Muslim rebels in the belief that such an option 
was more attainable in ending the rebellion in Mindanao. Even though the "all-out 
w ar" policy of the Estrada adm inistration was heavily criticized, the m ilita ry  
successfully launched a series o f massive m ilita ry  offensive operations that led to 
the capture o f major MILF camps.
The strength o f leadership concept has been proven powerful, many times, in 
the case o f the Mindanao armed conflict. Whenever the national leadership wanted 
to end the violence m omentarily at certain critical moments, s tric t observance o f a 
ceasefire has worked despite misgivings on the part o f the security forces, or i f  the 
other party was not openly amenable to it, the government usually opted to declare 
a unilateral suspension o f m ilita ry  offensives (SOMO) to give way to a possible 
negotiated settlement. In contrast, whenever the President, w ith  his advisers for 
example, failed to consider other options than the use o f m ilita ry  action, then such a 
policy has had chaotic consequences for the conflict-affected areas in  Mindanao. 
Usually, the m ilita ry  option as a policy toward the Mindanao armed conflict 
diminishes the cred ib ility  o f the state because continuous fighting has had a 
tremendous deleterious effect on peoples' lives and properties. In short, domestic 
support for a government approach to Muslim rebellion in  Mindanao is dependent 
on how the people perceive the likelihood o f success w ithou t endangering, on the 
part o f the Moro people, the ir security, culture, identity and religion; and on the part 
o f the Christian m ajority the ir security, livelihood, and probably the te rrito ria l
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in tegrity of the country.
This study suggests tha t an investigation to understand and address the 
Mindanao armed conflict should pu t more emphasis on the ab ility  o f the 
government to attain a longer peace. Although lasting peace can be achieved in some 
other ways, the government has a greater responsibility to end the violence through 
peaceful means than any other group tha t are particu larly responsible fo r bringing 
chaos to the conflict-affected areas. On several occasions, the attempts o f past 
governments to find a concrete solution to the conflict were almost close to 
realization because the avenue fo r cooperation was w ide enough to accommodate 
Moro grievances. What made those opportunities for conflict settlement unrealistic 
was the unstable and unclear government stance, especially when the national 
policy on the peace process was challenged by unscrupulous individuals or groups 
that did not want the government to have a peace settlement w ith  the Muslim 
rebels. Historically, a small group or a single personality has proven capable o f 
diverting the strategic decision o f the national leadership, hence derailing a peace 
negotiation.
In 2008, government efforts to bring  an end to the Muslim rebellion peaked 
when i t  was about to sign an in itia l step towards a peace settlement, at least 
between the government forces and the MILF. The national leadership's capacity to 
implement its strategic decision was tested when the jo in tly  crafted Memorandum 
o f Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD),8 hammered together after years o f
8 The MOA-AD is another version for a peace deal and a product of long years of negotiations by the 
Philippine Government panel and the MILF which would be a prelude to conflict resolution in 
Mindanao.
203
study and negotiation, was rejected and declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court itself.9 A ll members o f the negotiation panel had been carefully selected by 
both parties to the conflict. The Government of the Republic o f the Philippines (GRP) 
chose the members o f its panel on the basis o f the ir knowledge o f the conflict and 
the ir ab ility  to come up w ith  a formula fo r resolving more than four decades of 
Muslim rebellion in the south.
The head o f the GRP panel was Hermogenes Esperon, a form er Chief o f Staff 
o f the Philippine Armed Forces who was well-versed on the situation in  Mindanao. 
He and his panel members were expected to find a viable solution to the conflict. On 
the other hand, the MILF also carefully selected the members o f its negotiating panel 
on the basis o f the ir loyalty to the Bangsamoro to ensure that th e ir decision would 
represent the voice o f the m ajority o f the Muslims. But again, all th e ir efforts turned 
fu tile  when the Supreme Court junked the crafted MOA-AD.
It must be noted that the Supreme Court ru ling  was preceded by reports of 
the Chief Executive's intention not to sign and thus to reject the MOA-AD, according 
to information relayed to the public by the so lic itor general on September 2, 
2008.10To this effect, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo dissolved the peace panel 
ta lking to the MILF the follow ing day. On October 14, the Supreme Court ru led w ith  
fina lity  that the MOA-AD, being unconstitutional, cannot be used fu rthe r as a tool fo r 
peace in Mindanao. Skepticism prevailed as to how the contents o f the MOA-AD 
were crafted and finalized w ithout the knowledge o f the President since she herself
9 See The Supreme Court of the Philippines, "SC Declares MOA-AD Unconstitutional", October 2008, 
last accessed 30 September 2012.
10Philippine Star, "GMA Dissolves Gov’t Peace Panel", 4 September 2008. 
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=398250, last accessed September 26, 2012.
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rejected the agreement. What is clear, however, is that the President’s decision was 
preceded by negative reactions to the MOA-AD of some very vocal local political 
leaders in Mindanao. In response, the MILF announced that i t  w ould launch 
offensive actions on government, hence the series o f more intensified clashes that 
ensued in different areas of Mindanao.
Amid these armed confrontations, the Amnesty International reported that 
both the government security forces and the rebels had violated international 
human rights and humanitarian law by targeting civilians.11 There was also an 
attempt to arm civilians, particularly on the Christian side, who were targets o f MILF 
attacks. In fact, some politicians both Muslim and Christian were properly  equipped 
w ith  high-powered firearms using the security problem to legitim ize the arm ing of 
the ir respective private security organizations. In a h ighly m ilitarized community, 
this effort encourages a scenario that only raises fu rthe r the level o f divisiveness 
among the people rather than enhancing unification o f efforts tow ard unconditional 
reconciliation and peace.
The instability in Mindanao has sometimes gotten less attention because it  
has become an integral part o f daily liv ing  in tha t region, but it  reflects the inab ility  
of the national leaders to address the pressing security issues caused by the long 
history o f Muslim rebellion in the south. Contrary to popular belief, i t  is the more 
than 40 years o f armed conflict that has impoverished the resource-rich region o f 
Mindanao, and not the commonly held th inking that the widespread poverty there 
has been the cause of Muslim rebellion. As observed in Mindanao, when the security
11 Amnesty International, Shattered Peace in Mindanao: the Human Cost of the Conflict in the 
Philippines (October 2008).
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issue is a problem, all other aspects o f governance and society are affected and 
become part o f or accessories to the problem. The w orst thing that has happened 
many times, and continues to this day as a result o f unresolved animosities, is when 
the security o f every group, whether Moro or Christian, has been perceived to be 
threatened because everyone believes they are responsible for the ir own security. 
In other words, this observation o f the Mindanao armed conflict validates the 
common argument that a volatile situation becomes more complicated when the 
security o f a group is not guaranteed, forcing that group to take steps toward 
protecting its own because its very survival is non-negotiable.12
Today, the adm inistration o f President Benigno Aquino III, along w ith  his 
effort to r id  government o f unscrupulous individuals, is determined to come up w ith  
a peaceful means to  end the violence in Mindanao. As before, the peace panels of 
both parties are w orking hand in hand to craft a formula that is acceptable to the 
Filipino people. The most im portant th ing the panel is doing now is undertaking a 
careful analysis o f several studies that have tried  to uncover the very reasons for 
elusive peace in Mindanao, and consulting w ith  d ifferent ethnic groups. A significant 
development in this process is the signing o f the New Political E ntity  (NPE) 
framework fo r the Bangsamoro on October 15, 2012.13 The Bangsamoro o r Moro 
nation is a new term  in the process o f negotiation intended to replace the ARMM 
previously established in the context o f the government peace agreement w ith  the
12 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27- 
47.
13 The NPE is a framework and prelude to a peace deal conceived between the government of the 
Philippines and the MILF. http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/2012-Framework-Agreement-on-the- 
Bangsamoro. last accessed October 10, 2012.
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MNLF in 1996. The implications o f the NPE fo r the 1996 Peace Agreement and the 
overall e ffort to resolve the Mindanao conflict have ye t to be seen. W hat is clear is 
that the MNLF members are unhappy w ith  the NPE tha t has been crafted w ith  the 
MILF. Also, the recently organized Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), an 
MILF breakaway group, apparently disapproves o f how  the negotiations between 
the government and the MILF are being pursued.
INVESTIGATIONS ON THE MUSLIM ARMED STRUGGLE
Most studies suggest that violence occurs when the needs o f the society are 
not satisfied, which is usually measured through the public’s demands and /o r 
expectations.14 But in the case o f the Mindanao conflict, i t  does not fo llow  that the 
Muslims w ill take up arms against the government when their demands are not met. 
This author has observed that even i f  the demands of the m inority Muslims are not 
granted or fu lfilled according to what they actually need, they do not usually resort 
to violence. Instead, they remain silent and strive to maintain the ir strength and 
cohesiveness. Except fo r a few instances especially in recent years, the Moro people 
have remained calm whenever the ir demands during peace negotiations did not get 
a favorable response from  the government o f the Philippines.
In contrast, they become active and organized when they realize tha t the ir 
very existence is threatened in the face of a series o f massive m ilita ry  operations, 
and thus jo in hands to defend themselves against the government m ilita ry  units 
conducting offensive attacks. I t  is im portant to note, at th is point, tha t many studies
14 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review 27, no. 1,
[February 1962):6; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel? (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1970), 46.
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have tried  to dig deeper into the decades-old Mindanao armed conflict in order to 
understand its nature and root causes. Despite these efforts, however, the Mindanao 
conflict has persisted, thus bringing up the question o f w hy it  is so. This is the main 
theoretical puzzle that needs to be answered.
One o f the most pioneering studies on the Moro resistance to Philippine 
society is that which brought about the creation of the Commission on National 
Integration (CNI) in 1957. The CNI was created by the Philippine Congress in  the 
wake o f an investigation conducted by three Muslim lawmakers in 1954 which 
ultim ately concluded tha t a broader bu t d irect strategic solution to Muslim rebellion 
must be adopted by the state. Education and economic development was the core of 
the recommendation forwarded to the Philippine government.15 It  was probably the 
firs t comprehensive study about the Moro rebellion which offered a strategic 
solution to Muslim aggression in the south. But even as the study was very helpful in 
addressing Moro aggression, the implementation o f its recommended solution 
became problematic.
Educational programs fo r m ino rity  groups were aggressively pursued w ith  
the aim o f integrating the new Muslim professionals in to  Philippine governance. But 
perhaps due to the perceived continuing discrim ination against the Moros, such 
educational program that helped raise the level o f intellectual capacity and netw ork 
o f the Muslims became a w indow o f opportunity fo r the Muslim radicals to increase 
the ir leverage in bringing the Mindanao armed conflict to the international arena. 
While education has contributed to Muslim upbringing, i t  has also been used not
15 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 244; McAmis, Muslim Filipinos, 43.
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only fo r the original purpose o f building common governance but has also facilitated 
the internationalization of and subsequent intervention of foreign parties in the 
Mindanao conflict. The intervention o f outside actors, i t  must be pointed out, is not 
always beneficial to the recipient state as i t  can bring more confusion to an already 
complicated situation.16
Economic development was the second recommendation o f the CNI which 
was also vigorously pursued by the government. Underdevelopment in Mindanao 
was identified as one o f the main causes o f the Muslim rebellion tha t required both 
the attention o f the Philippine government and the international community. The 
conventional wisdom among analysts and observers was that poverty had given rise 
to the common grievances among the people which had encouraged aggression. 
According to this view, the Muslims may have resorted to fighting the government 
fo r secession because they fe lt the effects o f extreme poverty as a consequence of 
government prejudices against them.
However, the tru th  o f the matter was that poverty was all over the country 
and that despite the ir serious grievances against the government, not all ethnic 
groups wanted to secede from  the Philippines. Moreover, Mindanao had been 
flourishing economically even when the people o f Mindanao started resisting 
foreign interventions that began at the dawn of the Spanish colonial period in the 
16th century. In other words, Mindanao, then and now, compared w ith  other regions 
o f the country, is not far in terms o f economic performance and potential. H istory 
shows that there are other factors beyond economic issues tha t are fueling the
16 Brown, The International Dimension o f Internal Conflict, 575.
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recurrence o f the armed conflict. It has been observed tha t the attitude and behavior 
o f both the national and local leaders can prolong armed conflict o r cause the 
reversal o f a supposed peace settlem ent This can be seen in the national policy, 
particularly in how the government responds to d ifferent threat groups in each 
region.
The Muslim rebellion in  Mindanao has certain sim ilarities to Muslim 
aggression in other parts o f the world, particularly in Arab states. Poverty has been 
a problem in the Muslim w orld  but i t  has not been the main reason fo r Muslim 
rebellion. Mohammed Hafez has observed that Muslims rebel fo r tw o main reasons, 
namely: (1) they encounter an ill-fated combination o f political and institu tional 
exclusion; and (2) it  is the ir response to reactive and indiscrim inate repression of 
governments.17 In other words, the Mindanao problem can be understood not as a 
p rim arily  aggressive reaction to economic deprivation caused by impoverishment 
or in recent studies "failed modernization,” bu t ra ther as the Moro people’s 
response to a system that threatens th e ir organizational structure, the ir security, 
and the ir religion, Islam, which is deeply integral to  their w ay o f life. This 
phenomenon can be seen as causing the shrinking o f Muslim te rr ito ry  and 
misrepresentation in the national government. In fact, the new generation of 
Muslims see no reason fo r them to be oppressed because "all they w ant is to live in 
peace and prosperity, give the ir children a good education w ithou t losing Arabic 
education, and freely exercise the ir righ t to religion, Islam."18
17 Hapez, Why Muslim Rebel? 199-200.
18 Police Senior Superintendent Nickson Muksan, a Muslim, native of Jolo and working in the 
Philippine National Police, interview by the author during a focus group discussion on Mindanao
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The Moros o f the southern Philippines obviously have a religious lin k  to the 
Muslim world. This linkage was established through international trade, religious 
affairs, and other means, like Islamic education and religious pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Acknowledging the resemblance o f Muslim Filipinos w ith  Muslims in the Arab w orld  
should create a w ider understanding o f the nature o f Moro resistance to Philippine 
governance. I f  there is freedom and independence o f religion in the country, i t  is 
also im portant to understand that any action tantamount to or perceived to be 
threatening the existence o f Islam could be a potential source o f discontent and 
grievances among the Muslim communities. Of course, Islam as a re lig ion is w idely 
respected in the Philippines, but this is not enough to conclude that the practice of 
Islam in the country is free from interference. What is equally im portan t is respect 
fo r the lives o f the people who believe in a certain faith. For instance, the mere 
conduct o f combat operations that hampers religious practice in a Muslim 
community can be perceived as a systematic disrespect fo r Islam.
A single act o f conducting combat operations in  a Muslim area in times of 
"Ramadan" or in times that distract religious congregations from  the ir activities 
could be easily interpreted as an attack on religion not on ly by the local Muslims but 
also by every Muslim around the w orld  who may learn o f such an inc iden t Everyone 
can claim that no one is violating religious practices in the Philippines, but 
complaints about the burning o f mosques and the slaughter of forbidden animals, 
like dogs and pigs, inside a mosque or religious site during m ilita ry  operations show 
that violations exist. The actual situation on the ground most often does not reach
Armed Conflict, Development Academy of the Philippines, Mandaluyong City, September 18, 2012.
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the attention o f national leaders who have the potential to correct misdeeds at the 
local level.
A vigorous campaign to educate Filipinos about the Moro people in the south 
could offset the adverse impact o f poorly perform ing security forces on Muslim 
communities in  the areas o f conflict. I t  is true that in  times o f conflict or war, 
anything can happen, but good and effective implementation o f rules, regulations, 
and laws can temper the effects o f violence. As noted earlier in this study, it  is safe to 
assume that 80 to 90 percent o f all Filipinos, including lawmakers and national 
leaders, have inadequate knowledge about the Muslims in the south and the 
government’s policy on the Mindanao conflict. Nevertheless, in recent years, studies 
are helping to educate Filip ino readers about the Mindanao armed conflict, but s till 
only a few are well-informed about this matter since there is no serious educational 
campaign about conflict resolution in academic settings at all levels and in other 
institutions o f government. This has naturally helped perpetuate the practice of 
stereotyping against the Moros o f Mindanao.
Intellectual findings in several studies may d iffe r in approaches but all are 
geared toward understanding the root causes o f the conflict situation in Mindanao. 
There are those who have attempted to assess the frag ility  o f the 1996 peace 
agreement between the GRP and the MNLF. In an academic paper, Jacques Bertrand 
views the 1996 pact as a genuine and great opportunity fo r conflict resolution, but 
that its inab ility  to account fo r the effects o f weak institution, corruption, and 
controversy over the exercise o f political power w ith in  the autonomy has made it  
very d ifficu lt to attain sustainable progress, thus leading to the failure o f the
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agreement.19In other words, the transitional process from  national supervision to 
autonomy neither benefited the Muslims nor the non-Muslims. This finding may 
prove useful in crafting a better system fo r future efforts to end violence in the 
south, especially once a peace accord is forged w ith  the MILF fo llow ing the signing 
o f the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro on October 15, 2012. Corruption, 
a common finding in all studies, is seen to have been a key stumbling block in the 
realization o f the 1976 and 1996 Peace Agreements. Corruption, by the way, is not 
only observed in  the local ARMM bu t is also seen to be prevalent in the national 
socio-political system and deemed a main source o f economic impoverishm ent in 
the country.
The 1996 Peace Agreement, by and large, did not change the liv ing  conditions 
o f the people in the area o f the autonomy, and this is seen by many observers as the 
reason fo r the failure o f that agreement.20 I f  the principal motivation fo r the conflict 
settlement was to bring an end to violence which would understandably reduce the 
number o f loose firearms, then the 1996 agreement succeeded to a certain extent as 
numerous firearms were turned over to the government; still, the security o f most 
people liv ing in the conflict-affected areas remained uncertain because a much 
larger number o f MNLF firearms remained unaccounted for. There was even a 
report that most o f the genuine MNLF firearms were transferred to the ownership 
o f the MILF.
The MILF has been observed to be capable of generating popular support
19 Jacques Bertrand, "Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement 
is fragile?" Pacific Affairs 73, No. 1 (Spring, 2000): 37-54
20 Ibid.
Today, the MILF is considered a major threat to national s tab ility  because o f its 
capacity to launch major attacks on government. Up to this date, there remains a big 
doubt on whether the national leaders are aware o f this "complex situation" in 
Mindanao which has been affecting the national policies on peace and security, 
foreign relations, and economic development. I t  is argued in this study that w ithou t 
addressing the security issue in  Mindanao, the Philippines w ill remain problematic 
in its quest fo r achieving a competitive status on a par w ith  that o f some o f its more 
progressive neighbors. Similarly, the Muslims through their leaders must exert 
more e ffort and show the entire w orld  tha t they are capable o f governing 
themselves consistent w ith  the principles o f good governance in a democratic 
society, free o f corruption, free from  malicious power struggles because there is due 
process, and most o f all, fa ithful to the tenets o f governance that is for all Muslims 
and non-Muslims in Mindanao. This way, the Bangsamoro or Muslim nation can 
proudly show that although they are comprised by many ethnic groups w ith  many 
names, they have only one common goal o f liberating the people o f Mindanao from 
social injustice, extreme poverty, corruption, and d isunity and preserving the ir 
Islamic way of life.
ARMED GROUPS AND FIREARM CONTROL
There are at least three main groups claiming to represent the p ligh t o f the 
Moro people. The MNLF, which agreed to have a peace deal w ith  the government in 
1996; the MILF which is currently negotiating w ith  the GRP fo r an expanded 
autonomy essentially d ifferent from  the GRP-MNLF agreement; and the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG), w ith  its affiliates, which is the most notorious and v io len t o f all three
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groups. Although the ASG is considered a te rro ris t group w ith links to international 
te rro ris t networks, it  has also claimed to represent the Muslims in  the south. A t the 
back o f all these armed groups are the different ethnic groups o f Muslims in 
different parts o f Mindanao who, in  general, support the Bangsamoro's figh t fo r self- 
determination. In recent years, the presence o f small armed groups controlled by 
politicians has also added to the bands o f armed elements taking part in the 
eruption o f violence in the area. On the side o f non-Muslims, the presence o f civilian 
armed groups has been a major concern o f security forces. These param ilitary forces 
are used by politicians for security and for advancing their po litica l ambitions. 
Other than these groups, the New People’s Arm y (NPA) has been threatening the 
security o f Mindanao. The NPA, which advocates communism, also has wide support 
from  non-Muslim communities, especially among the economically disadvantaged 
communities in Mindanao's Christian-dominated provinces.
The M ilita ry  and the Police are the armed components o f the government 
whose prim ary task is to maintain peace and order, and to protect the people and 
the state. In the course o f perform ing the ir sworn duty to the country, the regular 
Armed Forces has been struggling to appropriately address the security threats in 
rura l areas. This is the prim ary reason tha t the param ilitary C ivilian Volunteer 
Organization (CVOs) and the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) 
were commissioned to help maintain peace and order and defend villages against 
rebel attacks. Most of the time, conflicts are touched o ff by a d irect encounter 
between the rebels and the param ilitary forces. Other than the empirical 
contributions o f the param ilitary forces to security, the ir existence is justified by the
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fact that maintaining civilian armed elements is much cheaper than enlisting young 
men fo r regular m ilita ry  service.21
CVOs and CAFGUs are legitim ately supported by government forces because 
they are protecting the civilian villages where they live from attacks by threat 
groups. This scenario makes "arm ing civilians" justifiable on the basis o f self- 
defense. However, an internal problem usually arises when these civilian armed 
troops assume fu ll responsibility fo r the security of th e ir respective communities 
rather than putting fu ll confidence on leaving the security matter in the hands o f the 
m ilita ry  and the police. As a consequence, the role o f the security forces has been 
taken over by these civilian armed groups tha t have less education and training, 
thus making them prone to com m itting abuses. The participation o f param ilitary 
forces in internal security operations has been proven effective only i f  properly 
managed and supervised by the regular security forces. But m ilita ry  and police 
supervision o f these civilian armed forces cannot be guaranteed at all times. 
Sometimes, these CVOs and CAFGUs are tapped by political leaders fo r the ir own 
security and political ambitions, w ith  m inimal m ilita ry  intervention. I t  is im portant 
to note, at this juncture, that when a public servant, such as a local politician, is 
mostly surrounded by armed elements, he tends to assume a m ilita ris t th inking 
instead o f that o f a political leader who ensures the delivery of basic services to his 
constituents.
The management of armed groups, like the rebel forces in Mindanao, is very
21A CVO or CAFGU is receiving only a subsistence allowance amounting to about $ 2.10 a day from 
government or private companies while their firearms and ammunitions are usually provided by 
the armed forces.
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difficult. For some analysts, there is a need fo r government to enhance the amnesty 
program to accommodate all combatants into the mainstream o f society.22Applied in 
Mindanao, this concept has been proven effective in reducing and contro lling loose 
weapons in exchange for a better future fo r rebels. Former MNLF combatants 
especially the leaders, fo r example, were given politica l positions in government in 
preparation fo r further integration into the socio-political mainstream, while other 
members were asked to lay down th e ir firearms so they can be accommodated in 
the regular security forces. But amnesty may tu rn  problematic when the process 
cannot be sustained fo r certain reasons. In the case o f MNLF integration, there were 
many questions on its implications fo r conflict resolution.
After the 1996 peace agreement was signed, each o f the 7,500 MNLF 
combatants was required to tu rn  in at least one high-powered firearm  in  order to be 
absorbed into the Armed Forces and the Police. The signing o f the peace deal was 
undoubtedly a success, but the process o f integration was a failure because only a 
portion o f the loose firearms was recovered; others remained in the possession of 
MNLF members who were "left-out" in the integration process.23 Some MNLF 
members joined the MILF forces who continued the struggle for fu ll autonomy. Also, 
a significant number o f those integrated were dismissed from the m ilita ry  service 
after few years for reasons o f mismanagement, w hile  the form er combatants 
themselves fe lt they still did not belong to the ir new organization, the AFP and the 
PNP.
22 Maj Gary J. Morea, "From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in Mindanao", Air and Space Power 
Journal (May-June 2008): 192
23 Maj. Nasser P Lidasan, "The Integration of MNLF and MILF Combatants into the Philippine Armed 
Forces: Implications to Conflict Resolution" (master’s thesis, University of Bradford, 2006), 68.
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In consonance w ith  the idea that arms or weapons make a group capable of 
waging an armed struggle against the government, an amnesty program fo r rebels 
could be an effective tool fo r bringing the form er rebels back into the mainstream 
especially i f  the government is fu lly  capacitated fo r such implementation. Also, the 
amnesty approach has been proven useful in halting violence. However, based on 
the MNLF integration process, an amnesty program would have been an effective 
way o f addressing the Muslim rebellion i f  the rebels were assured by the 
government o f the ir security and economic welfare or, at least, i f  the things 
promised to them were tru ly  implemented. The integration of rebels was very costly 
and closely examined to ensure that the Philippine government could sustain i t  in 
the context o f firearms control. I f  conflict settlement w ith  a certain group is carefully 
done in the context o f ending a rebellion, this study argues that no m atter how  many 
threat groups are confronting the government, they w ill all subscribe to conflict 
settlement through peace negotiations because they see no reason to continue 
fighting the government. In other words, w hat is im portan t in ending a rebellion is a 
commitment from the government to provide conditions that prevent the rebels 
from entering a new phase o f rebellion.24
A country like the Philippines that is bombarded by internal threats from  
NSAGs must consider tw o im portant things in addressing rebellion, namely: (1) the 
capacity o f the government to effectively implement a good amnesty program, 
followed by reconciliation; and (2) the ab ility  o f the government to show and assure 
the rebel organization o f the ir security and future economic disposition, usually
241. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflict," in Stopping the Killing: 
How Civil Wars End, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: NY University Press, 1993), 24-25.
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coupled w ith  the offer o f positions in government. I f  th is set o f approaches is not 
attained in the context o f integrating combatants, then the armed conflict w ill 
simply persist. Furthermore, countries w ith  experience in  internal conflict are prone 
to corruption not only on the side o f the rebels but also in government, both at the 
national and local levels, as they take advantage o f the dynamics o f the armed 
conflict. In the Philippine experience, the role o f local actors usually determines the 
outcome of the reintegration and reconciliation process fo r former combatants.
RESETTLEMENT AND LAND DISPUTE
The movement o f populations has been identified in many studies as the 
prim ary root o f the Mindanao armed conflict. This claim is supported by historical 
evidence that the Philippine government has been systematically and collectively 
pursuing the marginalization and m inoritization o f indigenous Filip ino Muslims and 
other ethnic groups in  Mindanao.25 The vo luntary bu t government-supported 
migration of people from  Luzon and the Visayas to Mindanao especially in the 1960s 
has led to the shrinking o f Muslim te rrito ry , eventually turn ing them into a m ino rity  
in the ir homeland. Since then, the Muslims have been struggling to  recover the vast 
lands they lost to the settlers. The Philippine government encouraged the 
resettlement o f the Christians in Mindanao w ith  lesser consideration o f its 
implications fo r the lives of indigenous people who have been resisting foreign 
occupation by the Spaniards, followed by the Americans, and then the Japanese. 
Until today, the question on ancestral domain is s till the main issue in the peace
25 Jorge V. Tigno, "Migration and Violent Conflict in Mindanao," Population Review 45 (November 1, 
2006): 23-47
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negotiations between the GRP and the MILF. So far, i t  is the same resettlement areas 
where most armed confrontations have taken place.
The same issue o f land ownership lies at the very root o f the violence in the 
Bangsamoro that requires careful consideration in  every peace negotiation. 
Nevertheless, the author has observed that the Muslims no longer require the 
government to return the whole area that h istorica lly belongs to them (areas 
form erly belonging to the sultanate o f Sulu and Mindanao), but are w illing  to settle 
fo r a te rrito ry  slightly larger than the present ARMM. Unlike the early years o f the 
Muslim struggle fo r independence, Muslims today are by and large amenable to 
coexisting w ith  the Christian settlers, provided that they (the Moros) can freely 
practice the ir religion, culture, and political system aligned w ith  Islamic ways of 
governance. It means they can agree to a settlement, provided that they can freely 
observe the ir customs and traditions according to the teachings o f Islam in the 
proposed te rrito ry  (Bangsamoro) even i f  i t  is under the jurisd iction o f the Philippine 
government.26 In short, any arrangement that does no t address the te rrito ria l 
aspirations o f the Muslims is like ly to fail in the long run because the Moros believe 
that land, which was unceremoniously taken away from  them during the period of 
Christian resettlement in the ir ancestral domain, is v ita l to  their existence and can 
alleviate the ir liv ing conditions.
The issue o f land ownership has been behind many incidents that turned a 
volatile situation into an open armed conflict. In some parts of Mindanao, Christian 
villages have been targeted by Muslim armed groups, presumably connected to the
26 Personal interview with traditional leaders of Muslims, Cotabato City, June 23-25, 2012.
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MILF, over a land dispute. A fter the failed MOA-AD deal between the MILF and the 
GRP in 2008, the MILF launched attacks to assert the ir bid to reclaim land that had 
been occupied by Christians in the province o f North Cotabato since the early 1970s. 
The armed confrontation escalated in many areas o f Mindanao. The violence, 
however, did not last long bu t the damage to lives and properties was considerable 
enough to affect the economy in the region. During the period o f intense violence, 
several civilian communities were targeted by armed groups. Again, the renewed 
violence happened because the negotiation process at the national level failed to 
forge an agreement acceptable to the m ajority o f Filipinos. This means that a 
complex situation in the areas o f armed conflict and the dynamics of the process 
related to the peace negotiations at the national level are interlinked.
As the armed conflict evolves, the people in  Mindanao have gradually learned 
to co-exist, sometimes even try ing  to forget a h istory weighed down by suffering, 
violence, and discord. A problem arises, however, when an attem pt to break the 
volatile situation by the threat o f armed confrontation cannot be remedied 
peacefully. Even a supposed isolated situation in one area concerning the issue o f 
land ownership can be a triggering mechanism and spontaneously becomes a 
rallying po in t for the Moro struggle for self-determination. In fact, the MILF has 
been pushing for secession, rather than just local autonomy, to pu t an end to armed 
skirmishes. Again, in a situation that involves renewed armed confrontation 
between the m ilita ry  and MILF fighters, the most alarm ing is the fact tha t the Moro 
people, openly or discreetly, are observed to be united in fighting one common 
enemy — the government. During the 2000 “all-out w ar" policy o f the government
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against the MILF, even Moros abroad participated in the armed conflict by providing 
financial support to the local Moro fighters.27
OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A closer examination o f the historical roots o f the Mindanao armed conflict 
confirms the d ifficu lty o f looking fo r an appropriate formula tow ard longer peace. 
Throughout its long history o f animosity, however, the Mindanao conflict opened 
parallel opportunities for a peaceful resolution. As discussed in Chapter III, the 
Mindanao conflict has been an impediment to Philippine economic progress. 
Observers have noted that one major obstacle to development is the internal 
security issues o f the country, such as the Moro secessionist movement and the New 
Peoples Army (NPA]. In the context o f addressing these internal threats, m ilita ry  
campaigns aimed at containing them have been draining the resources o f the 
country.
The nation's political elite generally disagrees w ith  this observation as it  
usually considers corruption by a problematic leadership as the key factor dragging 
down the national economy and keeping the nation poor. This study, however, is o f 
the view that the failure o f the Philippine government to resolve its in ternal security 
problem is a major factor in  the country’s almost stagnant development. 
Nevertheless, the protractedness o f the internal security problem is not p rim arily  
due to the poor leadership o f and relations between politica l elites but, rather, stems
27 "Several Muslim organizations in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, have been created 
to help one another while abroad, but in times of crisis in Mindanao, all generated funds are diverted 
to help the Mujahideen fighting the Philippine military in Mindanao”. This is a testimony of, at least 4, 
oversees Foreign workers (OFWJ interviewed by the author in Maguindanao province from June to 
September, 2012.
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from  the ir differing perspectives on how to approach the same interna l threats. The 
effort to resolve the Mindanao armed conflict, for example, has less support from 
lawmakers and policymakers in the country. But despite the skepticism among 
national leaders, international organizations have shown keen interest in  mediating 
and supporting efforts to resolve the armed conflict.
No m atter how wide the available opportunity fo r peace, attempts at conflict 
resolution to end a rebellion are like ly  to fail w ithout fu ll support from  the people in 
government because spoilers often have the upper hand over the peace advocates. 
This scenario has been observed on several occasions in the Mindanao peace 
negotiations. Most efforts o f government have been rendered fu tile  due to a lack of 
consensus among national leaders, and i f  an in itia tive  succeeded in gaining the ir 
support, i t  has often been unknowingly directed towards the w rong audience 
because o f the difficu lty in accommodating many groups that are fighting the same 
government. In the end, attempts to derail peace negotiations by unscrupulous 
individuals often succeed. Moreover, when the government focuses on one group in 
a peace settlement, such effort usually earns litt le  support from both Muslims and 
Christians because i t  is perceived as unfa ir to other affected groups, thus fu rther 
aggravating perceptions o f injustice.
The benign intentions for progress o f a government whose country is beset 
w ith  internal threats are prone to being misinterpreted. As experienced in 
Mindanao, a single government e ffort for development in areas dominated by 
Christians could be interpreted as unfair treatment against the Moros who are 
equally in need o f government’s basic services. Again, the w orst that can happen is
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when there is no sense of ownership, among the targeted communities, o f a massive 
government development effort in the ir areas. In other words, national economic 
development efforts not fu lly  supported by the local people could exacerbate and 
further encourage aggression rather than mitigate it.
The CNI, as earlier discussed, has so far been the most pioneering e ffort in 
terms o f the Philippine government response to the Muslim separatist tendency. It 
was a genuine and noble government in itia tive  to address the Moro rebellion, bu t it  
did not prosper because it  became one-sided in  the course o f implementation. Its 
development programs were particularly directed towards up lifting the economy of 
selected areas while skipping the Muslim-dominated communities. In the end, it  
only helped to strengthen feelings o f marginalization among the Muslims. No doubt 
the CNI was a genuine policy that was supposed to fu lfill the educational, social, 
physical, and psychological needs o f Muslim Filipinos. During its implementation, 
however, its benign intention was not fu lfilled  in the context of conflict settlement. It 
has been argued by scholars that when the basic needs o f the people are satisfied, 
social unrest is not like ly to erupt in the society.28
In Mindanao, the Moro people’s needs are not only in terms o f material 
things for the daily sustenance o f the ir families. Their religious obligations and the 
need to realize Islam's fundamental relationship to the ir lives is a m us t Islam is a 
way of life for the Moros that cannot be taken for granted in any Muslim  community. 
In Mindanao, the constitutional mandate on the separation of church and state is 
legally observed. But this policy alone is already in  conflict w ith  the Islamic political
28 Edward E. Azar, The Management o f Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, (Hampshire: 
Dartmouth Publishing Co.Ltd., 1990), 2.
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system that does not distinguish the separation o f Islam from  the national 
government. This does not mean, however, that there is no room fo r cooperation 
between the Christian and Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao. Islam as relig ion in the 
Philippines is a religion o f peace-loving people. What is critical in keeping the peace 
from  turn ing into violence is respect fo r one another, regardless o f religious 
affiliation. Otherwise, even the most educated members of the m ino rity  w ill tu rn  
vio lent i f  oppression against the ir group continues.
As discussed in Chapter Four, educated Muslims in the Philippines have 
h istorically turned into charismatic figures that have strengthened the Moro 
struggle fo r self-determination and have extended their networks to the 
international community, instead o f becoming a group o f intellectuals who would 
lead the integration program. Studies show that rebel groups in  in ternal conflict 
w ill step up to the next phase o f rebellion, that is, from  condemning government's 
inattention to the ir grievances to questioning the very legitimacy o f the 
government.29 In the case o f the Mindanao armed conflict, the rebels move from the 
issue of identity  to secessionism when they feel discrim inated against and relegated 
to the margins in the country's development efforts.
Lessons o f the past indicate that downgrading the level o f rebel claims could 
be very d ifficu lt because it  can serve as a justification for fu rther pressuring the 
government into granting previous demands. In negotiating w ith Muslim rebels like 
the MILF, anything less than what they are asking for is always unacceptable. As a 
result, bargaining becomes a burden on the side o f the dominant power, the
29 I. William Zartman, The Unfinished Agenda, 25.
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government. In some instances, the national leaders become aggressive when 
diplomatic means fail, hence a potential source o f national policy change. Another 
critical phase during a peace negotiation is the change o f national leadership. This 
study is o f the view  that latent conflict can become an open w ar when a leadership 
change gives way to state leaders who believe that the use of force is more beneficial 
than giving in to the demands o f the rebels. When normal politics can no longer 
satisfy the groups' concerns and grievances, thus, i t  inevitably breaks down.30
This is exactly why a w indow  fo r conflict settlement is sometimes closed 
because of the aggressive behavior o f Philippine leaders. During the Marcos 
administration, there was a massive campaign to curve the growing violence in the 
country even to  the po in t o f using m ilita ry  power in response to Moro rebellion in 
the south and the communist insurgency in almost every province not populated by 
Muslims. The employment o f m ilita ry  rule earned countless criticisms bu t it  
continued to prevail for years because o f the determination o f Marcos to impose 
what he thought best for the Philippines. Nevertheless, all changes in government 
politics always offer opportunities fo r ending violence in Mindanao,
a. From A Virtually Open Policy to M ilitary Rule 
The declaration o f Martial Law in September 1972 was seen as an aggressive 
policy o f the government towards m inority  groups. But beyond its perceived 
oppressive implications for peoples' freedoms, its main goals o f eradicating loose 
firearms while addressing the economic needs o f the country may have been 
another way to achieve stab ility in the entire country, and a great opportun ity  fo r
301. Willian Zartman, The Unfinished Agenda, 28.
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resolving armed conflict in the Philippines. S trict implementation o f firearms 
control and management can especially dampen the secessionist movement in the 
south. Martial law  in itse lf was a critical government option, especially when the 
government system became synonymous to m ilita ry  ru le  that carried out political 
repression and the curtailm ent o f the people’s rights.
In contrast, a state faced w ith  in terna l security threats sometimes needs to 
ta ilo r its policy to equally address national security and economic concerns. For 
instance, Singapore during its early stage o f development curtailed some o f its 
peoples' rights w hile successfully pursuing economic development fo r its people. In 
that context, the im portant th ing to consider is that for as long as there is a 
reduction o f disparities among groups that also harbor an ambition for recognition 
at the highest possible level, the likelihood o f violence is minimal.31 This means that 
equal treatm ent o f d ifferent groups is v ita l to preventing the rise o f one group 
against another group, or by extension, against a government.
Military rule in the Philippines was supposed to address the problem of 
rampant violence and the growing rebellion in  the south. To curb the surge o f 
violence especially in the rural areas, the orig inal in tent o f Martial Law must have 
been appreciated, but it  soon became a gateway fo r rebels to use the system itse lf in 
generating substantial popular support. Its im plementation was perceived by many 
as inim ical to human rights because o f the abuses and atrocities committed by the 
security forces. Forced disappearances and illegal arrests were the most popular 
violations that were blamed on the government. In the Muslim communities, one o f
31 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (London: University of California Press, 2000), 599.
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the most common complaints was the systematic action of the Christian settlers, 
aided by government forces, to force the transfer o f populations by attacking 
villages and burning houses. Such action was tantamount to encouraging revo lt 
because the Moro people fe lt unsafe in  the hands of government authorities. In fact, 
i t  was the prim ary reason tha t the Moros supported the common in itia tive  to send 
young Muslims to foreign countries fo r m ilita ry  training.
During that time, the MNLF was only in the early stages o f arm ing its fighters 
as an appropriate response to an oppressive government. The MNLF, like other 
sim ilar groups in recent years, claimed it  was fighting for the oppressed Muslims 
and, on this platform, became a huge organization contesting government policy 
toward Muslims in the south. Consequently, the supposed benign intention of 
Martial Law became ineffectual as many groups fought Marcos's d ictatoria l regime 
for its gross violations o f the rights o f Filipinos. The Muslims were determined to 
fight m ilita ry  rule which, as alleged by many, d id not address the aspirations and 
grievances o f the Moros but rather systematically employed a policy that favored 
only a few groups in society. The plight of the Muslims was neglected, and i t  became 
a prim ary responsibility of the MNLF or the "Black Shirts" to fight fo r the rights and 
security of the Moros.
Even w ith  the growing tensions between the government and rebel forces, 
there was an opportunity for conflict resolution later in  1976 -  which may have 
been a ripe moment fo r the government to take advantage o f the Muslims' 
eagerness to proceed w ith  the peace negotiations. In the midst o f m ilita ry  rule, the 
Muslims through the MNLF became cooperative and, in  time, supportive o f the
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"Tripoli Agreement" forged between the GRP and the MNLF. But such opportun ity 
did not materialize owing to discrepancies especially in  how the leaders interpreted 
the provisions o f the agreement. In such a situation, the role o f national leaders and 
elites including those in the areas o f conflict -trad itiona l Muslims leaders and 
leaders in Christian resettlements -  play an im portant part in the sudden tu rn  o f the 
volatile situation into violence. The armed confrontation between MNLF combatants 
and government forces allowed the "forceful and secured" occupation by settlers of 
the lands claimed by the Muslims as theirs. This process lent Muslim leaders the 
charismatic power to lead the Moro people in  asserting and fighting fo r self- 
determination.
Marcos ruled the country as an autocrat fo r 14 years, disbanding the 
legislature and creating a new constitution which rendered the form er constitution 
entirely obsolete. In itia lly, the move was appreciated especially by those who were 
opposed to the traditional elite political leadership. Marcos removed the trad itional 
elites from the ir seats o f power. But unfortunately, Marcos packed the government 
w ith  his relatives and friends, making the whole structure of governance aligned to 
his selfish political interests. Still, such a drastic change in itia lly  gained significant 
appreciation both from the local population and other countries. Marcos stabilized 
the economy by attracting foreign investors and incurring loans on behalf o f the 
state. He was able to bring basic services to  the populace, although arguably fewer 
services were extended to rural areas in Mindanao, by building roads, sewer 
systems, irriga tion systems, hospitals, and schools. As this developed, however, his 
political ambitions also soared. Widespread dissatisfaction w ith  his regime started
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to spread among the population as he perm itted massive fraud tha t resulted in 
billions o f dollars taken from international aid and funneled into his own private 
accounts or those o f his cronies.32
Thus, the original in tent o f stabilizing the economy and security in the entire 
country was left to the discretion o f a few in  the seat of power. Most o f the ir 
approaches were merely preventive actions aimed at deescalating tensions instead 
o f addressing the grievances o f the people, particu larly the Muslims in the south. As 
a consequence, neither the m ilita ry  campaigns o f the Marcos regime nor the 
government's socioeconomic programs addressed the root causes o f the Moro 
rebellion.33 Until now, local politica l leaders are observed to be acting as i f  there is 
no power above them. They build up a protective posture p rim a rily  fo r the ir own 
security instead of the government security forces provid ing a secure environment 
for local communities. Unfortunately, the m ilita ry  always offends up supporting 
local power leaders not only because i t  is part o f the ir mandate but more 
im portantly because i t  helps ease the burden on the security requirements of 
communities facing threats from  NSAGs.
b. The Return of Democracy
Another great opportun ity fo r conflict resolution came during the fa ll o f the 
Marcos dictatorship and the re turn  o f democracy in 1986. After President Corazon 
Aquino assumed the presidency in  the wake o f Marcos's fall from power in a popular 
uprising at the national capital, she started looking fo r a way to continue the talks
32Clifton Sherrill, "Promoting Democracy: Results of Democratization Efforts in the Philippines,"
Asian Affairs: An American Reviews 32 (January 2006): 211-23.
33 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 282.
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w ith  Moro rebels. Her brother-in-law, Agapito 'Butz’ Aquino, was the one directly 
tasked to find ways to engage the Muslim rebel groups, particu larly the MNLF and 
the MILF. In addition, leaders o f the Moro rebels, who were in the M iddle East, were 
encouraged to return to the Philippines fo r ceasefire talks, even as in itia l efforts to 
orchestrate a jo in t meeting w ith  them failed. Instead, the rebel groups escalated the 
clashes to pressure the government on the ir original demand fo r autonomy w ith in  
the context o f the 1976 T ripo li Agreement.34
By authority o f the President, the Constitution of the Republic o f the 
Philippines was amended and, at the beginning o f 1987, ratified by the people in  a 
nationwide referendum. Included in the new Constitution was a provision fo r the 
creation o f autonomous regions, the Autonomous Region in Muslim  Mindanao and 
another in the Cordillera region, w ith in  the context o f national sovereignty and 
te rrito ria l in tegrity o f the Philippines.35 Also, Misuari's insistence on fu ll 
independence for Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan (MINSUPALA) had been neutralized 
by some ASEAN nations; he likewise dropped the MNLF's long-standing demand for 
separation and agreed, instead, to fu ll autonomy for the Moro people. This sh ift in 
MNLF demands was also influenced, in part, by the OIC.
W hat complicated the negotiation for peace was the inclusion o f a 
referendum as a means o f implementing autonomy. At tha t critical po in t in the talks, 
the government insisted on the constitutional process, w hich meant tha t the grant o f 
autonomy fo r Muslims was subject to a political exercise in  which the people would 
be asked whether or not they wanted to be part o f the autonomy. The MNLF
34 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 332.
35 Section 15, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
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opposed this method, convinced that Christian-dominated areas w ould most like ly 
reject the ir inclusion in the Autonomous Region. Again, another great opportun ity  
fo r conflict resolution became an avenue fo r fu rther escalating the con flic t The 
government security forces were ordered to stand ready to use m ilita ry  power in 
case peaceful negotiations failed. On the other hand, the Muslim rebel forces had 
strengthened the ir forces and resources in preparation fo r war.
But the deadlock was broken after the term  o f Corazon Aquino. Of all the 
attempts to end the armed conflict in Mindanao, the period during the presidency of 
Fidel V. Ramos was the most promising for conflict resolution. The signing o f the 
1996 Peace Agreement was made possible w ith  the government’s resolve to end the 
violence while encouraging economic development and reconciliation. Aside from  
engaging the Moro secessionists, the government also engaged the m ilita ry  rebel 
forces, who had launched several coup attempts in the previous adm inistration, so 
they would refrain from using the m ilita ry  option to undermine the newly regained 
democracy in the country. The government offered amnesty, which meant that all 
rebels would be pardoned i f  they chose to lay down the ir arms and rejo in the 
national mainstream. The program was not only directed towards form er m ilita ry  
men who had participated in  several coups as well as the Moro rebels bu t also 
extended to the communist armed group, the New People's Army.
In Mindanao, the integration o f the MNLF combatants into the government's 
armed services was the most tangible accomplishment o f the Ramos adm inistration 
in addressing the secessionist tendency o f the Moro people. The e ffort to neutralize 
the armed rebellion in Mindanao was in consonance w ith  the general objective o f
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development fo r the most depressed communities in  conflict-affected areas. 
Mindanao was declared a "zone o f peace and development." For a while, because of 
the integration o f the combatants into the armed forces and the police, there was 
relative peace in the areas o f conflict. The success in bringing down the MNLF threat 
was made possible because President Ramos was determined to have peace and 
development in Mindanao.36
The government, however, failed to consider the implications o f a 
negotiation that did not address other armed groups operating in the same areas of 
conflict. For failing to encourage the MILF to participate in the peace process, the 
relative peace did not last long. In fact, the problem w ith  the MILF was inherited by 
succeeding administrations. Today, the MILF is asking for w ider te rr ito ry  and 
autonomy w ith  more political, economic, and social powers. The realization o f MILF 
aspirations would depend not only on the outcome of the peace process, hopefully a 
peace accord, but the process thereafter.
On the part o f the MNLF organization, combatants integrated in to  the AFP 
were enjoying the fru its o f being in government service w ith  m inimal commission of 
misdemeanors. This, despite the fact that some o f them were silently questioning 
army regulations which were fu lly  applied to them even though they could not cope 
w ith  such regulations due to fundamental deficiencies, such as low  educational 
attainment, that really put them in a disadvantaged position while in  the service.37 
The benign intention o f existing policies o f the Armed Forces is to
36 Ruben Torres, "Warriors Crave for Peace," RPDEVSGVFoundation: Caring, Sharing, Daring [2009).
37 Personal interview with former MNLF combatants who are now already bringing the rank of Major 
in the army, 29 June 2012 at fort Bonifacio, Makati City, Philippines.
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professionalize its ranks. Most recently, some o f the form er MNLF officers and men 
were recalled from the ir previous u n it assignment in  Mindanao as part o f the 
rotation policy, which applies to all army personnel. However, form er MNLF 
combatants are more useful and effective in the performance o f the ir duties when 
they are actually deployed in areas where they came from. They can be more useful 
in Muslim communities where they have the opportun ity  to speak on behalf o f the 
government, rather than in areas not fam iliar to them. There are many unpopular 
Muslim traditions and beliefs in Mindanao which only the Muslim integrees in  the 
AFP and the PNP know about. Besides, assigning the former MNLF combatants to 
areas outside the ARMM is a violation o f the Department of National Defense policy 
stipulated in  DND circular 05 dated September 30, 2003 and section 20, paragraph b 
of the 1996 peace agreement.
c. Questions over Ancestral Domain
In spite o f the controversy over its legality, the stalled MOA-AD could be a 
step forward fo r longer peace in  Mindanao. The GRP- MILF panel that worked hard 
to craft the MOA-AD fo r years had been looking fo r a means to realize peace and 
development in  Mindanao. In addition, teams o f international observers were also 
helping the government ensure s tric t adherence to the established ceasefire in 
Mindanao and facilitate peace negotiations. However, the supposed prelude to 
longer peace failed to materialize because o f an unclear policy tha t has made the 
Christians and non-Muslims suspicious o f the government's real in tention fo r the 
MOA-AD. As expected, the MOA-AD did not earn substantial support from  the 
m ajority o f lawmakers, policymakers, and Christian elites in  Manila.
234
For fear o f being under the control o f the MILF in  the long run, some 
Christians in Mindanao were opposed to the supposed signing o f the MOA-AD. The 
government, at the last minute, had to tu rn  its back on the MOA-AD followed by the 
declaration o f the Supreme Court that i t  was unconstitutional. Consequently, this 
was followed by a series o f intensified armed confrontations between the MILF 
mujahideen and government forces. It must be remembered tha t almost the entire 
Muslim community, as claimed by many, fu lly  supported the crafted MOA-AD as a 
way to address the Moro peoples' questions about te rrito ry  for conflict settlement.38
The failure of the MOA-AD, however, has not meant a to ta l deadlock in  the 
Mindanao conflict settlement. The GRP-MILF has remained firm  in its resolve to 
continue the stalled peace negotiations. On the part o f the Muslims, they usually 
conduct a general assembly to get the consensus of the Moro people. The most 
recent assembly o f Muslims was on 6-9 July 2012 at the MILF's Camp Darapanan in 
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao where thousands o f Muslims from  all sectors of 
society came to take part in the consultations as well as show the in tegrity  o f the 
Moros and the ir eagerness for peace in Mindanao. Such peace assembly was 
witnessed by several international organizations, ambassadors of Muslims 
countries, and the International Contact Group (ICG).
This study is o f the view  tha t this cohesiveness o f the Bangsamoro people is 
w orth  looking into, other than paying close attention to the instruments o f w ar 
(weapons or armaments), since the huge domestic support for the Moro people’s 
cause has the potential for fueling and perpetrating a rebellion. As long as the end
38 Personal interview with at least 10 Muslim leaders in the province of Maguindanao, Sultan 
Kudarat, North Cotabato, and Lanao Del Sur from June 2 to July 8 2012.
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goal o f any in itia tive is for the Bangsamoro, historical evidence shows that Muslims 
from all parts o f Mindanao are united fo r a common goal. This observation is crucial 
to an understanding o f the Mindanao conflict because in  many forms o f aggression, 
m inority  groups would resort to engaging in collective action -  be i t  peaceful or 
violent. But such collective action in contemporary politics must be empowered 
w ith  resources that enable m ino rity  groups to compete with, o r "put-up a fight" 
against, powerful opponents.39
Today, the current adm inistration is very optim istic tha t i t  can reach a 
settlement w ith  the MILF for a lasting peace because i t  addresses the issues raised 
by the Bangsamoro. On October 15, 2012, the government of the Philippines and the 
MILF panel signed the "framework agreement" for the Bangsamoro o r the New 
Political Entity (NPE) which would replace the ARMM created in the context o f the 
1996 Peace Agreement between the MNLF and the government o f the Philippines. 
The NPE has raised hopes, though w ith  opposition from  some groups especially the 
MNLF, that i t  would allow the return to normalcy in the conflict-affected areas of 
Mindanao. The NPE is a genuine document that clearly emphasizes a mechanism, 
sim ilar to previous ones that would address the questions of Muslims in  the south. 
However, the question o f how the government can be effective and capable in this 
endeavor, especially in regard to the implementation process, remains to be seen.
What is clear at this tim e is that the MNLF is unhappy w ith  the signing o f the 
"Framework Agreement," and has warned o f a renewed armed struggle in the south. 
Likewise the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters [BIFF), which bolted from  the
39 Tilly et al. 1975; Tilly 1978,;McCarthy and Zald 1973,1977.
MILF in  mid-2011 and created its own armed group, launched several attacks on 
m ilita ry  units in Central Mindanao tw o months p rio r to the signing o f the 
framework on the NPE. The offensive and defensive actions o f the m ilita ry , however, 
have all been calibrated in such a way that escalation could be prevented in 
compliance w ith  the principle o f "supremacy o f the peace process." On October 10, 
2012, after the government had announced tha t the signing would take place the 
follow ing week, MNLF founding chairman and form er ARMM Governor Nur Misuari 
expressed opposition to the signing o f the framework agreement and warned that 
the MNLF would return to armed struggle. However, an actual armed confrontation 
between the government and the MNLF remains to  be seen, even as several 
incidents of bomb threats and a few explosions have occurred in some parts of 
Mindanao, including an armed confrontation between the MILF and BIFF 
combatants in the province o f Maguindanao. This situation shows how d ifficu lt and 
complex the situation in Mindanao is, and underscores the need fo r a critical study 
on how a longer peace may be attained.
d. Economic Development and Lasting Peace
The economic development approach is a noble and proven im portant long­
term solution to insurgency, such as the one in Mindanao. However, i t  encourages 
separation or secessionism i f  directed only toward a certain group in  society. 
Development in one area may be a source o f discontent tha t encourages rebellion or 
secession because o f feelings o f neglect and resentment toward government among 
groups that do not benefit from such an effort. Ted Gurr, in his classical work, asks 
the question, ‘Why do men rebel?.' His analysis is anchored on the physical and
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psychological needs o f humankind. His "frustration-aggression approach" links the 
incidents o f political violence and rebellion d irectly to feelings o f deprivation that 
arise out o f unfu lfilled expectations.40 In other words, this theory can be linked to 
questions about secessionism wherein discrim inated groups are more like ly  to 
resort to separation preferably through vio lent means i f  they see no chances of 
success through peaceful means.
The very foundation o f Moro aggressiveness is rooted in  an in itia tive  tha t is 
supposed to address poverty but is not directed towards the righ t recipients. Karl 
Cordell and Stefan W olff recently observed that one reason fo r the occurrence of 
violence in Mindanao is the fact that the governor o f the area supposedly created for 
the rebels, on behalf o f the Muslims, has never been a member o f the MNLF.41 The 
rebel groups may have experienced waning support from the people but a 
sustainable settlement o f the Mindanao conflict is unlikely because the way the 
armed group is treated is critical to Mindanao conflict settlement, even as th is study 
is convinced that, by and large, the civilian component o f the rebellion w ill play an 
im portant role. Also, when the living conditions o f the Muslim people are not 
enhanced by a peace agreement which is presumably aimed at developing Moro 
land, violence is more like ly to recur in a short span of tim e after such an agreement 
is forged because discontent remains prevalent. In short, there is a strong 
correlation between economic development initiatives and the cessation o f violence, 
even as the persistence of armed struggle is beyond such relationship. In Mindanao,
40 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel? (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 46.
41 Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: Causes-consequences-responses (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2010), 55.
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substantial aid has poured into the area bu t the inab ility  o f an old system to 
implement such a concept has been a major obstacle to ending the secessionist 
tendency o f the Muslims. An old system could mean the trad itiona l ways of 
channeling development aid which, arguably, are no t aligned w ith  the original 
intention o f changing the people’s mindset from  aggressiveness to one of 
cooperation.
The Muslim rebellion in the south could be addressed in many ways, but the 
most appreciated option is a negotiated settlement because of the generous idea that 
promises economic development for ord inary people and not the wealthy or elites. 
However, negotiations are much more credible when they are relig iously pursued in 
the context of a fair, honest, and meaningful search for peace. In the long h istory of 
Mindanao conflict management, peace agreements have been forged but, most often 
than not, the implementation process for such pacts have created even more intense 
conflict due to differences in the interpretation o f the agreement's provisions. In the 
final analysis, however, the vagueness o f the provisions in  the pact has merely been 
used by some influentia l individuals to further the ir own political ambitions.
The generous international and local efforts to mitigate the effects o f armed 
conflict among the population should have been sufficient and appreciated not only 
because o f the humanitarian consideration bu t also because they relieved the 
displaced people from  the miseries of hunger. However, i t  must be noted that such 
relief operations which extended financial o r food assistance to in terna lly  displaced 
people (IDPs) in affected areas were only a temporary re lie f to m itigate the costly 
effects o f violence. International aid, on the other hand, could be a potential source
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o f corruption. The undesirable behavior o f local officials handling international aid 
could derail the real intention o f the humanitarian assistance in helping displaced 
persons to recover from  the miseries o f violence.
In some instances, truckloads o f rice fo r displaced civilians believed to  be 
moving towards evacuation centers were seen a few days later in  local markets 
being sold by local traders at a lower price.42 The question o f how this food aid, 
supposedly free, came into the possession o f local traders was not clear. W hat was 
evident, instead, is that the humanitarian mission fo r IDPs can be, and has in  fact 
been, a source o f corruption among a group o f people who may have influence in  the 
process o f food distribution. Usually, corruption remains unchecked as majorities of 
the people in Mindanao, especially the Muslims, are silenced and unable to public ly 
express the ir concerns over the corrupt practices of local executives out o f fear of 
retaliation from  more influentia l personalities.
In the same context o f tempering the effects o f violence, i f  change through 
economic development is the government’s goal, greater community partic ipation 
from  both Christians and Muslims in determ ining and implementing development 
projects would help ensure that projects are implemented as envisioned, thus 
allowing peace and a development attitude to become ingrained in the minds o f the 
people.43 But again, this can only be done i f  the security o f the people is guaranteed 
as to encourage them to openly report any mishandling o f efforts to m itigate or stop 
the armed conflict in Mindanao. As long as the people are hesitant to participate in
42 Personal interview with Locals affected by conflict in Datu Piang, Maguindanao on 10 June 2012.
43 Benedicto Bacani, Beyond Paper Autonomy: The Challenge in Southern Philippines (Cotabato City: 
Center for Autonomy and Governance, NDU, 2004), 57.
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this complex situation out o f fear o f retaliation, the government's economic 
development e ffort w ill continue to be used fo r the personal interest of 
unscrupulous individuals and lasting peace may ultim ately prove elusive through 
economic development.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Philippines has been embroiled in the security problem brought about 
by the Muslim rebellion in the south, which has evolved into a more complex 
situation. I t  is fo r this reason, however, that investigations into the conflict have 
become more complicated so that, due to the inaccessibility o f data, most findings 
are based on available inform ation and fail to consider what has been prevailing in 
the areas o f conflict. For a more valid and unbiased conclusion, studies must be 
based on a deeper analysis o f inform ation obtained at the very area o f the conflict 
where critical data are available. Policy recommendations, therefore, should 
originate from a critical analysis o f the situation in the area of conflict and not from  
elsewhere. Critical to this is the ab ility  o f a research study to penetrate the general 
population's situation and the ir perspective in the context of addressing discontent 
and grievances. In the long run, studies conducted on the basis o f accessible data at 
the outer layer o f the conflict areas may miss the importance o f addressing the 
rightfu l audience, and may also fa il to address the empirical puzzle surrounding the 
persistence o f armed conflict. This study does not claim to offer a stra ightforward 
solution, bu t i t  does bring to ligh t some im portan t variables tha t the Philippine 
government may take into consideration so that attempts to resolve the conflict fo r 
longer peace in Mindanao may be attained.
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a. Security Sector
Most research w ork  on the Mindanao conflict loosely considers the 
im portant role o f arms or weapons in  the cycle o f violence. Among others 
mentioned in this study, it  is the ready availability o f weapons that complicates the 
situation and makes conflict resolution even more difficu lt. No doubt, the Muslims in 
the south have grown up in  the belief that only the ir weapons could save them in 
times o f security crisis. In some Muslim communities, a weapon is a status symbol; 
the more weapons one has, the more respect one earns in a society that gives him 
power.44 Nevertheless, this study is quite confident tha t even in the face o f many 
weapons, conflict resolution remains possible because there is a rationale behind 
the proliferation o f weapons in  a society.
Muslims in the south have acquired many weapons in numerous ways. There 
are those w ith  the financial capacity to personally buy weapons from  illegal sources. 
There are communities, such as clans, who by v irtue  o f the ir common goal of 
protecting the ir families from  unlawful attacks, opt to generate funds from  each 
fam ily w ith  which to buy the ir weapons. Similarly, those occupying politica l office 
take advantage o f the ir position to acquire more weapons from government security 
forces on a loan basis. This is justified by claiming that they themselves are fighting, 
alongside the m ilitary, against MILF combatants or other lawless elements and that 
the ir security must also be protected. Of all these mechanisms, the most threatening 
is the claim o f government officials that they are entitled to arm themselves because 
the ir lives are threatened as a consequence of th e ir official functions. This means
44Uztadz Daud, serving as underground political leader in the Bangsamoro, interview by the author, 
Maguindanao province, June 5, 2012.
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that the capacity o f government's armed services to maintain the security o f people 
in government is in question.
Arm ing civilians may be an option against any threat to life bu t i t  could be the 
most critical o f all stumbling blocks to conflict resolution, economic development, 
and the preservation o f peace. Before the massacre o f 58 people in  Maguindanao in 
2009, fo r instance, the government had authorized civilians to arm themselves in 
preparation for possible attacks by, in the case o f Maguindanao province, the 
MILF.45 This mechanism became a legal basis for the local politicians to build  up 
the ir own security. W hat happened was that the government, in good faith, supplied 
arms to perceived allies because the m ilita ry  themselves believed that it  was one 
way o f reducing the burden o f deploying more forces to these areas.
This approach, however, has been found to be defective. Other than the 
discipline that should be ingrained in these civilian armed elements, those holding 
guns, like the m ilitary, need proper training. As observed in Mindanao, once the 
civilian sector such as local politicians is armed, there is a decline in the delivery of 
effective services to constituents because these local leaders apparently sh ift more 
attention to assuming a m ilita ry  role rather than that o f public servants in the ir 
political jurisdiction. In the most daring massacre in Maguindanao where 58 people 
were killed on 23 November 2009, most o f the firearms and weapons recovered 
from the suspected Ampatuan clan came from the Armed Forces. A ll other suspects 
were civilian volunteers armed w ith  high-powered firearms w ith  no clear m ilita ry
45 Executive Order 546, section 2, August 2006: The PNP is authorized to deputize the "Barangay 
Tanod" or people serving as local security forces, as force multipliers in the implementation of 
peace and order in the areas of conflict.
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personnel supervising them.
This incident makes i t  imperative to review the policy on arm ing civilians, 
especially politicians, in the context o f attaining peace in Mindanao. Perhaps, 
reducing the number o f loose firearms, i f  they cannot be completely removed, may 
contribute to attaining the aspirations o f the people, both Muslims and Christians, 
for peace and development. Moreover, the v irtua lly  open policy on selling guns 
should be studied. In the Philippines, one can own a gun by buying i t  from  a gun 
store as long as one undergoes a seminar and other adm inistrative orientations. In 
developed countries such as the United States, owning a gun is legal, bu t this model 
could not be adopted in the Philippines, a country smarting from  the effects of 
internal armed conflict.
Arms should be controlled i f  the Philippine government intends to m inim ize 
crim ina lity caused by the use o f readily available firearms. I f  there is a stric te r policy 
on the control and management o f guns, then the likelihood of having a society w ith  
lesser crim ina lity is high. In this case, conflict resolution would no t be so d ifficu lt 
since it  reduces the complications brought about by loose firearms, which are then 
only in the possession o f rebels. Also, through th is scheme, the local politicians may 
become advocates of peace instead o f being accessories to the conflict by acting like 
members o f a m ilita ry  organization.
Lastly, the security sector must undergo a reform  to ta ilo r its activities to the 
security needs o f the peace process for lasting peace in Mindanao. I t  must be noted 
that one reason the m ilita ry  is sometimes having d ifficu lty  in  ta ilo ring its 
operational activities in Muslim-dominated areas is tha t these communities are
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d ifficu lt to penetrate. For reasons beyond political control, these communities are 
in filtra ted  by an "exclusive organization," such as the MILF, the MNLF, and other 
armed groups like the BIFF which recently bolted from the MILF.
In ligh t o f crafting a strategic policy to address such organizational 
exclusiveness where anyone who looks suspicious is no t welcome, one suggestion is 
to study the possibility o f increasing the number o f Muslims in  the m ilita ry  
organization, rather than just suspecting young Muslim men o f being rebels o r of 
being supportive o f the rebellion. A fter all, the 1987 Philippine Constitution itse lf 
mandates that "the officers and men of the regular force o f the armed forces shall be 
recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities."46 Finally, sincere and 
vigorous tra in ing and education on social awareness may ease the feeling of 
uncertainty on the part o f the officers and soldiers of the AFP and the PNP about the 
culture, traditions, and beliefs of the Muslims in the south. In the end, m ilita ry  units 
deployed in the Muslim-dominated areas for whatever missions w ould face these 
communities w ith  more cred ib ility  because the presence o f Muslim soldiers attests 
to the ir sense o f belongingness in the m ilita ry  and to the sincerity o f m ilita ry  units 
toward the Muslims.
b. Political Sector
The issue between government goals and Muslim aspirations has been 
strongly linked to the political system in the country. This problem has been 
classified by many as a political problem that needs a political solution. In this 
context, political figures are critical in  the future o f the armed struggle o f Muslims in
46 Philippine constitution, article XVI, section 5.
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Mindanao. This study, however, is convinced tha t the situation may reach a po in t 
where both parties in this decades-old conflict would finally agree to end the 
violence by forging a peace agreement. On October 15, 2012, the Framework 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro was signed by both the government o f the 
Philippines and the MILF panels. However, as in the past, a binding w ritten  
document does not guarantee the end o f aggression because o f many technicalities 
tha t can be exploited by spoilers of peace that could thus derail the direction o f the 
implementation o f such an agreement. Political leaders are crucial in  getting the fu ll 
support o f the people. The national leadership, for example, may influence all 
government sectors to support the peace process because it  is designed, among 
others, to maintain the te rrito ria l in tegrity  o f the Republic and preserve a popular 
democracy. On the other hand, leaders o f government sectors can also be a potential 
source of disagreement.
For several decades in the history o f Mindanao, local leaders particu la rly  in 
the Muslim areas have failed to implement the essence of good governance. This 
study believes this issue can be addressed through the dedicated supervision o f a 
credible system by the central government. Moreover, i f  there is autonomy, whether 
it  is the existing ARMM or the proposed expanded autonomy in the GRP-MILF 
negotiations, it  is more appreciated by the people when the essence o f autonomy is 
felt instead o f having autonomy only on paper. An autonomous region that does not 
address the real question o f m inority  is most like ly  to fail in the long run because the 
conditions fo r a rebellion remain. In Mindanao, the people liv ing  in the conflict- 
affected areas expect positive change in  the political system so tha t it  is a system
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appropriate fo r a m ulti-ethnic society.
Contrary to common understanding, change in the Philippine politica l system 
should be viewed as a step towards peace and security, not as a threat to national 
security. The 1996 peace agreement championed by Ramos was made possible 
through the w o rk  o f national leaders, policymakers, and most o f all the lawmakers 
who, by v irtue o f the ir mandates, saw to i t  that autonomous regions (the ARMM and 
the Cordillera region) were included in the Philippine Constitution tha t was ratified 
in 1987.47Because the law  accommodates the creation o f an autonomous region, the 
peace negotiations p rio r to the forging o f the 1996 agreement earned meaningful 
support from  the population and the international community.
Beyond entering into an agreement, the central government should bear the 
responsibility to help the autonomous area (ARMM) or the proposed Bangsamoro in 
the GPH-MILF negotiations to ensure a government that accepts responsib ility and 
accountability to its people. The general observation is tha t current ARMM 
governance is weak.48This is a fa ir observation supported by the fact that 
institutions in the current ARMM must be reformed in order to address the needs of 
its citizens. The people have complained that the 1996 Peace Agreement has not 
improved or changed the ir lives.
W hat w ent wrong in the ARMM could be summed up as poor governance and 
the failure to implement the essence of autonomy. Probably, it is also a good idea to 
see to it  that political leaders in the ARMM are capable o f running the ARMM. This is
47 Philippine constitution ratified in 1987, after the fall of Martial Law.
48 David Gorman, during his remark on the comparison of Mindanao and Aceh, 13 July 2012 at 
Development Academy of the Philippines.
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possible through a systematic campaign to  educate the people and the supposed 
leaders, even i f  they come from  the rebel groups, on good governance. In this way, 
unscrupulous leaders may be checked and wane naturally. This is a huge task 
because the national government itse lf is bombarded w ith  corruption, bu t to a 
certain degree, a move towards good government may resolve the unstable ARMM 
in the south. A fter all, the political will to promote genuine autonomy should be 
pursued w ithou t hindrance while ensuring the establishment o f a mechanism to 
have the ARMM, buttressed w ith  a realistic budget, included in the national 
investment priorities.49
c. Education, Socio- Cultural Sector
Education, as discussed earlier, has not addressed the overall integration of 
Muslims in to  Filip ino society. However, putting aside the historical disadvantage of 
Muslim educational programs in the past, a good education in the 21st century 
environment should be a prim ordia l concern o f every state to see to it  that there is 
equal access to education among its entire citizenry. Today, there are a number of 
educated Muslims occupying positions in politics, education, agriculture, and other 
sectors o f government. On the other hand, it  is this study's view that the complex 
situation in Mindanao has been further aggravated by knowledgeable individuals 
w ith  divergent agenda. The assortment o f numerous actors has given the 
government so much d ifficu lty  in dealing w ith  the security problem in Mindanao. 
But this complex environment could be well-addressed by strong and firm  leaders 
committed to having a united Filipino nation. Sometimes, dealing w ith  educated
49 Bacani, Beyond Paper Autonomy, 60-61.
248
individuals is even more difficult, especially when an approach does not provide a 
clear and unbiased policy.
In Mindanao, the problem could be blamed on a system tha t unknowingly 
promotes feelings of discrim ination and inequality. Educated Muslims are qualified 
to occupy key positions but representation in  the central government has been 
disproportionate. In essence, the decision making process in regard to the Muslims 
is most often plagued w ith  criticism, especially from  the Muslim m inority, because 
strategic policies are conceived w ithou t the consent o f knowledgeable Muslims 
themselves. In the end, the divisiveness o f communities is unw itting ly  highlighted 
instead o f being able to promote stronger, cohesive, and progressive governance 
w ith  reasonable representation from key sectors of society. Again, these faulty 
systems have been noted and strategic attempts have been made to address the 
same, but they have been neglected fo r whatever reason by individuals who have 
influence over the situation.
The Madrasa educational system, for instance, has doubtlessly existed since 
the time when the Muslim people in Mindanao adopted Islam as th e ir relig ion and 
Arabic as the medium o f instruction in the ir schools. In 1973, the Department o f 
Education and Culture ordered the use o f Arabic as a medium o f instruction fo r 
Grade I and Grade II in areas dominated by Muslims, then in the provinces o f Sulu, 
Basilan, Zamboanga del Sur, the Lanao areas, and all areas o f Cotabato (now 
Maguindanao, [North] Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, and Sarangani 
provinces).50 Aside from minimal implementation o f the program fo r whatever
so Department Order no. 25, series of 1973, Department Education and Culture.
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reasons, this national policy should have been appreciated if  said program was also 
available in schools throughout the country. Although Arabic as a language may not 
be used in schools in  Christian-dominated areas, basic knowledge about the 
existence o f Islam in the southern Philippines should at least be taught to Filip ino 
children so that the next generation is equipped w ith  knowledge on the Arabic 
language and Muslim values rather than suspecting Madrasahs (in today’s 
generation) as a breeding ground fo r terrorism .
During the ARMM period, the Department o f Education after a series of 
studies and consultations has directed schools, particularly in the Muslim 
autonomous region, to adopt the implementing guidelines on the Arabic curriculum. 
The Department o f Education has mandated public schools and other private 
Madrasah to implement the Refined Elementary Madrasah Curriculum (REMC), the 
Arabic Language and Islamic values (ALIVE) fo r public schools and the Refined 
Standard Madrasah Curriculum (RSMC) for private Madrasahs. The policy covers 
pupils from Grade I to Grade VI. This educational policy also allows the smooth 
transition o f a private Madrasah into becoming a public school w ith  the ALIVE 
program.51 This is another attempt to acknowledge the exclusive educational needs 
o f the Muslims while maintaining the national identity  as Filipinos through the 
preservation of cultural heritage. However, its fu ll implementation has yet to be 
seen. More so, as earlier suggested, the target audience should include the m ajority  
Christians so that the level o f awareness about Muslims, Islamic values, cultural 
practices, and other traditions o f Muslims in the south would be enhanced and
51 Department Order no. 40, series Of 2011, Depart of Education of the Philippines.
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would facilitate easy resolution o f major barriers between Muslims and Christians 
in the country.
Finally, an education program on peace studies is much needed in 
revitalizing the environment, that is, a self-sustaining program aimed at addressing 
differences or even common disputes among groups o f people. In essence, the 
culture o f violence that many believe to be a compelling mechanism fo r prolonged 
armed conflict w ill be transformed into a culture of peace that w ill be ingrained in 
every generation o f Filipinos. In the end, future generations in the country w ill be 
one that does not distinguish or discriminate against anyone according to ethnic 
affiliation. I f  this is achieved, the probability  of attaining a solid peace is very high.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on the complexity o f armed conflict in  Mindanao 
that showcases the d ifficu lty  facing negotiated settlements and its implications for 
government. It  has shown that to attain a lasting peace, the government must be 
patient and flexible enough to accommodate the demands of m ino rity  groups but 
firm  enough so as not to jeopardize the integrity o f the state. The response o f 
government, usually, is dependent on the intensity o f the conflict and the extent o f 
damage to the communities. The establishment o f ceasefires is a potential source o f 
peace, but what makes them more disadvantageous is the failure to explore all 
possible avenues to peace as actors exploit the emerging confusion that eventually 
leads to renewed and persistent violence, and even the scrupulous leaders become 
too tim id to overcome the few spoilers o f peace.
It is true that truces sometimes provide enough space fo r both parties to
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prepare fo r the next intensified fight, bu t tha t is only because the temporary 
cessation o f violence is not followed by a systematic means o f pursuing peace 
through fa ir and dedicated negotiations. In other words, the general notion about 
the bad effects o f truces can be tempered by a serious effort o f leaders to push fo r a 
genuine advocacy fo r peace.
It is evident, in this chapter, that the complexity o f the Mindanao situation is 
a product o f the vicious cycle o f violence. Approaches to this armed conflict have 
generated many questions based on the empirical evidence that violence as a result 
o f armed confrontations between government security forces and the Muslims 
rebels has persisted fo r decades. For this reason, the results o f studies and 
investigations on this phenomenon have not been given the opportun ity fo r serious 
implementation, or i f  implemented, have failed to address the supposed rightfu l 
audiences. In the end, mediocre implementation o f approaches to the problem has 
been exploited by spoilers who have no intention o f find ing a genuine resolution to 
the conflict.
A rido or conflict between Moro clans, fo r example, has been used to hide the 
real security issues in the areas o f conflict. When a conflict is classified as a rido, its 
early resolution, more often than not, is left to the conflicting parties, thus requiring 
m inimal pacifying efforts from the government. In the end, a localized conflict tha t is 
classified as a "rido" eventually escalates into a bigger conflict that calls for major 
participation from the same government security forces.
There are at least three major questions that need to be addressed on the 
matter o f fam ily or group war. When there is an armed confrontation between
252
Muslim families, what should the government security forces deployed in the area 
do? When there is an armed confrontation between Christian families, what should 
the m ilita ry  do? And i f  there is an armed confrontation between a group o f Muslim 
families and a group o f Christian families, what must the security forces do? These 
questions, by and large, may be rhetorical in nature, bu t answering these questions 
may ease the tension between and among the people in  Mindanao regardless of 
the ir ethnic or religious group. In times o f war, spoilers always prevail because the 
m ajority peace advocates become reluctant and choose to be silent out o f fear for 
the ir own security.
To bring about an urgent peace that would mitigate the effects o f vio lent 
conflict, national leaders are often forced to craft a policy that is supposed to meet 
the needs of the country for peace and development. Unfortunately, i t  usually does 
not address the issues tha t would ensure the continuity o f peace and security in the 
areas o f conflict. The spoilers o f peace most often take advantage o f the complicated 
environment to successfully carry out the ir aim o f derailing the peace process. In the 
end, even the brightest people tend to stay away from  mediating negotiations 
because o f the unclear policy on the conflict in Mindanao. The government, 
however, may not be blamed fo r every failed settlement as the government policy 
on implementation has been manipulated by unscrupulous individuals, whose 
success in derailing negotiated settlements in the south has helped enable the 
perpetuation o f the "on and off” cycle o f fighting between the government security 
forces and the Muslims rebels.
No doubt the government strategic approach to th is prolonged conflict has
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been studied and implemented, though analysts have seen anomalies in 
implementation. In addition, policies towards the Mindanao conflict have been 
challenged by intervening factors, such as kidnappings for ransom targeting 
foreigners and selected businessmen. Succeeding responses to these intervening 
factors should not create new opportunities for turn ing the volatile situation in the 
conflict-affected areas into an open war. That way, the true essence o f conflict 
settlement may be attained as the ultimate goal o f the country. Also, clan disputes 
should not be treated as small localized conflicts best le ft to the w arring  parties to 
resolve. The 1987 Constitution mandates the Armed Forces to protect the country 
and the people regardless o f ethnic origin or religious affiliation. Security forces 
should use this as a legal tool for taking action to settle these disputes rather than 
sim ply w aiting on the sidelines un til a confined dispute erupts into a w ar between 
the Muslim rebels and the Armed Forces o f the Philippines. In short, mediation 
should come even before disputes between groups start to bu ild  up, and the 
government approach should be firm  enough to stand against the rigorous threats 
to peace and security. Policy makers, lawmakers, and state leaders should base 
strategic decisions not on emotional biases but on a careful analysis o f empirical 
evidence w ith  a view  to attaining peace, development, and unity among the people.
In the final analysis, i t  appears that the spoilers have so far prevailed because 
the country, in general, has failed to appropriately address the perverse intentions 
of a few but influentia l and unscrupulous individuals. The government, however, is 
in a position to impose what is good fo r the people in accordance w ith  existing law 
and an evidence-based approach. Therefore, an attempt to derail a peace in itia tive
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must not be allowed to succeed because the lessons o f the past can serve as a basis 
fo r evaluating the causes o f failed approaches to this conflict.
Beyond all these observations, a serious campaign to educate the people and, 
i f  possible, all sectors o f governance about the lessons o f the past w ould be helpful 
in the pursu it o f negotiated settlements. A fter all, as long as differences prevail over 
un ity in  the country, the Mindanao conflict w ill not go away. Failures in the past 
should serve as lessons that guide the leaders in the struggle for peace in Mindanao. 
The complex security environment is oppressive and a prim ary source o f prolonged 
conflict, bu t the complexity o f the same situation could be addressed appropriately 






The firs t chapter o f this study highlights the role o f local actors entangled in 
the process at the state level as a significant determ inant for ending the Mindanao 
armed conflict. On the same note, this study is aligned w ith  the m oral princip le that 
peoples o f a state should not fight each other in order to m aintain the nation’s 
te rrito ria l in tegrity and sovereignty which, in  turn, propel national economic 
prosperity. As long as the Philippines is bombarded w ith  challenges posed by 
internal security threats from distinct groups, the prospects for a better Philippines 
and a national economy that is highly competitive in the international system in  the 
21st century remain unclear. It  is true that the complex situation in the southern 
Philippines has been ingrained in  its long h istory o f hatred and divisiveness, but the 
opportunity fo r conflict resolution also runs parallel to the Mindanao conflict.
In fact, in almost every outbreak o f m ajor conflict between the government 
forces and the Muslims, the opportun ity fo r settlement has been there. Even as the 
conflict intensifies, the international community has been playing an im portant role 
in bringing the violence to a temporary halt. Efforts are temporary in  nature because 
the opportun ity for outside players to become effective tools fo r attaining longer 
stability that can last beyond ceasefires has been neglected in the context o f peace 
and security, social justice, economic development, and equality.
The 1976 peace agreement, better known as the Tripo li Agreement, was 
among the official accords that may have brought more stability to Mindanao. But
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the systematic move to mislead the true direction of the peace accord became one of 
the stumbling blocks to the realization o f w ha t had been mandated in  the peace 
agreement. In the end, the T ripo li Agreement became a means to s im ply contain and 
suppress the supposed escalation o f the conflict in Mindanao. Some o f the leaders of 
the Moro rebels were absorbed into the government system by assuming political 
positions while others were given a chance to s ta rt a new life in the business sector. 
This system, by and large, tem porarily  halted the violence p rim a rily  due to the 
absence o f leaders in the rebel movement, bu t more dynamic and charismatic 
leaders eventually emerged to continue the armed struggle.
The country, w ith  its policy of containment, has been put in  a bad ligh t in the 
eyes o f the international community. The OIC, for example, openly blamed the 
Government o f the Philippines fo r failing to implement the mandates o f the T ripo li 
Agreement.1 Because o f diplomatic pressure from  Islamic states, the country tried  to 
ameliorate the effects o f the Muslim rebellion in the south by devising a mechanism 
that would make the situation more manageable, w ith  greater focus on the welfare 
and safety o f Muslim communities in the affected areas. Even i f  th is policy was not 
popular, the government was compelled to satisfy the interest o f external actors 
while arguably addressing the domestic demands. A peace settlement through the 
implementation o f the Tripo li Agreement, thus, became second p rio rity , giving way 
to the government's top p rio r ity  which was now the implementation o f a 
mechanism to mitigate the regional implications o f the con flic t In fact, the 
succeeding approaches to  the same security problem in the south were pursued in
1 See 11th ICFM Resolution no. 22/11-P, "The question of the Muslims in the Philippines", Islamabad, 
Pakistan May 17-22,1980. http://www.oic-oci.ora/paae detail.asp?p id=68
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compliance w ith  the very basic legal demands o f the 1976 Tripo li agreement.
Similarly, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement was conceived fo r the supposed 
realization o f the 1976 T ripo li agreement mandates. I t  was expected that the 1996 
final peace agreement where the parties affirmed the sovereignty, te rrito ria l 
integrity, and the Constitution o f the Republic o f the Philippines, w ould "constitute 
the fu ll implementation o f the T ripo li Agreement."2 There was no major question on 
the process o f negotiation, especially the provisions o f the agreement, up to the 
po in t where the MNLF combatants joined the security forces. The biggest question 
was on the process of implementation. Aside from  the inab ility  o f the mechanism to 
incorporate the critical aspect o f integrating the combatants into the mainstream of 
Philippine society, the future sustainability o f such efforts was not favorably 
considered.
The integration o f form er combatants, fo r example, should have been the 
model fo r succeeding efforts in  addressing sim ilar problems posed by other armed 
groups. But instead, the remaining firearms and weapons o f MNLF combatants 
during the integration process were never given serious attention. In the end, the 
ready availability o f the weapons le ft behind by the MNLF combatants served to 
strengthen other groups that were not part o f the integration. Also, in the course of 
developing a solid m ilita ry  organization w ith  the integration o f fo rm er rebels into 
the national security and police forces, the scheme became problematic. The system 
in  the Arm y became less lenient in  its policy toward form er MNLF combatants. In 
the latest inventory o f records, only about ha lf o f them remain in the service out of
2 For the details of the mechanism, see the contents of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement forged 
between the GRP and the MNLF.
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the original 6,000 combatants who were integrated in to  and became officers and 
men of the Philippine A rm y .3
STUMBLING BLOCKS TO A LONGER PEACE
A number o f factors have been observed to p lay a critical role in fu rther 
complicating the Mindanao internal conflict to the extent that every e ffo rt to forge a 
peace settlement in Mindanao is almost unrealistic.
First, the situation in Mindanao became a vicious cycle o f violence because o f 
stumbling blocks that have been, w itting ly  or unw itting ly, enabling the persistence 
o f the armed conflict. The most critical o f these factors is that the people themselves 
seem to easily forget the historical events that make any negotiations even more 
difficult. The historical hatred between the Moros and the Christian Filipinos has 
become a source o f potential prejudices in the treatm ent o f the problem, most 
especially in the decision making process that determines the future endeavors o f 
the country. It is this author's observation that most o f the strategic decisions 
concerning Muslims in the south has been tainted by suspicions, such as the 
suspicion that granting Muslim autonomy would be a prelude to secession, that gain 
more consideration than making an evidence-based policy that addresses the needs 
o f all affected groups.
In short, the failure o f the past peace agreements to  end the Muslim Rebellion 
may have been due to the same reason that the ir implementation was not really 
meant to fu lfill them bu t that the mechanism was being used sim ply to go around 
the technicalities. This study has emphasized earlier tha t the oppressive effect of
3 This data is based from the recent records of the Philippine Army, August 2012.
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ancient hatred can be tempered by more open understanding o f one another, 
especially among policy and decision makers, o r simply by making decisions fo r the 
sole purpose o f attaining cooperation rather than crafting a policy out o f suspicion. 
As long as the suspicion that Muslims would secede when they have the power to do 
so prevails, the attainment o f lasting peace in Mindanao and the rest o f the country 
is not like ly  to  come in the near future. The idea of cooperation and not conflict 
should be more effective when it  really comes from  the leaders that determine the 
direction this country w ill take. In this way, even the long years o f misery, hunger, 
discrim ination, and dislocation o f people may fina lly come to a natural end because 
the leaders are determined to do what is best fo r the people, regardless o f ethnic or 
religious affiliation.
Second, the pro liferation o f loose firearms is one o f the most identified causes 
o f the persistence o f armed conflict. Owning a weapon is sometimes justifiable 
especially when an individual is concerned fo r his own security. W hat is crucial to 
this matter is how to transform  a society that believes in  the usefulness o f guns into a 
diverse society where the value o f guns or weapons naturally loses its attractiveness. 
The latest estimate shows that in the new Bangsamoro [form erly ARMM) alone, 
there are least 3,190 assorted firearms in the possession of the MILF; 330 in the 
hands o f the ASG; 310 in  the hands o f the MNLF (these belong to the MNLF cadres 
who were le ft out during the 1996 integration); about 140 in the hands o f crim inal 
gangs; 1,340 in the possession of wanted persons; and 24,400 assorted low- 
powered firearms in the hands o f the general public fo r a to ta l o f 29,710 loose
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firearms.4 The Philippines, like other countries, has learned from  experience that 
the availability o f weapons as tools o f w ar serves as a catalyst for another round of 
armed conflict. It is understood tha t a peace deal should consider the final 
disposition o f weapons owned by the combatants. But w ithout a serious and sincere 
effort o f the government to account for loose firearms other than those in the 
possession o f rebel combatants, the likelihood o f ending violence may not be 
attainable.
In the case o f the recently forged Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 
i t  is acknowledged that the huge number o f firearms poses a serious concern. 
Skeptics doubt whether or not the GRP-MILF panel could address the issue o f "other 
armed groups" through the implementation o f mandates under the fram ework 
agreement. Another potential challenge to the successful implementation o f the 
agreement is the final disposition o f the MILF combatants and th e ir families who 
have lived in areas not covered by the Bangsamoro. Can they be covered by the 
peace deal even i f  they are not liv ing w ith in  the Bangsamoro? Another im portant 
concern is the effective disposition o f the MNLF combatants (who entered in to  a 
peace agreement in 1996) who have maintained several camps w ith  appropriate 
firearms and weapons. As long as the pro liferation o f firearms and weapons 
remains unchecked, the vo la tility  o f the situation remains a m ajor concern in 
tempering the oppressive effects o f a recurrent vio lent conflict. In essence, thus, a 
peace deal that lacks the capacity to implement effective firearms control and 
management may be rendered ineffectual because vio lent armed conflict can occur
4 Firearms and Explosive Ordnance, PNP presented in the seminar workshop/ focus group discussion 
on the MILF Normalization, OPAPP, Pasig City, 29-31 November 2012.
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spontaneously when such weapons, as tools o f violence, are accessible.
Third, insincerity is a potential variable tha t this study has considered in the 
failure o f at least tw o agreements to prevent the recurrence o f armed conflict in 
Mindanao. On this premise, this study holds tha t the peace mechanisms, including 
those m inor initiatives for conflict settlement, were meant principally to "contain” 
the violence from further escalating rather than effecting a genuine settlement that 
would fina lly end the conflict. Consequently, the process of conflict settlement in 
subsequent negotiations became more complicated because the demands o f the 
disadvantaged groups, the Muslims, had become more exacerbated by the effects 
and memories of the previous settlement effort.
Aside from the fact tha t the 1976 T ripo li Agreement was not meant, in 
general, to address the questions and sentiments o f the Bangsamoro, the same 
peace deal dictated the difficulties that the 1996 Peace Agreement encountered and 
tremendously affected the supposed success i t  sought to achieve. It  is true that i t  is 
hard to appease everyone in a society bombarded w ith  internal security problems, 
but a serious and religious implementation o f w hat has been agreed upon may ease, 
and in fact, tempers m inor problems stemming from unforeseen events that were 
not considered during the policy planning.
In the current negotiations between the GPH and the MILF, the prim ary 
factor causing apprehension among the people about the capacity o f the framework 
agreement to resolve the problem in Mindanao is the historical experience that has 
corrupted the minds o f the general public. The current security threats being faced 
by the framework agreement are anchored on the assumption that the other threat
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groups are skeptical about the sincerity o f the peace process. The MNLF, for 
example, is questioning the legality o f the process, apprehensive that those agreed 
upon in 1996 may simply be swept aside by current fram ework agreement. The 
framework agreement clearly stresses that the ARMM and, by extension, the 1996 
Peace Agreement was a failure. This stand o f the government was reiterated by the 
President himself when he remarked on the beauty and strength o f the current 
Framework Agreement even as he acknowledged the huge task that lies ahead in 
finalizing the "annexes" to the deal.
The newly created Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter (BIFF], an MILF 
breakaway group, has also expressed its discomfort w ith  the fram ework agreement 
fo r the same reason that the organization is s till unsure whether said Agreement can 
genuinely and effectively address the p light o f the Muslims. On th is aspect, these 
two formidable forces cannot simply be disregarded as both can transform  the 
relatively peaceful environment into a situation beyond the control o f the peace 
panel or even the government. The mishandling o f these pressing issues may ru in  
the Moro people's confidence, somehow regained in this latest e ffo rt at resolving the 
conflict, in the peace process and the government's overall goal o f fina lly  ending the 
violence in the south. The feedback from  Muslim communities is that the "wait-and- 
see" attitude o f armed groups such as the MNLF, the Special Operations Group 
(SOG), the BIFF, and even the communist-driven New People’s A rm y can also be 
addressed and brought to the negotiating table w ith  the same sincerity shown to the 
MILF in fu lfilling  commitments and promises.
Fourth, weak government impartiality is commonly argued as a source o f
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ins tab ility  in a state.5 The Philippines may not fa ll under this category bu t because 
its ina b ility  to resolve the problem  in the south creates the im pression tha t i t  is a 
weak state. Aside from  this unfavorable international perception, the Government is 
also vulnerable to critic ism  especially from  the m in o rity  groups in  society. To offset 
this misconception, however, the approach o f government should be transparent 
enough so tha t its im pa rtia lity  in dealing w ith  issues o f national in te rest may gain 
the upper hand. In Mindanao, the Bangsamoro people always tend to  look at the 
perceived prejudices against them not because o f the perception itse lf bu t because 
o f the need to find  out w hether they are being assessed and treated fa ir ly  and 
sincerely, an attitude developed over a long h is to ry  o f oppression and 
marginalization tha t has brought them so much uncerta in ty and misery.
In times o f crises invo lv ing Muslims and Christians, i t  is always perceived, 
w ith  a high degree o f tru th , th a t the government supports the Christians ra ther than 
taking an im partia l approach to the problem  in  the context o f a tta in ing peace. 
Government forces, fo r example, are always perceived to  be favoring the Christians 
ra ther than protecting everyone, including the Muslims, w ith  efforts to  prevent 
armed confrontation between groups o f people. As discussed earlier, when the 
conflict is between Muslim  fam ilies o r clans, the security forces tend not to  get 
involved by s im ply adopting a hands-off po licy tow ard  the problem , thereby 
ignoring the need to ha lt such hostilities. However, when the conflic t is between 
Christians and Muslims, the security forces tend to take the side o f the non-Muslims.
5 Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in International 
Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, 1996), 
13-14.
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This observation has been proven in the context o f investigating the deeper 
causes o f the conflict in  Mindanao. The government should guard against a llow ing 
the same misdeeds o f local authorities, as in  the case o f the ARMM, tha t tend to 
inde fin ite ly  prolong the conflict. In o ther words, the perceived weakness o f the 
government is not due to an ina b ility  to end its in ternal o r domestic security 
problem  but is ra ther the consequence o f a policy on Mindanao tha t has fa iled to 
address concerns about the s tr ic t observance o f im partia lity , accountability, 
responsibility, transparency, and responsiveness in the context o f fa ir trea tm ent o f 
all constituents, regardless o f ethnic or relig ious inclination.
A fte r all, Islam in  general or the Muslims in  the Philippines in particu la r have 
a proud trad ition  o f generosity and m aximum tolerance in  order to  be able to  live  in 
peace and security. But they usually tu rn  v io len t when they feel d iscrim inated 
against and treated unfairly, w hich convinces them tha t they are included in  the 
economic, social, cultural, and educational programs o f the country. On several 
occasions such as the 1976 and 1996 peace agreements, the author has observed 
tha t most o f the steps taken after the signing o f the agreements were conceived to 
m itigate the effects o f violence, and i f  possible, contain i t  and prevent its escalation 
to the po in t o f inv iting  in ternational in tervention . There may be w isdom  in  no t 
involving outside actors, bu t the po licy o f containment is entire ly d iffe ren t from  the 
in itia tive  to b ring  about an enduring peace. As usual, in the globalized 21st century, 
the regionalization or in ternationalization o f local conflicts is normal and d ifficu lt to 
prevent. W hat is more serious is the im plication o f such interventions fo r the a b ility  
o f a government to solve its own problems. In the case o f the Mindanao co n flic t,, the
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involvem ent o f outside actors in  domestic efforts to end the violence somehow 
discredits the ab ility  and sincerity o f the Philippine government in  addressing the 
sentiments o f the Bangsamoro and fu lfillin g  its in ternational com m itm ent under the 
T ripo li agreement.
THE CONSEQUENITAL EFFECTS OF A PROLONGED ARMED CONFLICT
The protracted armed conflic t in M indanao has affected a lm ost every sector 
o f Philippine society. In the international setting, the Philippines has been try in g  to 
resist in ternational pressure to resolve its  in te rna l security problem. It  m ust be 
remembered that even as the Mindanao problem  has been confined w ith in  national 
boundaries, i t  has links to  the outside w o rld  no t only due to M indanao's economic 
and security ties w ith  other countries bu t more im portan tly  because the Moros o f 
Mindanao, by v irtue  o f th e ir Islamic faith, have a strong connection to  the Arab 
w orld . In ternational rules, however, dictate tha t the internal affairs o f every 
independent state should be the sole responsib ility  o f tha t state. In the Philippines, 
the policy o f being independent has always been the core princip le in  dealing w ith  
in terna l security threats bu t the strong connections among Muslims around the 
w orld  have made i t  d ifficu lt fo r national leaders to regulate and prevent the 
intervention o f outside actors. In fact, certain strategic decisions o f the country in 
the past were triggered by outside pressure, as demonstrated by then-President 
Marcos’s decision to enter in to  a peace deal w ith  the MNLF in 1976 under pressure 
from  the OIC and Marcos’s apprehension over the th rea t o f a potentia l o il embargo 
should he fa il to do so.
In short, the persistence o f armed conflic t allows international actors to  come
in  and explo it the situation. There is no question about the benign in tentions o f 
intervention, such as provid ing economic and security aid to affected groups and 
even governments because th is should be allowed in  the sp ir it o f interdependence, 
bu t in ternational th rea t groups can also take advantage o f the same complex 
situation. The ASG, linked to al-Qaeda, has been playing a crucial ro le in  the 
internationalization o f the Mindanao conflict, ra ising the level o f con flic t from  pure ly  
domestic issues to  something tha t needs the in te rven tion  o f in te rna tiona l security 
forces. Experience shows tha t even w ith  the presence of U.S. armed forces, the 
threat has remained active u n til recently. This goes to  show tha t prolonged armed 
conflict must be addressed effectively so tha t its fu rthe r escalation to  a degree 
beyond the contro l o f in terna l security forces m ay be prevented. As long as armed 
conflict exists, the like lihood o f outside in te rvention  remains high because the 
natural energy tha t attracts foreign intervention ists is driven by th e ir own vested 
interests aided by domestic pressure on governm ent to  end the violence.
Domestic support fo r any means o f con flic t resolution in  M indanao is 
im perative fo r government to succeed. W hat makes the uncerta in ty common on the 
part o f the general public is tha t the foo tprin ts  o f unsuccessful peace deals in  the 
past are s till fresh in the public ’s memory, thus affecting the level o f cooperation the 
general population is w illing  to extend to government. The people, by and large, are 
very much eager to see the end to the conflic t bu t every peace negotiation is always 
plagued w ith  skepticism on whether the same failures in  the past w ill be repeated or 
whether armed skirm ishes w il l  escalate anew in  the offing. In essence, there is 
greater urgency today to effectively resolve this armed conflict and ha lt the violence
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once and fo r all in  the near future, fo r the confidence of the population in  the 
legitimacy o f government efforts to genuinely address the Mindanao conflic t is 
waning. This s ituation is en tire ly  affecting the w ay people look at the capacity and 
competence o f the system to address th is  in te rna l problem  tha t has plagued the 
country fo r decades. I f  there is a question on the legitimate pow er o f the 
government system, the tendency o f elites and non-state actors is to dera il the peace 
process because they do not see the realization o f the expected outcome.
The persistence o f the armed conflic t is so oppressive tha t even state actors 
tend to do away, secretly or openly, w ith  legal procedures in the im plem entation o f 
rules and regulations. This condition is perceived normal when the demand o f the 
pressing security condition on the ground is stronger than jus t the standard 
performance o f duties and functions. In the s p ir it o f reconciliation, fo r example, 
security forces can always abide by the national po litica l goals o f the country even i f  
such a policy is perceived to bend norm al procedures. In contrast, however, the 
situation in  Mindanao has shown tha t the national po licy is not fo llow ed at all times 
in the local scene.
One factor tha t has the potentia l fo r causing the recurrence o f armed conflict 
is the disconnection o f policy at the national level from  the rea lity  on the ground. 
This study has observed tha t a single v io la tion, intentional o r un intentional, o f 
security forces, fo r example, can lead to  a s ituation where a la tent con flic t can 
explode in to  an open armed conflict. This has, in  fact, happened many times in 
Mindanao precisely due to the consequential effects o f w a r fatigue. A fte r all, security 
forces can always jus tify  th e ir actions, even i f  such is no t in conform ity w ith  and a
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vio la tion o f the national goal o f peace, such as the curren t adm in is tra tion ’s "the 
supremacy o f the peace process" policy. When a law  enforcement operation is 
launched, by and large, i t  becomes a pa rt o f the officia l functions o f the Police. When 
a security operation is conducted by the Arm y, i t  is justified  on the basis o f the 
m ilita ry 's  mandate to ensure the security o f the people and the state. This paradox 
in  the performance o f legal mandates, where security forces tend to  go around the 
legalities re la ting to the overall goal o f con flic t settlem ent has been a source o f 
potential armed conflict in Mindanao. On many occasions, in  fact, th is complex 
situation w hich developed due to the persistence o f Muslim  armed rebellion in  the 
south has been the most common source o f recurring armed conflic t in  th a t region.
A t the local scene, politic ians and elites have also been affected and 
victim ized by the same armed conflict. The author has observed tha t the local 
leaders and elites who may have influence over the settlement o f the conflic t have 
become tim id  tha t they themselves are hesitant to  take appropriate actions. When 
the armed confrontation becomes intense, the tendency o f local leaders and elites is 
to take shelter w ith  the security forces. As a consequence, they tend to  forget and 
neglect the ir p rim ary  responsib ility  to the general public and rush fo r options that 
would ensure th e ir  own security instead o f tha t o f the entire area. Local politic ians 
are prone to becoming m ilita ry-m inded than po litica l leaders who w ou ld  look a t the 
welfare o f the people. They tend to aggressively pursue a policy tha t favors them, 
ra ther than tha t o f the common good. Rather than advocates o f peace, these 
politic ians tend to become "spoilers o f peace" as they often fa ll fo r malicious 
allegations and essentially look after th e ir own selfish interests. This scenario makes
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conflict settlem ent elusive because settlements are overshadowed by the dynamics 
o f the same conflic t w hich have turned the po litic ians from  po litica l leaders to 
v irtu a lly  m ilita ry  commanders.
Local po litics in  the south has been influenced and dictated by the same 
demands fo r security assurance. A po litica l position, no m atter how  low, is deemed 
so precious fo r i t  vests a po litic ian w ith  power. In this context, pow er does no t only 
mean politica l pow er w hich can influence the fu tu re  o f the society, bu t also a power 
to control and explo it available resources th a t would guarantee the security and 
prestige o f a po litic ian 's own interests. When a po litica l leader occupies an officia l 
government position, he has the power over the po litica l te rr ito ry  over w hich he has 
jurisd iction, w hich means tha t everyone who is w ith in  that area secure his good 
graces to be able to share in such power. Even the security forces have to nurtu re  
the ir linkages to local po litics because local pow er leaders have strong connections 
w ith  the national governm ent which often makes the final decision on the 
prom otion o f security commanders on the ground. In the end, the system is jus t an 
interaction between and among local actors in  the areas o f con flic t w ith in  the 
umbrella and supervision o f the national po litica l leadership. This system is w hat 
makes a leadership am bition (hunger fo r power) most im portan t in society because 
m ajority  o f the elites and local leaders see i t  as a tool fo r  securing th e ir tenure and 
enhancing th e ir po litica l and financial strength ra ther than provid ing service to  the 
public tha t put them in office.
In short, the process o f economic development and po litica l m a tu rity  is 
abandoned because the overrid ing  concern becomes the security o f po litica l leaders.
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By the way, po litics may have failed to  consider issues o f economic development 
because politic ians themselves, ow ing to the position they hold in  government, 
usually do not see and feel the effects o f an im poverished society. Incidentally, the 
protractedness o f the armed conflic t in  M indanao has forced in fluen tia l people there 
to become greedy that th e ir po litica l in terest m ust be secured and assured even at 
the expense o f others, sometimes resulting in  the k illin g  o f prospective po litica l 
opponents.
Because o f this complex system ru led by the vested interests o f po litic ians 
w ith  lit tle  regard fo r the welfare o f the m ajority, local governance has been 
perceived as a mechanism fo r the continuing oppression o f the disadvantaged. 
W hile these local politic ians' insensitiv ity  to the p ligh t o f o rd inary people, armed 
groups continue to  bu ild  up in such areas due to  the general loss o f tru s t over the 
system. The security forces may continue to  prepare fo r any eventualities w h ile  the 
rebel combatants continue to exp lo it the s ituation in order to gain more support 
from  the general public. As a consequence, the relative action o f the rebel 
combatants is a collateral im plication o f a po litica l system that is self-serving and 
unresponsive to the needs o f the people. As a human rights leader in  Cotabato once 
said, "when they are not in  a position, they (the po litic ians) are the ones concerned 
about find ing a way to ensure tha t each group lives in peace and security bu t they 
tend to forget promises and pledges and continue to oppress the people once they 
are in politica l power."6 In other words, a ll o ther consequential effects o f the armed 
rebellion in Mindanao are a product o f the Mindanao conflict tha t has persisted fo r
6 Head of an NGO interviewed by the author in Cotabato City, October 22, 2012.
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decades pa rtly  because i t  is benefiting certain people.
COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE ARMED CONFLICT
The commercialization o f a conflict is the stage in  the armed conflic t 
spectrum when the means o f resolution is overshadowed by the beneficial effects o f 
the protractedness o f such conflict. Usually, the benefits are on ly fo r a few  but 
in fluen tia l individuals o r groups. I t  is a process o f the transform ation o f con flic t into 
a more complex environm ent, wherein the occurrence o f violence becomes the 
status quo and peace settlem ent becomes a second consideration. In short, the 
persistence o f armed conflic t becomes a natural phenomenon accepted by the 
general public not on ly because many do not th in k  i t  can be remedied bu t also 
because those who may have the capacity to conceive of a possible settlement 
become hesitant and instead become interested in  the benefits they can derive from  
this complex environm ent. In essence, the im m oral effect o f violence is superseded 
by its lucrative outcome and benefits to only a few.
It is these politic ians w ho can be categorized as bad leaders o r individuals 
who jus t go w ith  the status quo and do not th in k  o f a remedy, and instead exp lo it the 
national support and economic aid from  external sources that have poured in to  the 
region fo r th e ir own welfare. This badness is no t by itse lf o f cu ltura l o rig in  bu t is a 
consequence o f the complex environm ent tha t has developed from  the prolonged 
armed rebellion in Mindanao. As observed, when armed conflict becomes intense, 
even the victim s themselves and the stakeholders in  the conflict-affected areas 
become hesitant and are unable to th in k  w isely fo r the common good. In effect, th is 
complex situation is a m ajor im pedim ent to making con flic t resolution a p rio rity . In
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a situation like  this, conflict resettlem ent is no longer in  the lis t o f p rio ritie s  and the 
recurrence o f armed hostilities is always possible because "there are people 
becoming more pow erfu l when there is a conflict.”7
Nevertheless, in  the h is to ry  o f this Muslim  armed rebellion  in  Mindanao, 
there have been many instances when the op po rtun ity  fo r a longer peace on the 
ground was attainable. The in te rna tiona l com m unity has been active ly involved in 
try ing  to help resolve the armed conflict. There have also been instances when a 
small group o f peace-loving ind iv iduals has tr ie d  to be heard in  o rder to  realize the 
so-called peace and security w hich the people are longing for, b u t m ost often than 
not, the force o f energy dragging them  to  the complex situation has been much 
stronger than the power o f those who w ant to explore the possib ility  o f cooperation 
ra ther than conflict. When the com plexity o f the arm ed conflict prevails, leaders 
usually resort to either o f only tw o  options, namely: (a) to  remain fence sitters who 
do no t see any possible remedies to  the conflict and ju s t go w ith  the norm al flow  of 
the policy o f exclusion; o r (b) possibly favor in itia tives tha t w ou ld  be beneficial to 
th e ir interests. This is essentially w ha t makes the Mindanao armed conflic t close to 
commercialization, as the few gains made by a few in the course o f the conflic t have 
superseded the perceived losses stemming from  the fa ilu re  to resolve it.
A typical example of th is  scenario is the kidnapping for ransom activities 
carried out by a few armed groups. Even i f  i t  is an im m ora l activ ity, the financial 
gains from  the ransom become a source o f power and live lihood fo r the kidnappers, 
th e ir followers, and th e ir support network. This is exactly how and w hy the small
7 BGen Leo Ferrer, Senior M ilitary Adviser (SMA) OPAPP, workshop on Normalization Concept for 
the M1LF, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila, September 12, 2012.
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b u t notorious Abu Sayyaf Group o r ASG has been steadily active in  the status quo by 
explo iting the dynamics o f the Muslim  armed rebellion. K idnapping in  M indanao has 
gained international a ttention no t fo r the crime itse lf bu t fo r the personalities 
behind i t  who are linked to in ternational te rro r is t groups.
BEYOND THE COMMON ROOTS OF ARMED CONFLICT
This study, among others, is convinced tha t the w ay the armed rebellion  has 
persisted in  Mindanao goes beyond the common causes o f armed struggle. In this 
regard, thus, no m atter how  many peace deals are forged in  the future, the potential 
fo r repeating the same mistake is always present i f  the lessons o f the past are not 
taken into consideration. As discussed earlier, an in itia tive  that deals w ith  th is long 
conflic t must learn to investigate the prevailing  complex s ituation beyond w hat 
conventional wisdom about the Muslim  rebellion dictates. A peace agreement can be 
forged by any head o f state as long as he is determ ined to do so, bu t i t  does not 
prevent the recurrence o f armed violence fo r as long as the state is unable to realize 
tha t there are other factors beyond the usual culprits, such as the ins ince rity  o f both 
sides in honoring the provisions o f a peace agreement, tha t can trigger a 
recurrence o f armed hostilities. Again, there are common roots o f rebellion  such as 
economic deprivation tha t compels d iscrim ination, prejudices, and aggression 
against a m ino rity  group, as w ell as the un fa ir d is tribu tion  o f wealth and resources, 
bu t even i f  these factors are m itigated, the th rea t o f recurrence o f violence o r a 
prolonged armed rebellion is more like ly  in  the absence o f a sincere and dedicated 
process tha t may tem per the oppressive effects o f renewed armed conflict.
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a. ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION
In recent years, investigations show tha t the Mindanao problem  is p rim a rily  
fueled by the same problem  occurring in  o ther parts o f the w orld , tha t is, the basic 
needs o f the people are not met and they are economically deprived. Consequently, 
studies indicate tha t the Mindanao conflic t is essentially economic based and tha t 
options may focus on the economic s ituation o f the Moro people in  o rder to 
understand the surge o f violence in  the sou th .8
In most Muslim  dominated provinces, poverty remains the p rim a ry  factor 
causing discontent among the Moro people. Economic surveys reveal tha t 
Maguindanao province is considered the poorest among the country 's poorest 
provinces. Incidentally, Maguindanao is the center o f gravity o f the MILF armed 
organization. On the same note, th is  is the same reason that most analyses po in t to 
the economic issue as the roo t o f the rebellion, and thus encourage economic 
development as a solution.
Along this line, the Philippine governm ent and the in ternational com m unity 
have been pouring economic aid coupled w ith  several capacity-build ing activ ities in 
the conflict-affected areas o f Mindanao. Countless development aid have poured 
in to  the areas o f conflict over the last decade in  order to address the perceived 
prim ary roo t o f the armed rebellion. In contrast, however, the in tens ity  o f the armed 
confrontations in these areas has no t changed and may even have moved up to 
higher level during the years o f development activ ities in the affected region. 
Apparently, Muslims believe, w ith  a high degree o f tru th , tha t they have been
8 Astrid A. Tuminez, " The Land is Ours: Moro Ancestral Domain and its Implications for Peace and 
development in the Southern Philippines," SAIS Review 27, no.2 (Summer -Fall 2007): 79.
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neglected in the economic development programs of the government.9
In short, those development activities o f the government d id  no t reach the 
ord inary people. Perhaps one reason tha t m ost people, especially the Moros, remain 
discontented w ith  government's development projects is tha t they do not see or 
experience the im pact o f such projects, or to the extreme, only a few  have benefited 
from  such aid. On the same note, co rrup tion  among those who may have first-hand 
knowledge o f such aid is an im portan t factor in  the m ishandling o f development 
funds. This, o f course, can be blamed on weak institutions tha t lack the capacity to 
check and contro l the undesirable intentions o f unscrupulous ind iv idua ls or groups.
Local institu tions must be strengthened i f  on ly to ensure th a t economic 
programs are implemented according to expectations so that taxpayers' money does 
not fall in to  the hands o f few unscrupulous individuals. I f  i t  is true  th a t economic 
progress is the answer to this security problem, then i t  is the m ishandling o f local 
funds or in te rna l aid by those authorized to handle such funds th a t causes the 
continuous feeling o f dissatisfaction among the people. In essence, o rd ina ry  people 
continue to feel uncertain about the true  intentions o f those in governm ent who are 
entrusted w ith  the responsib ility o f im plem enting development programs, and can 
easily equate th e ir continuing neglect to  governm ent oppression. As always, w hat 
follows next is the th rea t o f violence because o f economic development programs 
that have no t in  any way enhanced liv ing  conditions o f o rd inary people and has 
instead enriched only a few individuals who are in  positions of authority.
Perhaps, this is also the main reason tha t m ost observers, scholars o f conflict,
9 Interview with local Muslim leader, Municipality of Buluan, Maguindanao, October 21, 2012.
276
and the m ino rity  Muslims v iew  those development activities as on ly centered in 
Christian-dominated areas because on ly the Christians in  the conflict-affected areas 
seem to  have fe lt the effects o f economic progress w h ile  the Moro people's needs 
and expectations remain unanswered. Indeed, the issue o f armed rebellion  is fuelled 
not by the perceived deprivation o f people o f th e ir  r ig h t to better liv in g  conditions, 
bu t by the de teriora ting  conditions caused by the malicious actions o f selfish 
individuals. I f  those who have contro l over resources can exh ib it goodness and 
a ltru ism  and the same can be reciprocated by the recipients o f th e ir  acts o f 
magnanimity, then i t  can probably spell the beginning o f a more enduring peace in 
Mindanao.
b. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
I t  is common fo r m ino rity  groups to use the issue of d iscrim ina tion  against 
them to demand fo r fa ir and jus t treatm ent from  the ir government. In M indanao, the 
issue o f racial d iscrim ination is no t new. In fact, one o f the main issues explo ited by 
those who stand to gain from  the Mindanao conflic t is the governm ent’s un fa ir 
treatm ent o f the Moros that has raised the level o f discontent in  m ost Muslim  
communities. This observation, perhaps, is no t so much o f concern in  areas 
dominated by the Muslims o r areas w here the local politica l leaders are Muslims 
because whoever the leader is, the w orkers or employees in local governance are 
Muslims. Rather, this situation is more pronounced in  areas w here Muslims 
comprise the m ino rity  and are subjected to ram pant stereotyping because most 
people in  these areas refuse to open th e ir  m inds to m ino rity  groups. In the same 
way, Muslims in  other areas o f the country dominated by non-Muslims, such as the
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national capital o f Manila, suffer the same d iscrim ina tion  from  most Christians and 
d iffe rent national agencies. This is one reason tha t most Muslims are skeptical about 
jo in ing  communities other than th e ir own, especially for job-seeking purposes, 
because they know  tha t th e ir chances o f no t being discrim inated against are slim .10 
This process, however, may not have any significant im pact on society as a whole, 
bu t i t  is a potent force fo r continuous divisiveness ra the r than coexistence among 
Filipinos under one government and one flag.
In Manila, Muslims from  Mindanao are com m only discrim inated against, for 
being a Muslim  is a great factor weighing on the like lihood o f being accepted for 
employment. A t the height o f the government's "a ll-ou t w ar” in  2003, Muslims who 
sought refuge in  Manila had great d ifficu lty  not only because they were in  a place 
not fam ilia r to them but also because getting a job was not easy. As such, this 
compels Muslims to hide the ir iden tity  as such, no m atter how  educationally 
qualified they are. A good example is tha t o f Engineer Ricky Lidasan who, when he 
moved to Manila after passing the licensure examination fo r Mechanical Engineers, 
had to pass h im self o ff as a Roman Catholic by ind icating this as his re lig ion  in  his 
job application forms in a year-long job hunting so he can be accepted in  a job  he 
p re fe rred .11
In short, d iscrim ination against people belonging to  the m ino rity , includ ing 
the Moros, continues to  this day. Investigation shows th a t this practice stems from  a 
misconception tha t has been planted in the m inds o f those w ho have been 
victim ized by a system and /o r processes o r who have refused to understand the
10 Interview w ith professional doing own business in Taguig City, Metro Manila, October 30, 2012.
11 Engineer Ricky Lidasan, interview by the author, Makati City, June 30, 2012.
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rea lity  about Muslims in  the south. A fte r all, ou r perception o f one another can be a 
source o f m isunderstanding that, more often than not, causes severe tension 
between Christians and Muslims. When groups o f people have no confidence in  one 
another, i t  can lead to a level o f violence th a t is no longer manageable at the local 
level and requires the national governm ent to take action and intervene w ith  
policies advocating peace and cooperation. In essence, local leaders can become 
victim s o f m isperception resulting from  the long h is to ry  o f armed conflic t in 
Mindanao. W ithou t carefully understanding th is  complication, the danger o f the 
recurrence o f armed conflict remains because the com plexity o f the s ituation can 
always be perceived, especially by the disadvantaged groups, as governm ent 
oppression against them.
Perhaps, one w ay to tem per the oppressive effects of "stereotyping" against 
the Muslims is to assert the leadership advocacy on cooperation ra ther than 
m istrust, and coexistence in a diverse society ra ther than divisiveness. This is easier 
said than done, bu t once national leaders have the so-called "po litica l w ill,"  then 
success is attainable as far as resolving the Mindanao conflic t is concerned. Perhaps, 
education coupled w ith  strong government determ ination to address the issue of 
d iscrim ination can, in  the long run, resolve issues tha t continue to derail efforts 
tow ard cooperation. A fte r all, i t  is evident tha t Muslims are peace-loving people 
when not oppressed, and that d iscrim ination is a only a product o f m isperception 
tha t has generated biases against the Moros. Again, the prevalence o f d iscrim ination  
against Muslims in the south is a resu lt o f cu ltural ignorance and a systematic 
process that encourages indifference rather than un ity  and is no t by itse lf an
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irreversib le stra in  in the cu ltu ra lly  diverse island o f Mindanao. A situa tion like  this 
is always vulnerable to explo itation by ind iv idua ls or groups who see the 
persistence o f armed conflic t as a beneficial enterprise,
c. INEQUALITY
As in o ther countries experiencing an in te rna l security problem, the 
Philippines has always been accused o f cu ltiva ting  a system that on ly cares fo r a few 
w hile  neglecting the welfare o f the m ajority, includ ing m ino rity  groups such as the 
Moro people in the south. Among the m ajor issues tha t Muslims are figh ting  for 
against the government is the alleged unbalanced development e ffo rt in  the south, 
w ith  major projects being implemented only in the Christian-dom inated provinces. 
To some extent, th is allegation is supported by  facts as a survey o f the areas in 
Mindanao that are occupied by the Muslims and the provinces occupied by the 
Christians, also referred to as settlers, there is a great d isparity  between the 
government's economic development programs in  these tw o  areas. In m ost areas of 
populated by the "settlers," massive irrig a tion  projects, for example, are w ell- 
established bu t no t in  the Muslim  provinces.
Again, the government may not have the in tention  to segregate Muslim  
communities but th is is the natura l product o f m istrust, corruption, and ins tab ility  
in these areas. In the investigation o f this study, th is  complex s ituation whose roots 
can sometimes be easy to  trace is a product o f the long-persisting animosities 
between individuals or groups o f people which have only fu rther d iv ided Philippine 
society. As discussed in the previous chapter, the government d id no t abandon the 
Muslim-dominated areas. In fact, since the early stage o f the Muslim  rebellion, the
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government has been pouring resources to  help the local governm ent u p lift the local 
s ituation o f extreme economic im poverishm ent to some degree o f development. 
Most often, however, development projects could no t be im plem ented w itho u t 
considering the demands o f the armed groups o r the vested interests o f 
unscrupulous local actors.
This situation remains the same u n til today, especially in  the depressed areas 
o f the Autonomous Region in  Muslim  Mindanao (ARMM). There have been 
development efforts in these areas bu t the pace o f development is painstakingly 
slow. Because o f this prevailing situation, persistent allegations tha t the 
government is only fo r few and not fo r the disadvantaged m a jo rity  continue. More 
than anything else, the Muslims, most o f whom  continue to live in poverty, are 
thoroughly convinced tha t they are and cannot be pa rt o f the system and w ill never 
have the opportun ity  to share in  the economic grow th o f the country. In essence, it  
is commonly perceived in  Muslim  circles tha t the government, no t the unscrupulous 
individuals, is incapacitated to  resolve poverty, unequal access to education, and the 
social injustice the Moro people have endured fo r decades. Again, th is  entire 
complex situation is a result o f the prolonged armed conflic t whose oppressive 
demands have tended to carry away even the best and most educated individuals, 
especially when armed confrontation occurs.
Some scholars, like David C. Schwartz, see and in te rp re t collective mass 
actions through the lens o f a po litica l process o f the state. He conforms to  the idea 
tha t politica l phenomenon originates in the m inds o f humans tha t compose 
collective actions such as a revolution. He argues tha t v irtu a lly  a ll revo lu tionary
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organizations are formed by "persons who have previously socialized to accept a 
po litica l system" bu t later, the same po litica l system m ay have alienated them  that 
the ir loyalties were never effectively tied  to  the government system.12 In the case o f 
the Bangsamoro, however, they may no t have to ta lly  subscribed to  being integrated 
to the Philippine society, bu t in  recent years, these people have been observed to be 
cooperating w ith  the national governm ent agenda. In  fact, attem pts at conflic t 
resolution have been supported not only by the armed combatants bu t also by the 
civilians.
On a final note, the inequality may be beyond the im agination o f whoever 
leads the country but i t  is commonly perceived as such because the consequential 
effects o f armed conflic t have corrupted the minds o f the people, especially those 
d irectly  affected by the same armed conflict. There is no government, even a 
tyranny, tha t w ould encourage rebellion because i t  is perceived as a th rea t to 
leadership. But because o f the inab ility  o f the Philipp ine government to  close the 
long h istory o f armed rebellion in Mindanao, the system has been accused of 
corruption because o f the perceived inequality; o f oppressing the Muslims because 
o f unfa ir treatm ent o f the Moros whose security is no t guaranteed which, in  turn, 
endangers th e ir identity; and o f insincerity because o f fears tha t i t  has no genuine 
intention  to resolve its in terna l security problem  in Mindanao. I f  these factors are 
not checked, the tendency to prom ote divisiveness is more like ly  while making 
reconciliation w o rk  becomes more d ifficu lt, leaving the question o f w ha t the fu ture
12 David C Schwartz, Political Alienation: The Psychology of Revolution’s First Stage, in, Ted Robert 
Gurr, et al, (eds) Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research (New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, 
1972), 58.
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holds s till in  the hands o f the country's leaders.
THE FUTURE OF THE MINDAO CONFLICT
Analysis in  this study points to the conclusion tha t the in te rna l con flic t in 
Mindanao between the government o f the Philippines (GPH) and the Muslims can be 
peacefully ended. Most o f the tim e in  the course o f negotiations, i t  has been 
observed that both parties were agreeing to end this prolonged arm ed rebellion. 
W hat makes i t  d ifficu lt to  realize the so-called "longer peace" is the set o f stum bling 
blocks tha t is as hard to resolve as i t  is to understand it. Im plem enting an agreement 
is a huge task bu t in the case o f the Mindanao armed conflict, ins ince rity  has played 
a v ita l role. Insincerity is hard to  break, especially i f  i t  involves a change in  the 
system, no t only because i t  may involve huge resources on the p a rt o f the 
government bu t also because tru s t and confidence are hard to  bu ild  between 
fo rm erly  opposing forces. The challenge in  th is case, thus, is the fu lfillm e n t o f the 
commitments made by both the GPH and the Muslim  combatants w itho u t 
necessarily reckoning every strategic decision from  the m istrust o f the past.
Again observation shows, among others, tha t the ro le o f the security forces is 
crucial as fa r as reconciliation is concerned. Reconciliation does no t on ly mean 
embracing one another's views to jo in tly  address differences, bu t also taking 
appropriate actions on the ground so as to prevent the possible breakdown of 
attained peace and harmony between both sides. For all intents and purposes, 
security forces can always find  a way to prevent the escalation o f every m inor 
dispute w ith  the potential to break an established settlement. In contrast, as 
discussed earlier, the same security forces can always ju s tify  responses according to
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the mandates o f th e ir organizations bu t such actions must be aligned w ith  the 
princip le  o f the supremacy o f peace.
Political leadership is also an im portan t determ inant o f the fu tu re  o f armed 
conflic t in Mindanao. There is no doubt tha t the curren t adm in istra tion  was able to 
come up w ith  a peace deal through the Fram ework Agreement w ith  the MILF 
because the President is dedicated to  and sincere in  bring ing peace to  Mindanao and 
local po litica l leaders are cooperating w ith  the national leadership even i f  i t  hurts 
th e ir vested interests. In contrast, local politic ians themselves being catalysts o f 
peace can also be a source o f potent force w hich could derail the overall goal o f the 
National government fo r longer peace. A state leader's behavior is critica l to  the 
im plem entation o f policies in  addressing security issues a t the local level. In the case 
of the Mindanao armed conflict, leadership change could mean a m ajor sh ift o f 
approach w hich often threatens the re la tive ly achieved peace. The absence o f open 
armed confrontations can always slide back to  instability.
When a state leader does not w ant to  continue the policies and programs of 
the previous adm inistration, th is could have a contagion effect down to  the lowest 
level o f society. Leaders at the local level are obedient to  national policies and the 
im plem entation o f previous strategies can easily be discontinued by the national 
government by the simple issuance o f an executive order or by s im ply cu tting  o ff the 
appropriate support fo r such a policy. This is exactly w hat happened, as discussed in 
this chapter, w ith  the change o f leadership resulting in  the change o f domestic 
po licy on the interna l conflic t in  Mindanao. Instead o f pursuing peaceful 
negotiations to at least come up w ith  a w ork ing  fram ew ork fo r the restora tion  of
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normalcy, the areas were once again tu rned in to  a battleground a fte r several years 
o f negotiations.
In short, the recurrence o f violence in  society can be understood as a product 
o f w rong and problem atic leadership exp lo iting the complex environm ent on the 
ground. A fte r all, the same po litica l leaders can always jus tify  th e ir actions tha t are 
contrary to conflict settlement, taking the rebellion and the security problem  as the 
baseline. It has been seen in  many countries faced w ith  a security problem  that 
selective actions benefiting a few o r on ly a selected group are perceived to be 
oppressive and detrim ental to the common benefits o f peace. Applied in  Mindanao, 
th is s ituation has always caused the reversal o f re lative peace to open armed 
hostilities. A small but dynamic group can be a potentia l triggering mechanism that 
may determ ine the future o f a peace settlement. In the case of the Mindanao conflict, 
the ASG and the BIFF -  although considered isolated groups -  are po tentia l threats 
to  the Fram ework Agreement i f  they continue to be excluded from  the peace 
process. The apprehension, among the general public, about the strength o f the 
Fram ework Agreement and the "wait-and-see" a ttitude among other armed groups 
in  the areas o f conflic t can be tempered by a religious and sincere im plem entation of 
the impending peace agreement between the GPH and the MILF.
For now, there are at least three peace accords in the h is to ry  o f the Mindanao 
armed conflict and im portan t lessons tha t can be derived from  the same in 
understanding the like lihood o f achieving a more sustainable and longer peace in 
th is  part o f the w orld. Those experiences can serve as a tool to  guard against 
repeating the same mistakes o f the past conflic t settlements. In an in te rna l conflict
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such as the one in  Mindanao, the role o f the governm ent is to  take more p a rt in 
conflic t resolution because o f its dominance in  all aspects o f society. Even i f  the 
decision o f the national government is a b it  favorable to  the m ino rity  and somewhat 
hurts the national interest, the national governm ent -  being the dom inant force -  
must extend its leniency i f  on ly fo r the sake o f a peace settlement. When a 
government insists on a constitutional basis, the rule o f the m ajority, the democratic 
process, or a system not amenable to  change through constitu tional amendments, 
the like lihood o f a tta in ing a longer peace is un like ly  because the w ill o f the m ino rity  
is eventually ignored. Such policy equates to  a more complex environm ent that 
leaves no room  fo r conflic t settlem ent because the needs o f the m in o rity  are not 
addressed.
Ending the Muslim  rebellion in  Mindanao, however, is achievable because the 
parties to the conflic t themselves are w illin g  and open to negotiation. A peace 
accord, after the fram ew ork agreement, could be forged sooner o r la te r bu t the 
caution fo r sincerity remains and should serve as the basis fo r achieving an 
enduring and solid peace in Mindanao. This study views the fu tu re  o f th is  armed 
conflict w ith  great caution in  the knowledge tha t the longer the con flic t exists, the 
higher its  im pact on the national economy. In o ther words, the protractedness o f the 
conflict is always detrim enta l to the interest o f every F ilip ino in  term s o f achieving 
cooperation and u n ity  under one country. I t  m ust be remembered tha t fo r so long, 
hatred ra ther than cooperation has prevailed between the m ajority  Christians and 
the m ino rity  Muslims which has encouraged enm ity, distrust, and endemic violence 
over a long period. Our leaders at all levels o f society must have a w e llsp ring  o f
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knowledge by now  on a ll the loopholes in  the decades-long quest fo r a peaceful and 
progressive nation i f  on ly to b ring  the unstable Mindanao situation in to  a long- 
lasting and sustainable peace because there may fina lly  be, as Johan Galtung calls it, 
positive peace.13
Apparently, i f  th is  conflic t is no t halted sooner, the longstanding v is ion o f 
coexistence under one governm ent w ill inev itab ly  fa il because i t  is m ore expensive 
to force groups to  live together when they are incompatible. This study is concerned 
tha t the prolonged armed conflic t w ou ld  a llow  a situation th a t w ou ld  place the 
government o f the Philippines at a disadvantaged position, especially i f  tha t 
situation is not addressed at the earliest time. In the 21st century and w ith  the 
advent o f m odern technology w hich facilitates easy and fast coordination through 
modern communications systems, the educational literacy o f people in the 
contested areas has im proved substantia lly and, combined w ith  the pow er o f media, 
would drag the v irtu a lly  "commercialized conflict" in to  modern warfare. These 
include, among others, the battles fo r legality over issues of se lf-determ ination and 
the strong possib ility  o f the internationaliza tion  o f the conflict.
To the extreme, the high level o f awareness among the Bangsamoro, ow ing to 
the grow ing num ber o f educated Moro people, and th e ir secessionist tendency 
w ould b ring  the conflic t to a level beyond the legal fram ew ork o f the Philippine 
Republic. In the end, the in ternational com m unity w ould u ltim a te ly  favor the 
Muslim m ino rity  which w ould eventually create a strategic environm ent favoring 
separation. Secondly, legal battles are m ore disadvantageous to a dom inant power
13 Johan Galtung, "An Editorial", Journal o f Peace Research 1, (1964): 2.
today because m ino rity  groups usually get more a ttention and sym pathy from  
distant power countries in  the context o f prom oting  the basic rights o f an oppressed 
m inority. Consequently, in ternationaliza tion o f the conflic t w ou ld  p revail because 
the long h isto ry o f the inab ility  o f governm ent to address its in te rna l problem  w ould  
affect its c re d ib ility  and legitimacy. When tha t stage o f the M indanao conflic t is 
reached, the renewed claim fo r fu ll independence is more like ly  because the 
socialization o f a conflic t has been proven an effective too l fo r m in o rity  groups. In 
short, the protractedness o f the armed conflict, i f  i t  is no t brought to  its  fina l closure 
sooner, may result in  the Philippines losing the contested areas in  Mindanao to  the 
Moro people because insincerity prevails over confidence and m is trus t dominates 
over the need fo r open mindedness among the p rim a ry  actors in  th is armed conflict.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
Before 1521 pre-Spanish period 
1521-1898 The Spanish period
1898-1946 The American period
1899-1902 The Philippine -Am erican w ar 
1899-1903 US m ilita ry  occupation o f Mindanao 
1903-1906 The existence o f Moro Province 
1914-1920 Existence o f departm ent o f Mindanao and Sulu 
1942-1945 Japanese occupation
1972-1986 M artia l Law period
1973-1996 Existence o f the MNLF 
1984-todate Existence o f the MILF
2011-todate Existence o f the BIFF 
Peace Agreements
1976- T ripo li Agreement Between the GPH and the MNLF 
1996- Final Peace Agreement between the GPH and the MNLF
2012- Framework Agreement between the GPH and the MILF
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APPENDIX B: DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND PURPOSES
Addressed to the Congress o f the United States o f America:
Whereas a group o f politicians, leading b lin d ly  certain elements o f the 
population who have a fa ith  and culture d iffe ren t from  our own, as w e ll as w ide ly  
d ifferent po litica l aspirations, have raised a clam or and ou tcry  against the 
continuation o f American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands, thereby jeopardizing 
our hope o f prosperity, libe rty , and economic security, through the possib ility  tha t 
the congress o f the United States o f American m igh t in  opportunely w ith d re w  its 
sovereignty from  these Islands, pe rm itting  thereby to  be created an independent 
government under w hich the Mohammedan or Moro Nation w ould  be destroyed or 
placed under a galling yoke, we the fo llow ing representatives o f the Moro Nation, 
do, in the name o f same Creator, worshipped by Christian and Mohammedan alike, 
set fo rth  the fo llow ing  solemn declaration o f our rights, princip les and intentions fo r 
which we pledge our lives and fortunes:
Assuming that in the course o f tim e the United States o f America w ill grant 
complete independence, or a larger measure o f autonom y to the Philipp ine Islands, 
and due to the fact tha t the insecurity o f po litica l tenure o f the United States and the 
threat o f politica l dom ination o f our people by the Christian F ilip ino m a jo rity  in  the 
Islands o f Luzon and the Visayas is holding back the economic developm ent o f our 
country, and causing no lit t le  unrest and unhappiness to  our people, we hereby 
subm it the fo llow ing suggestion fo r the solution o f ou r present d ifficu lties to  the 
consideration o f the Congress o f the United States o f America.
First. We are not seeking tem porary o r pa llia tive  measures. We ask fo r a 
solution which w ill be perm anent and lasting in  its effects. Therefore, we propose 
tha t the Islands o f Mindanao and Sulu, and the Island of Palawan be made an 
unorganised te rr ito ry  o f the United States o f America.
In order tha t we may be fa ir to the F ilip inos and in  order tha t they may not 
raise an outcry to the effect tha t we w ish to  dismember the Philippine Islands, we 
propose that 50 years after the independence may have been granted the rest o f the 
Philippine Islands, a plebiscite be held in  the proposed unorganized to  decide by 
vote whether the proposed te rr ito ry  w ill be incorporated in the governm ent o f the 
Islands o f Luzon and Visayas, rem ain a te rrito ry , o r become independent.
This would apply the princip les o f justice and equity to all elements o f the 
population and im p ly  a governm ent through the consent o f the government.
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Second. That a simple fo rm  o f governm ent be designed fo r the new te rrito ry , 
taking in to  consideration tha t through lack o f education in English o r Spanish our 
people can not hope to exercise suffrage fo r at least tw o  generations, and w ith  the 
fo llow ing objects in view:
(1) Justice and equity fo r Christian, Mohammedan, pagan, and foreigners 
alike. In  order to atta in th is we m ust have Americans in  high places to  act as referees 
between our trib a l and religious demarcations.
(2) No dom ination o f one element over another
(3) Freedom o f speech and re lig ion
(4) Every opportun ity  fo r American capital to develop the natural 
resources o f our country, thereby afford ing our people the opportun ity  to  progress 
in the arts and sciences and in agriculture, as w e ll as to use lessons o f the 
schoolroom after leaving school. A t present, there is no outlet fo r the ta lents and 
energies o f our youths, owning to  the economic p rostra tion  of our country.
(5) That the school system be reform ed under American teachers and 
made suitable to the needs and prejudices o f the Mohammedan population
(6) That we do not vote in elections fo r the president o f the United States, 
fo r the reason that we do not w ish to otherw ise than tru s t to the mercy and justice 
o f the United States.
Whereas we enjoy none o f the above benefits in  th e ir fu llest measure, and
Whereas we do not even enjoy the r igh t o f pe tition  and redress o f wrongs 
which the Constitution o f the United States insures to its  citizens, ow ning to  the fact 
tha t we have addressed petitions w ith o u t num ber to  the Governor General even 
when he has been disposed to grant our desires he has found h im se lf helpless to  aid 
us, owning to the provisions o f organic act know n as the Jones Law:
Therefore we, in  the representation o f nearly h a lf a m illio n  Mohammedan 
residents o f Mindanao and Sulu, do solemnly a ffirm  and declare-
That we are loyal unto death to the United States.
That in p roo f o f this loya lty we have pledged ourselves by the m ost solemn oath 
known to the Mohammedans, do die ra ther than subm it to dom ination by Christian 
Filipinos from  the North, and, i f  necessary, to die in o rder tha t the United States 
Congress, which therefore has len t a deaf ear to our petitions, may now  hear us.
That in the event that the United States grants independence to the 
Philippine Islands w itho u t provision fo r our re tention under the American flag, i t  is
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our firm  in tention  and resolve to  declare ourselves an independent constitu tiona l 
sultanate to  be known to the w orld  as the Moro nation. I t  is the du ty  o f the Congress 
o f the United States to make provision at once fo r the security and protection 
promised to us when we surrendered our arms to the United States Army. This 
promise is just as sacred as any alleged promises you have made to the Christian 
Filipinos. You have le ft us defenseless, and i t  is your du ty  to p ro tect us to  re tu rn  to 
us our weapons you took from  us, and which we free ly gave you, re ly ing  on your 
promises.
That w hile i t  is no t our desire to do so, by disregarding our righ ts and wishes 
w hile  at the same tim e conceding po litica l and economic favors to  the Christian 
Filipinos, favors which are in  tu rn  used against us, you are forc ing us surely and 
steadily to  recourse to desperate and bloody measures, which are abhorren t to  us, 
in  view  o f our loya lty  to the American Flag, our Governor General, and ou r gratitude 
to  the United States fo r the lib e rty  and security o f life  which we enjoyed u n til you 
delegated your power and au tho rity  to the Christian Filipinos.
We complain tha t we have not one representative in  the Philippine 
Legislative elected by d irect vote o f the people. Our meager representation is 
through representatives appointed by the Governor General, w ho m ust have the 
approval o f a senate controlled by the Filipinos. Hence such representation is a 
farce.
We complain tha t the Philippine Legislature appropriates 1,000,000 per 
annum fo r pro-independence propaganda, thereby forcing us to con tribu te  through 
taxation w ithou t representation to the efforts o f certain Christian F ilip inos to  severe 
the bonds between us and the United States, all o f which is not in  accordance w ith  
out wishes.
We complain tha t when our people, including women and children, have 
been shot down by constabulary o r otherwise m altreated investigations have been 
conducted in such a manner as to gloss over the tru th .
We complain that in  spite o f the large volume o f evidence o f m isgovernm ent 
o f our people presented to  the Wood-Forbes Commission and subsequently to the 
Governor General, nothing whatever has been done to  assure our people tha t 
reforms meeting w ith  our approval w ould be undertaken, fo r the reason tha t the 
power to institu te  reforms lies in  yourselves and not in  the Governor General, the 
hands o f the la tte r being tied  by the provisions o f the Jones Law.
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We complain that the petitions are being circulated w hich  ou r people by 
means o f pressure from  offic ia l sources are obliged to sign. These petitions are fo r 
the purpose o f leading the people o f the United States to  believe tha t we are disloyal 
to the United States and to our Governor General, which such is no t the case. Even 
provincia l governors and other high officials p rostitu te  the ir offices fo r th is purpose. 
Therefore, we are forced to take concerted and v io len t action in o rder to  avoid being 
misrepresented. Even Americans who sympathize w it  our aspirations and loya lty  to 
the United States are forced to  discuss the situation in  whispers, i f  they dare discuss 
i t  at all, fo r fear o f reprisals. Surely th is is no t in accordance w ith  ideals o f American 
justice and fa ir play.
We complain that the e ffo rt is being made to submerge our c iv iliza tion  and 
culture through the assim ilation o f our people by the Christian F ilip inos. As a means 
to this end colonies or Christian F ilip inos financed by the Government are being 
injected in to  our m idst to la te r cause such complications as have caused unto ld  
m isery in the Balkan States and European Turkey. (Moros re tu rn ing  from  
pilgrimages to Mecca or v is its to Borneo bring  in  a fa irly  steady stream o f 
in fo rm ation  as to  affairs in the other east), and which constitute a problem  today 
which again threatens the peace o f the w orld.
Had we the machinery o f governm ent and taxation in our hands, as have the 
Christian Filipinos, we could also send missions to  Washington to  present our side 
o f the question, bu t having ne ither we can only offer our lives in  o rder tha t you may 
understand and act accordingly.
Therefore, we hereby solem nly and respectfully petition  the Congress o f the 
United States fo r redress and am elioration o f our present economic and po litica l 
situation, and ask you, in  the name o f your God and our God, w ho is one and the 
same, that you p rom ptly  grant us our request in  order that this, the land o f our 
forefathers, may not be gain drenched in the blood o f Mohammedans and Christians 





1. Sultan Mangigin o f Maguindanao





6. Datu Benito o f Lanao
Source: copied fo r the documents kept by MILF leadership on 20 July 2006.
[(Appendix D, 298-303, Salah Jubair, The Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless 
Tyranny, Kuala Lum pur :IQ M arin SDN BHD. T h ird  Edition, October 1999. cited also 
in  Peter Gowing, Muslim  Filip inos- Heritage and Horizons. Quezon City: New Day 
Publishers, 1979. Gowing said, "In  1926 the U.S. Congress placed on record a 
Declaration o f Rights and Purposes sent to it  in  1924 b y  a group o f M oro leaders 
claim ing to represent nearly ha lf a m illion  Mohammedan residents o f Mindanao and 
Sulu. In Moroland there was widespread support for the sentiments expressed in 
tha t declaration (Congressional Records, 1926:8836)”]
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APPENDIX C: THE MANIFESTO OF THE MUSLIM INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
In The Name o f ALLAH, The Most Gracious, and Most Merciful. 
PREAMBLE
The Muslim  inhabitants o f Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan invoking the grace of 
the alm ighty Allah, the Gracious, Most Merciful, on Whom all praise is due and 
W hom all creation depends fo r sustenance, make manifestation to  the whole w orld  
its desire to  secede from  the republic o f the Philippines, in o rder to establish an 
Islamic State tha t shall embody th e ir ideals and aspirations, conserve and develop 
the ir patrimony, th e ir Islam ic heritage, under the blessings o f Islam ic Universal 
Brotherhood and the regime o f law, justice and democracy, and the recognized 
princip le  o f the law  o f nations, do promulgate and make known the declaration o f its 
independence from  the m other country, the Republic o f the Philippines.
TERRITORIES
The Islamic State shall comprise the contiguous southern po rtion  o f the 
Philippine Archipelago inhabited by the Muslims, such as, Cotabato, Davao, 
Zamboanga and Zamboanga City, Basilan City, Lanao, Sulu, Palawan, and the 
adjoining areas o r island w hich are inhabited by the Muslims o r being under the ir 
sphere o f influence, including the m aritim e areas therein.
PEOPLES
The Muslim  inhabitants o f the Republic o f the Philippines, num bering some 
four m illions (4,000,000) w ith  culture and h is to ry  o f th e ir own are d is tinc t from  the 
affluent Christian m ajority, and fo r the reasons abovementioned, its  in tegration into 
the Philippine body politics being impossible.
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
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1. That i t  is a recognized princ ip le  underly ing  the Charter o f the United 
Nations and the Declaration o f Human Rights o f the righ ts  of a ll people constitu ting 
the m ino rity  in a given state fo r self-determ ination;
2. That the Islam ic W orld  Congress has affirm ed the above principles, 
particu la rly  on the rights o f the Muslims who are in the m ino rity  in  non-Muslim  
state fo r self-determ ination;
3. That the systematic exterm ination o f the Muslim  you th -like  the 
Corregidor Fiasco-the po licy o f isolation and dispersal o f the M uslim  communities 
have been pursued vigorously by the governm ent to  the detrim ent o f the Muslims;
4. That Islam, being a communal re lig ion-an ideology and a way o f life, 
must have a definite te rr ito ry  fo r the exercise o f its  tenets and teachings, and fo r the 
are observance o f its laws;
5. That economic progress, social development, and po litica l 
independence are the cherished and inv io lab le  dreams and aspirations o f the 
Muslims, and the realization o f which can be be tte r be served and prom oted by and 
among the selves; and
6. That under the present state o f things, the Muslims are capable o f self- 
government or po litica l independence they being endowed w ith  suffic ient number 
o f professionals w ith  academic, technical and legal tra in ing.
Now, therefore, i t  was decided tha t a government shall be organised 
and established fo r the Muslims inhab iting  the aforesaid particu lar areas o f Islands 
o f Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, and the outly ing te rrito ries  which are a ll under the 
sway o f the Muslims, said government to  be independent from  all states and be 
equal w ith  all others under the laws o f civilised nations; and
Be i t  fu rthe r known tha t said governm ent for the Muslims shall be 
known and referred to as-
THE REPUBLIC OF MINDANAO AND SULU.
Pagalungan darul Islam, Cotabato, Philippines, May 1,1968
PRINCIPAL SIGNATORY:
(sgd.) EX-GOVERNOR DATU UDTOG MATALSource: W.K. Che Man, Muslim  
Separatism: The Moros o f Southern Philippines and the Malays o f Southern Thailand 
(Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1990), 187.
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APPENDIX D: THE MANIFESTO OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANGSA MORO REPUBLIK
We, the five m illion  oppressed Bangsa Moro people, w ishing to  free ourselves 
from  the te rro r, oppression and tyranny o f F ilip ino  colonialism w hich has caused us 
untold sufferings and miseries by crim ina lly  usurping ou r land, by threaten ing Islam 
through wholesale destruction and desecration o f its places o f w orsh ip  and its Holy 
Book, and m urdering our innocent brothers, sisters and folks in  a genocidal 
campaign o f te rrify ing  magnitude;
Aspiring to have the sole prerogative o f defending and chartering ou r own 
national destiny in accordance w ith  our own free w ill in  order to ensure our fu ture 
and that o f our children;
Having evolved an appropriate from  o f ideology w ith  w hich the un ity  o f our 
people has been firm ly  established and th e ir  national iden tity  and character 
strengthened;
Having established the Moro National L iberation Front and its m ilita ry  arm, 
the Bangsa Moro Army, as our principa l instrum ent fo r achieving our p rim a ry  goals 
and objectives w ith  the unanimous support o f the great mass o f our people; and 
fina lly
Being own in  firm  contro l o f a great po rtion  o f our national homeland 
through successive and crushing victories o f our Bangsa Moro A rm y in battle 
against the Armed Forces o f the Philippines and the Marcos dictatorship, thereby 
declare:
1. That henceforth the Bagsa Moro people and revolution, having 
established th e ir Bangsa Moro Republik, are th row ing  o ff a ll th e ir politica l, 
economic and other bonds w ith  the oppressive governm ent of the Philippines under
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the d ictatoria l regime o f President Ferdinand E Marcos to  secure a free and 
independent state fo r the Bangsa Moro peoples;
2. That we believe arm struggle is the on ly  means by w hich we can 
achieve the complete freedom and independence o f ou r people, since Marcos and 
his government w ill never dismantle the edifice o f Philippine colonial ru le in  our 
national homeland f  th e ir own accord;
3. That the Moro National L ibera tion  Front and its  m ilita ry  arm, the 
Bangsa Moro Army, shall no t agree to any fo rm  o f settlem ent o r accord short o f 
achieving tota l freedom and independence fo r ou r oppressed Bangsa Moro people;
4. That the revo lu tion o f the Bangsa Moro people is a revo lu tion  w ith  a 
social conscience. As such i t  is com m itted to  the princ ip le  o f establishing a 
democratic system o f governm ent which shall never a llow  or to lerate any fo rm  of 
exploitation and oppression o f any human being by another o r o f one nation by 
another;
5. That those Filip inos who may w ish  to remain in  the Bangsa Moro 
national homeland even after independence shall be welcomed and en titled  to equal 
rights and protection w ith  a ll o ther citizens o f the Bangsa Moro Republik, provided 
tha t they fo rm ally  renounce th e ir F ilip ino citizenship and whole heartedly accept 
Bangsa Moro citizenship; th e ir p roperty  rights shall be fu lly  respected and the free 
exercise o f the ir political, cu ltural and religious rights shall be guaranteed;
6. That the Bangsa Moro people and the revolution are com m itted to  the 
preservation and growth o f Islamic culture among our people, w ith o u t prejudice to 
the development and grow th o f other re lig ious and indigenous cultures in  our 
homeland;
7. That our people and Revolution recognise and adhere to the Charter 
o f the United Nations and the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights; and, in 
addition, they shall respect and adhere to all laws b ind ing upon the nations o f the 
world;
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8. That the Bangsa Moro people and Revolution are com m itted to  the 
preservation and enhancement o f the w orld  peace through m utual cooperation 
among nations and common progress o f the people o f the w orld , accordingly, they 
are com m itted to  the princ ip le  o f m utual respect and friendship among nations 
irrespective o f th e ir ideological and religious creed;
9. That our people and the Revolution, upholding the p rinc ip le  o f self- 
determ ination, support the r igh t o f all peoples o f all nations in  th e ir  leg itim ate and 
jus t struggle fo r national survival, freedom and independence;
10. That the Bangsa Moro and the Revolution shall, in  the in te rest o f tru th , 
guarantee the freedom o f the press;
11. That, in order to  accelerate the economic progress o f our w a r ravaged 
Bangsa Moro homeland, our people and revo lu tion shall encourage foreign 
investm ent under terms and conditions beneficial to our people and the investors. 
Accordingly, those foreign investors in the Bangsa Moro homeland who may decide 
to continue th e ir economic activities under the revo lu tionary regime shall be 
welcomed;
12. The Bangsa Moro and the Revolution are com m itted to  the princip les 
tha t they are a pa rt o f the Islamic W orld  as w e ll as o f the th ird  w o rld  and o f the 
oppressed colonised hum anity everywhere in  the w orld .
Therefore, we hereby appeal to the conscience o f a ll men everywhere 
and the sympathy o f all nations o f the w orld  to help accelerate the pace o f our 
people's legitim ate righ t to obtain the ir national freedom and independence. Such 
recognition and support m ust be concretised by accepting the Bangsa Moro 
Republik as one the members o f the fam ily o f independent and sovereign nations in 
the w orld  and giving official recognition to the Moro National L iberation Front.





Source: W.K. Che Man, Muslim  Separatism: The Moros o f Southern Philippines and 
the Malays o f Southern Thailand (Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila U niversity Press, 
1990)
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APPENDIX E: JEDDAH ACCORD
January 3-4,1987
Joint Statements o f the Philippine Government and the MNLF Panels
The two panels agreed to  continue discussion o f the proposal fo r the grant o f fu ll 
autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Taw i-Taw i and Palawan subject to  democratic 
processes.
In the meantime, the MNLF panel proposes th a t President Corazon C. Aquino w ill 
issue an executive order suspending pertinen t provisions of the d ra ft constitution 
on the grant o f autonomy to Muslim  Mindanao in the scheduled plebiscite on 
February 2, 1987, to a llow  the MNLF to  undertake democratic consultations w ith  
the people o f Mindanao and its  islands, and th a t the Philippine Government panel 
shall present th is proposal to President Aquino fo r her approval.
MNLF Panel Philippine Government Panel




Secretary General o f the Organization o f the Islamic Conference
OIC Headquarters,
Jeddah, Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia,
January 3,1987
Summary o f the points taken up in the meeting between the Philippine and the 
MNLF Panels held at the Organization o f the Islamic Conference Headquarters, 
Jeddah, Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia on January 3,1987
The tw o panels have taken up the fo llow ing points:
1. The substantive pa rt o f the talks w il l  be held in Manila, Zamboanga or 
any other place in  the Philippines m utually acceptable to both parties. For this
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purpose, a jo in t commission composed o f three members from  each side shall be 
created to discuss and dra ft the mechanics and details o f the proposal to grant fu ll 
autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Taw i-Taw i and Palawan. The Joint 
Commission is tasked to  do everyth ing possible to complete its w o rk  w ith in  n inety 
(90) days from  February 9,1987.
2. The provincia l committees shall be created to m on ito r and im plem ent 
the observance o f the agreement on the cessation o f hostilities between the 
Philippine Government and the MNLF.
3. The MNLF proposed some form  o f reorganization invo lv ing  certain 
po litica l and governmental institu tions to  enhance a conducive atmosphere for 
fu rthe r talks. The MNLF proposed tha t an Executive Order be im m ediate ly issued 
fo r th is purpose.
4. The Philippine and the MNLF Panels agreed to propose the immediate 
form ula tion  and im plem entation o f a comprehensive economic and social 
development program in  p r io r ity  areas m utually agreed upon.
5. Both panels agreed to jo in tly  pursue the dissemination o f accurate 
and comprehensive info rm ation  regarding the Bangsamoro issue as pa rt o f the v ita l 
pu rsu it o f democratic processes in  a rriv ing  at a jus t and lasting solution to  the 
Bangsamoro problem.
6. The Philippine panel agreed to exercise its  best efforts to  provide a 
secure and peaceful atmosphere to enable the MNLF to  undertake consultations 
w ith  the component peoples in  the proposed area o f autonomy.
7. The Philippine panel likew ise agreed to propose to  the authorities of 
the Republic o f the Philippines to provide security to the three-man representative 
o f the MNLF Panel to the Joint Commission referred to in  Paragraph 1, above, and to 
th e ir staff in  the discharge o f th e ir duties as members o f the Joint Commission. 






Philippine Government Panel 
By:
AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR. 
Chairman
JOSEPH B. BANGHULOT 
Member
AGAPITO A. AQUINO 
Member
Joint Statement o f the MNLF and the Philippine Government Panels
The tw o panels met in the evening o f January 3, 1987 a t the Headquarters o f the 
Organization o f Islamic Conference in Jeddah, Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia, and agreed 
to:
1. Create a Joint Commission w hich w il l  discuss and dra ft the 
mechanism and details o f the proposal fo r the grant o f fu ll autonom y to Mindanao, 
Basilan, Sulu, Taw i-Taw i and Palawan subject to democratic processes. The Joint 
Commission shall be composed o f three members from  each panel and shall in itia lly  
meet in Manila on February 9, 1987. I t  shall endeavor to  complete its w o rk  w ith in  
90 days from  said date;
2. Create provincia l committees to m on ito r and im plem ent the 
observance o f the agreement on the cessation o f hostilities between the Philippine 
government and the MNLF; and
3. Propose the immediate form ula tion and im plem entation o f a 
comprehensive economic and social development program in  p r io r ity  areas 
m utually agreed upon.
Both panels express the ir sincere gratitude and appreciation to King Fahd Ibn Abdul 
Aziz, Custodian o f the Two Holy Mosques, fo r graciously allow ing th is meeting to  be 
held in Jeddah, Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia.
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The MNLF Panel hereby conveys its heartfe lt gratitude to  Her Excellency, President 
Corazon C. Aquino o f the Republic o f the Philippines, fo r sincerely addressing the 
aspirations o f the Bangsamoro people and fo r sending a Philipp ine panel most 
suitable fo r this delicate negotiation.
The panels also w ish to thank the Organization o f Islamic Conference, th ru  its 
Secretary-General H.E. Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, fo r continuing to  p rovide its good 
offices in assisting the parties in th e ir efforts to achieve a peaceful and lasting 
solution to  the Bangsamoro problem.
Jeddah, Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia, January 4,1987.
MNLF Panel Philippine Government Panel
By: By:
NUR MISUARI AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.
Chairman Chairman
Source: United States Institu te  o f Peace web site:
w w w .us ip .o rg /lib ra rv /pa /ph ilipp ines /ieddah  01041987.h tm l. 25 June 2006.
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APPENDIX F: THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT
In the Name o f God, the Omnipotent, the Merciful.
Agreement Between the Government o f the Republic o f the Philippines and Moro 
National L iberation Front w ith  the Partic ipation o f the Quadripartite  M in isteria l 
Commission Members o f the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General o f the 
Organization o f Islamic Conference.
In accordance w ith  the Resolution No. 4 Para. 5 adopted by the Council o f M inisters 
o f the Islam ic conference in  its  Fourth Session held in  Benghazi, Libyan Arab 
Republic during the month o f Safar 1393 H. corresponding to March 1973, calling 
fo r the form ation o f Q uadripartite M in isteria l Commission representing the Libyan 
Arab Republic, the Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia, the Republic o f Senegal and the 
Republic o f Somalia, to enter in to  discussions w ith  the Government o f the Republic 
o f the Philippines concerning the situation o f the Muslims in  the South o f the 
Philippines.
And in accordance w ith  the Resolution No. (18) adopted by the Islam ic conference 
held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in  Jumada A lakh ir 1393 H. corresponding to June 
1974 A.D. w hich recommends the searching fo r a just and peaceful po litica l solution 
to the problem  of the Muslims in the South o f the Philippines through the 
negotiations.
And in accordance w ith  the Resolution No. 12 /7 /S  adopted by the Islamic 
conference held in Istanbul in Jumada El-Ula 1396 H. corresponding to  May 1976 
A.D. em powering the Q uadripartite M in is te ria l Commission and the Secretary 
General o f the Islamic Conference to take the necessary steps fo r the resum ption of 
negotiations.
And fo llow ing  the task undertaken by the Quadripartite  M in isteria l Commission and 
the Secretary General o f the Islamic Conference and the discussions held w ith  H.E. 
President Marcos, President o f the Republic o f the Philippines.
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And in realization o f the contents o f Para. 6 o f the Joint Communique issued in  
T ripo li on the 25th Zulgeda 1396 H. corresponding to  17th November 1976 A.D. 
fo llow ing the officia l v is it paid by the delegation o f the Government o f the 
Philippines headed by the F irst Lady o f the Philippines, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, to the 
Libyan Arab Republic and w hich calls fo r the resum ption of negotiations between 
the tw o parties concerned in T rip o li on the 15th o f December 1976 A.D.
Negotiations were held in  the City o f T rip o li during the period between 24th Zulhija 
1396 H. to Second to Moharram 1397 H. corresponding to the period  from  15th to 
23rd December 1976 A.D. at the M in is try  o f Foreign Affa irs presided over by Dr. A li 
Abdussalam Treki, M in ister o f State fo r Foreign Affa irs o f the Libyan Arab Republic, 
and com prising o f the Delegations of:
1. Government o f the Republic o f the Philippines, led by Honorable 
Carmelo Z. Barbero, Undersecretary o f National Defense fo r Civilian Relations.
2. Moro National Liberation Front, led by Mr. Nur M isuari Chief o f the
Front.
And w ith  the partic ipation o f the representatives o f the Quadripartite  M in isteria l 
Commission:
The Libyan Arab Republic - represented by Dr. A li Abdussalam Treki, M in is te r of 
State fo r Foreign Affairs.
The Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia - H.E. Salah Abdalla El-Fadl, Ambassador o f the 
Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia, Libyan Arab Republic.
The Republic o f Senegal - Mr. Abubakar Othman Si, Representative o f the Republic o f 
Senegal and Charge d'Affairs o f Senegal in  Cairo.
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Democratic Republic o f Somalia, Libyan Arab Republic.
W ith  the aid o f H.E. Dr. Amadou Karim  Gaye, Secretary General o f the Organization 
o f Islamic Conference, and a delegation from  the Secretariat General o f the 
Conference composed o f Mr. Qasim Zuheri, Assistant Secretary General, and Mr. A re f 
Ben Musa, D irector o f Political Department.
During these negotiations w hich were m arked by a sp irit o f concilia tion and 
understanding, i t  has been agreed on the fo llow ing:
First: The establishment of Autonom y in  the Southern Philippines w ith in  the realm  
o f the sovereignty and te rr ito r ia l in teg rity  o f the Republic o f the Philippines.
Second: The areas o f the autonomy fo r the Muslims in the Southern Philippines shall 
comprise the fo llow ing:
1. Basilan 8. Sultan Kudarat
2. Sulu 9. Lanao del Norte
3. Taw i-taw i 10. Lanao del Sur
4. Zamboanga del Sur 11. Davao del Sur
5. Zamboanga del Norte 12. South Cotabato




1. Foreign Policy shall be o f the competence o f the Central Government 
o f the Philippines.
2. The National Defense Affa irs shall be the concern o f the Central 
A u tho rity  provided tha t the arrangements fo r the jo in ing  of the forces o f the Moro 
National L iberation Front w ith  the Philippine Armed Forces be discussed later.
3. In the areas o f the autonomy, the Muslims shall have the rig h t to  set 
up the ir own Courts which im plem ent the Islam ic Shari'ah laws. The Muslims shall 
be represented in all Courts including the Supreme Court. The representation o f the 
Muslims in  the Supreme Court shall be upon the recommendation from  the 
authorities o f the Autonom y and the Supreme Court. Decrees w ill be issued by the 
President o f the Republic o f th e ir appointm ents taking in to  consideration all 
necessary qualifications o f the candidates.
4. Authorities o f the autonomy in  the South o f the Philippines shall have 
the righ t to  set up schools, colleges and universities, provided th a t matters 
perta in ing to  the relationship between these educational and scientific organs and 
the general education system in  the state shall be subject o f discussion la te r on.
5. The Muslims shall have th e ir own adm inistrative system in 
compliance w ith  the objectives o f the autonom y and its institu tions. The 
re lationship between this adm inistrative system and the Central adm inistrative 
system to be discussed later.
6. The authorities o f the autonomy in  the South o f the Philippines shall 
have th e ir own economic and financial system. The relationship between this 
system and the Central economic and financial system o f the State shall be discussed 
later.
7. The authorities o f the autonomy in  the South of the Philippines shall 
enjoy the righ t o f representation and partic ipation  in the Central Government and in 
all other organs o f the State. The num ber o f representatives and ways of 
partic ipa tion shall be fixed later.
8. Special Regional Security Forces are to be set up in  the area o f the 
Autonom y fo r the Muslims in the South o f the Philippines. The re la tionship between 
these forces and the Central security forces shall be fixed later.
9. A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council shall be form ed in 
the areas o f the Autonomy fo r the Muslims. The setting up o f the Legislative
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Assembly shall be constituted through a d irec t election, and the fo rm ation  o f the 
Executive Council shall take place through appointments by the Legislative 
Assembly. A decree fo r th e ir form ation shall be enacted by the President o f the 
Republic respectively. The num ber o f members o f each assembly shall be 
determ ined la te r on.
10. Mines and m ineral resources fa ll w ith in  the competence o f the Central 
Government, and a reasonable percentage deriv ing  from  the revenues o f the mines 
and m inerals be fixed fo r the benefit o f the areas o f the autonomy.
11. A Mixed Committee shall be composed o f representatives o f the 
Central Government o f the Republic o f the Philippines and the representatives o f the 
Moro National L iberation Front. The Mixed Committee shall meet in  T rip o li during 
the period from  the F ifth  o f February to a date not la te r than the T h ird  o f March 
1977. The task o f said Committee shall be charged to study in deta il the points le ft 
fo r discussion in  order to reach a solution the reo f in  conform ity w ith  the provisions 
of this agreement.
12. Cease-fire shall be declared im m ediate ly after the signature o f this 
agreement, provided th a t its coming into effect should no t exceed the 20th January 
1977. A Joint Committee shall be composed o f the tw o parties w ith  the help o f the 
Organization o f the Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite M in isteria l 
Commission to supervise the im plem entation o f the cease-fire.
The said Joint Committee shall also be charged w ith  supervising the fo llow ing:
a. A complete amnesty in  the areas o f the autonom y and the 
renunciation o f all legal claims and codes resu lting  from  events w hich took place in  
the South o f the Philippines.
b. The release o f all the po litica l prisoners who had relations w ith  
the events in the South o f the Philippines.
c. The re tu rn  o f a ll refugees who have abandoned th e ir areas in 
the South o f the Philippines.
d. To guarantee the freedom o f movements and meetings.
13. A jo in t meeting be held in Jeddah during the firs t week o f the m onth o f 
March 1977 to in itia l w hat has been concluded by the Committee referred to  in
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Para. 11.
14. The final agreement concerning the setting up o f the autonomy 
referred to  in the firs t and second paragraphs shall be signed in the City o f Manila, 
Republic o f the Philippines, between the Government o f the Philippines and Moro 
National Liberation Front, and the Islamic Conference represented by the 
Quadripartite M inisteria l Commission and the Secretary General o f the Organization 
o f Islamic Conference.
15. Im m ediately after the signature o f the Agreement in  Manila, a 
Provisional Government shall be established in  the areas o f the autonom y to  be 
appointed by the President o f the Philippines; and be charged w ith  the task o f 
preparing fo r the elections o f the Legislative Assembly in the te rrito ries  o f the 
Autonomy; and adm in ister the areas in  accordance w ith  the provisions o f this 
agreement un til a Government is formed by the elected Legislative Assembly.
The Government o f the Philippines shall take all necessary constitu tional processes 
fo r the im plementation o f the entire Agreement.
Fourth: This Agreement shall come in to  force w ith  effect from  the date o f its 
signature.
Done in the City o f T rip o li on 2nd Muharram 1397 H. corresponding to 23rd 
December 1976 A.D. in three orig ina l copies in Arabic, English, French languages, all 
equal in legal power.
For the Government o f the Republic o f the Philippines:
Hon. Carmelo Z. Barbero
Undersecretary o f National Defense fo r C ivilian Relations
For the Moro National L iberation Front:
Professor Nur M isuari 
Chairman o f the Front
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Dr. A li Abdusaalam Treki
M in ister o f State fo r Foreign Affairs, Libyan Arab Republic and Chairman o f the 
Negotiations
Dr. Amadou Karim Gaye
Secretary General o f the Organization o f the Islam ic Conference
Source: Conciliation Resources Website: www.c-
r.o rg /acco rd /m in /acco rd6 /tripo li.sh tm l. re trieved on 30 June 2006
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APPENDIX G: FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT
September 1996
In The Name o f God, The Omnipotent, The M erciful
The final agreement on the im plem entation o f the 1976 T rip o li Agreem ent between 
the Government o f the Republic o f the Philippines (GRP) and the M oro National 
L iberation Front (MNLF) w ith  the partic ipa tion  o f the Organization o f Islamic 
Conference M inisteria l Committee o f Six and the Secretary General o f the 
Organization o f Islamic Conference.
Whereas, the President o f the Republic o f the Philippines, His Excellency Fidel V. 
Ramos, has pursued a peaceful settlem ent o f the armed conflict under the princip le  
o f peace w ith  honor and to  serve the param ount ends o f national un ity , so lida rity  
and progress fo r a ll Filipinos;
Whereas, the MNLF, led by Professor N ur M isuari, inspired by th e ir  quest fo r peace 
and prosperity, had in the past asserted the righ t o f the Moro people to freely 
determ ine th e ir politica l status and freely pursue the ir religious, social, economic 
and cu ltural development;
Whereas, the Organization o f Islamic Conference (OIC), upon the request o f the GRP 
in itia ted the F irst Formal Peace Talks between the GRP and the MNLF during its 
Th ird  M in isteria l Conference in  Jeddah, Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia, w h ich  resulted in 
the signing o f the T ripo li Agreement on December 23, 1976, the document w hich 
served as a basis fo r a just, lasting, honorable and comprehensive solution to  the 
problem in  Southern Philippines w ith in  the fram ework o f the Philippine 
Constitution;
Whereas, by the Grace o f the A lm ighty God and owing to  the bo ld and innovative 
in itia tive  o f the Philippine Government, under H.E. President Fidel V. Ramos, and the
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dedication and perseverance o f his du ly appointed representatives, headed by the 
Presidential Adviser fo r the Peace Process Manuel T. Yan, coupled w ith  the h ighly 
positive and laudable response o f the MNLF leadership under its founding 
Chairman, H.E. Professor N ur M isuari, a peace process has been conducted and 
pursued successfully fo r the last fou r (4) years, w ith  the m ost constructive and 
beneficial partic ipation o f the OIC M inisteria l Committee o f the Six, headed by  its 
distinguished Chairman, H.E. A li Alatas, M in ister o f Foreign Affairs o f Indonesia, and 
his fou r (4) able assistants as facilita tors o f the talks, namely: H.E. Ambassador S. 
W iryono, H.E. Dr. Hassan W irajuda, H.E. Ambassador Pieter Damanik, and H.E. 
Ambassador Abu Hartono, and the OIC Secretary General, H.E. Ham id Algabid, and 
his deputy, H.E. Ambassador Mohammed Mohsin, and w ith  special m ention to 
Libyan Ambassador, H.E. Rajab Azzarouq;
Whereas, the parties acknowledge the valuable role o f the Organization o f Islamic 
Conference (OIC) in prom oting and upholding the rights, welfare and w ell-be ing o f 
Muslims all over the w orld;
Whereas, the parties likewise, acknowledge the ro le  o f the OIC M in isteria l 
Committee o f the Six comprising the nations o f Indonesia as Chair, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, Bangladesh, Senegal and Somalia in  the search o f a just, comprehensive and 
durable peace in  Southern Philippines;
Whereas, in  accordance w ith  the Statement o f Understanding signed in  T ripo li, 
Libya on October 3,1992 and the subsequent Statement o f Understanding signed in 
Cipanas, West Java on A p ril 14,1993, the parties agreed, through the good offices o f 
the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah, inspired and guided by its great leader, H.E. 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the Government o f the Republic o f Indonesia under the 
wise and able leadership o f H.E. Bapah President Suharto, and H.E. OIC Secretary 
General, Dr. Hamid Algabid, to  hold form al peace talks to  discuss the m odalities for 
the fu ll im plem entation o f the 1976 T ripo li Agreement in  le tter and sp irit; to include 
those portions o f the Agreement le ft fo r fu rth e r discussion and the trans itiona l 
im plem enting structure and mechanism;
Whereas, the parties a ffirm  the ir solemn com m itm ent in the aforementioned 
Statement o f Understanding as w ell as the Memorandum o f Agreement signed in  the
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1st Round o f Formal Peace Talks held in Jakarta, Indonesia on October 25 — 
November 7,1993; the In te rim  Agreement signed in the 2nd Round o f Formal Peace 
Talks held in Jakarta on September 1-5, 1994; the In te rim  Agreement signed in  the 
3rd Round o f Formal Peace Talks held in  Jakarta on November 27 — December 1, 
1995; the In te rim  Agreement signed in  the 4th Round o f Formal Peace Talks held in 
Jakarta on August 29, 1996; and in  the nine (9) meetings of the M ixed Committee 
held in  various places and dates in the Philippines and Indonesia;
Whereas, all these agreements resulted from  the consensus points reached by the 
Mixed Committee and the Support Committees (Support Committee No. 1 - National 
Defense and Security; Support Committee No. 2 - Education; Support Committee No. 
3 - Economic and Financial System, Mines and Minerals; Support Committee No. 4 - 
Adm in istra tive  System, R ight o f Representation and Partic ipation in the National 
Government, and in all Organs o f the State; Support Committee No. 5 - Shariah and 
the Judiciary; and the Ad Hoc W orking Group on the Transitional Im plem enting 
Structure and Mechanism in  meetings held in various places in  the Philippines and 
Indonesia;
Whereas, the parties have rationalized and consolidated all the agreements and 
consensus points reached, w ith  the assistance o f the Mixed Committee and the 
various support committees established fo r the purpose, in to  a fina l peace 
agreement;
Whereas, the parties a ffirm  the sovereignty, te rr ito r ia l in tegrity  and the Constitution 
o f the Republic o f the Philippines; and
Whereas, th is final peace agreement constitutes the fu ll im plem entation o f the 
T rip o li Agreement.
Now therefore, the Parties do Hereby Agree on the Following:
I. Im plem enting Structure and Mechanism o f th is Agreement
1. Phase I shall cover a three (3) year period starting a fte r the signing of 
the peace agreement w ith  the issuance o f Executive Order establishing the Special
325
Zone o f Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippine Council fo r 
Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly.
During this phase, the process o f the jo in ing  in  o f MNLF elements w ith  the Arm ed 
Forces o f the Philippines w ill start. The jo in ing  in  o f MNLF elements w ith  the PNP as 
part o f the regular police recru itm ent programme w ill also take place in th is  phase.
2. Phase II shall involve an amendment to  o r repeal o f the Organic Act 
(RA 6734) o f the Autonomous Region in Muslim  Mindanao (ARMM) through 
Congressional action, a fter w hich the amendatory law  shall be subm itted to  the 
people o f the concerned areas in a plebiscite to  determ ine the establishment o f a 
new autonomous government and the specific area o f autonom y thereof.
a. W hile peace and developm ent programs are being 
implemented in  the SZOPAD, a b ill to amend or repeal the RA 6734 shall be in itia ted  
w ith in  Phase I (1996-1997). The b ill shall include the pe rtinen t provisions o f the 
final Peace Agreement and the expansion o f the present ARMM area o f autonomy. 
A fte r a law  shall have been passed by Congress and approved by the President, i t  
shall be subm itted to the people fo r approval in  a plebiscite in  the affected areas, 
w ith in  tw o  (2) years from  the establishment o f the SPCPD (1998).
b. The new area o f autonom y shall then be determ ined by the 
provinces and cities tha t w ill vote/choose to jo in  the said autonomy (1998). I t  may 
be provided by the Congress in  a law  tha t clusters o f contiguous M uslim -dom inated 
m unicipalities voting in favor o f autonomy be merged and constituted in to  a new 
province(s) which shall become p a rt o f the new Autonomous Region.
II. The Transitional Period (Phase I)
Phase I shall be implemented as follows:
3. There shall be established a Special Zone o f Peace and Development in 
the Southern Philippines (SZOPAD) covering the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Taw i- 
Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, 
Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, 
Sarangani and Palawan and the cities o f Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, 
Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga and Puerto Princesa. W ith in  the next three (3)
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years, these areas shall be the focus o f intensive peace and development efforts. 
Public and private investments shall be channeled to these areas to spur economic 
activities and u p lift the conditions o f the people therein.
4. There shall be established a Southern Philippines Council fo r Peace 
and Development [SPCPD), composed o f one (1) Chairman, one (1) Vice Chairman 
and three (3) Deputies, one each representing the Muslims, the Christians, and the 
Cultural Communities. They shall be appointed by the President.
5. The SPCPD shall be assisted by the Darul Iftah (advisory Council) 
which shall be created by the Chairman o f the SPCPD.
6. The local governm ent units in the area including the ARMM, shall 
continue to exist and exercise th e ir functions in  accordance w ith  existing laws.
7. Appropria te agencies o f the governm ent tha t are engaged in  peace 
and development activities in  the area, such as but no t lim ited  to  the Southern 
Philippines Development A u tho rity  (SPDA), shall be placed under the contro l 
and /o r supervision o f the Council as its im plem enting agencies to ensure tha t peace 
and development projects and programs are effectively accomplished.
Based on the foregoing, the fo llow ing  agencies o r entities w ill be placed under the 
control and /o r supervision o f the SPCPD, to w it
a. The Southern Philippines Development A u tho rity  (SPDA) may 
be attached to the SPCPD and be placed under the latter's d irec t supervision 
insofaras SPDA offices and projects in the SZOPAD are concerned. The SPCPD can 
exercise a fu rthe r degree o f contro l over SPDA by a llow ing the Council to subm it 
recommendees to the President fo r appointm ent as officials of SPDA;
b. The Regional and Field Offices o f the  Office o f Muslim  Affairs 
(OMA) which are situated and operating w ith in  the Special Zone o f Peace and 
Development (SZOPAD), shall be placed under the d irec t supervision o f SPCPD, 
provided that the coordination, linkages and complementation between the central 
OMA and SPCPD shall be defined by a Presidential issuance;
c. The Regional and Field Offices o f the Office o f Southern 
Cultural Communities (OSCC) which are situated and operating w ith in  the Special 
Zone o f Peace and Development (SZOPAD), shall be placed under the d irect 
supervision o f SPCPD, provided tha t the coordination, linkages and 
complementation between the central OSCC and SPCPD shall be defined by a
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Presidential issuance;
d. Task Force Basilan, w hich shall be reorganized in to  the Basilan 
Development Task Force, to undertake developm ent activities in  Basilan shall be 
placed under the contro l and supervision o f SPCPD;
e. Task Force MALMAR, to be reorganized in to  the Central 
Mindanao Development Task Force, to  undertake development activ ities in Central 
Mindanao shall be placed under the contro l and supervision of SPCPD;
f. Sulu Development Task Force — an interagency task force tha t
shall be organized to undertake developm ent projects in  Sulu shall be placed under
the control and supervision o f SPCPD; and
g. Special Development Planning Group — th is is an ad hoc body 
composed o f sta ff officers and planning experts from  the Department o f Trade and 
Industry (DTI), the National Economic and Development A u tho rity  (NEDA), the 
Department o f Public W orks and Highways (DPWH) and other concerned agencies 
which could be organized to support d irec tly  the staff planning requirem ents, shall 
be placed under SPCPD.
The foregoing enumeration o f agencies or entities shall not preclude the President 
from  exercising his power or d iscretion to delegate, subject to existing laws, certain 
powers or functions to  the SPCPD, or to place other agencies o r entities under the 
control a nd /o r supervision o f the latter.
8. The SPCPD, in consultation w ith  the Consultative Assembly, u tiliz ing  
the funds from  the National Government, shall m onitor, promote and coordinate the 
development efforts in  the area, includ ing the a ttraction o f foreign investment, 
specially from  OIC member countries and the Association o f South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).
9. The powers and functions o f the SPCPD and the Consultative 
Assembly are derivative and extension o f the powers o f the President. The powers 
referred to here are on ly those powers o f the President that could be delegated 
under the Constitution and existing laws.
10. There shall be established a Consultative Assembly w ith  81 members 
composed o f the fo llow ing:
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a. The Chairman o f the SPCPD shall be the head and presiding 
officer o f the Assembly;
b. The Governor and the Vice Governor o f the ARMM, the 14 
Governors o f the provinces and the 9 C ity Mayors in the SZOPAD;
c. 44 members from  the MNLF; and
d. 11 members from  various sectors recommended by non­
governmental organizations (NGOs) and people’s organizations (POs).
11. The Consultative Assembly shall exercise the fo llow ing  functions and 
powers:
a. To serve as a forum  fo r consultation and ven tila tion  o f issues
and concerns;
b. To conduct public hearings as may be necessary and to  provide 
appropriate advice to the SPCPD; and
c. To form ulate and recommend policies to the President through 
the Chairman o f the SPCPD and make rules and regulations to the extent necessary 
fo r the effective and effic ient adm in istra tion o f the affairs o f the area.
12. The OIC shall be requested to continue to  extend its assistance and 
good offices in m onitoring the fu ll im plem entation o f this agreement during the 
transitional period un til the regular autonomous government is firm ly  established 
and fo r th is purpose, help generate broad in te rna tiona l support fo r the Zone o f 
Peace and Development
13. A Joint M onitoring Committee composed o f members coming from  the 
GRP and the MNLF, w ith  the help o f the OIC, shall continue to meet to review  and 
identify  agreements tha t can be im m ediately implemented, and m on ito r the 
im plem entation o f this Agreement during Phase I.
14. The provisions o f the 1994 and 1995 In te rim  Agreements and 
subsequent agreements entered in to  by the GRP and the MNLF tha t w ou ld  not 
require legislative action shall be implemented during  Phase I.
15. The funds fo r the operations o f the Council and the Assembly shall be 
in itia lly  sourced from  the funds o f the Office o f the President. Funding fo r
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development programs and projects shall come from  the appropriations o f Congress 
as may be drawn from  the General Appropria tions Act. A supplementary budget fo r 
the year 1996 w ill be recommended to Congress fo r the purpose.
16. The term  o f the SPCPD and the Consultative Assembly shall be fo r a 
period o f three years and may be extended by the President upon recomm endation 
o f the Council itself.
17. The term  o f office o f the SPCPD and the Assembly shall coincide w ith  
the three-year te rm  o f office o f the officials o f the Autonomous Region in  Muslim  
Mindanao (ARMM) elected in 1996.
18. The powers and functions o f the Council shall be as follows:
a. To take charge in prom oting, m onitoring and coordinating the 
im provem ent o f peace and order in  the area;
b. To focus on peace and developm ent efforts more pa rticu la rly
in the depressed areas and cause the im plem entation o f peace and development
projects;
c. To provide support to  local governm ent units as necessary;
d. To exercise such o ther powers and functions necessary fo r the
effective im plem entation o f its mandate as may be delegated by the President;
e. To assist in  the preparation fo r the ho ld ing o f elections, 
referenda o r plebiscite and people's in itia tive  in  the area as may be du ly deputized 
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC);
f. To cause the creation o f such offices or instrum enta lities as 
shall be necessary fo r the effective and e ffic ient adm in istra tion o f the affairs o f the 
areas. There shall be approval from  the Office o f the President fo r budgetary 
purposes.
19. The jo in ing  o f the MNLF elements w ith  the Philippine National Police 
(PNP) and the Provision o f Security Protection fo r Certain Officials o f the Southern 
Philippines Council fo r Peace and Development:
a. During the transitiona l phase (Phase I), there shall be a
program o r process to a llow  the jo in ing  o f MNLF elements into the PNP and to  be 
part o f the PNP in  accordance w ith  guidelines and procedures under existing laws. 
The Philippine Government shall allocate one thousand five hundred (1,500) PNP 
vacancies fo r th is purpose to be filled  up by MNLF elements during  the trans ition
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period, and another tw o  hundred fifty  (250) items fo r special o r aux ilia ry  services.
b. The processing o f MNLF elements w ill s ta rt upon the 
establishment o f the Southern Philippines Council fo r Peace and Development 
(SPCPD). The police tra in ing  programs to be undergone by the jo in ing  MNLF 
elements shall be as prescribed by existing laws and regulations, and shall be 
conducted by the PNP.
c. The concerned officials o f the Council (e.g. the Chairman and 
his Deputies) shall be provided security and protective assistance by the national 
government, as the security s ituation w arrants and as part o f confidence-building 
measures. An AFP/PNP security detail shall be im m ediately and pa rticu la rly  
assigned to the Council. This special AFP/PNP security detail shall be composed o f 
form er MNLF regulars who shall have been granted AFP or PNP appointm ents and 
duly integrated into the AFP o r PNP. This security detail shall be o f appropria te  size 
in accordance w ith  the needs o f the situation, w ith o u t prejudice to  augm entation by 
regular AFP o r PNP units as the need arises and in  coordination w ith  the AFP and 
PNP commanders concerned. This security deta il w hich shall no t be u tilized  fo r law 
enforcement, bu t solely fo r the security and protection o f SPCPD officials concerned, 
shall conduct themselves in  accordance w ith  existing policies and regulations in 
order to prevent undue alarm to the population during  movements o f concerned 
officials.
d. To have good coordination between the AFP and PNP on the 
one hand and the SPCPD on the other, a lia ison system w ill be set up composed o f 
the AFP, PNP and SPCPD senior officials.
20. The jo in ing  o f the MNLF forces w ith  the Armed Forces o f the 
Philippines (AFP):
a. Five thousand seven hundred fif ty  (5,750) MNLF members 
shall be integrated into the Armed Forces o f the Philippines (AFP), 250 o f whom  
shall be absorbed in to  the auxiliary services. The government shall exert utm ost 
efforts to establish the necessary conditions that would ensure the eventual 
integration o f the maximum number o f the rem aining MNLF forces in to  the Special 
Regional Security Force (SRSF) and other agencies and instrum enta lities o f the 
government. There shall be a special socioeconomic, cultural and educational 
program to  cater to MNLF forces not absorbed in to  the AFP, PNP and the SRSF to 
prepare them and th e ir fam ilies fo r productive endeavors, provide fo r educational, 
technical skills and live lihood tra in ing  and give them  p r io r ity  fo r h ir in g  in
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development projects.
b. In the beginning, the MNLF forces w ill jo in  as units d is tinc t 
from  AFP units. They w ill be in itia lly  organized in to  separate units w ith in  a 
trans ition  period, un til such tim e tha t m utual confidence is developed as the 
members o f these separate units w ill be gradually integrated in to  regular AFP units 
deployed in the area o f the autonomy. Subject to  existing laws, policies, rules and 
regulations, the appropriate authorities shall waive the requirem ents and 
qualifications fo r entry o f MNLF forces in to  the AFP.
c. One from  among the MNLF w ill assume the functions and 
responsibilities o f a Deputy Commander o f the Southern Command, AFP, for 
separate units tha t w ill be organized out o f the MNLF forces jo in ing  the AFP. The 
Deputy Commander w ill assist the Commander o f the Southern Command, AFP in 
the command, adm in istra tion and contro l o f such separate units th roughou t the 
aforementioned transition  period. The Deputy Commander w ill be given an 
appointm ent commensurate to his position and shall be addressed as such.
d. The government recognizes the skills, capabilities and 
achievements o f the MNLF and its capacity to  develop its  members fo r the highest 
echelons o f m ilita ry  and civ ilian leadership. The ranks and grades o f MNLF forces 
jo in ing AFP shall be subject to the decision o f the President in  his capacity as 
Commander-in-Chief o f the AFP along the princip les o f universality, non­
discrim ination, equity and preferentia l trea tm ent fo r the poor and underprivileged.
e. The government shall take a ffirm ative measures to continua lly 
im prove the capabilities o f those MNLF forces jo in ing the AFP to  enhance the ir 
opportunities fo r professional advancement in the m ilita ry  service. I t  shall 
undertake in itia tives to provide professional tra in ing  and m ilita ry  schooling in 
foreign countries to form er MNLF members absorbed in to  the AFP in  consonance 
w ith  the education and tra in ing  programmes w ith  the AFP.
f. A ll o ther matters regarding the jo in ing  o f MNLF forces in to  the 
AFP not expressly covered by th is Agreement shall be prescribed by the President in 
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP.
III. The New Regional Autonomous Government (Phase II)
The fo llow ing  provisions shall be implemented after a law  amending or repealing 
the Organic Act o f ARMM shall have been enacted by Congress and approved by the
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people in the concerned areas in a plebiscite therefore. Accordingly, these 
provisions shall be recommended by the GRP to  Congress for incorporation  in  the 
amendatory or repealing law.
A. Executive Council, Legislative Assembly, Adm in istra tive  System and 
Representation in  the National Government
Executive Council
21. Executive power shall be vested in the Head o f the regular 
Autonomous Government du ly elected at large by  d irec t vote o f the people o f the 
Autonomous Region. There shall also be a Vice Head o f the Regional Autonomous 
Government also elected in  the same manner. The Head o f the Regional 
Autonomous Government may appoint three (3) Deputies. The Head, the Vice-Head 
and the three (3 ] Deputies shall comprise the Executive Council o f the area o f 
Autonomy.
22. The President shall exercise general supervision over the Regional 
Autonomous Government and all local governm ent un its in the area o f Autonom y 
through the Head o f the Regional Autonomous Government to ensure tha t laws are 
fa ith fu lly  executed.
The Head o f the Autonomous Government shall exercise general supervision over all 
local government units in  the area o f autonomy to  ensure that national and regional 
laws are fa ith fu lly  executed, and see to i t  tha t they act w ith in  th e ir assigned powers 
and functions.
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
23. Legislative power shall be vested in  the Regional Legislative 
Assembly.
24. The Legislative Assembly shall be composed o f members elected by 
popular vote, w ith  three (3) members elected from  each o f the Congressional 
Districts.
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25. There shall be sectoral representatives in  the Legislative Assembly 
whose number shall no t exceed fifteen percent (15% ) o f the to ta l num ber o f elected 
Members o f the Legislative Assembly coming from  the labor, disabled, industria l, 
indigenous cultural communities, youth, women, non-governm ent organizations, 
agricultural, and such other sectors as may be provided by Regional Law to  be 
appointed by the Head o f the Autonomous Government from  among the nominees 
o f the d ifferent sectoral groups; provided, however, th a t the youth  representative 
shall no t be less than 18 years o f age nor more than 21 years o f age a t the tim e o f his 
appointment.
26. The people's in itia tive , by way o f a plebiscite o r referendum, is 
recognized.
27. The Regional Legislative Assembly shall exercise legislative power for 
application in the area o f autonom y except on the fo llow ing  matters, to  w it
a. Foreign Affairs; e.
b. National Defense and Security;
c. Postal Service;
d. Coinage, and Fiscal and M onetary Policies;
e. Adm in istra tion  o f Justice except on matters perta in ing to 
Shari'ah;
f. Quarantine;
g. Customs and Tariff;
h. Citizenship;
i. Naturalization, Im m igration and Deportation;
j. General Auditing, Civil Service and Elections;
k. Foreign Trade;
1. M aritim e, Land and A ir  Transportation and Communications
tha t affect areas outside the autonomous region; and
m. Patents, Trademarks, Tradenames and Copyrights.
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28. The Legislative Assembly may create, divide, merge, abolish or 
substantially a lter boundaries o f local governm ent un its in the area o f autonom y in 
accordance w ith  the crite ria  la id down by law  subject to  approval by a m a jo rity  o f 
the votes cast in  a plebiscite called fo r the purpose in  the po litica l un its affected. I t  
may also change the names o f such local governm ent units, public places and 
institutions.
29. Any member o f the Legislative Assembly who accepts an appointm ent 
and qualifies fo r any position  in  the Government, includ ing governm ent-owned- 
and/or-contro lled  corporations or institu tions and the ir subsidiaries, shall 
automatically fo rfe it his seat in  the Legislative Assembly.
30. No member o f the Legislative Assembly may personally appear as 
counsel before courts o f justice o r quasi-judicial and other adm in istra tive  bodies. 
Neither shall he d irectly  or ind irectly , be interested financia lly in  any contract w ith , 
o r in any franchise o r privilege granted by, the Government o r any subdivision, 
agency or instrum enta lity  thereof, including any governm ent-owned-and/or- 
controlled corporation o r its  subsidiary, during his te rm  o f office. He shall not 
intervene in any m atter before any office o f the governm ent fo r his pecuniary 
benefit o r where he may be called upon to act on account o f his office.
31. In case o f vacancy in the Legislative Assembly occurring at least one 
year before the expiration o f the te rm  o f office, a special election shall be called to 
f il l the vacancy in the manner prescribed by law; provided that the m em ber elected 
shall serve fo r the unexpired term .
32. The Legislative Assembly shall elect from  among its members a 
Speaker and such other officers as the rules may provide. The Speaker shall appoint 
the personnel o f the adm in istra tive organization o f the Legislative Assembly.
33. The powers, functions, responsibilities and structure o f the d iffe rent 
Departments, agencies, bureaus, offices and instrum enta lities o f the regional 
government including regional government-owned-and-controlled corporations in 
the areas o f the autonomy shall be prescribed and defined by the Regional 
Legislative Assembly.
34. No person shall be elected member o f the Legislative Assembly unless 
he/she is
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a. A natural-born citizen o f the Philippines;
b. A t least 21 years o f age on the day o f elections;
c. Able to read and w rite ;
d. A registered voter o f the d is tr ic t in w hich he/she shall be
elected on the day he/she files h is / her certificate o f candidacy; and
e. A resident thereof fo r a period o f no less than five years
im m ediately proceeding the day o f election.
35. Every member o f the Legislative Assembly shall take an oath or 
a ffirm ation o f allegiance to the Republic o f the Philippines before taking h is /h e r 
seat.
36. The Legislative Assembly shall adopt its own rules o f procedure by a 
m ajority  vote o f all its Members including the selection o f members o f its standing 
committees and the suspension o r expulsion o f its  Members.
37. A m ajority  o f all the Members o f the Assembly shall constitu te a 
quorum  to do business, bu t a smaller num ber may adjourn from  day-to-day and may 
compel the attendance o f absent members in  such manner, and under such penalties 
as the Assembly may provide.
38. The Legislative Assembly o r any o f its  committees may conduct 
inquiries or public consultations in  aid o f legislation in  accordance w ith  its rules. 
The rights o f persons appearing in or affected by such inqu iries shall be respected.
39 The Legislative Assembly shall keep a Journal of its proceedings and a 
record o f its caucuses and meetings. The records and books o f account o f the 
Assembly shall be preserved and be open to public scrutiny. The Commission on 
A ud it shall publish an annual repo rt o f the item ized lis t o f expenditures incurred by 
the Members o f the Assembly w ith in  s ix ty (60) days fro m  the end o f every regular 
session.
40. The Speaker o f the Legislative Assembly shall, w ith in  ten w ork ing  
days from  approval thereof, subm it to the President and to  both Houses o f Congress 
a certified true copy o f all laws and resolutions approved by the Legislative 
Assembly.
41. No member shall be questioned or be held liable in  any o ther place fo r
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any speech or debate in the Assembly or in  any com m ittee thereof.
42. The Chief Executive o f the Autonomous Government shall approve the 
budget o f the Autonomous Region. If, by the end o f any fiscal year, the Legislative 
Assembly shall have failed to pass the regional appropriations b ill fo r the ensuing 
fiscal year, the regional Appropria tions Act fo r the preceding fiscal year shall be 
deemed autom atically re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect u n til the 
regional appropriations b ill is passed by the Legislative Assembly.
43. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in  the regional 
appropriations b ill unless i t  relates specifically to some particu lar appropria tion  
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be lim ited  in  its operation to  the 
appropria tion to which i t  relates.
44. The procedure in  approving appropriations fo r the Legislative 
Assembly shall s tric tly  fo llow  the procedure fo r approving appropria tions fo r o ther 
departments and agencies o f the Regional Government.
45. A special appropriations b ill shall specify the purpose fo r w hich i t  is 
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified  by the 
Regional Treasurer, or to  be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
46. D iscretionary funds appropriated for particu lar offices shall be 
disturbed only fo r public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and 
subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by regional law.
47. A ll money collected on any regional tax levied fo r a special purpose 
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out fo r such special purpose only. I f  the 
purpose fo r which a special fund was created has been fu lfilled  o r abandoned, the 
balance, i f  any, shall accrue to  the general funds o f the regional government.
48. Trust funds shall on ly be paid out o f the regional treasury upon 
fu lfillm en t o f the specific purpose fo r which said funds w ere created o r received.
49. Except as provided by its rules, the Legislative Assembly shall meet in 
open session. Regular session shall commence on the 4th Monday o f A p ril and shall 
continue to  be in session fo r such num ber o f days as may be determ ined by the 
Assembly un til th ir ty  (30) days before the opening o f its next regular session.
50. The Legislative Assembly shall meet in  special sessions at the request 
o f one-third  (1 /3 ) o f all its  Members or by call o f the Chief Executive. Such special 
sessions must be convened w ith  specific agenda.
51. No b ill shall become a law  unless i t  has passed three (3) readings on
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separate days and prin ted copies thereof in its final fo rm  have been d is tribu ted  to 
its Members three (3) days before its passage, except when the Chief Executive 
certifies to  the necessity o f its im m ediate enactment to  meet a public calam ity or 
emergency.
52. Every b ill passed by the Legislative Assembly shall, before i t  becomes 
a law, be presented to the Chief Executive. I f  he approves the same, he shall sign it, 
otherwise, he shall veto i t  and re tu rn  i t  w ith  his objections to  the Legislative 
Assembly, which shall enter the objections at large in  its journa l and proceed to 
consider it. If, after such reconsideration, tw o-th irds  (2 /3 )  o f all the Members o f the 
Legislative Assembly shall agree to pass the b ill, i t  shall become a law. In all such 
cases, the veto shall be determ ined by yeas and nays, and the names o f the members 
voting fo r or against shall be entered in  the journal. The Chief Executive shall 
communicate his veto o f any b ill to  the Legislative Assembly w ith in  th ir ty  (30) days 
a fte r the receipt thereof; otherwise, i t  shall become a law  as i f  he had signed it.
53. The Legislative Assembly may request the presence o f the Chief 
Executive, Vice-Chief Executive, Cabinet members or th e ir deputies, as the rules 
shall provide, fo r questioning on matters fa lling w ith in  the scope o f th e ir assigned 
powers and functions.
54. Subject to the rules o f the Legislative Assembly, the legislative power 
to inqu ire  on matters re la ting to  the exercise o f adm inistrative functions by an 
agency o f government w ith in  the Autonomous Region shall be in the fo rm  o f w ritte n  
questions.
55. The Chief Executive shall subm it to the Legislative Assembly not later 
than tw o (2) months before the beginning o f every regular session, as the basis of 
the regional appropriations b ill, a budget o f expenditures and sources o f financing, 
including receipts from  existing and proposed revenue measures.
56. The fiscal year o f the Autonomous Region shall cover the period 
January 1 to  December 31 o f the same year.
57. The Legislative Assembly may not increase the appropria tions 
recommended by the Chief Executive fo r the operation o f the Autonomous 
Government as specified in  the budget. The form, content and m anner o f 
preparation o f the budget shall be prescribed by regional law; provided, however, 
tha t pending the enactment o f such regional law, the budgeting process shall be 
governed by existing national laws and rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Department o f Budget and Management.
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58. The Chief Executive shall have the power to veto any pa rticu la r item  
o r items in  an appropria tion or revenue b ill, bu t the veto shall no t affect the item  or 
items to w hich he does not ob jec t The veto may be reconsidered by the Assembly 
by a vote o f tw o th irds (2 /3 ) o f a ll its Members.
59. The financial accounts o f the expenditures and revenues o f the 
Autonomous Region shall be audited by the Commission on Audit.
60. No money shall be paid ou t o f the Regional Treasury except in 
pursuance o f an appropria tion made by regional law.
61. No regional law  shall be passed authorizing any transfer o f 
appropriations; however, the Chief Executive, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the 
Presiding Justice o f the highest Shariah Court may, by law, be authorized to  augment 
any item  in  the Regional General A ppropria tion  Law fo r the ir respective offices from  
savings in  other items o f the ir respective appropriations.
Adm in istra tive  System
62. The Regional Autonomous Government shall have the pow er to enact 
its own Regional Adm in istra tive  Code and Regional Local Government Code 
consistent w ith  national laws and the Constitution provided tha t i t  shall no t in  any 
w ay d im in ish the powers and functions already enjoyed by Local Government Units.
Right o f Representation and Participation in the National Government and in  all 
Organs o f the State
GENERAL PRINCIPLES:
63. Representation in the National Government by the inhabitants o f the 
Autonomous Region may be effected through appointm ent or elections and m ust be 
subject to  standards and guidelines prescribed fo r the position. When 
representation is done by appointment, the inhabitants o f the Autonomous Region 
w ill be appointed by the President o f the Philippines to  herein specified positions 
which are policy determ ining, h ighly technical, p rim a rily  confidentia l and
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supervisory upon recommendation by the Head o f the Autonomous Government.
64. Right o f representation shall no t be construed in  such a way tha t 
applicants from  the Autonomous Region, especially Muslims, and Cultural 
Communities, fo r low er positions in the above organs o f the governm ent cannot be 
appointed anymore thereto.
Manner o f Representation and Participation
EXECUTIVE
65. I t  shall be policy o f the National Government tha t there shall be at 
least one (1) member o f the Cabinet (w ith  the rank  o f Department Secretary) w ho is 
an inhab itant o f the Autonomous Region to be recommended by the Head o f the 
Autonomous Government.
66. It  shall likew ise be a policy tha t there shall be at least one (1) official 
in each o f the departments and the constitu tional bodies o f the national governm ent 
w ho shall be appointed in  executive, p rim a rily  confidential, h igh ly technical policy- 
determ ining positions, from  among the inhabitants o f the Autonomous Region upon 
recommendation by the Head o f the Autonomous Government. The Head o f the 
Autonomous Government shall partic ipate as ex-officio member o f the National 
Security Council on all matters concerning the Autonomous Region and such other 
matters as may be determ ined by the President.
67. Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) or 
institu tions and th e ir subsidiaries in  the area o f autonomy: where Government- 
Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) are operating m ain ly o r w ith  a 
subsidiary in the area o f autonomy, as a policy, the Regional Autonomous 
Government shall be given some representations in  the Board o f D irectors o r in the 
policy-m aking body o f said GOCCs or th e ir subsidiaries consistent w ith  the ir 
respective charters.
LEGISLATIVE
68. I t  shall be the policy o f the National Government tha t the Regional
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Autonomous Government shall have one [1) representative in  Congress as a 
Sectoral Representative. This is aside from  the representatives/congressmen 
elected from  the congressional d is tric ts located in  the autonomous region.
JUDICIAL
69. I t  shall be a policy o f the National Government tha t a t least one (1) 
justice in the Su9preme Court and at least tw o  (2) in  the Court o f Appeals shall come 
from  the Autonomous Region. For this purpose, the Head o f the Autonomous 
Government may subm it the names o f his recommendees to the Judicial and Bar 
Council fo r consideration. This is w ith o u t prejudice to the appointm ent o f qualified 
inhabitants o f the Autonomous Region to  o ther positions in  the jud ic ia ry  in 
accordance w ith  the ir m erits and qualifications.
70. The GRP shall endeavour to cause the appointment, as a m ember of 
the Judicial and Bar Council, a qualified person to  be recommended by the Head of 
the Regional Autonomous Government.
71. The GRP shall request the Supreme Court to create the Office o f the 
Deputy Court A dm in is tra to r fo r the Area o f Autonomy, and to appoint there to  a 
qualified person recommended by the Head o f the Regional Autonomous 
Government.
CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILTIES
72. The civil service e lig ib ility  requirem ents fo r appo in tm ent to 
government position shall be applicable in the Autonomous Government. As 
necessary, the Civil Service Commission shall hold special civil service examinations 
in the region to fu rthe r increase the num ber o f eligibles therein. For a period not 
longer than five (5) years from  the establishment o f the Regional Autonomous 
Government, the GRP w il l  endeavour to  provide fo r appropriate c iv il service 
e lig ib ility  to applicants in  the Autonomous Region, provided, the m inim um  
educational qualifications fo r the position are met.
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B. The Establishment o f the Special Regional Security Force fo r the Autonomous 
Region
(Phase II o f the Im plem entation o f the T rip o li Agreement)
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
73. When the new regular Autonomous Regional Government shall have 
been established, there shall be created o r constituted a PNP Regional Command for 
the new Autonomous Region, w hich shall be the Special Regional Security Forces 
(SRSF) as referred to in Paragraph 8, A rtic le  III o f the T rip o li Agreement.
74. The Regional Legislative Assembly may enact laws governing the PNP 
Regional Command fo r the Autonomous Region/SRSF consistent w ith  the 
constitu tional provision tha t there shall be one police force in the country w hich is 
national in scope and civilian in  character.
75. The PNP Regional Command fo r the Autonomous Region/SRSF shall 
be composed o f the existing PNP units in  the area o f autonomy, the MNLF elements 
and other residents o f the area who may la te r on be recruited in to  the force.
76. The powers and functions o f the PNP Regional Command fo r the 
Autonomous Region/SRSF, which shall be exercised w ith in  the te rrito rie s  covered 
by the Regional Autonomous Government (RAG), shall be the fo llow ing:
a. Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to  the pro tection  of 
lives and properties;
b. M aintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to 
ensure public safety;
c. Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest o f crim inal 
offenders, b ring  offenders to justice and assist in  the ir prosecution;
d. Exercise the general powers to  make arrest, search and seizure 
in  accordance w ith  the Constitution and pe rtinen t laws;
e. Detain and arrest a person fo r a period no t beyond w ha t is 
prescribed by law, in form ing the person so detained o f all his rights under the 
Constitution and observing the inherent human rights o f the citizens; and
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f. Perform such other duties and exercise a ll o ther functions as 
may be provided by law.
77. The PNP Regional Command fo r the Autonomous Region/SRSF shall 
be charged w ith  the maintenance and preservation o f peace, law  and order, and 
protection o f life, libe rty  and p rope rty  in  the region in consonance w ith  the 
Constitution.
Organization o f the PNP Regional Command fo r the Autonomous Region/SRSF
78. It  shall be civilian in  nature o r character.
79. It  shall be regional in  scope o f operations.
80. It  shall be headed by a Regional D irector who shall be assisted by two
(2) Deputies, one (1) fo r A dm in is tra tion  and one (1) for Operations.
81. I t  shall have regional, provincial, and city  o r m unicipal offices.
82. A t the provincial level, there shall be a provincia l office, headed by a 
Provincial Director.
83. A t the c ity or municipal level, there shall be an o ffice /s ta tion  which 
shall be headed by a Chief o f Police.
Powers o f the Head o f the Regional Autonomous Government over the PNP Regional 
Command fo r the Autonomous Region/SRSF
84. Act as the Deputy o f the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) in 
the region and shall be the ex-officio Chairman o f the Regional Police Commission 
(REPOLCOM).
85. Exercise operational contro l and general supervision and d iscip linary 
powers.
86. Em ploy/deploy the elements o f the Regional Command through the 
Regional Director.
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87. Assign/reassign officers and other personnel th rough the Regional 
Director.
88. Recommend to the President the appointm ent o f the Regional 
D irector and his tw o  (2) Deputies.
89. Oversee the preparation and im plem entation o f the integrated 
regional public safety plan.
90. Impose, after due notice and summary hearings o f citizen's 
complaints, adm inistrative penalties on personnel o f the Regional Command except 
Presidential Appointees.
CREATION OF THE REGIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
91. There shall be created a Regional Police Commission (REPOLCOM) by 
the Regional Legislative Assembly consistent w ith  the Constitution.
92. The REPOLCOM shall be under the supervision o f the NAPOLCOM.
93. The Chairman o f REPOLCOM shall be an ex-officio Commissioner of 
the NAPOLCOM.
C. EDUCATION
THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF EDUCATION
94. The Regional Autonomous Government shall have an educational 
component comprising o f existing schools, colleges and universities in  the present 
area o f autonomy and such other schools and institu tions in the fu tu re  expanded 
area o f autonomy, w ith  the possible inclusion o f state universities and colleges 
(SUCs) to be decided later on. The re la tionship o f the Regional Autonomous 
Government educational body w ith  the national educational system shall be tha t of 
a system and sub-system w ith  emphasis on the autonomy of the sub-system. In the 
event tha t SUCs should be included as pa rt o f the educational com ponent o f the
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Regional Autonomous Government, the autonomous governm ent recognizes the 
fiscal autonomy and academic freedom o f the SUCs as mandated by th e ir  respective 
charters.
95. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system shall, 
among others, perpetuate F ilip ino and Islamic ideals and aspirations, Islam ic values 
and orientations o f the Bangsamoro people. I t  shall develop the to ta l sp iritual, 
intellectual, social, cultural, scientific and physical aspects o f the Bangsamoro people 
to make them God-fearing, productive, pa trio tic  citizens, conscious o f th e ir F ilip ino 
and Islamic values and Islamic cu ltu ra l heritage under the aegis o f a jus t and 
equitable society.
THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
96. The elementary level shall fo llow  the basic national s tructure  and 
shall p rim a rily  be concerned w ith  provid ing  basic education; the secondary level 
w il l correspond to four (4) years o f high school, and the te rtia ry  level shall be one 
year to three (3) years fo r non-degree courses and fou r (4) to e ight (8) years for 
degree courses, as the case may be in  accordance w ith  existing laws.
CURRICULUM
97. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system w ill adopt 
the basic core courses fo r a ll F ilip ino children as w ell as the m in im um  required 
learnings and orientations provided by the national government, includ ing the 
subject areas and the ir da ily tim e allotment. Teaching materials and curricu lum  
contents shall promote solidarity, u n ity  in diversity, F ilip ino and Islam ic values.
98. The addition o f more required learnings and instructiona l materials 
shall be the prerogative and responsib ility  o f the Autonomous Government.
99. The m inim um  requirem ents and standards prescribed by Department 
o f Education Culture and Sports (DECS), Commission on Higher Education (CHED) 
and Technical Education and Skills Development A u tho rity  (TESDA) w ill be 
fo llowed by the Autonomous Region.
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100. The same textbooks o f the National Government w ill be used by 
schools in  the Autonomous Region. The form ulation, shaping and revision o f 
textbooks are the responsibilities o f the Regional Autonomous Government and the 
National Government and w ith in  agreed norms, academic freedom and relevant 
legal lim its, the form ula tion and revisions shall emphasize Islam ic values or 
orientation, in addition to  F ilip ino values which include Christian values and values 
o f indigenous people, modern sciences and technology as w e ll as the latest 
educational thrusts. Having adopted the core curricu lum  o f the national government 
in  consideration o f achieving the highest quality  o f education, students and 
graduates o f the education system o f the Autonomous Region shall be fu lly  
accredited when they transfer to non autonomous regions.
101. The integration o f Islamic Values in the curricu lum  should be done 
gradually after researches and studies are conducted.
102. The teachings o f Islamic Values, as w ell as F ilip ino values, shall be 
incorporated in Good Manners and Right Conduct in  appropriate grade levels 
including the te rtia ry  level subject to agreed norms, academic freedom, and legal 
lim ita tions.
103. Muslim  culture, mores, customs and trad itions w hich are m ainly 
based on Islam, as w ell as the cultures, mores, customs, and trad itions o f Christians 
and indigenous people, shall be preserved through the regular public and special 
schools in  the Autonomous Region, considering tha t schools are perpetuating 
vehicles o f the values o f the people.
ADMINSTRATION OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
104. The management and control, and supervision o f the entire 
educational system in the area o f autonomy shall be the p rim ary  concern o f the 
Regional Autonomous Government, consistent w ith  the declared policies o f national 
educational bodies. The national education bodies shall m on ito r compliance by the 
regional educational system w ith  national educational policies, standards and 
regulations in collaboration w ith  the educational authorities o f the autonomous 
region. The head o f the educational system of the Regional Autonomous 
Government shall have the rig h t to partic ipate in po licy and decision making 
activities o f the national educational bodies.
105. The Regional Autonomous Government shall be represented in  the
346
Board o f SUCs in  the region as co-chairman or a t least, co-vice-chairman, as may be 
provided by law. Appoin tm ent to  SUC Boards shall be made by the President o f the 
Philippines.
106. The Regional Autonomous Government w ill be responsible for 
specific adm inistrative, management functions and powers, educational supervision 
and school adm inistration, and regulation over private schools.
107. The organizational structure o f the educational system in the 
autonomous region shall fo llow  the basic structure o f the national educational 
system. The Regional Legislative Assembly may add special structures, i f  necessary. 
I t  shall fo llow  w hatever organizations o f the cu rricu la r years as found in  the 
national set-up.
108. Locally funded programs w ill be the responsib ility  o f the Regional 
Autonomous Government.
109. The selection, recru itm ent, appointm ent and prom otion  o f teachers 
and employees shall be the responsib ility  o f the Regional Autonomous Government 
in  accordance w ith  general qualification standard prescribed by the Civil Service 
Commission (CSC) provided tha t the Regional Autonomous Government can in itia te  
regionally-defined standards w hich are no t below  national standards.
110. The selection, recruitm ent, appo in tm ent and prom otion  of 
elementary, secondary and te rtia ry  education employees shall be the responsib ility  
o f the Regional Autonomous Government in accordance w ith  general standards of 
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and other recognized bodies.
111. Prim ary d isc ip linary  au tho rity  over officia ls and employees o f the 
Regional Autonomous Government w ill be the area o f concern o f the Regional 
Autonomous Government in accordance w ith  Civil Service Commission (CSC) rules 
and regulations. Adm in istra tive  sanctions deemed appropriate and reasonable as 
determined by the Civil Service Commission w ill be the area o f concern o f the 
Regional Autonomous Government.
RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION
112. Religious instruction  in  public schools should be optional, w ith  the 
w ritte n  consent o f the parent/guard ian, taught by the authorities o f the re lig ion to 
which the student belongs, and should not involved additional costs to the 
government in  accordance w ith  national policies.
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MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION
113. F ilip ino and English shall be the medium  o f instruction  in  the areas of 
the Autonomy; provided that Arabic shall be an aux ilia ry  medium o f instruction .
114. Regional languages may be used as aux ilia ry  officia l languages in  the 
region as w ell as auxiliary medium o f instruction  and communication.
115. Arabic shall be recognized as a m edium  o f instruction  in  Madaris 
(schools) and other Islamic institu tions.
116. Arabic shall be taught as a subject in a ll appropriate grade levels as 
presently required in the existing laws fo r Muslims, and optional, fo r non-Muslims.
MADRASA EDUCATION
117. Existing Madaris, including Madaris Ulya shall be under the Regional 
Autonomous Government educational system as presently organized in  the area of 
autonomy.
118. Madaris teachers shall receive compensation out o f the funds o f the 
Regional Autonomous Government provided they are employed in  the public 
schools.
NON-FORMAL EDUCATION AND SPECIALIZED EDUCATION
119. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system shall 
develop the fu ll potentials o f its human resources, respond positive ly to  changing 
needs and conditions and needs o f the environment, and institu tiona lize  non-form al 
education.
120. The educational system shall respond positive ly and effectively to  the 
changing needs and conditions o f the times as w ell as regional and national needs of 
the environm ent through the proper use o f the latest educational technology, 
development, planning, m onitoring, evaluation, and appropriate and tim e ly  
educational in tervention as w e ll as linkages w ith  national and in ternational 
institutions.
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121. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system shall 
institu tiona lize  non-form al education in  scope and methodology, to include literacy, 
numeracy and intensive skills tra in ing  o f the youth and adult, to a llow  them  to 
participate actively and productive ly in  the mainstream o f regional and national life.
SCHOLARSHIP GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE
122. Universities and colleges in the areas o f autonomy may seek and 
receive overseas donations fo r educational purposes.
123. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system w ill 
handle, by adm inistrative arrangement w ith  the national DECS, CHED, and TESDA 
scholarship programs, both local and foreign, includ ing those provided by the 
autonomous region pursuant to  the provis ion o f existing laws.
124. Disadvantaged bu t deserving students w ill be given financial 
assistance by the Regional Autonomous Government out o f funds given by the 
national government fo r the purpose and from  other sources o f funds.
FUNDS FOR EDUCATION
125. Funds fo r education constitu ting the share o f the Regional 
Autonomous Government as contained in the General Appropria tions Act should be 
given d irectly  to the Autonomous Government
D. THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM, MINES AND MINERALS
126. The Regional Autonomous Government in  the area o f autonom y shall 
establish its own Regional Economic and Development Planning Board chaired by 
the Head o f Government in  the area o f autonomy. The Board shall prepare the 
economic development plans and programs o f the Autonomous Government.
127. The pivotal ro le  o f banks and other financial institu tions for 
development in the area o f autonomy is recognized.
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128. The Regional Autonomous Government in  the area o f autonom y has 
the power to prom ote tourism  as a positive instrum ent fo r developm ent provided 
tha t the diverse cultural heritage, moral and sp iritua l values o f the people in  the 
area o f autonomy shall be strengthened and respected.
129. The Regional Autonomous Government in  the area o f autonom y shall 
have the power to grant incentives including tax holidays w ith in  the pow er and 
resources in the area o f autonomy.
130. The Regional Autonomous Government in  the area o f autonomy 
advocates equal opportunities fo r all the inhabitants o f the area o f autonomy 
regardless o f ethnic origin, culture, sex, creed and religion.
131. In enacting tax measures, the Regional Legislative Assembly shall 
observe the princip le  o f u n ifo rm ity  and equity in  taxation and shall no t impose 
confiscatory taxes or fees o f any kind.
132. The Regional Autonomous Government in  the area o f autonom y shall 
have the power to enact a Regional Tax Code and a regional Local Tax Code 
applicable to  all local government units w ith in  the area o f autonomy.
133. A ll corporations, partnerships or business entities d irec tly  engaged in 
business in  the area o f autonomy shall pay th e ir corresponding taxes, fees, and 
charges in the province, c ity or m un ic ipa lity  in  the area of autonom y where the 
establishment is doing business.
134. A ll corporations, partnerships or business entities whose head offices 
are located outside the area o f autonomy, but doing business w ith in  its te rr ito r ia l 
jurisd iction, e ither by using, exploiting, and u tiliz ing  the land, aquatic and all natural 
resources therein, shall pay th e ir income taxes corresponding to  th e ir income 
realized from  th e ir business operation in  the area o f autonomy through the 
province, c ity  or m unicipality where th e ir branch offices are located. In case the 
business establishment has no branch in  the area o f autonomy, such business 
establishment shall pay through the c ity  or m un ic ipa lity  where its operation is 
located.
135. The Regional Autonomous Government in  the area o f autonom y as a 
corporate body, may contract domestic loans.
136. The Regional Autonomous Government recognizes the p ivo ta l role 
played by banks and other financial institu tions in  the economic developm ent o f the 
area o f autonomy. Toward this end, the Autonomous Government shall:
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a. Encourage the establishment o f banks and bank branches in 
the area o f autonomy;
b. Encourage the en try and establishment o f off-shore banking 
units o f foreign banks in the area o f autonomy.
137. The Regional Autonomous Government may accept fore ign financial 
and economic grant fo r the development and welfare o f the people in  the region.
138. The Regional Autonomous Government may issue its own treasury 
b ills, bonds, prom issory notes, and other debt papers in  consultation and 
coordination w ith  the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
139. The Regional Autonomous Government may contract foreign loans 
w ith in  the purv iew  o f national laws and pe rtinen t m onetary and fiscal policies.
140. In the pu rsu it o f the region's economic growth, developm ent and 
welfare, the autonomous government shall have the r igh t to form ulate economic 
and financial policies and im plem ent economic and financial programs, taking into 
account national laws and policies.
141. The Regional Autonomous Government in  the area o f autonom y shall 
encourage, promote and support the establishment o f economic zones, industria l 
centers, and ports in  strategic area and grow th centers to a ttract local and foreign 
investments and business enterprise.
142. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area o f autonom y shall 
undertake encourage, promote and support the establishment o f economic zones 
and industria l centers. And, in order to a ttract local and foreign investm ents w ith in  
the area o f the zone and outside bu t w ith in  the area o f autonomy, the governm ent in 
the area o f autonomy may grant incentives to investors as may be defined in  an 
Autonomous Investment Act to be form ulated by the Regional Legislative Assembly 
w ith in  one year from  its organization.
143. The residents in the area o f the autonom y shall have preferentia l 
rights over the exploration, development and u tiliza tion  o f natural resources in  the 
area o f autonomy respecting existing rights on the exploitation, exploration, 
development and u tiliza tion  o f natural resources.
144. The Regional Autonomous Government in  the area o f autonom y shall 
enjoy fiscal autonomy in  budgeting its own revenue resources and b lock subsidies 
granted to  i t  by the National Government and foreign donors. Budgeting includes 
planning, program m ing and disbursing o f funds.
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145. The National Government shall appropria te  for the area o f autonomy 
a sufficient am ount and fo r a period [both  to be determ ined later) fo r in frastructu re  
projects which shall be based on a development plan du ly  approved by the Regional 
Autonomous Government taking in to  account national policies.
147. In the regulation o f the exploration, u tilization, development, 
protection o f the natural resources inclusive o f mines and minerals, except strategic 
m inerals which w ill be defined later, the government in  the area o f autonom y shall 
enact rules and regulations and shall impose regulatory fees, tak ing  in to  account 
national policies.
148. An Islamic Banking U n it shall be established in the Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas which shall be staffed by qualified Islam ic banking experts nom inated by 
the Governor o f the Regional Autonomous Government. The Governor o f the 
Regional Autonomous Government shall nominate a t least three [3 ) qualified 
persons from  the area o f autonomy, from  which nom ination the appointing 
au thority  shall appoint the Head o f the Unit. The same procedure shall be observed 
as regards the rest o f the positions in  the Unit.
149. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall have a Regional Office w ith  fu ll 
banking service in the capital o f the governm ent o f the Autonomous Region to 
respond to the grow ing needs o f the banking com m unity in the area o f autonom y 
which shall be established w ith in  one (1) year from  the establishm ent o f the 
Autonomous Government. The Governor o f the Autonomous Government shall 
subm it a lis t o f qualified recommendees to the appointing au thority  from  w hich the 
staff o f the regional office may be chosen; provided tha t those staff w ho are now 
occupying and already appointed to positions in  the regional office are considered 
as recommended by the Governor o f the Regional Autonomous Government.
150. The Regional Autonomous Government shall establish a body in  the 
area o f autonomy w ith  the same powers as the Philippine Economic Zone A u tho rity  
[PEZA) consistent w ith  the Special Economic Zone Act o f 1995.
151. A ll current year collections o f in te rna l revenue taxes w ith in  the area 
o f autonomy shall, fo r a period o f five [5) years, be allotted fo r the Regional 
Autonomous Government [RAG) in  the Annual General A ppropria tions Act; 
provided that:
a. The Bureau o f In terna l Revenue [BIR) shall continue to  collect 
such taxes and the BIR Collection D istricts/O ffices concerned shall re ta in  such 
collections and re m it the same to the RAG through an approved depository bank 
w ith in  th ir ty  [30) days from  the end o f each quarter o f the current year;
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b. Out o f said in terna l revenue tax collections, f if ty  percent (50% ] 
o f the tax collected under Section 100 (Value-added tax on sale o f goods], 102 
(Value added tax on sale o f services], 112 (Tax on persons exempt from  value-added 
tax], 113 (Hotel, motels and others], and 114 (Caterers] o f the National In te rna l 
Revenue Code (NIRC], as amended, in excess o f the increase in collections fo r the 
im m ediately preceding year shall be shared by the RAG and the local governm ent 
units (LGUs] w ith in  the area o f autonomy as follows:
(1 ] Twenty percent (20% ] shall accrue to the c ity  o r m un ic ipa lity  where such taxes 
are collected; and
(2 ] Eighty percent (80%) shall accrue to the RAG.
In all cases, the RAG shall rem it to the LGUs the ir respective shares w ith in  s ixty (60) 
days from  the end o f each quarter o f the cu rren t year.
Provided, however, tha t the provinces, cities, m unicipalities and barangays w ith in  
the area o f autonomy shall continue to receive th e ir  respective shares in the In ternal 
Revenue A llo tm ent (IRA), as provided fo r in  Section 284 o f the Local Government 
Code o f 1991.
Provided, finally, tha t the five-year (5) periods herein abovementioned may be 
extended upon m utual agreement o f the National and Regional Autonomous 
Governments.
E. SHARI AH AND JUDICIARY
152. The Regional Legislative Assembly o f the area o f autonom y shall 
establish Shari'ah Courts in accordance w ith  the existing laws.
F. TOTALITY CLAUSE
153. This Peace Agreement, w hich is the fu ll im plem entation o f the 1976
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T ripo li Agreement, embodies and constitutes the to ta lity  o f a ll the agreements, 
covenant and understandings between the GRP and the MNLF respecting all the 
subject matters embodied herein. This Agreement supersedes and m odifies all 
agreements, consensus, covenants, documents and communications no t referred to 
o r embodied in  th is Agreement o r whose term s and conditions are otherwise 
inconsistent herew ith. Any con flic t in  the in te rpre ta tion  o f this Agreement shall be 
resolved in the ligh t o f the Philippine Constitution and existing laws.
G. EFEECTIVITY CLAUSE
154. This Agreement shall take effect im m ediate ly upon the signing hereof 
by the parties, unless otherw ise provided herein.
Done in  the City o f Manila on the 2nd day o f September 1996.
For the GRP:
H.E. Ambassador Manuel T. Yan 
Chairman o f the GRP Panel
For the MNLF:
H.E. Professor N ur M isuari 
Chairman of the MNLF Panel
W ith  the partic ipation  o f the OIC M inisteria l Committee o f the Six and the Secretary- 
General o f the OIC
H.E. M r.A li Alatas
M inister fo r Foreign Affairs o f the Republic o f Indonesia/Chairman o f the OIC
M inisteria l Committee o f the Six
H.E. Dr. Hamid Al-Gabid 
Secretary-General o f the OIC
Source: United States Institute of Peace web site:
www.usip.org/librarv/pa/philippines/ieddah 01041987.html. 25 June 2006.
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APPENDIX H: MAP OF MINDANDAO AND PALAWAN
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APPENDIX I: MAP OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
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